Quaternion engagements and terrains of knowledge  (1858-1880): a comparative social history of Peter Guthrie Tait and William Kingdon Clifford's uses of quaternions by Petrunić, Josipa Gordana
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Historical studies of quaternion mathematics have usually placed Sir William Rowan Hamilton's
"discovery" of quaternions within the context of the history of modern vector analysis. Exemplary of
this technique is the seminal study A History of Vector Analysis by Michael Crowe (1967), in which
Hamilton's development of quaternions is seen as an important precursor to the eventual
development of contemporary vector calculus. Within Crowe's account, the reader also finds the
story of two transitional figures: Peter Guthrie Tait (1831-1901) and William Kingdon Clifford (1845-
1879). Tait is described as a propagator of Hamiltonian methods—someone who wrote about them
more succinctly than did Hamilton, and someone who applied them to various topical problems in
dynamics. Meanwhile, Clifford is described as a secondary, minor figure—a transitional character
whose development of bi-quaternions figures not at all in Crowe's historiography.
This thesis redresses those categorizations by effectively "stopping the clock" at 1880, before the
"modern" conception of vector analysis had emerged. Following a brief account of the state of
British mathematics and science in the first half of the century (1800-1850), the present study
focuses on the motivations behind Tait and Clifford's respective engagements with and uses of
quaternion mathematics in the second half of the 19th-century.
Using the analytical metaphor of "terrains of knowledge" (which is inspired in part by the
Wittgensteinian metaphor of language games, and the Strong Program account of finitism in
scientific knowledge), I aim to describe the environments—philosophical, institutional, political, and
religious—within which Tait and Clifford worked. By describing those "terrains of knowledge", the
historian is able to explain why Tait and Clifford, two actors who lived in a similar time and similar
place, engaged with the conceptual artifacts of "quaternions" in divergent ways.
In the case of Tait, the crucial "terrains of knowledge" to consider in identifying the conceptual
environment requisite for him to have used quaternions in the manner that he did includes
Cambridge and Belfast mathematics, the University of Edinburgh as an institution in flux (1840-
1870), the "science of energy" (1850-1870), and Presbyterian politics and Tait's attack on secularism.
In Clifford's case, the salient "terrains of knowledge" include the University of Cambridge and the
morphing of symbolical algebra (1860-1870), non-Euclidean geometries in Britain, Clifford's
Darwinism, and University College, London as a secularist urban educational institution.
When combined, these terrains constitute the varied intellectual environments within which each
actor engaged with "quaternion" mathematics, and within which each actor found the resources
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This is a story with two main characters: Peter Guthrie Tait (1831-1901) and William Kingdon Clifford
(1845-1879). Born and raised in opposite parts of Britain in the first half of the 19th-century, but
trained in similar symbolical algebraic curricula at Cambridge University, both mathematicians
engaged with curious 19th-century mathematical entities known as quaternions. Their choice to do
so was by no means evident. Their engagements with those entities were by no means
unproblematic. And their respective views of one another's work were shaded by the vastly different
conceptual resources that each actor drew upon. In Tait's case, those resources included Scottish
conceptions of "energy" and Presbyterian morality. In Clifford's case, they included non-Euclidean
geometries and Darwinist secularism.
Yet, the story that follows is not one of opposition, or even one of stark contrast. It is, rather, one of
overlapping "terrains", in which Tait and Clifford are presented as two voyageurs traveling upon
differing "terrains of knowledge" in their intellectual, social and personal navigations. They both
encounter the artifact of "quaternion mathematics" and they both manipulate and use that artifact
in distinct and idiosyncratic ways. Thus, this story has a simple plot, with a fairly simple conclusion,
though its characters are vibrant and lively. Tait and Clifford were not in direct conflict in their
respective developments of quaternions. Rather, they were operating upon differing "terrains of
knowledge"—terrains that allowed each actor to define the worth of quaternions in varying
symbolical, social and even moral terms.
Tait, Clifford and the history ofscience
In his review of Clifford's The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences (1885), Tait did not mince his
words. He lauded his old friend Clifford and then proceeded to insinuate plagiarism. Tait wrote:
Once more a characteristic record of the work of a most remarkable, but too brief, life
lies before us. In rapidity of accurate thinking, even on abstruse matters, Clifford had
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few equals; in clearness of exposition, on subjects which suited the peculiar bent of his
genius and on which he could be persuaded to bestow sufficient attention, still fewer.
[However] the ease with which he mastered the more prominent features of a subject
often led him to dispense with important steps which had been taken by some of his less
agile concurrents. These steps, however, he was obliged to take when he was engaged
in exposition; and he consequently gave them (of course in perfect good faith) without
indicating that they were not his own. Thus especially in matters connected with the
development of recent mathematical and kinematical methods, his statements were by
no means satisfactory (from the historical point of view) to those who recognized, as
their own, some of the best "nuggets" that shine here and there in his pages. His
kinematic was, throughout, specially open to this objection: ~ and it applies, though by
no means to the same extent, to the present work (Tait 1885).1
Tait was at odds with his late colleague. Thinly veiling his accusation of plagiarism, he argued
Clifford's development of bi-quaternions was fundamentally dependent upon his own work in
quaternions.
Yet, unlike other cases of clear controversy in the history of science,2 it would be hasty to argue that
Tait's criticism of Clifford is indicative of their general interactions. The two had been on friendly
terms for many years; they had even shared ideas over a brief correspondence in the 1870s.
Without doubt, Tait and Clifford did not see eye-to-eye on matters of significant metaphysical,
political and scientific importance. Their divergent philosophical views did not, however, always
reflect antagonistic mathematical opinions. Consider for instance the fact that Tait concluded his
account of The Common Sense of the Exact Sciences by acknowledging that, despite the apparent
plagiarism,
Clifford could never have written in this vein. He would either have kept silent, or have
blurted out the whole truth. Mystery and insinuation were not weapons of his, and
should not be employed in connection with his name (Tait 1885).
So sincerely did Tait recognize Clifford's integrity in mathematical matters that he recommended
Clifford as author of a proposed article on quaternions, which Arthur Cayley (1821-1895) had
1
Tait admits that "the specially important and distinctive features of [Clifford's] work, viz. the homely, yet apt and often
complete, illustrations of matters intrinsically difficult, are entirely due to the Author himself" (Tait 1885).
2
See, for instance, Shapin and Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), which documents the controversy between
Hobbes and Boyle.
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requested ofTait.3 Notably, Tait's recommendation came after Clifford had already lambasted Tait's
Unseen Universe (1875) in a public forum, saying it constituted little more than metaphysical
propaganda for God-fearing ideologues. Despite Tait's antagonistic stance on Clifford's evolutionary
theories and agnostic affiliations, he nonetheless recognized Clifford's worth as a mathematician and
intellectual. Writing to the Reverend J. Paton (February 15th 1883), Tait stated,
The naturalists, with the exception of Huxley, (who is really a great man), can easily be
settled ... And in dealing with Huxley, the true ground to take is to state (what is
perfectly certain, though he will not allow it), that Natural History has not got the length
of even its Copernicus yet: - far less its Galileo, its Kepler, or its Newton. The recent
bosh about Darwin as the "Newton of Biology" simply shows those who utter it to be
altogether ignorant of what Newton did! These people, even the best of them, have not
yet got beyond what I once called "the beetle-hunting and the crab-catching stage"! ...
My poor friend Clifford would have given you more trouble than all the host that is left.
But then he was a man of true genius (Tait 1883).
Tait was a Presbyterian northern scientist; Clifford was an agnostic London mathematician. Their
divergent professional and personal identities are important, but those attributes alone do not
account for their varying approaches to quaternion mathematics throughout the 1860s and 1870s.
In order to explain those respective mathematical practices, more complex account of the "terrains
of knowledge" through which each actor navigated is required. By accounting for each actor's
relative intellectual, conceptual, and linguistic environments, the historian is better placed to explain
why Tait and Clifford differed in their uses of quaternions. As we will see, Tait's use of quaternions
took place within a symbolical algebraic framework defined by the politics and practices of Scottish
natural philosophy, as it was manifest in Edinburgh in the 1860s and 1870s. Meanwhile, Clifford's
use of quaternions took place within a symbolical algebraic framework defined by the practices of
non-Euclidean geometry and the evolutionary theories dominant at Cambridge and in London
3
Cayley wrote to Tait (August 16th, 1877) asking, "Would it be any use to request you to undertake for next year the Report
on Quaternions - if so, the Committee of Section A would be delighted to do so - if not, we thought of asking Clifford,
who it seems is laboring on the subject. Please write or telegraph." On the back of the same note, Tait responded:
"Clifford certainly, if he will accept the task which I found too personal" (Cayley 1877).
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throughout the late-1860s and 1870s. Before delving into these contextual discussions further,
however, the reader must understand what I mean by "terrains of knowledge".
"Terrains ofknowledge" as an analytical metaphor
Since the 1960s, the history of science has increasingly sought to demonstrate the culturally situated
nature of scientific theories. Following Thomas Kuhn's seminal Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962), historians and sociologists of scientific knowledge have highlighted controversies in the
production of scientific knowledge, as well as institutional and cultural foundations underpinning
"normal science". Philosophers of mathematics have been slower to jump on the bandwagon. Linear
histories of mathematics, such as Bell (1937), Klein (1968), and Boyer (1989), have included little, if
any, account of the contextual settings within which mathematical actors carried out their craft.
Admittedly, in recent years, a slew of historians have taken up the complex task of offering
perspicacious cultural histories of mathematics, albeit with differing historical focal points. Richards
(1988), Guicciardini (1989), Gray (1989), Durand-Richard (2001; 2007), Flament (2003), Warwick
(2003), Crilly (2006), Parshall-Hunger (2006), and Mazzotti (2007) have all injected the history of
mathematics with socially-aware accounts of mathematical productions ranging from the medieval
period to the mid-20th century. The lucidity of their accounts justifies the methodologies they use,
silencing debates over the use of detailed case studies as demonstrations of mathematics-in-the-
making. In the words of Shapin and Schaffer (1985), it is now possible to forgo further philosophical
and methodological debate and "just get on with it"—that is, get on with the task of writing social
histories of mathematics.
Yet, one matter of methodological importance is still worth further clarification. The matter relates
to the meaning of the word "context". It is now common, if not necessary, to talk about the
"context" of a particular actor, a particular theorem, or a particular concept. Even established
historians of mathematics (some of whom have not always invoked contextual methodologies in
prior works) now regularly invoke claims of cultural context and social sensitivity. A case in point is
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Ivor Grattan-Guinness's (2008) recent contribution against the long-standing claim of the 20th-
century mathematician and quasi-Platonist, Eugene Wigner. In his 1960 article, "The unreasonable
effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences," Wigner claimed that mathematics explains
physical phenomena in an uncanny and inexplicable manner. He concluded that mathematics
therefore describes necessarily true (though mysterious) a priori laws in the universe. In his
opposition to Wigner's claims, Grattan-Guinness writes,
When forming a problem and attempting to solve it, a scientist does not work in
isolation: he is operating in various contexts, philosophical, cultural and technical, in
some cases consciously recognized while in others intuitively or implicitly adopted.
Thinkers develop theories in the presence of other theories already available as well as
by observations of the actual world, and can be influenced positively or maybe negatively
by these theories ... it is the world of human theories that is anthropocentric, not the
actual world (Grattan-Guinness 2008, 3).
Grattan-Guinness contends mathematical knowledge, like other forms of knowledge, expresses the
contexts within which it is generated.
Yet, herein lays the heart of a nagging methodological problem. What exactly constitutes "context"?
By "context", does the historian mean causal factors that necessarily lead the practitioner to adopt
certain theories or claims? Does the historian merely mean contingent factors that help a
practitioner to adopt certain theories, but which are not necessary for the production of those
claims (i.e. could the actor have come to make the same knowledge claims by relying upon other
conceptual resources?). Or does the historian simply mean colorful detail that is only relevant when
the scientist's knowledge claims are later deemed to be "wrong" or "false"? This last approach is
that of the 20th-century sociologist Robert K. Merton, for whom context was important only really
when the historian is forced to account for a scientist's false or incorrect claims (Merton 1973). The
implication of Merton's use of "context" is that proper scientific thought progresses in a vacuum of
intellectual and rational discourse, regardless of the socio-economic, politico-religious, philosophical
or institutional affiliations of the practitioner who is producing the knowledge claim. From the
Mertonian perspective, the identification of relevant "context" in the history of science indicates, at
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best, conditions that contingently pertain at the time of the development of a particular knowledge
claim, and at worst, detail that is only relevant when the historian is explaining a Whiggishly
determined "error" of judgment.
Over the past three decades, historians and sociologists of science have debunked the Mertonian
understanding of scientific knowledge through the use of various case studies. They have shown that
mystical and magical beliefs, which Merton and more traditional philosophers of science, such as
Karl Popper, would have deemed to be "pseudo-scientific", were integral to the production of
natural philosophical claims in the 16th- and 17th-centuries (see Koyre 1973; Henry 2001). They have
shown that varying conceptions of "ether" in the 18th- and 19th-centuries embodied particular socio-
religious viewpoints (Cantor and Hodge 1981). They have shown that sectarian affiliations and
conceptions of divine knowledge defined the attitudes of British mathematicians towards non-
Euclidean geometries in the 19th-century (Richards 1988). And they have explored the socialization
required to engage in experimental measurements of J-rays (Wynne 1976), N-rays (Nye 1980),
parapsychological effects (Collins and Pinch 1979), free quarks (Pickering 1981), and gravitational
radiation (Collins 2004). All those case studies point to the overriding conclusion that scientific
knowledge is an expression of a practitioner's (or a group of practitioners') time and place set, their
religious affiliations and beliefs, their institutional limitations, and their access to specialized
discourse. "Context" is more than just peripheral detail. It is somehow constitutive of scientific
knowledge.
Yet, as Shapin (1982) has also noted, many historical and sociological studies often fall short of
constituting a full-blown "sociology of scientific knowledge". Historical and sociological studies may
demonstrate the socially situated nature of scientific knowledge, but they often fail to explain why
certain knowledge claims arise in the first place. Alongside their colleagues in the history of science,
historians of mathematics have had to face similar concerns, as they have sought to demonstrate
the socially situated nature of mathematical knowledge. Yet, all too often, historians of mathematics
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have stopped short of trying to explain why certain claims come about. And in those instances where
the historian has tried to explain "why", he has often reverted to describing some sort of internal,
logical driving force in mathematics itself. Hacking (1999), for instance, draws on the intuitionist
school of J. E. L Brower in Holland in the early 20th-century to argue that, yes, indeed, mathematical
objects, theorems and proofs are produced in time. They are not a priori entities; they do not exist
until they are created and used by human actors. "Constructivism" therefore holds in mathematics.
Yet, according to Hacking, "constructivism" has a limit. Once a mathematical entity—be it theorem
or proof—is created, the unfolding of any consequent arguments associated with it are driven by the
internal logic of mathematical knowledge. Hacking's "why?" boils down to a logical impulse.
Mathematicians are driven to make certain claims by the internal logic of the tools they are using.
Hacking's approach cannot be a satisfactory resolution. After all, it begs the question, why did the
logical impulse come to be in the first place? One historian who has tried to answer these questions
in terms of the history of quaternions is Andrew Pickering (1983; 1995). Pickering has argued that
Hamilton's "discovery" of quaternions was a sociological phenomenon—one that can be best
understood as a combination of "bridging", which is a "free" move, and "transcription", which is a
"forced" move. This combination of moves is what Pickering labels the "mangle", and it accounts for
Hamilton's ability to develop a non-commuting system of rotational operators known as
"quaternions" (Pickering 1995, 120). Pickering explains that Hamilton was "free" to generate a
model of the "unknown" from the "known"—to move from an already developed system of triplets
towards an as-of-yet-undeveloped system of quaternions. For instance, Hamilton was able to work
with triplets & + iy + jz) by assuming that they followed the same rules of algebra that applied to
couples Cx + iy)- Hamilton had been able to algebraically square couples. Thus, he chose to
"bridge" the process to triplets and square them too.
However, the process of "bridging" does not tell the whole story. Pickering also identifies a
subsequent process of "transcription". "Transcription" is the act of using a technique developed for
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another problem (i.e. squaring couples) to solve a new problem (i.e. squaring triplets).
"Transcription" is a "forced" move in that it is motivated, and even necessitated, by the base
mathematical model from which it is distilled. For instance, to make the squaring process work,
Hamilton had to define /z = in his triplet system, just as he had had to define }Z = -1 in his
couple system. In other words, Hamilton's "free moves" were not enough. He depended upon
mathematically "forced moves" that "carried [his] extensions" to the point of developing workable
equations that defined the based elements of quaternions (Pickering 1995, 131). For Pickering,
therefore, it is the combination of "free" and "forced" actions that constitutes a cultural extension in
mathematics. Wherever the pieces of the puzzle do not fit, an actor is able to freely "tinker with the
various extensions in question" to generate partial solutions that are meaningful to him. However,
that actor is also reliant upon the "force" of mathematical logic which drives him to certain
conclusions. To be clear, Pickering is suggesting that, at certain points in Hamilton's investigations,
the mathematician had no choice but to follow the established rules of algebra. As with Hacking,
Pickering protects a place for the logical drive, or "forced" moves, necessitated by mathematical
logic, even though he prefaces it with the "free" "tinkering" that describes freedom in mathematical
modeling.
Problematically, Pickering nowhere explains where Hamilton's motivation to engage in such
modeling comes from. Why couples? Why triplets? Why did Hamilton even try? Ultimately, the
historian must explain "why" Hamilton wanted the system to work in the first place. What factors
existent in Hamilton's life caused him to want to make the system work by any means necessary?
This historian would contend that in so far as we understand Hamilton's definition of /z = — 1 to be
a tool he developed to help him complete the puzzle and make his triplet system work, then there
was indeed a choice at play. There was no "forced" move necessitated by the logic of mathematics.
Rather, there was a route chosen by Hamilton based on his calculation of a variety of factors.
Contrary to Pickering's account, I would suggest Hamilton's desire to develop a meaningful
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symbolical system that had a direct geometrical analogue emanated from social norms existent
outside the confines of his mathematical notebooks, where the specific acts of "bridging" and
"transcribing" might have taken place. Pickering offers no account of those norms. In sum,
Pickering's account is a description of "how" Hamilton made his claims, not "why" he made them.
My invocation of "terrains of knowledge" attempts to address this issue by identifying those factors
that provided necessary resources for the production of unique knowledge claims. This does not
provide a deterministic causal account (which is, in any case, an impossible task for the historian to
carry out), but it does provide an account of the historically contingent factors required for
knowledge claims to arise. In so doing, "terrains of knowledge" takes a step in the direction of
fulfilling Shapin's (1982) request that sociologists and historians account for "why" certain
knowledge claims arise, rather than just "how" they arise. I argue that "context" must be more than
merely superficial detail invoked only when viewed retrospectively as the explanation for errors in
judgment. In line with contemporary sociologists and historians of science, I consider "context" to be
constitutive of an actor's knowledge claims.
One might think that this still leaves open the question of whether "context" is necessarily "causal"
or merely "contingent". However, distinguishing between those two points is a more subtle exercise
than simply avoiding the Mertonian approach, because it involves recognizing that context is causal.
A "terrain" constitutes the supportive ground upon which an actor is dependent (i.e. the actor's
conceptual resources) as well as the plethora of artifacts dispersed throughout the environment in
which he finds himself acting. The actor can choose to move towards, or engage with, or even move
away from particular artifacts appearing on a given terrain. The direction of the actor's movements
indicates where it is that the actor locates his own interests. Thus, in describing an actor's
navigations through a "terrain", the historian is engaged in the act of describing which interests
motivate the actor to move in certain ways. The historian is also able, therefore, to identify why it is
that an actor's actions and choices are meaningful (i.e. reasonable) to the actor himself. In other
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words, "terrains" are conceptual spaces that are infused with meaning; they allow actors to consider
certain possibilities as reasonable and meaningful modes of action. They also contain the tools
needed for the actor to engage in those possible courses of action. "Terrains" therefore describe
"why" actors make the knowledge claims they do; and, in certain cases, they can also describe
"how" the actors make those claims.
The various "terrains of knowledge" I identify for the purposes of analyzing Tait and Clifford's
engagements with quaternions are those conceptual landscapes that Tait and Clifford navigated
through as they made their respective claims. The "terrains" I highlight describe the environments
within which Tait and Clifford felt their individual choices were meaningful. For instance, had Tait
not studied at Cambridge or worked in Belfast where Thomas Andrews introduced him to Hamilton's
quaternions as a valid research subject, had he not been transplanted to Edinburgh's world of
natural philosophy alongside the symbolical algebraic mathematician, Philip Kelland, had he not
been imbued with the language of "efficiency" and "work" as it appeared in thermodynamics, and
had he not adopted particular Presbyterian accounts of the universe, he would not have been
motivated to develop the specific claims about quaternions that he did, nor would he have seen
those claims as meaningful in and of themselves. Similarly, had Clifford not studied mathematics at
Cambridge in the 1860s, had he not adopted a belief in Victorian Darwinism, and had he not
accessed the geometrical works of Riemann and the physiological works of Helmholtz while teaching
at University College, London (where discussion of such nouveau concepts was allowed, if not openly
encouraged), he would not have been motivated to produce the claims about quaternions that he
did. In both Tait and Clifford's cases, the question "why" is answered by appealing to the complex
conceptual topology that each actor navigated through and which provided him with the resources
needed to effectuate those navigations and to deem them worthwhile. The question "how" is
answered by an account (delivered in Chapter One) of the symbolical algebraic methodology put
into place at Cambridge at the start of the 19th-century, and which was adopted more generally
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throughout the mid-century (identified here as the Peacockian "principle of the permanence of
equivalent forms"). Combined with the varied "terrains" mentioned above, symbolical algebra and
its varied mid-century manifestations allowed Tait and Clifford to engage with the artifact of
quaternion mathematics from a plethora of directions and in historically unique ways.
Defined by geographical and academic location, and often overlaid by natural philosophical beliefs, a
"terrain" is an analytical description of an actor's social placement at the time of a particular
engagement. It allows for ebb and flow in an actor's interest in a particular artifact, and it helps the
historian to identify those beliefs and institutional obligations that provided the actor with
motivation to engage with the artifact in the first place. In other words, to explain "why" particular
actors made the knowledge claims they did, the historian must appeal to the varied resources that
existed as foundational terrains underlying each actor's movements.
How "terrains" relate to the Strong Program
Questions over "context" have led many historians and sociologists to develop differing analytical
tools over the years, all of which have aimed to organize historical data in order to tell particular
stories. In their seminal comparative work on Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle, Shapin and Schaffer
(1985) have argued that "social context" is to be understood not only as the "wider society" but also
"something else"—namely, the norms of the "scientific method" as crystallized in "forms of social
organization", which constitute the "means of regulating social interaction within the scientific
community." Those authors invoke Wittgenstein's notion of language games to identify certain ways
of speaking, or "patterns of activity", that are normatively accepted. Those patterns (i.e. "language
games") determine the bounds of social acceptability. Ultimately, they determine the degree to
which any particular scientific claim can be deemed valid or justifiable. The authors "treat
controversies over scientific methods as disputes over different patterns of doing things and of
organizing men to practical ends" (Shapin and Schaffer 1985, 14). This is a useful starting point.
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Researchers within the tradition of the Edinburgh Strong Program have built upon views such as
those offered by Shapin and Schaffer to further specify the notion of "context". They have argued
that "context" does not pre-determine scientific claims or acts, although it can create the space
requisite for unique uses of scientific artifacts. On this view, each use of a scientific object (i.e. each
knowledge claim) constitutes a new social act—one that must be understood as historically-shaped
by contemporaneous norms, but which simultaneously changes the meaning of those norms
(Barnes, Bloor and Henry 1996). The "strong" approach to historical reconstruction stipulates that
scientific claims should be treated symmetrically as neither "right" nor "wrong". Rather, the analyst
should start from the assumption that each claim is a reasonable instantiation of historically unique
and contingent social factors (Barnes 1974; Bloor 1973; Bloor 1991). "The important point," Bloor
(1999) argues, "is to separate the world from the actor's description of the world. It is the
description that is the topic of enquiry, and the proposed separation is one of our resources." This
approach narrows "context" to highlight those causal aspects of a practitioner's life that answer the
question "why?"—"why" would an actor have sought to generate the particular knowledge claims
he or she did?
In brief, the "strong program" theorists argue that accounts of scientific knowledge should include
the following components: an account of "causality", understood to be the conditions that had to
pertain for particular knowledge claims to have been made; a stance of "impartiality", understood to
be a non-judgemental approach that avoids distinctions of "right" or "wrong"; and a respect for
"symmetry", understood to be recognition of the fact that similar socio-cultural factors can give rise
to either "successful" or "unsuccessful" scientific claims (Bloor 1991).4 Identifying the causal element
stipulated above constitutes the most difficult part of writing any social history of mathematics. The
historian is helped, however, by the further clarification, offered by the Edinburgh sociologists, that
"causality" can largely be identified as the "interests" at play in the generation of a particular
4
The Strong Program also includes a fourth component labelled "self-reflexivity," which is understood to mean that any
sociological account of scientific knowledge generation is itself open to analysis according to the three components
mentioned above—namely, causality, impartiality and symmetry.
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knowledge claim. As Barnes (1977) has put it, "All knowledge is actively produced by men with
particular technical interests in particular contexts; its significance and its scope can never be
generalised to the extent that no account is taken of those contexts and interests" (19). In other
words, the process of producing a socially-informed historical analysis of mathematical acts requires
that the historian ask the question: "What interests are at play in motivating an actor to make a
particular knowledge claim?" Or, as this historian would prefer to put it, "Which terrains are
supporting the actor's navigations and infusing those navigations with meaning?"
Far more complex than the Mertonian task of figuring out which explicit interests led a scientist or
mathematician astray, identifying "interests" here involves the more subtle task of identifying those
social factors that defined the realm of possibilities for any given historical actor and the discourses
that infused those possibilities with meaningful justifications. What makes this difficult to do is that
the most profound "interests" are those that have become so deeply institutionalized they have
disappeared from view; yet, an actor who chooses to act against certain norms or "interests" would
be deemed by his peers, his social grouping and even himself to be engaged in an act of self-
destruction or failure. My invocation of "terrains" attempts to respond to the call for "causality"
issued by the Strong Program by highlighting the foundational "interests" that motivated actors such
as Tait and Clifford to navigate through particular conceptual and linguistic environments and to
engage with artifacts that appeared within those terrains. In appealing to those differing terrains,
the historian can thus understand why the actor produced the varying accounts of quaternions that
he did, and why those productions were viewed by the actor himself as reasonable and meaningful
courses of action to take.
Though neither Tait nor Clifford would have seen their lives in the discontinuous terms of easily
distinguishable "terrains of knowledge", a "terrain" can nonetheless serve as an analytical tool that
helps the historian generate a causal account of "why" actors make particular knowledge claims. It
allows one to summarize a set of contingent resources that, wittingly or not, actors relied upon in
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the production of their claims. And though there may be other "terrains" in addition to those that I
have highlighted in Tait and Clifford's case studies, I would contend that, in so far as one wants to
explain those actors' uses of quaternions, there cannot be any fewer.
In sum, the manner in which a conceptual "terrain" causes a mathematician to make certain choices
is akin to the manner in which a physical terrain causes a hiker to alter her gait. When "terrains of
knowledge" are overlaid and mapped onto one another, their combined effect is that of a complex
topological structure that allows for a symmetrical account of history—one devoid of moralistic
judgements. The historian is able to see an actor becoming more or less motivated to generate a
particular knowledge claim over time due to the influence of other, overlapping terrains. Tait's
symbolical algebraic training and his Belfast-induced motivation to engage with Hamilton's
quaternions became less of a causal influence on his choices from 1860 to 1865, when his
engagements with thermodynamics contoured his intellectual terrains more profoundly, leading him
away from the artifact of quaternion mathematics. That said, once in place, a "terrain" does not fully
disappear either. The old terrain of "symbolical algebra" and the new terrain of mathematics at the
University of Edinburgh overlapped to influence Tait's behavior in meaningful ways, leading him
back to quaternions in the mid-1860s, though from a new and distinct direction—one which had
been shaped by the contours of thermodynamics in intervening years.
"Terrains" also force the historian of mathematics to write about mathematics as a story populated
by people doing things, as it is people who navigate through terrains. "Terrains" are inherently actor-
dependent. They define an actor's socio-economic, political, religious, institutional, and educational
experiences—all of which can provide resources for particular uses. But the central aspect of the
metaphor is that someone is navigating through the terrain. Knowledge emerges as the product of
those human navigations through varied environments, where particular objects (i.e. quaternions)
are encountered as artifacts to be engaged with or abandoned. In other words, "terrains" cannot be
used to explain the evolution or development of an idea. The history of ideas has no place in the
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world of "terrains", as "terrains" embed within them the notion that people, not objects, drive
history.
We have at our disposal, then, an analytical tool that makes explicit the view that knowledge
generation is open-ended and that the "progression" of a particular mathematical concept is not
pre-determined by the actor's previous engagements. Particular knowledge claims arise from
historically unique periods of overlapping concerns (i.e. "interests"). Like trekkers moving through a
vast terrain, mathematical actors navigate through multiple layers of beliefs, obligations and
structures as they use or abandon the conceptual artifacts they encounter. Therefore, "terrains of
knowledge" can be invoked to offer comparative case studies. A description of the relative "terrains"
that each actor navigates through can distinguish between the causal motivations underpinning
particular knowledge claims among practitioners who may have operated in similar time periods but
who nonetheless diverged in their uses of mathematical artifacts.
19th-century terrains ofknowledge in the history ofmathematics
Certain historical periods require the historian acknowledges some foundational "terrains" in order
to produce meaningful explanations. For the historian studying 19th-century mathematics in Great
Britain, fundamental "terrains" that are constitutive of any mathematician's claims include the
nature of the actor's mathematical training (i.e. the decade and the school at which he or she
studied mathematics), the professional institution(s) within which the actor developed his or her
career, and the actor's explicit or implicit religious affiliations. Though these are not the only
"terrains" relevant to an explanatory account of mathematics in the 19th-century (indeed, in Tait's
case, I add a "terrain" of "energy science" and in Clifford's case I add a "terrain" of "non-Euclidean
geometry"), they are the bare bones of any explanatory account of 19th-century mathematics.
Having thus outlined the concept of "terrains of knowledge" with regards to 19th-century
mathematics, let us now proceed to an account of quaternion mathematics that invokes this
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analytical metaphor. In Chapter One, I offer an overview of the development of "symbolical
algebra", and concomitant attempts to professionalize the discipline of mathematics and
mathematical research in Britain, in the early decades of the 19th-century. In Chapter Two, I offer a
brief segue between the rise of symbolical algebra in the 1810s and Hamilton's development of
quaternions in the 1850s. By looking at Hamilton's self-described account of quaternions in his 1853
Lectures on Quaternions, we see that Hamilton's hope was to legitimize quaternions as a branch of
symbolical algebra in order to gain credence for Irish science among practitioners of mathematics at
Cambridge.
In Chapter Three, I offer a more detailed account of the various causal "terrains of knowledge" that
Tait navigated through in his engagements with quaternions. Those terrains included Cambridge and
Belfast mathematics in the 1850s, the University of Edinburgh and its mathematical and natural
philosophical traditions, the "science of energy" and thermodynamics in Scotland in the 1860s, and
Presbyterian political discourse in Scotland in the mid-19th century. In Chapter Four, I offer a similarly
detailed account of the various causal "terrains of knowledge" through which Clifford navigated
during his encounters with quaternions. Those terrains included Cambridge mathematics in the
1860s, non-Euclidean geometries as they were introduced in Britain in the same decade, Victorian
Darwinism and its progressionist interpretation, and the University College, London as a secularist
urban educational institution. By considering these differing terrains, the historian is well placed to
suggest subtle reasons for which Tait produced the specific knowledge claims he did (i.e. that
quaternions were admissible by the terms set out by Peacock's philosophy of symbolical algebra),
and that they were "efficient" in nature and therefore constituted a more moral form of
mathematics), and to contrast these with reasons with Clifford's rather different knowledge claims
(i.e. that quaternions were symbolical in nature, but that they were destined to offer geometrically
meaningful claims that would advance the physical sciences and which would advance the status of
human evolution more generally). As we will see, Hamilton, Tait, and Clifford's respective
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engagements with quaternions and their respective conceptual productions can be explained by
appealing to the "terrains of knowledge" that each actor navigated. We start, then, at the opening of
the 19th-century in Scotland and Cambridge, where mathematicians began to adopt symbolical
algebraic notation in increasingly explicit ways.
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Chapter One: Symbolical Algebra—the foundations
Introduction
It is cliche to argue that the early decades of the 19th-century were a time of great upheaval and
social change. After all, what time period in the history of humanity has not been a time of great
upheaval and social change? Yet, important variations in social order, religious affiliation, and
political organization were taking hold of Great Britain and Ireland throughout the 1800s. Those
variations included the restructuring of university administration, the reformation of secondary and
post-secondary curricula, and the emergence of new affiliations between industrial and academic
communities. One important development to come out of these varied transformations was the
introduction of continental approaches to the calculus—specifically, the introduction of Leibnizian
differential notation and, in later years, the institutionalization of a philosophy of "symbolical
algebra" which hearkened an overarching focus on operations in mathematics rather than
magnitudes or quantities.
This section provides the reader with an overview of that symbolical algebraic tradition as it
emerged in Britain in the first half of the 19th-century. The aim is to identify key elements within that
tradition, including the Analytical Society's deistic approach to knowledge, George Peacock's (1791-
1858) "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms", mathematical reformers'
institutionalization of symbolical algebra in the Cambridge Tripos examination system, and the wider
move toward professionalizing scientific and mathematical disciplines throughout the 1830s.
Before beginning that discussion, it is important to note that in referring to a "tradition", or even a
"philosophy", of "symbolical algebra" I do not mean to suggest there was a homogenous set of
algebraic claims which actors such as Hamilton, Tait and Clifford adopted and abided by. The
contrary was the case. "Symbolical algebra" meant many things to many people. It was introduced,
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used and developed in a plethora of ways in Scotland and England. And it was that mixed bag of
symbolical claims and conceptualizations that provided youthful mathematicians at Cambridge with
a vast realm of possibilities—possibilities that would come to constitute more specific "terrains" in
the lives of Hamilton, Tait and Clifford in later years. Specifically, the British tradition of symbolical
algebra in the first half of the 19th-century established a methodology in mathematical analysis—one
that motivated young mathematicians to engage in research that would not have otherwise been
condoned. Had a Newtonian tradition in synthetic or geometrically-focused research maintained its
predominance at Cambridge, or at other British institutions of higher learning in the first half of the
19th-century, it would have been impossible for Tait and Clifford to make the quaternion claims they
did. In addition, it was due to the deistic approach to mathematical knowledge advocated by early
symbolical algebraists that mathematics, as a discipline, was opened up to the sons of industrialists
and religious dissenters, thereby establishing a world of professional research in the mid-century,
which was distinct from the world of gentlemanly science and privileged access to expert discourse
that had defined scientific and mathematical engagement in Britain over the course of the previous
two centuries.
A country in flux
Over the course of the 19th-century, Britain experienced a massive migration in human labour.
Surging labour demands associated with newly emerging industries in the country's urban capitals
and port centres resulted in a large-scale demographic shift. In 1801, the official census indicated
that only one-third of the English population was "urban", while only one in ten urbanites lived in a
city of 100,000 inhabitants or more. A century later, the 1901 census indicated that three-quarters
of the English population were "urban", and one in three urban denizens lived in a city of 100,000
inhabitants or more (Kearns and Withers 2007, 1). The foetal form of a fledgling British welfare state
developed within this milieu. As cities grew and populations became increasingly difficult to micro-
manage, the three to five generations of British citizens who lived to witness the 19th-century unfold
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also witnessed the slow emergence of a system that sought to publicly manage the country's urban-
dwelling and sexually-active populations (Driver 1989).
Growth in the bureaucratic macro-management of the country's population went hand-in-hand with
the centralization of Britain's political institutions. While pre-industrial Britain had been governed by
a "conglomeration of highly localized societies," ruled by magistracies and staffed by members of
the local landowning class, industrialized Britain was moving towards increased parliamentary
representation, catalyzing the decay of aristocratic nexuses of power (Williams 1994; Kearns 2007).
A centralized, London-based parliamentary authority soon began to rear its nationalist head to ward
off what it perceived to be the pernicious influences of Napoleonic France. But by the 1830s, the
serious social, economic, and health outcomes associated with the country's rapid urbanization and
industrialization became the stuff of home-grown dissent (Rees 2001; Southall 1996). Reformists and
lobbyists targeted Britain's national institutions, identifying them as the root of domestic ill.
Widespread grievances with Westminster manifested themselves in the People's Charter (1838).
From 1838 to 1848, the Chartist Movement issued a litany of reformist demands, many of which
sought to mobilize communities and improve upon local parliamentary representation (Searby
1977).5
As those socio-economic and political developments unfolded, they shaped the complicated milieus
within which symbolical algebra gained a foothold. The youthful mathematicians who spearheaded a
period of mathematical controversy at Cambridge in the 1810s were diverse in their political and
social standings. Their engagements with philosophical, metaphysical and mathematical systems
also varied. Indeed, the advocates of "symbolical algebra" invoked richly evolving hybrids of Lockean
empiricism, Cartesian rationalism, and Berkelean idealism.6 Perhaps not surprisingly historical efforts
5
The ownership and control of local militias, which few protesting town mobs could effectively resist, belonged to elite
ruling groups, including aristocrats and land-owners (Southall 1996,178).
6
The 18th-century interpretation of Locke that prevailed in France and in Britain was one that largely ignored the emphasis
on mathematical-as-theological knowledge. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), which includes the
chapter "Of our Knowledge of the Existence of a God," Locke discusses three tiers of knowledge: the first is "immediate"
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to narrowly categorize those mathematicians and their respective symbolical algebraic practices
have often failed to provide meaningful historical accounts. Indeed, the story of the introduction of
analytical techniques in Britain—including the adoption of Leibniz's ^ notation for differentials
(versus Newton's x dot-notation for fluxions)—has been told and retold by a plethora of historians.
Boyer (1949), Dubbey (1977), and Novy (1973) have all described how the young Cambridge
mathematicians Charles Babbage (1791-1871), John Frederick Herschel (1792-1871), and Peacock
launched initial efforts to introduce "symbolical" or "continental" algebra during their student days
at Cambridge, in large part through the formation of the Analytical Society in 1812. Novy (1973) has
argued that later-century actors such as Augustus De Morgan (1806-1871), Duncan Farquharson
Gregory (1813-44), George Boole (1815-1844), Flamilton, Arthur Cayley (1821-1895) and James
Joseph Sylvester (1814-1897) also served as seminal "symbolical algebraists" given that they, too,
influenced the country's approach to formal mathematics.7
which follows the tradition of Descartes (the only sort of knowledge of this kind is of ourselves); the second is divine
knowledge of God, which also requires individual effort; the third is empirical, which "we can have only by sensation"
(Richards 1992, 51). This latter empirical category is the focus of Locke's Essay, and it becomes the focus of Lockean
empiricism as practiced and advocated by his supporters in later decades and centuries.
Locke, however, had been keen to emphasize humans can acquire theological knowledge, too. One representation of such
knowledge is found in mathematical certainty. Theological knowledge is "certain and evident truth," which is "equal to
mathematical certainty". This sort of certain knowledge transcends the probable nature of natural philosophical or
empirical knowledge. In Locke's view, such knowledge is deeply personal as it is the result of personal reflection. It is,
therefore, impossible to communicate between people. In his chapter "On Probability," Locke claims, "In the
demonstration of [a proposition] a man perceives the certain, immutable connexion there is of equality between the
three angles of a triangle, and those intermediate ones which are made use of to show their equality to two right ones;
and so, by an intuitive knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the
progress, the whole series is continued with an evidence, which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those
three angles in equality to two right ones: and thus he has certain knowledge that it is so" (Richards 1992, 52).
The Lockean program served as a foundational resource for the early Analytical Society members who used it to defend
their own republican-influenced hopes for curricular reforms.
7
In his account of French mathematics in the 18th-century, the historian Ivor Grattan-Guinness (1990) has organized 19th-
century mathematicians according to their research outputs. Mathematical practitioners from France and Britain fall into
three "thinking styles," Grattan-Guinness claims. They include the geometrical, the algebraical, and the analytical, where
the "analysts" include those practitioners who employed, to some degree, the techniques associated with limits
(Grattan-Guinness 1990, 55-57). Grattan-Guinness recognizes that such categorizations are 20th-century constructions
that fail to resonate with the actions of the actors they are meant to be describing. Not all historians are as explicit as
Grattan-Guinness in recognizing the fluidity of such terms. In his detailed account of Newtonian mathematics in Britain
throughout the 18th and early-19th centuries, Niccolo Guicciardini (1989) has claimed that a significant division existed
between the development of continental techniques in Dublin and similar developments in Cambridge. While the Dublin
group emphasized the teaching of "applied mathematics (mechanics, physical astronomy, optics)," the Cambridge group
"was definitely purist-algebraist" (Guicciardini 1989, 124). It is not evident where Guicciardini locates the origin of those
terminological distinctions, given that actors such as Peacock, Babbage and Herschel did not refer to themselves as
"purist-algebraists." They did refer to themselves as "algebraists" and "analysts," but certainly not as "purists" or
"formalists."
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Yet, such a large list of mathematical actors, whose combined lifetimes spanned no fewer than 10
decades, suggests an inappropriate degree of generalization. What Britain experienced from 1810
onwards was not the introduction of one particular philosophy of mathematics to which a small
cluster of identifiable mathematicians gravitated. Rather, what Britain experienced was the
introduction of various new philosophies of mathematics, all of which drew metaphorical strength
from contemporaneous socio-political transformations, and many of which resulted in distinct
mathematical practices. Historians, such as Walter F. Cannon (1964), have therefore chosen to
identify a loose "network of algebraists" that emerged in the 19th-century, rather than point to any
specific "school" or definitive tradition. Cannon has emphasized the malleability and imprecision of
the boundaries defining members within that "network". Indeed, as we will see, early century
symbolical algebraists differed significantly in orientation and practice from one another throughout
the period spanning 1800 to 1850.
Calculus and Symbolical Algebra in Britain
By the mid-1700s, British natural philosophers and mathematicians had widely adopted Newtonian
notation for fluxional calculus. They had interpreted the fluxion, as well as the Leibnizian differential,
in terms of Newton's dual notions of limits and ultimate ratios, thereby bypassing the problematical
concept of the "infinitesimal" as a measuring stick of incremental change (Guicciardini 1989; 2003).
The "infinitesimal" had become a particular sticking point in British discussions, especially given
Bishop Berkeley's (1685-1783) popular debunking of the concept. Berkeley had argued that because
the infinitesimal could not be perceived, it was an unjustifiable metaphysical construction—an
imagined entity construed by mathematicians to serve their own fanciful interests.
Yet, Berkeley was not representative of all 18th-century British mathematicians. The calculus, as it
had been developed and propagated by the Bernoulli clan and Leonard Euler (1707-1783), continued
to attract a good number of British practitioners throughout the century. Mathematical actors, such
as Edmund Stone (1695-1768) whose Method of Fluxions (1730) constituted a translation of
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L'Hospital's Analyse des Infiniment Petits (1696), elaborated upon integral techniques (or the
"inverse method of fluxions") as a symbolical extension of the calculus. Edinburgh's professor of
mathematics, Colin Maclaurin (1692-1746), also refused to reject outright all aspects of the
Leibnizian project. Representative of the Scottish Enlightenment, Maclaurin insisted upon the
diffusion of both fluxional and differential calculus at universities in Scotland.
A degree of isolation did, however, come to reign over British mathematics in the last decades of the
1700s, due in no small part to the popularity of Berkeley's criticisms as well as widespread
pedagogical hand-wringing over the proper place of the calculus within British school curricula. As
Joan Richards (1988) has highlighted, primary, secondary and post-secondary teachers worried over
the degree to which emerging techniques in analysis threatened the time-honoured conservative
standards of "absoluteness" and divine truth that were manifest in the undeniable world of
axiomatic Euclidean geometry. Symbolical techniques introduced concepts, such as negative and
imaginary numbers, which had no clear empirical analogues. They fostered a sense of
conventionality and arbitrariness in mathematical practice. Most importantly, however, the 1780s
brought with it an avoidance of all things that whiffed of French revolutionary sentiment or, later,
Republican zeal. Not surprisingly, the number of British actors willing to openly adopt continental
notation dropped off, and those willing to laud accounts of Newtonianism and the fluxional method
rose to take their place.
Yet, despite the metaphysical, institutional and even political barriers to the wider introduction of
Leibnizian calculus in Britain, a number of key British and especially Scottish actors bridged the
emerging divide between Europe and the Empire. Robert Woodhouse (1773-1827), a Cambridge
don, defended the use of negative and imaginary numbers, as well as the use of "analytical" symbols
(e.g. complex numbers) at a time when anti-French political sentiment was rife, if not virulent (Enros
1979). In his Principles of Analytical Calculation (1803), Woodhouse contended symbolical
manipulations gained their "rational legitimacy" from "the rules governing [the] manipulation of the
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signs rather than [from the] ideas behind the signs" (Pycior 1984, 434). An arithmetical operational
symbol such as the equal sign could be given a more general definition so as to allow for the
manipulation of negative and imaginary quantities. Woodhouse argued,
In their simplest meaning, the symbols + — x designate additions, subtractions,
multiplications, to be made on the supposition that the characters connected by these
symbols can be resolved into units; and on this supposition, the first rules for
transposition and multiplication are demonstrated; but subsequently to the extension of
the rules, by which equations of no direct meaning and symbols incapable of being
arithmetically computed are introduced, these symbols take more extensive
signification: thus, a ± Z>V—1 + c ± 2by/—l is put a + c + 3bV^l where the symbols
b^f11, 2bV^ are connected together, in the same manner, as the signs of real
quantities are, that is, of quantities that admit numerical computation: again (a +
byf—T) X (c + dV—T) = ac + adyf^l + cdyf^l — bd, where the connecting sign x
indicates an operation to be performed: what that operation is, we know from having
previously established its nature, in those cases where the symbols employed were
supposed to represent collections of units (Becher 1980, 391).
Woodhouse's claim was that because algebra can represent operations independent of empirical
content, it offers a superior mode of thinking—one based upon the ability of mathematicians to
render abstract those concepts that had been previously tethered to empirical reality.8
Woodhouse's contemporaries, including the mathematician, John Toplis, at Cambridge (later
Nottingham), Charles Hutton, at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, and James Ivory, at the
Royal Military College in Marlow (later Sandhurst), also worked to generate greater respect for
symbolical analysis in the post-Eulerian world (Craik 2000).
Yet, it was within the Scottish context that debates surrounding the metaphysical and pedagogical
value of algebraic analysis gained vibrancy and profundity in the first two decades of the 19th-
century. As an outgrowth of the Scottish Enlightenment, questions over the nature of mathematical
knowledge had long been delineated by the epistemological skepticism of David Hume (Olson 1971).
Nearly all Scottish philosophers of the 18th-century shared Hume's view to some degree, even
8
Woodhouse's particular goal in this discussion was to address the question of convergence versus divergence in a series—
an investigation later taken up by Augustin Cauchy in the 1820s.
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though Scots such as Thomas Reid (1710-1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753-1828) advocated for a
"Philosophy of Common Sense" and ultimately identified themselves as opponents to Hume. Reid
and Stewart were deeply interested in the place of mathematics within the theory of knowledge. In
Reid's first philosophical publication, "An Essay on Quantity" (1748), the Scotsman argued the
content of "quantity" stems from the empirical observation of discrete entities in space. Yet, unlike
Hume, who had accepted the ultimate fallibility of empirical knowledge, Common Sense
philosophers emphasized the role of abstraction in mathematical reasoning as a means of preserving
the a priori. Reid explained that because human senses are fallible, all knowledge (including
mathematical knowledge) is the result of faulty sensory perception. Thus, geometers can never be
certain about their judgments concerning the pure shape of an object. To gain truth, geometers
must extend their thoughts beyond empirical observation; they must engage in that special capacity
for thought known as "abstraction" (i.e. the innate ability to sever mathematical objects from
empirical reality). It is for this reason that Reid, and later Stewart, maintained that mathematical
knowledge deals with special classes of objects. Mathematical objects can be "conceived [of]
without regard for their existence" even though the initial idea for the objects might have emerged
from sensory experiences (Reid 1863, 77).
In the first decades of the 19th-century, Stewart propagated Reid's ideas in his Elements of the
Philosophy of the Human Mind (1813)—a text that would come to later impress the young Babbage
so much so that its main thesis reappeared in the latter's unpublished Essays on the Philosophy of
Analysis. In his Elements, Stewart argued that although both geometry and algebra play a role in
developing the reasoning faculties, algebra is the superior of the two. He wrote,
[Just] as the decision of a judge must necessarily be impartial, when he is only
acquainted with the relations in which the parties stand to each other, and when their
names are supplied by letters of the alphabet ... so in every process of reasoning, the
conclusion we form is most likely to be logically just, when the attention is confined
solely to signs; and when the imagination does not present to it those individual objects
which may warp the judgment by casual associations (Stewart 1814,172-173).
34
The legitimacy of algebraic claims stemmed from their internal coherence, Stewart claimed. A logical
derivation from starting principles to valid conclusions is evidence that symbolical algebra contains
within it rational authority and universal legitimacy.
Stewart was not alone among 19th-century Scotsmen in supporting the adoption of this sort of
symbolical algebraic philosophy. Though John Playfair (1748-1819) is best remembered for his
popularization of James Hutton's theory of geology (in which he argued heat is the primary causal
agent of physical transformations of the Earth), he was also deeply involved in mathematical
research and teaching. Playfair believed in the principles of the French Enlightenment and its
concomitant idealistic mandate to create a "universal language" (i.e. a classless, Republican
language) in which all actors and practitioners could operate seamlessly. Playfair's most widely
disseminated publication was The Elements of Geometry, Containing the First Six Books of Euclid,
with Two Books on the Geometry of Solids (1795),9 in which he defined the concept of "analysis" and
defended it over and above any simple adherence to synthetic notions. In his first edition, the word
"addition" is replaced with a "+" sign and the word "equal" is replaced with an " = " sign
(Ackerberg-Hastings 2002). Though this constitutes only a basic introduction to symbolical notation,
Playfair was writing for a student audience for whom even such basic symbolical usage would have
been entirely new.
By the second edition of his book (published in 1806), Playfair had publicized his Republican political
sentiments more clearly. Concomitantly, his use of symbolical notation emerged with greater
prominence. Playfair ventured to introduce continentally-inspired symbolical notation throughout
Book II of his text, explaining that:
In the Second book ... some algebraic signs have been introduced, for the sake of
representing more readily the addition and subtraction of the rectangles on which the
demonstrations depend. The use of such symbolical writing, in translating from an
original, where no symbols are used, cannot, I think, be regarded as an unwarrantable
9
As Ackerberg-Hastings (2002) has noted, the result was that at least 13,000 British university and secondary students in
the 19th-century learned their basic geometry through Playfair's textbook.
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liberty; for, if by that means the translation is not made into English, it is made into that
universal language so much sought after in all the sciences, but destined, it would seem,
only for the mathematical (Playfair 1806, v).
Composed by a liberal Whig, who supported the French Revolution (despite the fall of Napoleon),
Playfair's text was as much a political treatise as it was a mathematical one. He acknowledged as
much when, in addition to his book revisions, he launched a course in analysis for 3rd-year
mathematics students in which he provided his class with the first English account of Laplace's
Mecanique Celeste, arguing in favour of abandoning the English adherence to synthetic techniques
altogether.
When Playfair was transferred to the university chair of natural philosophy, his successor, John Leslie
(1766-1832), discontinued Playfair's continentally-inspired 3rd-year algebra course. Leslie was
neither well-versed in continental methods nor was he supportive of the ideals of the French
Revolution. He opted, instead, to teach one course in Newtonian fluxions every two years. In the
preface to his Elements of Geometry (1809), he declared, "The analytical investigations of the Greek
geometers are indeed models of simplicity, clearness and unrivalled elegance." Furthermore,
It is a matter of deep regret, that Algebra, of the Modern Analysis, from the mechanical
facility of its operations, has contributed, especially on the Continent, to vitiate the taste
and destroy the proper relish for the strictness and purity so conspicuous in the ancient
method of demonstration (Craik 2000,139).
Leslie favoured a mathematical curriculum predominantly based upon geometrical methods.
Leslie's opposition to symbolical algebra was soon replaced, however, by explicit support for
continental mathematicians as expressed by William Wallace (1768-1843), who was appointed to
the mathematics chair after Leslie took over Playfair's position (Playfair having passed away by this
point).10 Wallace had been professor of mathematics at the Royal Military College prior to gaining his
post in Edinburgh, and in that post he had authored articles on "fluxions" and "analysis" that were
presented in the continental d-notation. Wallace had also published a translation of Legendre's
10
Charles Babbage had also applied for the post; but he was denied by the long-running tradition of appointing Scots to
Scottish chairs (Morrell 1997). In 1838, the Cambridge-trained mathematician, Philip Kelland, became the first English-
educated Englishman to be elected to a Scottish mathematics chair.
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memoir in Leybourn's Mathematical Repository (first in 1809 and then again in 1814). And he had
made his continental sympathies explicit in an article oddly entitled "Fluxions" in the Edinburgh
Encyclopaedia (1815), in which he presented a thorough overview of continental techniques in the
calculus, advocating for their wider adoption throughout Britain. Wallace issued a series of
encyclopaedic articles and popular journal contributions that indicated his very liberal attitude
towards the wider adoption of algebraic analysis at the university level (Craik 1999).
The Analytical Society
Thus, the "analytical revolution" that occurred at Cambridge in the 1810s was not as unprecedented
a "revolution" in English mathematics as has often been argued. Woodhouse, Playfair, Stewart and
Wallace—along with other early-century mathematicians, such as John Brinkley (1763-1835) and
Bartholomew Lloyd (1772-1837) in Dublin and William Spence (1777-1815) in Greenock—all
advocated the use of "French" or continental analysis up to a decade before the origination of the
Analytical Society. Yet, the group of actors that emerged in Cambridge in the 1810s was different
from their Scottish and other national contemporaries in two important ways. Firstly, the Cambridge
group was concentrated in a specific geographical location—Cambridge. Secondly, it formulated a
specific goal—to publish and disseminate a symbolical analytical text that could be used by
examiners who were setting questions on Cambridge's highly-regimented Tripos examination.
The world within which Peacock, Babbage and Flerschel operated was a peculiar one. It was
industrializing. It was urbanizing. Its inhabitants were engaged in debates over the relative value and
worth of educational reform and they were struggling with the neo-conservative mores that
characterized post-Napoleonic life in Britain. One of the most identifiable characteristics of that
period was the religious framework within which British university life operated. A salient aspect of
the Industrial Revolution (variously defined as having spanned from 1760 to 1830) was the adoption
of critical attitudes towards the Anglican Church's monopolistic determination of proper knowledge.
Concerns over the role of the Church in university governance resulted in parliamentary calls for
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universities, such as Oxford and Cambridge, to demonstrate their relevance in the new industrial
era. In brief, those universities were forced to justify their irrefragable positions as the producers of
Britain's moral and governing elite.
Note that the overarching objective of many British universities in the 18th-century had been to form
right-thinking people—i.e. to mould those people who would supply a constant flow of staff to the
professional clergy and government. Cambridge has often been characterized as the first of the
British universities to "shed the last vestiges of the scholastic academic order, which had its origins in
the high middle ages" and to adopt a curriculum that placed mathematics at the core of education.
That process of "modernization" departed significantly from the "staid theological curriculum of
Oxford" (Gascoigne 1984b, 1). It would be hasty to conclude, however, that the early 19th-century
saw Cambridge move suddenly away from forming religiously-trained students. On the contrary, as
with Oxford, Cambridge remained a large-scale seminary well into the mid-19th century. But unlike
Oxford, it did so via mathematical rather than theological curricula. Cambridge's Latitudinarian
tradition, which had coloured its religious discourse on campus throughout the 18th- century, meant
that the Church viewed natural philosophy as part of its corpus of claims. Cambridge's latitudinarians
held that mathematics and natural philosophy did not run contrary to the presence of God. Rather,
the subjects served to simultaneously expose students to metaphysical truth. Thus, by the mid-18th
century, the "iron grip of Whig clerical patronage" had taken firm hold of Cambridge, and sectarian
divisions had given way to a newly unified curriculum based upon Newtonian "synthesis" in
mathematics and Lockean empiricism in natural philosophy. By the late-18th century, that new
curricular focus had become the "unchallenged basis" of Cambridge's undergraduate education,
hardening into "a new orthodoxy almost as settled and complacent as the scholastic curriculum"
(Gascoigne 1984b, 24).
Heading into the 19th-century, the link at Cambridge between Church (albeit Low Church) and
mathematical knowledge was strong. By the 1810s, therefore, Peacock, Babbage, and Herschel
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found themselves advocating for a particular set of mathematical beliefs within a deeply religious
environment. Consider the controversy that arose at Cambridge in the same decade over the role of
the Bible in social life—specifically, over the manner in which that book was to be used and
interpreted. In the early 1810s, posters and placards plastered the town's walls asking inhabitants
whether they thought the Bible should be read with the Book of Common Prayer or on its own. A
student-led attempt to form an independent Bible Society resulted in the formation of a group of
undergraduates who contended the Bible ought to be distributed on its own, with no guidebook. On
the other hand, Herbert Marsh (1757-1839), Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, argued
the Bible should not be read without the prayer book, because people tended to misinterpret
scripture. The Book of Common Prayer served as a prophylactic against the heresy that the
"unlearned and unstable with which England now swarms" were apt to engage (Marsh 1811, 10).
Isaac Milner (1750-1820), Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, clashed with Marsh over the
reasonability of such claims. Milner took the position that the Bible's distribution would be a good
thing, whether it was assisted or not. He also contended that Marsh's position was overly skeptical
regarding the individual capacity of people to reason rightly (Ashworth 1996). That controversy
highlighted the degree to which individual interpretation—whether in scriptural or mathematical
matters—was still deemed to be illegitimate by powerful actors operating within the Cambridge
framework. Analytical Society members expressed their own views on these matters by contending
that an individual should have the right to generate mathematical interpretations without the
intervening interference of any governing authority—i.e. Newtonians, university administrators or
professors. Symbolical algebra provided a means, they argued, for individuals to engage with
mathematical truth on their own.
Within these varied terrains of religious-industrial life, Peacock, Babbage and Herschel set to work to
produce the Analytical Society's first publication. Not surprisingly, their writings were rife with both
religious and industrial motifs. For instance, the Society's first publication, issued in 1813, was
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eventually titled Memoirs of the Analytical Society, despite Babbage's ironic recommendation that it
be entitled "The Principles of pure D-ism in opposition to the Dot-age of the University" in order to
reflect the mathematicians' French-inspired deistic approach to knowledge acquisition. In addition,
the Memoirs (written by Babbage and Herschel, along with a preface authored by Babbage on the
history of analysis in Europe and Britain), made it clear that the Society's intention was to built upon
the Lockean tradition in empiricism (Woodhouse 1999). The algebraists argued knowledge is firstly
derived from empirical sensory perception. Thus, all people have access to it. But, they contended, it
can be abstracted and rendered universal through a process of rationalization, which allows latent
relations between objects (or "ideas") to be discovered.
Thus, Babbage and Herschel identified three reasons why "analytics" would be a powerful tool for
the Empire to adopt. Firstly, unlike classical geometrical techniques, symbolical algebra allowed for
the definition of new entities not constrained by evident empirical content. Embracing such
mathematical possibilities would have the practical effect of disburdening "the memory of all the
load of the previous steps, and at the same time, affords it a considerable assistance in retaining the
result" (Analytical Society 1813, 39). Secondly, symbolical algebra was more productive than
geometrical definitions and proofs, as it made possible the consideration of problems that, when
stated in common language or geometrical form, were impossible to solve due to their complexity
and lengthiness. The authors argued.
By separating the difficulties of a question, [analysis] overcomes those which appear
almost insuperable when combined, or at least, [in] reducing each to its least terms,
leaves them as the acknowledged landmarks of its progress, open to approach on all
sides, should ulterior discovery furnish any rational hope of their removal. Meanwhile ...
simple relations are found to exist between the most refractory functions, and even
when the difficulties themselves prove invincible, their nature at least becomes
thoroughly understood, and a means of evading them almost universally pointed out
(Analytical Society 1813, ii-iii).
Thirdly, symbolical algebra offered a new definition of mathematical "truth". The shift to a
"symbolical" approach to algebra meant that mathematical objects could be manipulated, and their
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relations justified, in terms of internally-defined equivalencies (Durand-Richard 2001). This was not
an attack on a priori truth, the Society members contended. Nor was it an attack on God—the
provider of irrefragable, eternal truths. Rather, as Babbage and Herschel explained, symbolical
analysis guaranteed a new form of logical certainty, which emerged from the recognition of
universal operations at play between conventionally established entities. In the eyes of the
Analytical Society, symbolical algebra was both productive and religiously pious.
As a case in point, the algebraists offered an account of the Taylor theorem, otherwise known as the
"theory of the development of functions" (Analytical Society 1813, iv). In the Memoirs, Babbage and
Herschel talked of having to "reimport the exotic" in outlining the historical progression of the
theorem that "immortalized the name of Brook Taylor." Taylor had initially developed his theorem
using a method "not remarkable for its rigor." Joseph-Louis Lagrange (1736-1813) had recast Taylor's
power series in his Theorie des Fonctions Anaiytiques (1797). In that work, the Frenchman had
independently demonstrated Taylor's theorem by applying it to various branches of differential
calculus without recourse to any notion of limits, infinitesimals or velocities. Meanwhile, Louis
Franpois Arbogast (1759-1803) had presented his own account of the theorem in a manuscript
presented to the Academy of Sciences in 1789. Lagrange's algebraic calculus was considered to be
the antithesis of Newton's fluxions—more so, even, than Leibniz's infinitesimals or D'Alembert's
limits. The British algebraists viewed Lagrange's method as operating free of the conceptual tethers
(namely, infinitesimals) strangle-holding common algebra and other approaches to the calculus
(Fisch 1994, 249). Lagrange and Arbogast reinvented Taylor's series and had "established it as the
true basis of the differential calculus" (Analytical Society 1813, iv). French mathematicians had
initiated what Society members considered to be the "greatest revolution which has yet taken place
in analytical science" (Analytical Society 1813, iv-v).
In the hands of Lagrange and Arbogast, differential calculus had improved upon Taylor's original
contribution by making manifest the latent symbolical relations within Taylor series. So highly did
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the young Cambridge algebraists esteem the symbolical version of Taylor's theorem, and Lagrange
and Arbogast's development of the "differential", that they excised Lacroix's d'Alembertian account
of limits in their Memoirs, and replaced it with an account of Taylor's theorem according to
Lagrange. Readers of the Society's first Memoir were urged to adopt Lagrange's "derived" functions,
in which successive coefficients in the expansion of a function of a Taylor series defined successive
derivatives of the function itself. With this symbolical algebraic account in hand, Society members
viewed themselves as having established the predominance of symbolical thinking, which had as its
aim the development of simple and efficacious tools that could productively advance mathematical
research through the revelation of new symbolical relations, while at the same time preserving
certainty in its logical form.
Babbage and Herschel offered more examples to justify their belief in the power of this symbolical
approach. They discussed the usefulness of tabulating integral tables, which allowed for complicated
partial differential equations to be calculated more efficiently. Such efforts had already effected
results through the "labours" of Fagnani, Euler, Landen and Legendre, all of whom played a role in
reducing complicated integrals, such as f where P is a rational and integral function of x, and R
is a quadratic radical of the form y/{a + fix + yx2 + Sx3 + £x4) , to three species of problems. In
other words, "a variety of integral formulae have, by dint of indefatigable research on all hands,
been reduced to the evaluation of [a few] functions," the Society authors concluded (Analytical
Society 1813, vii). They also highlighted the simplification resulting from the development of integral
tables, which could be used to solve difficult integrals composed of "transcendants". In the hands of
European practitioners, the Society members argued, those analytical techniques had achieved a
sophisticated level of expediency and technical precision (Analytical Society 1813, vi). As Babbage
and Herschel concluded,
It is this connection with fresher sources, which can restore fertility to subjects
apparently the most exhausted, and which cannot be too earnestly recommended to
those who wish to enlarge the limits of analysis. The fire of improvement, however
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dormant, and seemingly extinct, may yet break forth at the contact of some external
flame. The history of mathematics affords too many instances of the most distant
principles coming into play on the most unexpected occasions, to allow of our ever
despairing of success in such enquiries ... [To date] the multitude of different methods
and artifices, which for the most part lead only to the same results, and whose power is
limited by the same points of difficulty, is at length grown into a very serious evil. Our
continental neighbours seem sensible of this ... digesting various points into a systematic
form. But there is still much to be done in this line. That man would render a most
invaluable service to science, who would undertake the labour of reducing into a
reasonable compass the whole essential part of analysis, with its applications, curtailing
its superfluous luxuriance, rejecting its artificial difficulties, and giving connection and
unity to its scattered members (Analytical Society 1813, xxi-xxii).
According to the Memoirs, symbolical algebra was productive, efficient and capable of unifying
previously disparate mathematical and natural philosophical concepts.
Problematically, the lack of public support for such work in Britain had delayed the development of
similar advances locally. Babbage and Herschel invoked two case studies to legitimate their
doomsday view. The laborious work of Christian Kramp (1760-1826), who had calculated a table of
values for the integral f e'x" ■ dx in the case of n = 2, and the work of the Scottish manufacturer
(and leisure mathematician), William Spence (1777-1815), who had offered a table of integral values
x Ln~^(I "I~x^dxfor the "logarithmic transcendants" (defined by Spence as L"(l±x)= JQ — , where
L1 = lnx), had largely gone unnoticed.11 The Analytical Society members concluded that Spence's
work had "displayed] considerable ingenuity and a depth of reading rarely to be met with among
the mathematical writers of this country." Yet, "there is little hope of seeing...similar efforts" in the
future, as the mathematician who chooses to engage in such work would find "his labours will, at all
events, meet with little remuneration" (Analytical Society 1813, vii-viii).
French Revolutionary motifs among the Analytical Society members
Despite the restoration of the monarchy in France, anti-French sentiment still filled the halls of
Cambridge's lofty colleges throughout the 1810s. Dissent was not tolerated well. The works of
11
Guicciardini notes that Spence tabulated results for the functions L2 and L3, and applied them to the integrals:
1
/ FL'(V)dx,f FL2dx,where F = X/(a + bx ± X2)? and X and V are rational functions (Guicciardini 1989, 106).
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Lagrange, along with those of Pierre Simon Laplace (1749-1827) and Sylvestre Lacroix (1765-1843),
were considered the tainted products of the French Revolution. Because Lagrange's treatises on the
calculus were written in response to the needs of the Republican educational system, a rejection of
Lagrange was a rejection of the Napoleonic system itself (Grattan-Guinness 1990). Representative of
a young generation of quasi-revolutionary supporters, Peacock, Babbage and Herschel openly
adopted the works of the French revolutionary authors. Their choice to do so was representative of
similar choices being made more broadly by the sons of the country's middle-class industrialists,
who were flooding the university's lecture halls. While the bulk of Cambridge's student population
still hailed from the families of landed British aristocracy, the bulk of its Wranglers hailed
overwhelmingly from Britain's emergent middle class of professionals, some of whom sympathized
with the Republican ideals of egalitarianism. Those middle-class sons were a minority at Cambridge,
but they were radical in their political views.
Prior to entering Cambridge, Herschel, for instance, had travelled to France with his parents where
he had met Napoleon. In an 1812 letter to Babbage, Herschel called his friend "citizen" in the French
style. In a letter to Whittaker in 1813, he disparaged the failed state of Britain, lauding the idea of a
sweeping revolutionary make-over. Herschel wrote,
Look at our overgrown metropolis and the kindred tumours of the second magnitude
which have arisen in every limb of this diseased and corrupted body each tainting the
little circle around it, each daily increasing in extent and foulness - The nation is
apoplectic. - Choked with its own population - Overloaded with its useless
manufactures and decayed commerce - The sin has been crying, and the expiation must
be vast, and sweeping and satisfactory (Becher 1995, 410).
As the middle-class son of a court astronomer, Herschel was an unapologetic critic of the Church.
Though he eventually performed his duties in the Senate House Examination in 1813 (an initial part
of which questioned students on their religious beliefs), to finish Senior Wrangler, he was explicit in
his rejection of the Church's authority in the university's governance structure. Herschel argued that
humans possess the rational capacity to organize empirical data so as to discover abstract and
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universal truths that lay beyond the temporally observable world of phenomena. It is, therefore, the
duty of humans to be makers of their own destinies.12
The ardently critical Babbage, meanwhile, was the middle-class son of a banker. Early in his
university career, Babbage transferred from Trinity College to Peterhouse, as he had refused to
ordain as a minister—a prerequisite for Trinity fellowships. Babbage's move to Peterhouse did him
little good, however. His religious views led him to fail the initial Acts of the Senate House exam.13
Babbage ultimately graduated with an ordinary degree, having been denied the right to write the
formal Tripos.14 Sympathizing as he did with French deism, Babbage viewed God as a distant actor
12
Herschel made his religious views patently clear in his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830)—
a text in which he linked the notions of divine knowledge to considerations of universal, harmonizing truth (i.e.
operational relationships) in mathematics and natural philosophy. Herschel argued that, in carrying out his
investigations, the mathematician and natural philosopher finds: "The study of one [science] prepares him to
understand and appreciate another, refinement follows on refinement, wonder on wonder, till his faculties become
bewildered in admiration, and his intellect falls back on itself in utter helplessness of arriving at an end. [Thus] he feels
himself capable of entering only very imperfectly into these recesses of his own bosom, and analyzing the operations of
his mind—in this as in all other things, in short, 'a being darkly wise'', seeing that all the longest life and most vigorous
intellect can given him power to discover ... serves only to place him on the very frontier of knowledge, and afford a
distant glimpse of boundless realms beyond" (Herschel 1987, 4-6). Furthermore, "There is something in the
contemplation of general laws which powerfully persuades ... to commit ourselves unreservedly to their disposal; while
the observation of the calm, energetic regularity of nature, the immense scale of her operations, and the certainty with
which her ends are attained, tends, irresistibly, to tranquilize and re-assure the mind, and render it less accessible to
repining, selfish, and turbulent emotions. And this it does, not by debasing our nature into weak compliances and abject
submission to circumstances, but by filling us, as from an inward spring ... ; by showing us our strength and innate
dignity, and by calling upon us for the exercise of those powers and faculties by which we are susceptible of the
comprehension of so much greatness, and which form, as it were, a link between ourselves and the best and noblest
benefactors of our species, with whom we hold communion in thoughts and participate in discoveries which have raised
them above their fellow mortals, and brought them near to their Creator" (Herschel 1987,16-17).
13
The Acts were the pre-classification system the university used to place students into differing groups for the final days
of Tripos examination. The Acts were composed of two mathematical questions and one moral question. The entire
event was moderated by a Master of Arts. In Babbage's case, the M.A. was the Reverend Thomas Jephson, a devout
clergyman. In his response to the moral question put to him, Babbage apparently sought to argue the thesis that God
was material. Thomas Greenwood, a fellow member of the Analytical Society, and son of a muslin manufacturer, later
recounted: "Jephson's Piety received such a violent shock that 'Descendas' [fail] thundered from his lips ... All
Peterhouse was in an uproar, when the direful news came that their crack man had got a descendas" (Becher 1995,
408).
14
Note that Babbage was eventually brought back into the Cambridge fold in 1827, when he was made Lucasian Professor.
The position was made available as a result of George Airy's move from the post to the Plumian Chair following
Woodhouse's death. Babbage's appointment to the famed Lucasian chair was, however, not the result of his own doing.
It was, rather, the direct result of Peacock and Herschel's machinations. By the late-1820s, those two actors had
established an increasing degree of political control within university affairs. They conspired to organize support for
Babbage's election while he was in Italy with his wife. Wilkes (1990) has offered an insightful account of how it is that
Babbage, with his radical views in politics, and his vehement stance on mathematical philosophy, was also snobbish and
ungrateful in his personal behaviour—this latter character flaw being the product of Babbage's upper middle-class
upbringing, which had allowed him to live free from financial concern as an undergraduate, despite having no
aristocratic links. Babbage had found himself in a dire financial state following the abrupt end of his university career. As
a result, he had begun to apply to various posts in the hopes of gaining employment to satisfy his working father, though
he was unsuccessful in most of his efforts. As election for the Lucasian chair neared, Whewell, among others, suspected
Babbage would fail to succeed—his religious views were still too outlandish for wide acceptance at the university. At the
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uninvolved in the daily operations of the world. The adoption of d-notation, or "D'ism", in Babbage's
pun, was the young man's way of defending his view that humans ought to forge their own
destinies.
By contrast with his more radical colleagues, Peacock's religious attitudes lay within the framework
of the established theism of the university. The son of a poor clergyman and school master, Peacock
had been awarded a sizarship to attend Trinity College. Soon afterward, he was awarded a college
scholarship for the needy sons of clergy. Having graduated Second Wrangler and first Smith's
prizeman in 1813, he was then awarded a Trinity fellowship, after which he spent a decade as
college tutor. Peacock often operated as the voice of sober second thought within the Algebraic
Society, when it first started to function. When the Society's 1813 Memoirs failed to sell, due in large
part to its explicitly pro-French and anti-fluxionist stance, Peacock encouraged its members to issue
a second publication that was more conciliatory towards the university's established views. He
argued that explicit attacks on the fluxionists should not be included in the second book, so as to
avoid having the text labeled pro-French or anti-British (Becher 1995). The Society's second
publication—a translation of Lacroix's book—was well-thought out. The translation contained a
number of significant alterations to the original, offering a definition of limits that was more to the
liking of the university's traditional tutors. Peacock's calculations proved profitable; two hundred
copies of the Lacroix translation were sold in Cambridge within a month of the book's publication.
The successful publication of the Lacroix translation also opened up a channel for further attempts
to include continental techniques within the university's mainstream curriculum. Admittedly, it was
a temporal and unstable channel—one that could have closed up had it not been for continued
institutional efforts made by Peacock and his supporters throughout the 1820s. Nonetheless, it
allowed Peacock to make the seemingly audacious move as an 1817 Tripos "moderator" (i.e.
same time, as a sign, perhaps, of middle-class wealth, Babbage neither resided in Cambridge nor lectured as he was
expected to do as Lucasian Chair (Wilkes 1990, 210-212).
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examiner) to pose questions using Leibniz's c/-notation—a controversial act that generated voluble
criticism. As Peacock later told a colleague,
I assure you that I shall never cease to exert myself to the utmost in the cause of reform,
and that I will never decline any office which may increase my power to effect it. I am
nearly certain of being nominated to the office of Moderator in the year 1818-1819, and
as I am an examiner in virtue of my office, for the next year I shall pursue a course even
more decided than thitherto, since I shall feel that men have been prepared for the
change, and will then be enabled to have acquired a better system by the publication of
improved elementary books. I have considerable influence as a lecturer, and I will not
neglect it. It is by silent perseverance only that we can hope to reduce the many-headed
monster of prejudice and make the University answer her character as the loving
mother of good learning and science (Macfarlane 1916, 4).
Peacock's bold language should be qualified. There was such great opposition to his initial attempts
to introduce cf-notation that Peacock himself feared he had achieved nothing but vitriolic opposition.
His friends concurred. In a letter to Herschel in March 1817, Whewell wrote:
You have I suppose seen Peacock's examination papers. They have made a considerable
outcry here and I have not much hope that he will be moderator again. I do not think he
took precisely the right way to introduce the true faith. He has stripped his analysis of its
applications and turned it naked among them. Of course all the prudery of the
University is up and shocked at the indecency of the spectacle. The cry is 'not enough
philosophy' (Wilkes 1990, 213).
However, due to the fact that the symbolical algebraic network had by then convinced sufficient
numbers of college tutors of the worth of modifying the university's curriculum, Peacock was—
contrary to all expectations—again appointed to the position of Moderator in the 1819 session. He
capitalized on the opportunity by posing his d-notation questions again.
Importantly, Peacock's second attempt to introduce d-notation on the Tripos was soon followed by
supporting publications. Whewell's textbooks in mechanics displayed continental symbolism and
George Airy's (1801-1892) textbooks in optics and astronomy did likewise.15 Both authors helped to
15
By 1819, William Whewell (1794-1866) had already disappointed his analytical colleagues by advocating for a more
traditional approach to mathematical research in his Elementary Treatise on Mechanics (1819). Natural philosophy
should determine, first, the structure of the universe through the inductive observation of empirical phenomena.
Secondly, mathematics ought to be applied as a tool in natural philosophy and thus rendered subordinate to it.
Whewell's view was that French mathematicians had become overly attached to, "the forms and processes of pure
analysis, which they have cultivated with such signal success [and which] had given them disrelish for the more physical
and inductive part of the reasoning, and made them comparatively indifferent to the manner in which they arrive at that
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institutionalize symbolical analysis at Cambridge in the years immediately following the 1817 and
1819 exams. Peacock also issued his own Collection of Examples of the Applications of the
Differential and Integral Calculus (1820), including contributions by Herschel. His hope was that his
text would become a Cambridge coaching book used in training students for future Tripos exams.16
The Tripos as an institution
The role of the Tripos exam in this process of institutionalization deserves special mention. By 1780,
unofficial changes to the structure of The Senate House Examination (the official name of the Tripos)
had placed the exam at the centre of Cambridge undergraduate degrees. By the 19th-century, the
"hotly-contested order of precedence"—i.e. the student ranking of performance on the exam—was
posted at the end of the exam week and students fought for top place. The exam became a written
test in 1828. Past exams and solution guides were then published and used as training tools
(Warwick 2003, 115).17 Private mathematics coaches increased in importance as the rank of Senior
Wrangler became, almost exclusively, the domain of those trained by established Cambridge tutors
such as William Hopkins (1793-1866). Thus, by the 1830s, the Senate House Examination had come
to embody two widely-accepted opinions evident in early-Victorian British society. The first was a
view propagated by former Analytical Society members, which held that examinations constituted
the best means of judging talent in a society still weighed down by the economic barriers that kept
talented people at the social periphery of British life. Efforts to move away from aristocratic and
religious authorities could be promoted by competitive systems in which accolades would be
bestowed upon those who merited kudos rather than inherited it.
part of the subject where the machinery of analysis begins to work. Hence those principles which mechanics must
borrow of experiment are often made to depend on abstract reasoning and artificial definitions: or introduced as self-
evident, with some slight notice as to their agreement with matters of fact" (Whewell 1819, vi).
16
It is important to keep in mind that rise of Lagrangian-inspired calculus on the Tripos in the years following 1819 was an
addition to, not a complete usurpation of, what had gone before. On the 1820 exam, for instance, students were still
asked to "Explain by short examples the method of exhaustions, of indivisibles, and of prime and ultimate ratios." By
1830, questions still appeared on the exam asking students to "Define the Differential Coefficient, (1) according to the
method of limits; (2) according to La Grange's method. [And] Show that both methods lead to the same result" (Wright
1831). Symbolical algebra was an add-on rather than a revolutionary overthrow of previous content.
17
Prior to 1827, students were required to respond to orally-dictated questions—the oral diction being an outgrowth of
the traditional Senate House Examination disputations, in which the topics were relayed to candidates verbally.
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The second opinion was embodied in the views of Britain's rising industrial class more generally. It
held that competition and free enterprise were inherently good. Cambridge University
administrators played to this widespread industrial belief, arguing that, with its competitive ethos,
Cambridge could produce the Empire's new leaders and innovators. The Tripos became an
entrenched institution within British society, serving as an emblem of meritocracy and progress.
Indeed, by the end of the 1820s, the yearly ritual of the Tripos exam had already become a cultural
rite of passage for many young Cantabrigians and a cultural standard of excellence for Britons more
generally. It also came to serve as the model for British civil service examinations following federal
reforms in the 1850s, and it became the model for university mathematics exams issued by
universities established throughout the colonial empire and the United States. By 1873, the famed
Cambridge coach and textbook writer, Isaac Todhunter (1820-1884), claimed, "Ours is an age of
examinations, and the University of Cambridge may claim the merit of originating this characteristic
of the period." Todhunter went so far as to argue that the Tripos was "the model for rigour, justice
and importance, of a long succession of institutions of a similar kind which have since been
constructed" (Gascoigne 1984a, 547).
The rise of the Tripos must be considered in light of Cambridge's internal political battles. By the turn
of the century, the university was under severe pressure to reform the jealously guarded autonomy
that each college had developed over its respective curriculum. The Tripos was a mechanism by
which that autonomy could be degraded. It was the only university-wide examination that all
students seeking to graduate with honors had to complete; it was the institution through which
reforming administrators at the university-level sought to wrest power away from college fiefdoms.
The examination allowed the university's administration—as small and as weak as it was—to
maintain ultimate control over the dissemination of degrees. The more important the university-
wide Tripos became, the less important individual college rankings and curricula became (Warwick
2003). Political efforts to centralize power hardly meant that colleges suffered an absolute castration
49
of their abilities to dominate the examination process. As all Masters of Arts were eligible to
examine students, examiners from differing colleges could query and scrutinize top performers from
rival colleges in order to bolster their own. The phenomenon was particularly virulent at St. John's
and Trinity, both of which were colleges that tried to rival the growing reputation of the university's
Tripos by issuing college-based exams with internal rankings. Yet, under the pressure of a mid-
century parliamentary inquiry into the status of education at Cambridge, the university also became
the poster-child for curricular reform across the country. Though the colleges continued to possess
resources that rendered the central university a miniature financial foe, it was the university that
ultimately provided the "lustre of a Senior Wranglership" (Gascoigne 1984a, 557). By the 1830s, that
"lustre" referred to mathematical prominence. A top Wrangler was a top symbolical algebraist.
Alongside the institutionalization of symbolical algebra on the Tripos, another output of the
Analytical Society (which stopped being a "Society" only a few years after its establishment, as
members graduated and moved on to fellowship careers) was the formation of the Cambridge
Philosophical Society in 1819. The geologist, Adam Sedgwick (1785-1873), and the botanist, John
Henslow (1796-1861), conceived of the Society during a tour of the Isle of Wight. It was meant to be
a corresponding society devoted to a broad repertoire of emerging research. The Society's
objectives were defined by the mandate to promote "scientific enquiries" and facilitate "the
communication of facts connected with the advancement of Philosophy and Natural History" (Hall
1969, 7). By the end of the 1820s, 170 Fellows and £300 in private investment had flowed into the
group. Though the Society stated its goal in broad terms—i.e. as the advancement of all forms of
natural philosophical inquiry—the Philosophical Society became a conduit for primarily
mathematical research. Of the papers published in 1820 (the Society's first year of collaboration),
eight of 11 contributions (published in Volume I, Part I, of the Transactions of the Cambridge
Philosophical Society) were written by Herschel, Babbage, Whewell, Sedgwick or John Willis Clarke
(1833-1910), the Cambridge professor of anatomy (Cannon 1964, 72). Mathematical discourse
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predominated. Furthermore, the secretaries of the group up to 1850 included Sedgwick, Henslow,
Peacock, Whewell, the university teacher and architectural historian Robert Willis (1800-1875), and
Hopkins—three of whom (Peacock, Whewell and Hopkins) advanced symbolical algebra as a primary
methodology for research within the pages of the Society's journal. That journal soon became a
vehicle for the dissemination and propagation of a "Cambridge School" of analytical mathematics.
The Cambridge Philosophical Society thus served to institutionalize symbolical algebraic research as
a model and standard for mathematical engagement into the mid-century.
Professionalizing science and mathematics in the 1830s
The rise in prominence of the Tripos, and the establishment of the Cambridge Philosophical Society,
was not enough to convince everyone that Britain was now at the forefront of mathematical
research. When asked during his visit to Cambridge in 1842 to name the greatest living English
mathematician, Carl Jacob Jacobi (1804-1851) infamously responded, "There is none" (Macfarlane
1916, 3). That Jacobi's comments were overly cynical, there is little doubt. But that British
mathematics had failed to gain notice on the international stage well into the 1840s, there is some
justification. Jacobi's statement summed up what had been a growing sentiment among numerous
practitioners for years. As a nation, Britain was perceived to be scientific decline. The "declinist"
debate over the status of mathematics and natural philosophy gave rise to two specific concerns.
The first related to the question of Britain's place in the world. The second related to the role of
continental mathematics in Britain's hoped for revivification.
In a series of articles starting in 1804 in the Edinburgh Review, Playfair famously denounced the
"decline" of British mathematics and natural philosophy. He argued British mathematicians had to
acquaint themselves with mathematics from the continent (i.e. Laplacian mathematics) if they
hoped to make any worthy achievements in the future (Horsley 1804). The views propounded by
later-century "declinists" in the 1830s shared some of Playfair's sentiments, and even drew on his
concerns. But, the declinists of the 1830s were a breed of their own. Their concerns were shaped by
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the fact that analysis and symbolical algebra had, by that time, come to enjoy a happy home at
Cambridge. Yet, international recognition of this fact was nowhere to be found. Much blame for this
seeming lack of British exceptionalism on the global mathematical scene was directed at the Royal
Society. Its mismanagement and poor governance were considered by actors such as Babbage to be
the root of decrepitude in British mathematics. In his Reflections on the Decline of Science in England
(1830), Babbage, by then Lucasian Professor of Mathematics, invoked industrial metaphors to
highlight the lack of efficiency and productivity engendered in the structure of the Royal Society.
Babbage argued the outmoded philosophical body had severed Britain from the productive world
and impeded the advancement and progress of natural philosophy more generally. He wrote,
The progress of knowledge convinced the world that the system of the division of labour
and of co-operation was as applicable to science as it had been found available for the
improvement of manufacturers. The want of competition in science produced effects
similar to those which the same cause gives birth to in the arts. The cultivators of botany
were the first to feel that the range of knowledge embraced by the Royal Society was
too comprehensive to admit of sufficient attention to their favourite subject, and they
established the Linnean Society. After many years, a new science arose, and the
Geological Society was produced. At another and more recent epoch, the friends of
astronomy, urged by the wants of their science, united to establish the Astronomical
Society. Each of these bodies found that the attention devoted to their science by the
parent establishment was insufficient for their warrants, and each in succession
experienced from the Royal Society the most determined opposition (Babbage 1989,
21).
In a more sarcastic tone, Babbage continued,
Instituted by the most enlightened philosophers, solely for the promotion of the natural
sciences, that learned body justly conceived that nothing could be more likely to render
these young institutions permanently successful than discouragement and opposition at
their commencement. Finding their first attempts so eminently successful, they
redoubled the severity of their persecution, and the result was commensurate with their
exertions, and surpassed even their wildest anticipations (Babbage 1989, 21).
The Society was closed, elitist, and reluctant to advance British natural philosophy or mathematics. It
required reform at its most fundamental level if it were to remain relevant.
Babbage offered a series of recommendations for such reform, including changes to the Society's
publications standards. He argued the Society should include all data in its published experiments, as
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opposed to simply publishing the most "accurate" findings. He recommended it change its
experimental and methodological "principles" so as to oust "fraudsters," "hoaxes" and "cooks"—i.e.
those individuals who, of "a hundred observations," could pick out "fifteen or twenty which will do
for serving up." The Society had encouraged and protected poor scientific practices. In so doing it, it
had excluded those individuals who had contributed most to the scientific advancements of the day:
botanists, astronomers, medical experimenters, and mathematicians (Babbage 1989, 91).
The lack of any other nationally-supported scientific research program led to gloomy assessments of
Britain's technical competencies among other practitioners, too. When, in 1828, the government
abruptly abolished its Board of Longitude, one of the few state-funded natural philosophical
agencies (in which Herschel had served as commissioner) to produce new research, a sense of
abandonment came to prevail within certain research communities. In response, provincially-based
reformers mobilized to launch a new nation-wide research network to counter-act the lack of
research support flowing from federal coffers. Local philosophical groups, including the Manchester
Literary and Philosophical Society, the Bristol Philosophical Institution, and the Yorkshire
Philosophical Society worked to establish a research network that resided outside the confines of
any one particular university. Mobilized by the energetic Scottish inventor and natural philosopher,
David Brewster (1781-1868), Herschel, Whewell, Babbage and Forbes soon engaged in a flurry of
letter writing that resulted in the first meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of
Science (BAAS) in York, hosted by the Yorkshire Philosophical Society (Morrell and Thackray 1981).
To be sure, the location of the first meeting was not acceptable to all of London's intellectual elite.
Many of Britain's savants protested the idea that a newly-established British scientific institution was
to be born in a remote part of the country. The significant absence of enthusiasm from all corners of
the disciplinary spectrum, and the physical absence of major figures from Cambridge, Oxford, and
London, demonstrated the first meeting of the BAAS was a fledgling attempt to unify a
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heterogeneous group of "reformers".18 Babbage, Whewell and Herschel, for instance, all expressed
varying degrees of doubt regarding the form and organization of the Society. The BAAS's second
meeting was thus moved to London to bring established actors into the fold. Meetings were
thereafter organized at locations centring on major academic sites including Cambridge, Oxford,
Edinburgh and Dublin. Those meetings led to a series of membership expansions that drew in local
gentry and "gentlemen of science". The BAAS grew to become a cultural institution of significance by
the end of the decade (Cannon 1978; Howarth 1922; Williams 1961).
George Peacock's symbolical algebraic philosophy
Within this milieu of professionalizing science, Peacock's efforts to institutionalize symbolical algebra
stand out as particularly noteworthy. As a primary disseminator of the new symbolical algebraic
philosophy, Peacock's role in the advancement of symbolical techniques in both teaching and
research should not be understated.19 By 1814, Peacock (Second Wrangler, 1809) had been elected
to a fellowship at Trinity College. He served as college lecturer and later tutor. As a fellow, Peacock
engaged in various activities aimed at the improvement of education, including a restructuring of
Cambridge's administrative and examination system. When Peacock first posed questions in
continental notation on the 1817 exam, he rang a warning bell to students, coaches and university
administrators indicating that continental mathematics was no longer the stuff of mere peripheral
interest or extra-curricular activity. By the 1820s, the Tripos, and the culture of "coaching" at
Cambridge that had emerged around it, meant that questions set on the Tripos exam began to
establish the standard for curriculum design (Warwick 2003).
18
Of the three Cambridge participants present, only one was well-known outside of Cambridge. It was James Willliam
Geldart (1785 - 1876), professor of law (Morrell and Thackray 1981, 85). The London contingent included only a small
group of geologists, led by Roderick Murchison, president of the Geological Society the following year, the zoologists
John Gould (1804-1881) and James Rennie (1787-1867) (Morrell and Thackray 1981, 87).
19
Peacock's social involvements were another defining aspect of his life. As later Dean of Ely, he advocated for improved
sanitation in the region's waterworks and a widening of access to basic education for children of the working poor
(Pycior 1981, 25).
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As with many of his contemporaries, however, Peacock was woefully aware of the implications that
poorly planned curricula could have had on the youth of the day. Questions concerning
mathematical methodology could not be distinguished from questions concerning moral education.
Curriculum reform necessarily implied pedagogical reform, which implied a change to the standards
and norms of Cambridge's "moral" and "liberal" education. Those norms were what had
distinguished Cambridge and other British universities for centuries; preserving a place for them
figured prominently in Peacock's deliberations over the proper method of introducing students to
symbolical algebra. In his entry-level textbook, Treatise on Algebra (1830), Peacock's central
question was not whether symbolical algebra was useful, but rather how and when it was right to
introduce the new concepts to students.
As a young academic, Peacock had been attracted to symbolical algebra due to his interest in the
problem of negative numbers and imaginary "quantities". His response to the problem of imaginary
numbers had been to argue that the "symbolical algebraist"—i.e. the mathematician who was
interested in using arithmetical operations (such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division)
in conjunction with symbols that represent unknowns—was free to play around with operations as
he wished (Pycior 1976; 1981). The mathematician was free to assign arbitrary rules, invoke new
meanings and construct innovative symbols to explore symbolical relationships without having to
concern himself with physical reality. Peacock maintained that analysis is fundamentally
conventional in nature, though not temporal. The symbols being operated upon do not need to
represent identifiable, temporal quantities to gain their legitimacy. Peacock argued the value of
algebraic results is to be found in the operations used, not in the quantities produced (Durand-
Richard 2001). For Peacock, algebra was a logical endeavour—one that highlighted the abstract and
universal nature of symbolical "equivalences". Not surprisingly, Peacock avoided geometrical
representations of negative or imaginary numbers, as such representations were temporal and
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particular. In his view, they were irrelevant to the universalizing project embodied in symbolical
analysis.
In his Treatise, Peacock clarified the matter further by establishing distinct boundaries around
particular types of mathematical operations. He first identified "symbolical algebra" as the third step
in a three-step process of Lockean abstraction. The first step involved arithmetic reasoning; the
second step involved algebraic reasoning; the third step involved symbolical reasoning, whereby
concerns over the physical meaning of symbols and their rules of manipulation faded away entirely.
Peacock argued that arithmetical algebra corresponds to natural language and existent entities,
while symbolical algebra marks an abrupt change in the style and content of reasoning. In symbolical
reasoning, the mathematician focuses upon the operations at hand. The operations carry the
procedure through and the meaningfulness of the results obtained is based entirely upon the logic
of the operations used. The mathematician could abandon all concerns over the empirical
significance of particular mathematical objects. The primary aim of the symbolical algebraist was to
explore operational and relational truths.
In his Treatise, Peacock attacked the views of older mathematicians such as William Frend (1757-
1841), a former second Wrangler, and Francis Maseres (1731-1824), Fellow of Clare College—two of
the most vocal opponents of the use of the negative and imaginary numbers. In the opinions of
Frend and Maseres, mathematics involved the manipulation of quantities. Quantities (or
magnitudes) could not be negative or "imaginary" as no existent referents could ever be imagined
for such mathematical objects. As Frend had written in his Principles ofAlgebra (1796),
A number may be greater or less than another number; it may be added to, taken from,
multiplied into, or divided by, another number; but in other respects it is very
intractable; though the whole world should be destroyed, one will be one, and three will
be three, and no art whatever can change their nature. You may put a mark before one,
which it will obey; it submits to be taken away from a number greater than itself, but to
attempt to take it away from a number less than itself is ridiculous. Yet this is attempted
by algebraists who talk of a number less than nothing; of multiplying a negative number
into a negative number and thus producing a positive number; of a number being
56
imaginary. Hence they talk of two roots to every equation of the second order, and the
learner is to try which will succeed in a given equation; they talk of solving an equation
which requires two impossible roots to make it soluble; they can find out some
impossible numbers which being multiplied together produce unity. This is all jargon, at
which common sense recoils; but from its having been once adopted, like many other
figments, it finds the most strenuous supporters among those who love to take things
upon trust and hate the colour of a serious thought (Frend 1796-9,10).
In his Treatise, Peacock addressed Frend directly, aligning himself with early-century advocates of
symbolical mathematics, including Playfair, Woodhouse, and the former professor of rhetoric at the
University of Edinburgh, William Greenfield.20 Peacock argued the science of algebra had to
distinguish between "arithmetical algebra" and "symbolical algebra". The distinction pivoted on the
question of which entities could be dealt with in each respective branch of mathematical practice. In
arithmetical algebra, the standard rules of arithmetic hold and the symbols representing unknown
values are directly related to meaningful, existent quantities (i.e. "x" can stand in for apples or
geometrical lengths). In symbolical algebra, a sort of "freedom" unknown to the traditional field of
arithmetical algebra holds sway. The entities involved can include negative or imaginary
"quantities", even though new rules become requisite for combining such entities. In those cases,
the interpretation of the outcomes of symbolical algebraic operations can still be linked to
meaningful processes in natural philosophy, though such linkages are not necessary to justify the
processes in and of themselves.
In the preface to his second edition of the treatise, the two-volume Treatise on Algebra (1842/1845),
Peacock acknowledged that his 1830 distinction between arithmetical and symbolical algebra had
not had the effect on teachers of elementary algebra that he had hoped for. This was largely due to
the imperfect development of the distinction he had advocated, he concluded. Thus, in the first
volume, Arithmetical Algebra (1842), and the second volume, Symbolical Algebra (1845), he more
profoundly highlighted the radical break he had intended to define a decade earlier. Peacock's aim in
20
For a detailed account of the role that these mathematicians played in defending the use of negative and imaginary
"quantities" in the late-18th and early 19th-centuries see (Rice 2001).
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the 1840s was to clearly identify symbolical algebra as a universalizing agent. He re-emphasized the
epistemological and procedural differences between arithmetical and symbolical algebra, and he
underlined the fact that symbolical algebra is dependent upon empirically justifiable operations in
arithmetic, though not bound to the original empirical content of that arithmetic. In arithmetical
algebra, he wrote, symbols always represent numbers, and the operations to which arithmetical
symbols are "submitted" are the same as those operations used in common arithmetic. Thus, the
signs - and + denote the operations of addition and subtraction "in their ordinary meaning." In
other words,
... in expressions such as a + b we must suppose a and b to be quantities of the same
kind; in others, like a — b, we must suppose a greater than b and therefore
homogeneous with it; in products and quotients, like ab and^- we must suppose the
multiplier and divisor to be abstract numbers; all results whatsoever, including negative
quantities, which are not strictly deducible as legitimate conclusions from the definitions
of the several operations must be rejected as impossible, or as foreign to the science
(Peacock 1845, 1).
In arithmetical algebra, every symbol has a direct representative in terms of digits (i.e. positive,
integer numbers). Furthermore, each combination or operation within arithmetical algebra results in
another identifiable integer number. If the result is not a positive integer, then the operation itself
and the symbols are "foreign" to the science.
In symbolical algebra, on the other hand, the rules of arithmetical algebra apply, but without the
concomitant restrictions. Indeed, symbolical algebra "removes altogether [the] restrictions" of
arithmetic. Peacock contended,
Symbolical subtraction differs from the same operation in arithmetical algebra in being
possible for all relations of value of the symbols or expressions employed. All the results
of arithmetical algebra which are deduced by the application of its rules, and which are
general in form though particular in value, are results likewise of symbolical algebra
where they are general in value as well as in form; thus the product of am and an which
is am+n when m and n are whole numbers and therefore general in form though
particular in value, will be their product likewise when m and n are general in value as
well as in form; the series for (a + b)n determined by the principles of arithmetical
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algebra when n is any whole number, if it be exhibited in a general form, without
reference to a final term, may be shown upon the same principle to the equivalent
series for (a + b)n when n is general both in form and value (Peacock 1842, vi).
For Peacock, the universality and generality of symbolical algebra constitutes its strength as a
method. In focusing on the irrelevance of the precise quantities of things represented by the
symbols, Peacock forced an ideological point upon his readers. Analysis includes the abstract
manipulation of unknowns. The manipulation and the expansion of mathematics can take place
without regard for physical reality. Operations are what analysts consider regardless of the existence
of the mathematical objects being related. As Peacock concluded,
In the further development of this science, we shall continue to be guided by the same
principle, making the results of defined operations, or the rules for forming them, the
basis of the corresponding operations and results in Symbolical Algebra, and also of the
interpretation of the meaning which must be given to them, whenever such
interpretation is practicable (Peacock 1845, 59).
The principle underlying this discussion is what Peacock termed the "principle of the permanence of
equivalent forms." The "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms" is the basis of Peacockian
symbolical algebra. It can be stated as follows:
Whatever algebraic forms are equivalent, when the symbols are general in form but
specific in value, will be equivalent likewise when the symbols are general in value as
well as in form (Peacock 1845, 59).
Thus, from Peacock's point of view, what remains constant when transitioning from an arithmetical
to a symbolical mode of thinking is reliance upon the operations in question. If the operations used
are well-defined in arithmetic, then they remain well (and legitimately) defined in symbolical
algebra, despite the fact that the entities they operate upon may or may not "exist" in the
symbolical algebraic case. Peacock made sure to appease elementary teachers and geometrically-
inclined professors by qualifying the "freedom" of symbolical analysis. It is, he noted, a freedom
dependent upon the empirical truths of arithmetical algebra from which it is originally derived. Yet,
Peacock also emphasized the special universalizing nature of abstract symbolical thought. In so
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doing, he legitimated the professional actions of those mathematicians who had chosen to engage in
analytical practices and who had abandoned geometrical proofs as the standard of reasonability.
Critical responses to Peacock's "principle"
The "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms" set off a philosophical debate within varied
professional circles over the nature of mathematical reasoning. Three brief case studies suffice to
characterize the responses that flourished in the wake of Peacock's definition of the "principle". The
first is that of De Morgan; the second is that of Charles Dodgson (1832-1898) (also known as Lewis
Carroll); and the third is that of George Boole (1779-1848). De Morgan's approach to mathematical
knowledge stemmed from an explicitly non-sectarian perspective. In the Tripos of 1827, De Morgan
graduated Fourth Wrangler. He never proceeded to the M.A. degree because of his religious
objections to the examination process. Having left Cambridge, he initially pursued legal studies, and
was only coaxed back into mathematical research when the London University (later University
College) opened in 1828. De Morgan was a Dissenter by upbringing. When he was offered the
London University's first Professorship of Mathematics, he accepted the post based upon his support
for the institution's non-sectarian stance (as well as its proposal to not base its studies on
Cambridge-style examinations) (Richards 1992, 55). That institutional support changed in 1866,
when De Morgan accused the university's council of refusing a candidate for the chair of Logic and
Mental Philosophy due to the candidate's religious credentials. As a direct result of the council's
disregard for De Morgan's concerns, De Morgan resigned from his post following nearly 40 years of
service (Ranyard 1871, 409).
Throughout that period, De Morgan's attitude toward symbolical algebra shifted in a number of
important ways. Historians have been divided over whether De Morgan was a proto-"formalist",
because of his initial activities with the early agitators in symbolical algebra (Nagel 1935), or whether
he was an opponent of the new philosophy of mathematics, given his later equivocations on the
usefulness of symbolical algebra (Richards 1980). Pycior (1983) has captured De Morgan's varying
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moods best in categorizing his work into three stages. The first stage begins in the late-1820s, when
De Morgan defended the traditionalist, British view that mathematical knowledge constitutes
irrevocable a priori truths that are self-evident in nature. Negative and imaginary quantities posed
something of a problem for De Morgan. His equivocation on the topic led him to adopt an
ambiguous position with regards to symbolical algebra. In his "Introductory Lecture Delivered at the
Opening of the Mathematical Classes in the University of London" (1828), and in his The Study and
Difficulties of Mathematics (1831), De Morgan viewed mathematical knowledge as self-evident and
rational. The presence of negative and imaginary numbers, which go against the self-evidence of
mathematical truth, could be explained away only by an appeal to particular empirical case studies.
Negatives, for instance, could be associated with debts or loses of income. De Morgan thus worked
to generate meaningful accounts of mathematical entities such as - a, a~x, and V^a (Pycior 1983).
Peacock's 1830 Treatise changed De Morgan's views on these matters. The Treatise provided De
Morgan with the resources required to shape a formidable response to his earlier concern over the
status of particular mathematical entities. Thus, in his second "stage" of engagement with
symbolical algebra, De Morgan used Peacock's philosophical division between arithmetic and
symbolical to furnish a means of teaching foundational lessons in morality and logic, while also
supporting the move towards advanced algebraic and analytical techniques. In his 1835 review of
Peacock's Treatise, De Morgan argued that mathematics is a revisable field of study. Its principles
are not axiomatic. Rather, they are based upon investigation and trial-and-error. De Morgan
published his review in the Quarterly Journal of Education, a journal set up by the Society for the
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (published between 1831 and 1835). In it, he defended the idea that
symbolical algebra was not a science based upon identifiable magnitudes or geometrical entities.
Rather, it was based upon the investigation of operations and relationships (De Morgan 1835). De
Morgan had even begun to advocate for a level of mathematical generalization that went beyond
what Peacock had proposed.
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Recall that, for Peacock, arithmetical algebra (i.e. the science of "quantity" and "magnitude") still
formed the basis of mathematical extension and abstraction. For Peacock, the laws of arithmetic
dictated the laws of algebra. For De Morgan, the rules of arithmetic constituted no limit to the laws
of algebra. Algebra could invoke entirely new rules in order to investigate new relationships and
operational procedures. De Morgan's criticism of Peacock went to the point of arguing there is no
clear link between arithmetic and algebra at all. Rather, algebra should be seen as entirely
independent of arithmetic and subject to differing rules of operation. Peacock's principle could be
done away with (De Morgan 1835, 300-304). Of particular importance is De Morgan's claim that
basic rules in arithmetic, such as commutative and associative principles, might not be needed in
certain algebraic systems. In problems of dynamics, for instance, descriptions of rotation might
invoke symbolical rules whereby combining (+) and (+) or (—) and (—) produces a (—) result, or
whereby combining (+) and (—) or (—) and (+) produces a result (+) result, contrary to common
arithmetic. He claimed,
The hypotheses, the meaning of the symbols, however laid down, are in our own power:
subject only to the great rule of all search after truth, that nothing is to be asserted as a
conclusion, more than is actually contained in the premises (De Morgan 1835, 99).
For De Morgan, the speculative aspect of symbolical algebra was now relevant to a liberal education
as it taught students to engage in "hypothetical reasoning".
By the late-1830s, however, De Morgan had faced difficulties in teaching this approach to his entry-
level students at UCL. He thus began to devote himself to the elaboration of a third "stage" of
engagement with symbolical algebra, in which he focused on developing the physical and
geometrical analogues to symbolic forms and operations. Whewell's diatribes against the immoral
nature of teaching young students symbolical algebra also caused De Morgan a great deal of
concern.21 He thus came to qualify his previous accounts by adopting an equivocating attitude. De
21
By the 1830s, Whewell had distinguished between advocacy of permanence in "liberal" education and the materialism
and temporality inherent in analytical and algebraic thinking. In his Thoughts on the Study of Mathematics, as a Part of a
Liberal Education (1835), he contended that geometrical reasoning was superior from an educational point of view to
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Morgan never repeated his wholehearted endorsement of the investigative and hypothetical nature
of symbolical algebra, but neither did he abandon his endeavour to develop the field further. Rather,
De Morgan encouraged students to seek out greater meaning in "applied mathematics" and he
disseminated his newly pragmatic views through a series of lectures delivered from 1839 to 1844 to
his students at UCL. Entitled "On the Foundation of Algebra," his lectures maintained that algebra
could be divided into two branches: the technical (i.e. symbolical algebraic) and the logical. Technical
algebra is not a "science", De Morgan argued; it is an exploratory "Chinese puzzle" and it is
sometimes even "useless" (De Morgan 1842, 289). On the other hand, "logical" algebra (also called
"double" and "complete") constitutes meaningful science.
In his Trigonometry and Double Algebra (1849), De Morgan developed his so-called "double algebra"
further, by defining it as the algebra of imaginary numbers. The adjective "double" stemmed from
the fact that such algebras involved two components: length and direction. De Morgan stated his
goal as,
The construction of Algebra upon a basis which will enable us to give a meaning to every
symbol and combination of symbols before it is used, and consequently to dispense,
first, with all unintelligible combinations, secondly, with all search after interpretation of
combinations subsequent to their first appearance (De Morgan 1849, 89).
In his later works, De Morgan appears to have cut ties with Peacock's "principle of the permanence
of equivalent forms." This is perhaps not surprising given that De Morgan was struggling within an
institution that relied heavily upon the teaching of applied mathematics in order to produce
technically-trained men for the urban world of London.
De Morgan's criticisms of Peacock's "principle" stemmed largely stems from his pragmatic desire to
reform the educational framework within which he had to teach applied mathematics. Charles
Dodgson, on the other hand, was a more abstract critic of Peacock's. Dodgson emphasized the truth
that of algebraic reasoning, because it required "more thinking" than the mere application of memorized operational
rules (Whewell 1835, 42). Whewell was also concerned that the labour-saving mechanisms of algebraic reasoning took
away from the human toil and labour that Christians ought to perform throughout their lifetimes.
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of pre-established logical rules, and he sought to petrify the educational system according to the
methodologies favoured by those university practitioners dominant at the end of the 18th-century.
Dodgson's response was a fundamentally conservative one. The Oxford mathematician and logician
possessed a well-informed opinion of algebra. He learned about Peacock's 1830 Treatise through
Bartholomew Price, a fellow at Pembroke College and Dodgson's former mathematics tutor (Pycior
1984, 161). Price leaned toward an interpretation of mathematical meaning that underscored
geometrically-defined referents. Dodgson's main criticism of Peacock's system emerged in the 1850s
in his correspondences with Mary Dodgson, in which he expressed skepticism over the logical nature
of extending words such as "multiplication" from particular known quantities to general unknown
variables. Dodgson's sentiments were also expressed in Alice's behaviour in Lewis Carroll's
storybook publications. Operating within a tradition in mathematical humour (a common pastime;
both Frend and De Morgan had published satirical and humorist accounts of mathematical problems
in non-technical publications, such as the Athenaeum and The Lady's Diary: or the Woman's
Almanac), Dodgson issued his reactionary views through the silly musings of his now-famous Alice
character. In Alice in Wonderland, the Mad Hatter argues it is impossible to subtract something
from nothing. And while at the tea party, when the March Hare asks Alice whether she would like
more tea, Alice responds by saying she has "had nothing yet [and] so ... can't take more" (Pycior
1984, 164). Dodgson's popularly-reflected criticisms indicate the degree to which Peacock's
philosophy of generalized symbolical analysis, while popular among practitioners at Cambridge,
nonetheless evoked controversy beyond the borders of that institution.
As De Morgan wavered and Dodgson attacked, Peacock did receive wholehearted support from a
group of young Cambridge students who had studied for the Tripos throughout the 1820s and
1830s. Peacock's work was crucial to their development of a specific field of symbolical analysis as
advocated by Duncan Gregory (1813-1844), and which became known as the "calculus of
operations". As a young Cambridge graduate, Gregory had become interested in operations as the
64
fundamental component of algebraic thinking through his exposure to the Cambridge Philosophical
Society. In his article, "On the real nature of symbolical algebra" (1840), Gregory defined symbolical
algebra as the science that explores combinations of operations that are not defined by their nature
(i.e. what they are or what they do) but rather by the laws to which they are subject (i.e. the rules
that govern their combinations) (Gregory 1840). Gregory also related symbolical algebra to
geometric interpretability. Although in arithmetic a and +a are isomorphic, in geometry they might
not be. Therefore, a might indicate a simple magnitude or quantity, while -Pa might indicate a
magnitude and a direction. Gregory contended that mathematicians could free themselves from
"prejudice" if they avoided symbols that already had definite meanings associated with them, so
that they could push even further with the generalization of operational equivalences.
Based on Gregory's Peacockian-inspired work, a group of thinkers coalesced to form a nascent group
of symbolical logicians in Britain in the early-1840s. Spearheaded by the British mathematician and
logician George Boole (1815-1864), research in symbolical logic emerged as a mid-century
manifestation of Peacock's "principle of the equivalence of permanent forms." Richard Whately,
author of Elements of Logic (1826) and George Bentham, author of An Outline of a New System of
Logic (1827) had already established logic as a domain worthy of study in Britain, in particular at
Oxford. But it was through the work of Boole that symbolical algebra began to shape debates over
the formation of a new kind of logic—one inspired not by scholastic syllogism, but rather by abstract
symbols, the analysis of operations, and the formalization of operational rules. In his pamphlet, The
Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847), Boole assigned a primary role to "operation" including a clear
dedication to both Gregory and Peacock. For Boole, the symbolical algebraic philosophy of Peacock
and Gregory had hearkened a new era in mathematical and logical freedom—one in which "true
Calculus" could be characterized by its "method". As Boole argued,
The expression of magnitude, or of operations upon magnitude, has been—the express
object for which the symbols of Analysis have been invented, and for which their laws
have been investigated. Thus the abstractions of the modern Analysis, not less than the
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ostensive diagrams of the ancient Geometry, have encouraged the notion, that
Mathematics are essentially, as well as actually, the Science of Magnitude ... This
conclusion is by no means necessary. If every existing interpretation is shewn to involve
the idea of magnitude, it is only by induction that we can assert that no other
interpretation is possible. And it may be doubted whether our experience is sufficient to
render such an induction legitimate. The history of pure Analysis is, it may be said, too
recent to permit us to set limits to the extent of its applications. Should we grant to the
inference a high degree of probability, we might still, and with reason, maintain the
sufficiency of the definition to which the principle already stated would lead us. We
might justly assign it as the definitive character of a true Calculus, that it is a method
resting upon the employment of Symbols, whose laws of combination are known and
general, and whose results admit of a consistent interpretation. That, to the existing
forms of Analysis a quantitative interpretation is assigned, is the result of the
circumstances by which those forms were determined, and is not to be construed into a
universal condition of Analysis. It is upon the foundation of this general principle, that I
propose to establish the Calculus of Logic, and that I claim for it a place among the
acknowledged forms of Mathematical Analysis, regardless that in its object and in its
instruments it must at present stand alone (Boole 1847, 4).
Mathematics is not dependent upon number, quantity, or magnitude, Boole argued. Rather, it is a
conventional and logical language.
Boole's follower, William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882) institutionalized that view more profoundly in
the second half of the century (Durand-Richard 1991). Boole and Jevons's joint pursuit of a
Peacockian-inspired formal language of logic in mid-Victorian Britain did eventually lead to a
backlash. Neo-empiricists, inspired by Victorian interpretations of Humean skepticism, were
disturbed by Boole's newly proposed system of universal logic. John Stuart Mill (1806-1872),
Alexander Bain (1818-1903), and Clifford himself reacted against the establishment of a completely
distinct and empirically unfettered domain of absolute truth statements (for an account of the
German context, within which similar debates arose see Peckhaus (1999)). Thus, Peacock's "principle
of the permanence of equivalent forms" generated both deep-rooted opposition as well as hearty
support throughout the remainder of the 19th-century. While Peacock's legacy lies in influencing
particular developments in symbolical analysis and formal logic, through supporters such as Gregory,
Cayley Boole and Jevons, it also lays in influencing the reactive responses of empirical geometers
and epistemological critics, such as Mill and Clifford, the latter of whom appealed to evolutionary
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theories as a reason for why operational truths were, contrary to Peacock's claim, temporal in
nature rather than universal.
Conclusion
Symbolical algebra was discussed, debated and institutionalized in various forms throughout the
19th-century. For many mathematical actors in Britain, some version of "symbolical algebra" came to
constitute part of the "terrains of knowledge" through which they navigated in their Victorian
practices. Governed by practitioners at the University of Cambridge, and standardized by the norms
of the Cambridge Philosophical Society and the Cambridge Mathematical Journal, symbolical algebra
came to serve as a standard by which Hamilton judged his own work on quaternions in the 1850s. It
also came to define a particular curriculum, which had excised all experimental and "unfounded"
sciences, for Tait in the same decade. And it came to include the works of mid-century symbolical
algebraists, such as Cayley, for Clifford in the 1860s.
In brief, symbolical algebra came to constitute both a methodological approach towards
mathematical practice, in that it required mathematics to be succinct, symbolical, and unconcerned
by empirical or geometrical meaning, as well as a metaphysical view about the nature of
mathematical equivalences as universally true. Mathematics became a matter of operational
procedure rather than a matter of magnitude measurement. Conventional in nature, and expressed
controversially in Peacock's "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms," the symbolical
algebraic "philosophy" created the basis for the specific, mid-century "terrains" that would manifest
themselves in Tait and Clifford's lives, and which would imbue their navigations with meaning.
We turn now to an account of Hamilton's efforts in the 1850s to recast his mathematical research,
and his quaternions in particular, as a manifestation of Britain's symbolical algebraic tradition.
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Chapter Two: Hamilton's mid-century quaternions as symbolical
algebra
Introduction
Hamilton's quaternion system formed an important artifact that both Tait and Clifford encountered
in their mathematical engagements in the second half of the 19th-century. Volumes of material have
been written on Hamilton's quaternion developments. Consider Crowe (1967), Hankins (1977; 1980),
and more recently Schlote (1997), Flament (2003), and Lewis (2005). The aim here is to diverge
somewhat from those accounts by not placing Hamilton at the beginning of a tradition in vector
analysis. Rather, if one stops the clock at 1853, it is obvious that Hamilton was an actor who was
firmly situated within a tradition that was already decades-old—a tradition that he responded to in
order to establish himself as a dominant mathematician within the wider British context. Hamilton
navigated through the terrains of Protestant science in Ireland as well as Peacockian-inspired
symbolical algebra in Britain, as he sought to develop, disseminate, and legitimate his quaternion
mathematics by situating his work within a realm of Cantabrigian practices. In so doing, he sought to
subtly redefine symbolical algebra as a craft that allowed for the symbolical representation of
intuitive, universal truths.
In the 1840s, Hamilton identified his work exploring "couples" and "triplets" as having been
geometrically motivated—that is, as having been motivated by geometrical considerations related to
directed magnitudes. However, Hamilton's "Preface" to his 1853 Lectures on Quaternions openly
declares an allegiance to a version of symbolical algebra in which geometrical analogues to
symbolical operations are no longer necessary. The institutionalization of symbolical algebra in
Cambridge's Tripos system, its propagation within the Cambridge Philosophical Society, and its
dominance in mathematical research presented at the British Association for the Advancement of
Science created an environment through which Hamilton found himself having to navigate in the
1850s. Unable to deny the predominance of Peacock's "principle of the permanence of equivalent
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forms," Hamilton sought to recast his own work in light of that algebraist's claims. His choice to do
so was motivated by his need to develop and publish original research so as to satisfy his
administrators at Trinity University, Dublin, and by his desire to gain grander recognition for both
Irish science in general, and his mathematical work in particular, among the emerging class of
symbolical algebraic practitioners then dominant at Cambridge. "Irish science" and "symbolical
algebra in the mid-century" constituted two of the "terrains of knowledge" that must be described
in order to explain why Hamilton chose to present his quaternions in the manner that he did in his
1853 "Preface".
Protestant science in Ireland
One of Hamilton's most memorable contributions to British science as Royal Astronomer of Ireland
and Professor of Astronomy at Trinity College was his feted "prediction" in 1832 of canonical
refraction using Fresnel's wave theory of light. Despite its laudatory reviews, canonical refraction
was not that important of a phenomenon. It added little value to studies in optics, and it was not
significantly discernable from other similar developments in the field at the time. The Cambridge
physicist, Gabriel Stokes (1819-1903), argued that the prediction of canonical refraction did not
even justify a necessary belief in Fresnel's wave theory of light. Hamilton's prediction could have
been garnered by mathematically analyzing the corpuscular theory of light (Hankins 1980, 95). In a
letter to Herschel, Hamilton admitted his finding did not "essentially require the adoption of either
of the two great theories of light in preference to the other." Hamilton's prediction did, however,
earn him special status as someone who proved the ability of abstract mathematical reasoning to
predict accurate physical events. As Whewell exclaimed in his opening address to the BAAS in 1833,
"In the way of such prophecies, few things have been more remarkable than the prediction [of
canonical refraction]" (Attis 1997,19).
Hamilton had long believed that certain and absolute knowledge was not empirically induced, but
rather deduced from a priori starting principles. For Hamilton, the Fresnel wave prediction
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constituted an early justification of his Idealist outlook. Yet, Hamilton's motivations in pursuing
Fresnel's wave theory were broader and more political than a simple pursuit to justify a German-
inspired Idealist philosophy. Hamilton chose to work on the particular topic of Fresnel's wave theory
because he hoped it would justify and legitimate Irish science in the eyes of English mathematicians
at Cambridge. Hamilton's engagement with the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland also meant that he
was constantly engaged in using natural philosophy (or "science") as an intellectual weapon to
defend the independently productive nature of the Irish Protestant population. It was this primary
concern that motivated Hamilton's research in an area of optics that was relatively unimportant, but
which served to situate him within the right school of thought, at least in so far as Cambridge
mathematics was concerned.
Wave theories of light were largely promulgated and supported by Cambridge mathematicians and
natural philosophers, including Herschel, George Airy (1801-1892) and Humphrey Lloyd, for whom
the wave theory "represented an ideal of a mathematical, predictive science in which abstract
theories are confirmed by experiment" (Attis 1997, 22). Dublin-based scientists followed the
program initiated by those Cambridge mathematicians. At the opposite end of the theoretical
spectrum were those advocates of corpuscular theories of light, who were largely located at Scottish
Presbyterian institutions. They included Sir David Brewster (1781-1868), the physicist,
mathematician and natural philosopher, and Henry Brougham (1778-1868), the Scottish lawyer and
later British parliamentarian. By the mid-century, appeals to English and Cantabrigian scientific
traditions were deeply interwoven with the an Irish Protestant intelligentsia's keen desire to
institutionalize its scientific outputs and thus help to enshrine Protestant governing control over
Ireland more generally. Hamilton's engagement with Fresnel's wave theory was representative of
that religious allegiance. Many of the corpuscular theorists of the north, including Brewster and
Brougham, were religious Dissenters with profound ties to the Whig party. They advocated for
Benthamite utilitarianism in both politics and education. Proponents of the wave theory, on the
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other hand, were predominantly Tory. The notion of utilitarianism was anathema to their elite
university-based knowledge. And although not all Cambridge mathematicians were Tories (indeed,
many actors within the early symbolical algebraic network were openly Whig or Whig-sympathizers),
the Whig politics of Cambridge were different in content from the Whig politics of Scotland. Recall
that young members of the Cambridge symbolical network had supported the democratization of
access to mathematical knowledge. After all, symbolical algebra was meant to expose mathematical
inquiry to the industrial middle-classes, allowing mathematicians to gaze upon universal
relationships without the mediating effort of any particular religious or institutional authority. Yet,
Peacock was by no means a Dissenter, and Babbage and Herschel's French-inspired republican
efforts in British mathematics constituted a project aimed at advancing the English middle-class and
disempowering the English aristocracy. The young Cambridge analysts did not equate their London-
centric middle-class goals with the aims of the emerging, industrial middle-classes of the Clydeside
and Edinburgh. Recall, for instance, that several English algebraists failed to openly support the BAAS
in its opening years due to its overly provincial character and the locations of its meetings (see
Chapter One). In addition, although De Morgan joined the Society for the Diffusion of Useful
Knowledge, even he argued that because a university education was meant to teach students
rationality and morality, it was not meant for all segments of the population (Phillips 2005; De
Morgan 1830). Certainly, many of the symbolical algebraists aimed for an opening up of access to
education, but few expected their efforts to succeed in delivering wide-ranging social services, such
as free university education, which were explicit goals for northern Whigs, such as Brougham and
Brewster (Marsh 2003; Davie 1964).
Consider also the differences evident in pedagogical philosophy between reformist Cantabrigians in
the 1830s and their contemporaneous northern Whig colleagues. At Cambridge, Adam Sedgwick
(1785-1873), a political Whig and reformer, opposed religious tests. In his Discourse on the Studies of
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the University (1833)22, he argued inductive mathematical philosophy could help to reveal the mind
of God and point towards his creative acts. His views on these matters were in line with the
empirical views of the Glaswegian mathematician, James Thomson (1786-1849), father of William
Thomson (later Lord Kelvin). However, the northerner and southerner diverged significantly with
regards to the final objective of those inductive studies. For Sedgwick, the primary aim of university
education was not to promote social equality. It was, rather, to improve upon the rational and moral
capacities of youth. Sedgwick claimed,
Studies of this kind [do] not merely contain their own intellectual reward, but give the
mind a habit of abstraction, most difficult to acquire by ordinary means, and a power of
concentration of inestimable value in the business of life (Sedgwick 1834, 11).
By referring to the "power of concentration" in the "business of life", Sedgwick did not have in mind
the entrepreneurial business of life. In fact, he was opposed to any utilitarian approaches to
pedagogy or educational reform. Sedgwick opposed, for instance, the efforts of the Society for the
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, which had been founded in London in 1826 by a group of Whig
supporters led—not surprisingly—by Lord Brougham. That society had close ties to UCL and to
various mechanics institutes in London. Its aim was to provide cheap versions of scientific textbooks
to those students who were unable to afford a formal education. Such "societies" did not
promulgate the sort of elite educational ethos that a clergyman such as Sedgwick supported (Smith
and Wise 1989).
For Sedgwick, as for Whewell (who was, by then, a much more conservative Cambridge proponent
of mathematical education), the "business of life" referred to the proper moral and intellectual
edification of young, middle-class men.23 Mathematical training was part of that "liberal" education.
22
This text was first delivered as a sermon in Trinity College Chapel in 1832.
23
It is important to underscore the fact that the moral view of a Cambridge education extended beyond the particular
beliefs of Whewell and Sedgwick. Writing home to his father in 1841, the young William Thomson deprecatingly
recounted his first "classical lecture" at St. Peter's College: "Today we had the first classical lecture, or rather the
introduction to the classical lectures. The lecture (by Freeman, who is transplanted from Trinity) was a rather curious
one. He told us good deal about the university's ideas of education, as opposed to the modern diffusion-of-useful-
knowledge-Societies' ideas; that the idea of education was not as a collection of useful facts, so much as of a training
and strengthening of the mind. That now we have in a manner given our consent to her dogma (not expressed in any
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Thus, despite the stated aims of some of the early members of the symbolical algebraic network, for
whom symbolical thinking and mathematical speculation served as a metaphor for industrial
efficiency, the mathematical curriculum at Cambridge in the 1830s still aimed to elevate a select
group of English men, rather than a cross-section of industrializing British society. In addition, for
moralizers, such as Sedgwick and Whewell, the Cambridge curriculum, and its embodied
mathematical reforms, produced moral men who were trained to submit to proper authority
structures. In the north, on the other hand, latitudinarian reformers, such as James Thomson,
pursued broader educational objectives. For Thomson, university education was an inseparable part
of industrial and urban life. Its aim was to alleviate poverty, decrease suffering and counteract toil.
This utilitarian aspect of mathematical training was manifest in Thomson's Glaswegian classroom
throughout the 1830s. As Smith and Wise have concluded, "A gulf indeed existed in the 1830s
between the Cambridge disdain for economic man and the interest of the industrial entrepreneurs
of Clydeside" (Smith and Wise 1989, 61).
Along with his Cantabrigian colleagues, and in opposition to many Scots at the time, Hamilton
shared a strong distaste for utilitarianism and its underlying political message of democratization
(Graves 1882). Hamilton's engagement with Fresnel's wave theory must not be viewed, therefore, as
the simple outgrowth of his "mathematical" interests. Rather, "Hamilton's compromise" must been
seen in the "context of Anglo-Irish relations" in which the Irishman desired "to prove the Irish
capable of great scientific accomplishments." As one historian has argued, Irish Protestants largely
ignored the culture of the "native" Irish, and followed cultural standards emanating from England.
"They felt their ascendency over the Catholics was cultural as well as political," and Trinity College,
Dublin was the main institution through which that cultural and intellectual ascendency was
expressed. For people like Hamilton, an "entire way of life depended on Protestant Ascendency in
decree or book, but indicated in her system) and so we should give it a fair trial by being good boys and attending
lectures punctually. That the ultimate object of the lectures was not altogether for the examination, and not merely for
annoyance (though perhaps that might be its immediate object) but to carry out the university's idea of education, and
to ensure at least one hour a day being spent properly and according to her ideas" (Smith and Wise 1989, 58).
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Ireland, and their intellectual role was to support that ascendency by keeping English culture and
Anglican theology alive" (Attis 1997, 28).
Hamilton's efforts to legitimate Irish scientific contributions worked. By the mid-1830s he was
lauded throughout England by Whewell and Babbage—the latter of whom used Hamilton's
"prediction" that a single ray of light could be refracted into a cone of light within a biaxial crystal to
argue that symbolical analysis can predict empirical phenomena (Babbage 1989). Hamilton was
knighted by the Lord Lieutenant at the BAAS meeting in Dublin in 1835, and he was awarded the
Royal Medal of the Royal Society for "discoveries in Optics, and particularly that of Canonical
Refraction" (Attis 1997, 19). Meanwhile, Hamilton continued his engagements with religious projects
in Ireland. From 1837 to 1846, he served as president of the Royal Irish Academy, during which time
he sought to develop wide-ranging projects related to Irish history and culture (Lewis 2005, 461).
Hamilton's efforts to develop an algebraic system of couples, followed by his efforts to develop a
system of triplets, must be understood as the product of his navigations through a terrain in which
Irish Protestantism had to prove its worth to a Cambridge-dominated English audience.
As a corollary to his Protestant-minded mathematical projects, Hamilton's adherence to
"Kantianism" is a subject that has generated no small amount of historical and philosophical
speculation (see Hankins 1977; Flament 2003). Studies that have explored this aspect of Hamilton's
work have all too often ignored the political hues of Hamilton's metaphysics. Hamilton's Kantianism
related to his emerging identity as a "Cambridge"-style analyst in important ways. Kantianism had
become influential in certain social circles in England throughout the 1820s. German Idealism had
become the focal point for discussions in the Apostles Club at Cambridge over the course of the
following decade.24 Flowing through the conduit of Samuel Coleridge (1772-1834), who, though not
24
A flourishing of interest in the relationship between mathematics, science and theology blossomed in the formation of
German idealist social gatherings in Britain. Aided by the socializing and publicizing efforts of Madame de Stael and
Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), German Idealism became the subject of conversation among an elite group of English
literati. Though wide-spread interest was temporal, the German Idealist trend did help to generate a more permanent
75
a member of the Apostles Club was one of the Club's key experts on Kant, Kant's a priori synthetic
account of knowledge manifested itself in Hamilton's algebraic system of couples, which Hamilton
labeled the "Science of Pure Time." For Hamilton, Kantianism was a means of making contact with
powerful social and political actors in England. Later, it would serve as a flexible and open belief
structure that provided him with a foundation upon which he could reconcile the symbolical
algebraic approach then favored in Cambridge with his own geometrical work on "couples".
Hamilton as an algebraist ofa particular sort
Authors such as Nagel (1935) and Novy (1973) have traditionally argued that Hamilton rejected
symbolical algebra from the outset, while his contemporaries, including De Morgan and Gregory,
adopted it in unique ways. In so far as Hamilton did reject symbolical algebra, he was not alone.
Recall from Chapter One that the actuary and religious critic, William Frend, had been a long-time
opponent of symbolical methods. Frend viewed the Cambridge network of practitioners as a group
of mathematicians intent on attacking liberal thought. Hamilton was also joined in oppositional
ranks by the young Cambridge Wrangler, and later Queen's College fellow, Osborne Reynolds, who
thought the methods of symbolical reasoning institutionalized a bizarre and unjustifiable form of
metaphysics. Reynolds even went so far as to publish an anonymously authored text, entitled
following among a select group of Cantabrigian and Oxfordian students. Undergraduates and fellows at Trinity College
organized in the 1820s to teach and discuss German Idealism, contemporary poetry and modern science within a
Christian context (Cannon 1964). The upshot of those gatherings was the creation and formalization of the "Apostles
Club"—a discussion group that included an eclectic range of practitioners, such as Frederick Denison Maurice (1805-
1872), the Church of England clergyman mostly remembered for his later "Christian Socialism," Richard Trench (1807-
1886), the Church of Ireland archbishop of Dublin (mostly remembered for his active involvement in reforms within the
Irish Church); John Kemble (1807-1857), the Benthamite, Millian, and later Cambridge linguist; John Sterling (1806-
1844), the writer and poet and Alfred Tennyson (1809-1892), the Queen's poet laureate in later years. Among those
Apostles, as with the bulk of Trinity's students, religious crises erupted not over "the Real Presence or Apostolic
Succession, but over the application of Neibuhr's anti-mythical methods to the Bible and to Christian tradition
generally," as one historian has argued (Cannon 1964, 78). "Interest in all things German" radiated from Trinity in the
1830s. One publisher even issued a student's cram-book on Idealism "so strong was the need 'to Niebuhrize,' as it was
called" (Cannon 1964, 77). Though Niebuhr had actually been considered a "conservative" in his native country, his
readers at Cambridge managed to reshape his works into a symbol of liberalism and reform. Apart from Niebuhr, other
German Idealists were also feted by this select group of British elite. Those philosophers included Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) and Frederick Schelling (1775-1854). Interest in German philosophy also extended to include Friedrich
Schleiermacher (1768-1834), as well as the poets Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Johann Schiller (1759-
1805). Those philosophers enjoyed a period of deep revival at Cambridge, as the Apostles sought to apply the Germans'
views to current mathematical and natural philosophical developments. The symbolical algebraists' efforts jibed at times
with those of the Apostles Club (some of whose members crossed over).
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Strictures on Certain Parts of Peacock's Algebra (1837), in which he attacked Peacock for his
ambivalence and vagueness with regards to symbols themselves (Pycior 1982). Reynolds contended
that Peacock had defended two different definitions of "symbols". The first stated that symbols
could be entirely "arbitrary"; the second stated that symbols represented "nothing at all".
Maintaining both definitions was a contradictory position to find oneself in, Reynolds argued,
because "nothing at all" could not also represent "anything at all," even if that "anything" had been
arbitrarily chosen. Reynolds denied that symbolical algebra made any sense given that "nothing at
all" could not be operated upon, and, if the symbols in question were representative of "anything at
all" (rather than of "nothing"), then the burden of proof was on the mathematician to demonstrate
empirically that similar operations on an infinite number of different types of things necessarily
produced similar effects (Reynolds 1837).25
Historians have been right to highlight that Hamilton joined the oppositional ranks of people such as
Reynolds, though this author would argue that alliance was short-lived and highly qualified. While it
is the case that Hamilton initially rejected "symbolical algebra" (as advocated in Peacock's original
Treatise), his views shifted by the late-1840s. In fact, if we give any credit to Hamilton's account of
his own mathematical journey as it evolved from the mid-1840s to his 1853 publication of Lectures
on Quaternions, we must view him as something of a converted believer in, or at least a converted
user of, symbolical algebra. To understand why this is the case, let us return to Hamilton's earlier
engagements with Coleridge's Kantian-inspired metaphysics. The degree to which Hamilton's
Kantian predispositions shaped his later mathematics has been recounted by authors such as Crowe
(1967), Hankins (1977), Bloor (1981), and Winterbourne (1982).26 Those historical studies have often
focused on the fact that Hamilton was relatively non-productive between 1838 and 1842. Due in
25
Reynolds was no peripheral radical, either. His criticisms were recollected positively by the eventual editor of the
American Journal of Mathematics, James Joseph Sylvester (1814-1897), who noted that Peacock had delayed his second
edition of the Algebra in light of Reynold's insightful criticisms (Pycior 1982, 406-407).
26
Crowe (1967) has argued that Kantianism was a legitimacy tool rather than a constitutive element of Hamiltonian
mathematics. On the other hand, Hankins (1976) has claimed that Hamilton's paper on conjugate functions (i.e. ordered
pairs of numbers) is the product of a long-running interest in both the representativeness of imaginary numbers and in
the determination of a general expression for a logarithm of a complex number taken to complex base.
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part to the illness of his wife, and due in part to his ensuing alcoholic dependencies, Hamilton
produced little mathematical research over that four-year period. He did, however, manage to find
the time to produce a series of tracts on philosophical matters. He wrote about "triads" of
philosophical concern, where the "triad" of particular concern to himself was that of Will, Mind, and
Life—a conceptualization he first located in Coleridge's writing. Hamilton's later development of
quaternions was influenced by this Kantian-Coleridgean outlook, which suggested to him a
mathematical discourse of "triads" (or "triplets") and which motivated his hunt for algebraic triplets
(i.e. a system of three ordered numbers represented by triple coordinates x, y, z) (Hankins 1977).
Even more importantly, however, is the fact that, by the 1830s, Hamilton had focused his energies
upon elaborating the notion of Kant's a priori synthetic category of knowledge to legitimate his own
use of negative numbers. Negative numbers, Hamilton argued, were to be understood as analogous
to points on a timeline, which could occur before (negatively) or after (positively) one another.
Hamilton argued that imaginary numbers could, therefore, be represented as ordered couples
(ax,a2) in time. Hamilton was so convinced of the metaphysical meaningfulness of this claim that
he wrote in a notebook (dated 1831),
In all Mathematical Science we consider and compare relations. In algebra the
relations which we first consider and compare, are relations between successive
states of some changing thing or thought. And numbers are the names or nouns of
algebra; marks or signs, by which one of these successive states may be
remembered and distinguished from another ... Relations between successive
thoughts thus viewed as successive states of one more general and changing
thought, are the primary relations of algebra ... For with Time and Space we
connect all continuous change, and by symbols of Time and Space we reason on
and realize progression. Our marks of temporal and local site, our then and there,
are at once signs and instruments of that transformation by which thoughts
become things, and spirit puts on body, and the act and passion of mind seem
clothed with an outward existence, and we behold ourselves from afar. And such a
transformation there is when, in Algebra, we contemplate the change of our own
thoughts as if it were the progression of some foreign thing, and introduce
Numbers as the marks or signs to denote place in the progression (Hankins 1976,
336).
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Such strong comments suggest Hamilton was viewing his mathematics from a particular
metaphysical perspective and that his mathematical endeavors—as with his other activities—were
an expression of that worldview.
This characterization of intuitionist mathematics helped Hamilton identify with Thomas Carlyle's
account of German Idealism, which held that all matter is subordinate to "mind" (Bloor 1981).27
Carlyle's view had been that anti-religious arguments favoring materialistic perspectives of the
universe crumbled apart when forced to carry the weight of Idealism's main claim—namely, that all
matter is mind (Bloor 1981, 208). On an Idealist reading, Carlyle argued, only theology provides
ultimate answers to questions such as "Why"? Inductive, sensory perceptions are necessarily
subordinate to the rational laws of categorization produced by the mind. Carlyle's specific vision of
Idealism relied upon the existence of a priori natural laws. It considered natural law to be derived
from pure Reason (Vernunft) rather than from empirical Understanding (Verstehen).
Publicized through the works of the Tory "propagandist" Samuel Coleridge, Carlyle's Idealist
epistemology was used in the early part of the century to criticize the French Revolution and its
sympathizers. Coleridge thought that revolution was an instantiation of human understanding
usurping "the name of reason" (Bloor 1981, 210). Similarly, he criticized commercial interests in
Britain's industrializing centers for having ripped apart the social fabric of Britain. Idealist
epistemology rectified the situation, he claimed, by encouraging a new synthesis of opposing forces.
Coleridge thought aristocratic interests of the past ought to come together with the needs of
industrialists in a synthesis that would create a new national class of "clerisy". Coleridge envisioned
that "clerisy" to be the "essential element of a rightly constituted nation," which would balance out
the interests of each class in order to produce a transcendent order of harmony (Bloor 1981, 213).
Highly elitist and deeply class-based, Coleridge's German Idealism had an effect on the young Irish
Astronomer Royal. Working within a Protestant institution that constantly felt the pressure to justify
27
Carlyle (1795-1881) was the author of an article on Idealism in the Foreign Review (1829), which Hamilton vigorously
annotated.
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its elite position within Ireland's divisive and hierarchal polity, Hamilton chose to engage with an
ideological construct that had gained prominence among important social commentators and poets,
such as Carlyle, and which could also be put to good use in defending the intellectual superiority of
Protestants in Ireland.
Note that Carlyle's Idealism did not fit all of the natural philosophical or metaphysical beliefs that
Hamilton had developed. Indeed, Hamilton often found that he had to redefine certain aspects of
the Idealist project in order to advance his own natural philosophical beliefs. For example, Hamilton
held fast to a belief in Rudjer Boscovich's (1711-1787) theory of point atomism. Boscovich, a Jesuit
mathematician and fellow of the Royal Society, had presented a picture of the "atom" in his 1758
Theoria Philosophiae Naturalis in which "massiness" and impenetrability were eliminated and
replaced with "a kinematical inertial property" such that "matter is composed of discrete, indivisible
points without extension or mass" (Kargon 1965, 138). In the Boscovichan worldview, matter is non¬
existent—it is a mere manifestation of God's will. What truly exists are the motivating forces God
grants the points, which set them into motion in the first place. In a letter to Coleridge in 1832,
Hamilton acknowledged that Coleridge had explicitly rejected all brands of atomism as inherently
materialistic, including the Boscovichan view. However, Hamilton had long agreed with Boscovich
and, in the Jesuit's defense, he argued the problem lay in the actual meaning of "atomism". Because
the undulatory theory of light was, in fact, fundamentally atomistic (in Hamilton's view), there did
exist a harmonious means of bringing together Boscovich's atomism with Coleridge's Idealism.
Hamilton wrote to his poet friend,
Do I then at all express a possible view, or am I talking nonsense, when I say that I regard
a certain atomistic theory as having a subjective truth, and as being a fit medium
between our understanding and certain phenomena: although objectively, and in the
truth of things, the powers attributed to atoms belong not to them but to God? The
atomistic theory of which I speak is nearly that of Boscovich, and consists in
representing all phenomena of motion as produced by the action of localized energies of
attraction or repulsion, each energy having a centre in space; and this centre, which is
supposed to be a mathematical point, without any figure or dimension, being called an
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atom instead of a point, merely to mark its conceived possession of, or connexion with,
physical properties and relations (Graves 1882, 593).
The word "atom" in Boscovichan atomism did not refer to a materialistic entity that existed apart
from the mind of God, Hamilton claimed. Rather, it referred to a linguistic tool that could help
scientists conceptualize physical events. God's superior role in the movement of the universe was
preserved by such a theoretical outlook. Thus, a Boscovichan scientific worldview did not usurp
Reason in favor of materialist Understanding.
Throughout his career, Hamilton found many means of reshaping his scientific beliefs in order to fit
particular metaphysical constructs and vice versa. Indeed, Hamilton would come to reshape his
quaternion mathematics to fit the philosophical outlook of the symbolical algebraists, who he
perceived as dominant actors at Cambridge by the 1850s.
Hamilton's initial derision ofsymbolical algebra
Following Hamilton's first meeting in 1832 with Peacock, Herschel, Babbage and Airy, the Irish
scientist wrote to his poet friend, Aubrey Thomas de Vere (1814-1902), that the Cambridge
mathematicians were "winning to themselves mansions above the earth, though beneath the highest
heavens." At the time, Hamilton felt that symbolical algebra fell short of the standards set out by
Idealism's account of Reason in that symbolical relationships failed to point to necessary a priori
entities. The only actor within the Cambridge group that Hamilton could see himself engaging with
was Whewell—an actor who had already begun to diverge politically and philosophically from his
Cambridge colleagues. Whewell had begun to adopt a more explicitly Tory view of what he thought a
"liberal" (read moral) and geometrically-founded education ought to be.
But apart from philosophical affinity to Whewell, there were also a number of other institutional
reasons for why Hamilton might have felt justified in siding with Whewell against the more radical
symbolical algebraists of the day. Despite Peacock's Treatise (1830) and his Report to the BAAS
(1833), Hamilton might have viewed Peacock's symbolical algebra as peripheral to the central
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concerns of many Cambridge mathematicians. By the mid-1830s, for instance, Peacock was engaged
in vociferous debate with Whewell over the construction of a scientific laboratory at Cambridge.
Peacock had lobbied the university for the construction of such a laboratory in 1829; by 1832 it had
been partially started. Construction was stalled, however, due to Whewell's vehement opposition
(for an account of Whewell's stance on empiricism see Strong (1955)). Whewell had also begun to
oppose certain aspects of Peacock's symbolical algebraic reforms, lambasting the unregulated
introduction of symbolical methods on the Tripos exam. Peacock, meanwhile, was facing institutional
limitations to the promulgation of his analytical works at the level of university lectures. Despite
having been appointed Lowdean professor, Peacock was unable to attract large audiences to his
mathematical lectures. In fact, many of his lectures were delivered to empty-seated auditoria
(Becher 2004). Thus, although Peacock had written a seminal textbook in symbolical analysis, it might
have appeared to an external observer that he was not able to effectively disseminate his ideas on
campus.
In that same decade, Peacock also found himself walking a political tightrope. In the 1820s, recall, he
had had to compromise with more conservative elements at the university in order to avoid a
painful backlash against his unauthorized introduction of the d-notation on the Tripos. As the
adoption of continental analysis in coaching rooms increased, a reactionary backlash emerged again.
Peacock had to acquiesce to some of the university's administrative demands to preserve broad
support and goodwill for the continental techniques that had gained popularity among recent
graduates. Thus, by the mid-1830s, Peacock had had to distance himself from the more radical
proponents of the second generation of symbolical algebra, i.e. those practitioners who were
emerging as prominent actors within the Cambridge Philosophical Society. Peacock devoted himself
to curricular reforms that highlighted the physical applications of algebra—an approach more in line
with Whewell's own view of what constituted an acceptable curriculum (Warwick 2003). Peacock
was thus able to stave off the reactionary opposition to analytical questions on the Senate House
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Exam. Meanwhile, Whewell had by then become a priest, professor of mineralogy and explicit Tory
supporter. He was also deeply and publicly involved in the operations of the BAAS, where his aim
was to reshape that nascent organization so as to better reflect the hierarchal and gentlemanly
culture of science that he envisioned as proper to natural philosophy (Robson and Cannon 1964).
Ironically, Whewell wished to advance the sort of elitist culture that Brougham and Brewster had
initially sought to undo in their establishment of the organization in the first place. Whewell worked
to get himself appointed as vice-president of the BAAS in 1832. He became the local secretary in
Cambridge for the annual meeting in 1833, and, in 1837, he served as vice-president once more.28
Hamilton's perception of Cambridge mathematics might well have been colored by the seeming
importance of Whewell as a rising star within the BAAS and the seeming acquiescence of Peacock
with regards to reactionary curricular demands.29 In addition, Whewell's widely-received History of
the Inductive Sciences (1837) and his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840)—both of which
maintained that inductive science is the instantiation of absolute laws of nature that indicate the
presence of a Creator—helped to re-establish a role for theist rationalist beliefs (Yeo 2003). Those
theistic views were not unlike Hamilton's own. Hamilton had explicitly related the existence of a
priori necessary truths to the presence of an Almighty Being. It is perhaps not surprising then that
throughout the 1830s Hamilton deemed Whewell to be representative of the direction in which
British mathematics and natural philosophy were headed.
Whewell's social position would have also helped to feed into Hamilton's analysis of the situation.
Throughout the 1820s, Whewell had labored to climb up England's social ladder. He increasingly
moved in aristocratic circles and involved himself with former aristocratic Cambridge graduates,
such as the Earl Fitzwilliam (1786-1857) and the second marquees of Northampton (1790-1851). He
cemented his augmented social status in 1841 by marrying Cordelia Marshall, who he had been
introduced to through the Woodsworth family. That family connection was especially useful, as
28
Whewell later became president in 1841.
29
Whewell was professor of mineralogy at Cambridge in the 1830s; he later became professor of moral philosophy in 1841.
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Cordelia's eldest sister, Mary, was married to Lord Monteagle—an aristocrat who helped to define
Whewell's later Tory-affiliations (Todhunter 1876). Whewell's movements within aristocratic circles
in the 1830s and 1840s would not have gone unnoticed by Hamilton, whose own political
sympathies were opposed to any reordering of English-inspired class hierarchies in Ireland.
In the meantime, major proponents of the symbolical approach, including Babbage and Herschel,
were heavily occupied in duties elsewhere, adding to Hamilton's sense that the symbolical algebraic
movement was not an established component of Cambridge's research future. In 1834, for instance,
Herschel sailed off to the Cape of Good Hope where he remained for four years, retrieving
astronomical data and fighting for better pay and housing conditions from the state-funded
observatory (Crowe 2004). Babbage, for his part, was non-resident at Cambridge, despite his status
as the Lucasian Chair from 1828 to 1839. He also refused to offer any lectures. His engagements lay
elsewhere, as he was deeply involved in the construction of his proposed calculating machine—a
project that had become nationalized in 1830, but which collapsed in 1834 following recriminating
arguments with Joseph Clement, Babbage's master-engineer (Schaffer 1994).
Hamilton's lack of engagement with the more radical members of the symbolical network of
reformers in the 1830s should not, therefore, be seen as the simple result of his metaphysical
disagreements with those practitioners. Rather, it is probable that Hamilton perceived the
symbolical algebraic program to be peripheral or at least not foundational to the future of
Cambridge mathematics and natural philosophy. However, in deeming Whewell's more conservative
mathematical views to be a better commodity upon which to hedge his bets, Hamilton was misled.
Firstly, although Peacock's lectures were poorly attended, he was not alone in experiencing non¬
existent audiences for university lectures. The fact that students found college and university
lectures to be useless in preparing for the Tripos was well-known. The shifting pedagogical
environment at Cambridge favored private coaching over university lectures as a means of providing
students with the bulk of their daily learning and examination preparation. Although there had been
84
"private" tutors present at the university since the late-18th century, by the middle of the 19th-
century, private tutors (or "coaches") had become a staple part of an undergraduate's life, and a
necessary part of any successful wrangler's education. Undergraduates hoping to finish in top
wrangler positions relied upon their coaches to gain the tacit knowledge associated with emerging
techniques in analysis and algebra. Coaches, such as Hopkins, advocated and used techniques in
symbolical algebra in their classrooms, and had no qualms about passing on those techniques to
their students, knowing full well that the content of the Tripos was largely determined outside the
formal structure of university lectures (Warwick 2003). Contrary, therefore, to reactionary
sentiments that viewed symbolical algebra as improper material for consumption by undergraduate
students, the coaching system that had embraced such techniques was, in fact, producing qualified
undergraduate mathematicians.
Students of the symbolical algebraic curriculum had even started to publish in professional
journals—a phenomenon that Whewell famously lamented over, saying it was proof mathematics
had failed to instill in students a proper respect for authority.30 One of Peacock's Scottish students,
Duncan Gregory, along with another Scot, Archibald Smith, and an English student, Samuel
Greatheed, jointly established the Cambridge Mathematical Journal in 1837. The CMJ soon became
Britain's preeminent mathematics journal, reinforcing the presence of higher algebra and analysis on
the Tripos (Becher 1984; Crilly 2004). Not surprisingly, symbolical algebraic questions set on the
Mathematical Tripos increased notably in both number and difficulty by 1840. The engine of
mathematical production found in the university's coaching classrooms and on the pages of the CMJ
powered the rise of a second generation of symbolical algebraists, including Gregory and his co-
editors. This developing establishment effectively protected Cambridge's symbolical algebraic
curriculum from reactionary undoing in the 1850s, when the Whig government of Lord John Russell
(later Earl Russell) established a parliamentary commission to analyze the curriculum of Cambridge
30
Whewell maintained a good liberal education ought not to "rouse [students] to speculate for themselves," which
analysis was apparently doing (Warwick 2003, 99).
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University and to standardize it according to other universities across the country. Peacock was
appointed head of that commission, and one aspect of his job was to analyze the role that private
coaches played in undermining traditional university authority. Though not opposed to the way in
which coaching had allowed for the introduction of higher level analysis, Peacock was concerned
about the lack of standards present in diverse coaching classrooms. Defending unregulated coaching
practices, Hopkins testified that such teaching had, in fact, allowed the university to transform itself
into a manufacturer of professional mathematicians, as evidenced by the success of the CMJ.
Peacock ultimately agreed with Hopkins. The confluence of Hopkins's Peelite Toryism with Peacock's
Whig politics resulted in an interesting political crossover that severed Whewell from the
mainstream of Cambridge science and mathematics. Peacock was able to institute a series of
university-wide reforms that bolstered the position of university lecturers, and which provided
professors with the ability and motivation to teach higher-level analysis in their lecture halls, thereby
further entrenching symbolical analysis in the university's curriculum (Warwick 2003). Hamilton
would not have missed this transformation in Peacock's political might, nor would he have missed
indications of the deepening institutionalization of symbolical algebra at Cambridge. Thus, despite
his former reservations, Hamilton began to recast his work in quaternion mathematics as an
outgrowth of that very Peacockian-influenced analytical tradition that he had long derided.
Victorian accounts ofsymbolical algebra in Britain
In the year 1842, the Board of Overseers for Hamilton's Observatory demanded an account of the
natural philosopher's astronomical and scientific achievements. Recall that the early-1840s had been
witness to Hamilton's alcoholism and his wife's illness; his mathematical efforts had dropped off.
Although he did manage to publish some tracts on the philosophical notion of "triads", the Board's
demand for accountability focused on Hamilton's mathematical works. The Irish mathematician
returned to his previous work on couples and triplets with a vigor largely defined by the Board's
overbearing institutional watch. Facing the pressure to publish, Hamilton issued a nascent account
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of quaternions in 1843 in which he offered a four-termed expression to denote directed magnitudes
in three-dimensional space. The four terms corresponded to three positional identifiers (a versor) on
a three-dimensional axis, and one magnitude term (a scalar). Hamilton published accounts of this
system in 18 installments in the Philosophical Magazine over the remainder of the decade, and in 10
installments in the Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal (formerly Gregory's CMJ). The Board
was satisfied, and Hamilton's job was secured.
However, Hamilton's publications went on to generate no small amount of debate between
symbolical algebraists, including Cayley and De Morgan. That debate was partly the result of
Hamilton's new philosophical gloss, which he added to his 1853 "Preface" to the Lectures on
Quaternions. In that "Preface", Hamilton chose to justify his mathematical research in quaternions in
a manner disjointed from his previous Kantian ideals. Now his justifications of quaternions invoked
philosophical claims related to the worth of symbolical algebra as a methodology. Hamilton
recounted how, when playing around with triplet systems, he had found the distributive principle
was at times lost, while at other times many "absurd" pre-determined definitions were required to
make the system work. Although arithmetical rules remained a guiding tool for him, Hamilton stated
they could no longer constitute the absolute standard by which he was to proceed. Had they done
so, then he would have had to give up hope of finding a successful solution altogether. Hamilton
then cited the works of Peacock, Babbage and De Morgan. Notably, Hamilton especially aligned
himself with De Morgan, who had, by then, expressed some reservations over the notion of a purely
symbolical system with no physical referents. Yet, reflecting his newly modified, symbolical algebraic
philosophy of mathematics, Hamilton hypothesized that mathematical entities, such "directed
lines", "moments in time", "space-steps", and "time-steps" were fundamentally operational in
nature. Realizing, perhaps, that this shift in view would open him up to severe criticism from those
quarters in which he had previously sought refuge—namely, the loose network of Kantians upon
whom he had earlier relied—Hamilton's "Preface" reads like an apologia in which he seeks to
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demonstrate that the formerly heretical views of the symbolical algebraists are, in fact, akin to his
former Idealist beliefs.
The De Morgan- Hamilton relationship
Recall that upon reading Peacock's Treatise (1830), Hamilton had initially reacted negatively to
symbolical algebra. In a letter to Peacock he noted,
When I first read [the Treatise]... and indeed for a long time afterwards it seemed to
me...that the author designed to reduce algebra to a mere system of symbols, and
nothing more; an affair of pothooks and hangers, of black strokes upon white paper, to
be made according to a fixed but arbitrary set of rules: and I refused, in my own mind, to
give the high name of Science to the results of such a system (Graves 1885, 528).
In his 1837 essay, "Theory of Conjugate Functions, or Algebraic Couples; with a Preliminary and
Elementary Essay on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time"—the first part of which was read to the
Royal Irish Academy in 1833; the second part of which was read two years later—Hamilton offered a
three-category classification system of algebraic analysis as a critical response to Peacock's view of
symbolical algebra. The first category, Hamilton claimed, was the "practical", which viewed algebra
as an instrument for applications; the second was the "philological", which viewed algebra as a
conventional language with no necessary content; the third was the "theoretical", which viewed
algebra as a means of helping "contemplation" in the search for meaningful mathematical
relationships and objects. Of the practitioners operating in this field, Hamilton had written,
The Practical person seeks a Rule which he may apply, the Philological person seeks a
Formula which he may write, and the Theoretical person seeks a Theorem on which he
may meditate. The felt imperfections of Algebra are of three answering kinds. The
Practical Algebraist complains of imperfection when he finds his Instrument limited in
power; when a rule, which he could happily apply to many cases, can be hardly or not at
all applied by him to some new case; when it fails to enable him to do or to discover
something else, in some other Art, or in some other Science, to which Algebra with him
was but subordinate, and for the sake of which and not for its own sake, he studied
Algebra. The Philological Algebraist complains of imperfection, when his Language
presents him with an Anomaly; when he finds an Exception disturbs the simplicity of his
Notation, or the symmetrical structure of his Syntax; when a Formula must be written
with precaution, and a Symbolism is not universal. The Theoretical Algebraist complains
of imperfection, when the clearness of his contemplation is obscured; when the
Reasonings of his Science seem anywhere to oppose each other, or become in any part
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too complex or too little valid for his belief to rest firmly upon them; or when, though
trial may have taught him that a rule is useful, or that a formula gives true results, he
cannot prove that rule, nor understand that formula: when he cannot rise to intuition
from induction, or cannot look beyond the signs to the things signified (Hamilton 1967,
3).
Although no one algebraist "belongs exclusively to any one of three schools, so as to be only
Practical, Philological, or only Theoretical," Hamilton wrote, Peacock's "arithmetical algebra" is best
aligned with the "practical" and his "symbolical algebra" with the "philological".
Hamilton viewed his own work on couples as aligned with the "theoretical". The Irish mathematician
recollected that his aim in developing "couples" had been to
improve the Science, not the Art nor the Language of Algebra. The imperfections sought
to be removed, are confusions of thought, and obscurities or errors or reasoning; not
difficulties of application of an instrument, nor failures of symmetry in expression
(Hamilton 1967, 4).
And in a tempered critique of the symbolical algebraic approach, Hamilton added:
That confusions of thought, and errors of reasoning, still darken the beginnings of
Algebra, is the earnest and just complaint of sober and thoughtful men, who in a spirit of
love and honor have studied Algebraic Science, admiring, extending, and applying what
has been already brought to light, and feeling all the beauty and consistence of many a
remote deduction, from principles which yet remain obscure, and doubtful (Hamilton
1967, 4).
Hamilton's position in the 1830s was that of someone who felt ontological content had to exist for
mathematical entities to be justifiable. That content had to be established prior to the generalized
manipulation of the entities. Hamilton's overriding objective had been to establish a "science" of
algebra that was:
Strict, pure, and independent; deduced by valid reasonings from its own intuitive
principles; and thus not less an object of a priori contemplation than Geometry, nor less
distinct, in its own essence, from the Rules which it may teach or use, and from the Signs
by which it may express its meaning (Hamilton 1967, 5).
Hamilton saw himself as offering the novel claim that Time and Algebra were necessarily connected
(this being the "inductive" part of his work), and he put forward the view that "this notion or
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intuition of Time may be unfolded into an independent Pure Science"—i.e. that it constituted a new
branch of mathematics, which could then be used in the resolution of specific scientific quandaries
related to physical phenomena (this being the "deductive" part of his work).
In sum, Hamilton viewed his project as a unique synthesis of deductive and inductive processes.
Through the deductive use of algebraic rules, a new "Science" could emerge that would help to shed
light on the ways things are (i.e. progressions in time) rather than just comment on universally true
symbolical relations that were referent to nothing existential.31 Hamilton's claim that "the Science of
Pure Time ... is co-extensive and identical with Algebra, so far as Algebra itself is a Science" (Hamilton
1967, 5) indicates that, in the 1830s, he viewed symbolical algebra as valid only in so far as it
possessed inductive referents. The progression of time could not be severed from the algebraic rules
describing it.
Hamilton also considered his work in the 1830s to be a modern extension of classical mathematics,
which had long been based upon the notion of "Continuous Progression" or "Time". "It is the genius
of Algebra to consider what it reasons on as flowing, as it was the genius of geometry to consider
what it reasoned on as fixed," he wrote (Hamilton 1967, 5). Ancient geometers looked upon forms as
"fixed"; it was Newton who, eventually, developed the alternative principle in algebra of looking
upon forms, such as the tangent to a curve, as flowing and unfixed. Hamilton claims,
The Newtonian Method of Tangents ... regards the curve and line not as already formed
and fixed, but rather as nascent, or in a process of generation: and employs, as its
primary conception, the thought of a flowing point (Hamilton 1967, 5).
The entire theory of fluxions depended upon the notion of Time, as did Lagrange's later
"philological" attempt to reduce the Theory of Fluxions to a "systems of operations upon symbols,
31
Hamilton's belief was that "the Intuition of TIME is such a rudiment." He stated, "This belief involves the three following
components: First, that the notion of Time is connected with existing Algebra; Second, that this notion or intuition of
Time may be unfolded into an independent Pure Science; and Third, that the Science of Pure Time, thus unfolded, is co¬
extensive and identical with Algebra, so far as Algebra itself is a Science. The first component judgment is the result of an
induction; the second of a deduction; the third is the joint result of the deductive and inductive processes" (Hamilton
1967, 5).
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analogous to the earliest symbolic operations of Algebra," despite the fact that Lagrange had
attempted to "reject the notion of time as foreign to such a system" (Hamilton 1967, 6).
Hamilton's aim was to subsume the foundations of the "symbolical algebraic" approach under the
heading of "Algebra as Time", thereby providing it with ontological content that its initial advocates
had stripped away. Hamilton concluded that Lagrange,
In one of his own most important researches in pure Algebra, (the investigation of limits
between which the sum of any number of terms in Taylor's Series is comprised) ...
employs the conception of continuous progression to show that a certain variable
quantity may be made as small as can be desired (Hamilton 1967, 6).
Although Lagrange had considered algebra to be the science of functions, it is impossible to think of
"functions" without thinking of "its essence as consisting in a Law connecting Change with Change,"
Hamilton argued. And, "where Change and Progression are, there is TIME ... The notion of Time is,
therefore, inductively found to be connected with existing Algebra" (Hamilton 1967, 6). Hamilton
viewed his algebraic research of the 1830s to be part of a long tradition in algebraic (and Kantian)
thought—a tradition that had explicitly relied upon the notion of progression in time. Hamilton
concluded that "The notion or intuition of ORDER IN TIME is not less but more deep-seated in the
human mind, than the notion or intuition of ORDER IN SPACE" (Hamilton 1967, 7). In sum, "algebra"
has ontological content, based upon the fact it emerges from the intuition of progression in time,
which precedes even spatial intuition as a natural guiding principle for rational thought.
Recall that in the 1840s, Peacock produced his two newly revised texts on algebra (on Arithmetical
Algebra in 1842 and Symbolical Algebra in 1845), in which he emphasized the fundamentally
empirical nature of the normal rules of algebra, and in which he had demonstrated how symbolical
algebra, as arbitrary and as meaningless as it might seem, was nonetheless anchored to arithmetical
operational truths. The relationships revealed in symbolical algebra were universally true even
though they were not necessarily related to things in this world. Peacock's books received important
support from De Morgan, who had by then established himself as one of Britain's pre-eminent
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mathematicians. Yet, De Morgan had also read Hamilton's first paper on conjugate functions and
algebra as "pure time." As a result, he modified some of his own views (see Chapter One) in order to
present a new interpretation of symbolical algebra in a series of lectures entitled "On the
Foundation of Algebra," delivered to his UCL classes between 1839 and 1844, in which he argued
that logical algebra is "the science which investigates the method of giving meaning to the primary
symbols and of interpreting all subsequent symbolic results" (De Morgan 1842, 173). De Morgan
had, therefore, adopted a view similar to Hamilton's "theoretical" approach—namely, that entities
operated upon should be defined prior to their usage. De Morgan developed that Hamiltonian-
inspired view further in his Trigonometry and Double Algebra (1849), in which he stated,
The object of this book is the construction of Algebra upon a basis which will enable us
to give a meaning to every symbol and combination of symbols before it is used, and
consequently to dispense, first, with all unintelligible combination, secondly, with all
search after interpretation of combinations subsequently to their first appearance (De
Morgan 1849, 89).
De Morgan's shift in allegiance away from pure Peacockian symbolism towards a Hamiltonian-
influenced view in the 1840s meant that the London mathematician had become an advocate of a
merged form of abstract mathematical reasoning—one in which universal symbolical relationships
produced physical conceptualizations (Richards 1987).
On the flip side, however, in his 1835 review of Peacock's Treatise, De Morgan also noted the virtue
of an approach that rendered mathematical analysis entirely abstract and relational. That virtue
came from the fact that such an approach was anti-dogmatic. Symbolical algebra opened the door to
the critical adoption of non-established and questionable entities and operations. In so doing, it
constituted a form of thinking that reflected De Morgan's dissenting attitude toward
epistemological, theological and pedagogical authorities.32 In the preface to his Lectures, Hamilton
notes that De Morgan had criticized him for being too dogmatic in his 1830s conjugate functions
paper. De Morgan had accepted Hamilton's notion of "pure time" as a useful interpretative tool, but
32
De Morgan's anti-dogmatic political stance was one of the main reasons for which he had been expelled from Cambridge
during his student days, as he had refused to take the religious test required for a fellowship appointment.
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to argue that all algebraic analysis could be reduced to "pure time" was unjustifiably "dogmatic" in
De Morgan's view. As the London mathematician had written,
A symbol may thus denote either magnitude [or] operation, by which magnitude is
attained, or the conception of one extreme arrived at, the other having been the
previous object of contemplation. The earlier algebraists most certainly dwelt on the
first notion; a + b is with them the result of an operation, in which the method of
obtaining it is so completely forgotten, that the result a + b is actually obtained by a
distinct operation. It seems to me that Sir William Rowan Hamilton, in his very original
and methodical memoir on algebra as the science of pure time, has adopted a view of
the third kind. I cannot see why the whole paper might not be as easily applied to
succession of points in a line, as to succession of epochs in time. Succession, that is to
say continuous succession, might be made the fundamental conception in both cases;
and if such were the author's intention in the use of the word time, I should be very glad
to maintain after him that one of the explanations which suffice to convert technical into
logical algebra, has been fully established in his memoir. But, if any thing more physical
be intended by the distinguished author, and if some of his phrases are to be
interpreted as of his asserting algebra to be the science of pure time, I should then cite
him as an instance of the dogmatism already alluded to (De Morgan 1842, 176).
Hamilton responded to this review a decade later, by adopting a philosophical outlook reflecting
some of De Morgan's criticisms, and which adopted certain aspects of Peacock's "principle of the
permanence of equivalent forms."
In 1845, Hamilton met with Peacock again. He engaged in lengthy correspondences with him after
their meeting. Unlike their early-1830s encounter, Hamilton no longer thought Peacock and his clan
were "building castles in the sky." Rather, in 1846, he wrote to Peacock saying,
My views respecting the nature, extent and importance of symbolic science may have
approximated gradually to yours; and that approximation may be due chiefly to the
influence of your writings and conversation (Ohrstrom 1985, 53).
Thus, we find Hamilton philosophically repositioning himself in the latter half of the 1840s. For
example, he emphasizes the importance of the associative principle and the uniqueness of the
"determinateness of division," the latter of which referred to the fact that "a quotient [is] never
indeterminate or impossible, unless the constituents of division all vanish" (Ohrstrom 1985, 51)33.
33
This determinateness of division is based on Hamilton's understanding of the importance of the modulus of the
quaternion, where the "law of the modulus" fulfills the condition that the modulus of a product be the product of the
moduli, where the modulus of a quaternion q = a + b\ + cj + dk is |q| = (a2 + b2 + c2 + d2)1/2. As Gray (1997)
93
The associative principle and the notion of determinate division had appeared as two fundamental
properties in Peacock's 1842 Treatise.
Hamilton's repositioning—the Lectures on Quaternions (1853) as a
symbolical project
Hamilton's Lectures on Quaternions (1853) runs to a lengthy 736 pages. In his preface (which is a
mere 64 pages in length), he repackages and presents the history of quaternions as part of an
ideological divide in the history of mathematics. He situates himself on one side of that divide—the
symbolical algebraic side—and favors the creation of new mathematical techniques, new notations,
and new rules. Concomitantly, he places himself within a uniquely British community of activist
mathematicians who saw themselves as working at the forefront of research involving deistic
mathematics (for a brief account of Hamilton's quaternions, see Appendix One).
Hamilton initiates his monolithic work with the claim that, like his Cambridge counterparts, he too is
doing something new. He calls his mathematical analysis the "Method or Calculus of Quaternions".
His preface offers an historical recounting of the generation (in his words "discovery") of this new
method, and it aims to highlight the importance of quaternions to the future of British mathematics.
Hamilton's objective here is to underscore the profundity of the quaternion concept and its
fecundity for future research. By association, his aim is to underscore the profundity and fecundity
of Irish mathematics in general. In so doing, he offers the suggestion that quaternion algebra could
serve as the basis for a new symbolical algebra—one even more profound than Peacock's own.
Firstly, Hamilton identifies himself as having long been situated within a tradition of mathematical
and philosophical thinkers who had struggled to come to terms with imaginary numbers. He writes,
The difficulties which so many have felt in the doctrine of Negative and Imaginary
Quantities in Algebra forced themselves long ago on my attention; and although I early
formed some acquaintance with various views or suggestions that had been proposed
writes, this law "served as Hamilton's guarantee that the system of objects he constructed did not, for some hidden
reason, self-destruct" (Gray 1997, 90).
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by eminent writers, for the purpose of removing or eluding those difficulties (such as the
theory of direct and inverse quantities, and of indirectly correlative figures, the method
of constructing imaginaries by lines drawn from one point with various directions in one
plane, and the view which refers all to the mere play of algebraical operations, and to
the properties of symbolical language), yet the whole subject still appeared to me to
deserve additional inquiry, and to be susceptible of a more complete elucidation
(Hamilton 1853, 1-2).
Hamilton agrees with those mathematicians who had argued that "negatives" and "imaginaries" are
not "properly quantities at all." In the 1830s, he recounts, he had sided with those symbolical
algebraists who had claimed that imaginary numbers were operations rather than quantities, though
he felt that the approach failed to provide the operations in question with adequate meaning.
Hamilton recalls that he had,
still felt dissatisfied with any view which should not give to them, from the outset, a
clear interpretation and meaning; and wished that this should be done, for the square
roots of negatives, without introducing considerations so expressly geometrical, as those
which involve the conception of an angle (Hamilton 1853, 2).
That dissatisfaction had initially led Hamilton to Kantianism. Hamilton recalls that in his 1837
conjugate functions paper, he had defined algebra as the "Science of Pure Time," in which algebra
emerged as a symbolical manifestation of successive moments in temporal existence.
Algebra was no "mere Art, nor Language, nor primarily a Science of Quantity," he recounts. Rather, it
was "the Science of Order in Progression." Although,
the successive states of such a progression might (no doubt) be represented by points
upon a line, yet I thought that their simple successiveness was better conceived by
comparing them with moments of time, divested, however, of all reference to cause and
effect; so that the "time" here considered might be said to be abstract, ideal, or pure,
like that "space" which is the object of geometry (Hamilton 1853, 2).
Hamilton had argued couples could be used to represent directed lines and imaginary quantities. He
was then
encouraged to entertain and publish this view, by remembering some passages in Kant's
Criticism of the Pure Reason, which appeared to justify the expectation that it should be
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possible to construct, a priori, a Science of Time, as well as a Science of Space (Hamilton
1853, 2-3).
The "Science of Pure Time" was, in other words, the offspring of Hamilton's Kantian insight into the
d priori nature of the world.34 Hamilton aligned his early work on couples with the venerable
metaphysical claims of that German philosopher, by saying he had approached mathematical
knowledge from a particular "point of view as regards the first elements of algebra" (Hamilton 1853,
3).
However, by 1853, Hamilton acknowledges that in having pursued such an extreme version of
Kantianism in his earlier algebra, he had unfairly dismissed Peacock's Treatise on Algebra (1830). His
negative perception of Peacock's symbolical algebra, emerged from the fact that, from his Kantian
view, the search for a priori truths required a constant appeal to that which was intuitively
instantiated. In later years, Hamilton says, he came to realize that purely abstract symbolical
manipulations, in which the rules of algebra are treated as malleable and flexible, could reveal
important relationships between abstract mathematical objects—relationships not evident to the
mathematician who relies solely on intuitions of temporal succession. The symbolical algebraic
approach allowed, therefore, for the construction of new starting principles—principles from which
the mathematician could develop entirely new mathematical systems, some of which might
productively lead to new intuitive conceptions.
Recalling conjugate functions
In his preface, Hamilton recalls De Morgan's criticism of "dogmatism" in his 1837 conjugate
functions papers. Hamilton responds to the criticism by saying he had not intended for that paper to
be interpreted as claiming that "simple and elementary notations" should be been understood as
"necessary." Rather, the claims he had proposed in that paper were merely "consistent among
themselves, and preparatory to the study of the quaternions" (Hamilton 1853, 3). The focus on
34
Hamilton made this claim despite the fact that he read Kant directly only in 1834, after he had published his first paper
on Algebra as "pure time".
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"internal consistence" here is indicative of Hamilton's effort to accommodate the concerns of the
English algebraists for whom algebraic entities, such as "couples", ought to have been interpreted as
open-ended in content, as opposed to being reliant upon any one necessary interpretation prior to
their manipulation. In an effort to subtly redefine his past efforts, Hamilton presents his conjugate
functions paper as having been a nascent form of symbolical analysis rather than the "theoretical"
analysis that he had previously defined it to be. For instance, Hamilton recalls the first claim made in
his conjugate functions, which stated,
If the letters A and B were employed as dates, to denote any two moments of time,
which might or might not be distinct, the case of the coincidence or identity of these two
moments, or of equivalence of these two dates, was denoted by the equation,
B = A;
which symbolic assertion was thus interpreted as not involving any original reference to
quantity, nor as expressing the result of any comparison between two durations as
measured. It corresponded to the conception of simultaneity or synchronism; or, in
simpler words, it represented the thought of the present in time. Of all possible answers
to the general question, "When," the simplest is the answer, "Now," and it was the
attitude of mind, assumed in the making of this answer, which (in the system here
described) might be said to be originally symbolized by the equation above written
(Hamilton 1853, 3-4).
An expression of "non-equivalence," such as B > A or B < A is not to be interpreted as referring to
a specific quantity. Rather, it referred to a time sequence, or any sequence in general.
"Subsequence" and "precedence" answer to
thoughts of the future and the past in time; or as expressing, simply, the one that the
moment B is conceived to be later than A, and the other that B is earlier than A: without
yet introducing even the conception of a measure, to determine how much later, or how
much earlier, one moment is than the other (Hamilton 1853, 4).
Having established a meaning for the basic symbols =, >, and <, Hamilton recalls proposing that to
construct a "science ofpure time," the first use of the symbol ( - ) might be in the construction of a
complex symbol B — A, to denote the difference between two moments, or the ordinal
relation of the moment B to the moment A, whether that relation were one of identity
or of diversity; and if the latter, then whether it were one of subsequence or of
precedence, and in whatever degree (Hamilton 1853, 4).
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In the study of such symbols, questions about quantity often emerge, he notes, because it is at this
point that the mathematician usually wants to know about the "degree of such diversity"—a
question that invokes the conception of "duration, as quantity in time" (Hamilton 1853, 2), where
the full meaning of B — A is not be known until the mathematician knows "How long after, or how
long before, if at all, B is than A" (Hamilton 1853, 4).
Having emphasized the symbolical nature of his algebraic speculations at the time, Hamilton also
recalls his metaphysical justifications for interpreting such symbols on the basis of a time sequence.
He writes, "The contrast between the Future and the Past appears to be even earlier and more
fundamental, in human thought, than that between the Great and the Little" (Hamilton 1853, 4).
Unlike his 1837 paper, however, Hamilton uses his 1853 "Preface" to recast those past claims by
emphasizing the generality of the sequences (be it in time or otherwise) that he had been
speculating on. In his "Preface" Hamilton explains,
After comparing moments, it was easy to proceed to compare relations; and in this view,
by an extension of the recent signification of the sign =, it was used to denote analogy
in time; or, more precisely, to express the equivalence of two marks of one common
ordinal relation, between two pairs of moments (Hamilton 1853, 5).
The formula, D — C — B — A, can be interpreted to denote an "equality between two intervals in
time," thus indicating a general relationship between symbolical entities used. D is to C as B is to A,
where the equivalences at play indicate "identity or diversity," and where the "quantity and quality
of such diversity" are only "taken into account" afterwards (Hamilton 1853, 5). In other words,
Hamilton spells out a process by which symbolical equivalences are first established and their
"quantity" or "quality" (i.e. their positivity or their negativity) are determined secondarily, after the
analysis has been completed.
In his conjugate functions paper, such relationships had been subjected to various further
transformations and combinations (including "inversion" and "alternation"), all of which he had
interpreted in terms of moments (subsequent or precedent) in time. In his "Preface", however,
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Hamilton emphasizes that all those manipulations agree "with the received rules of algebra."
Though, in his 1837 paper, Hamilton had maintained that algebra was "identical to" the concept of
time, he does not repeat the claim in his 1853 "Preface". Rather, he insists the rules governing the
algebra of "couples" mimic the rules governing normal algebra. For example, the "the contrasted
formulae of inequalities of differences," such as
D - C > B - A,D - C < B - A,
can be interpreted to mean "D was later, relatively to C, than B to A; and the other that D was
relatively earlier" (Hamilton 1853, 5). But Hamilton leaves open the possibility that other
interpretations are also possible, suggesting that symbolical equivalence holds true for "anything at
all," as Peacock had claimed. For example, in his account of the (+) symbol, Hamilton says he had
previously used the symbol as
a mark of a combination between a symbol, such as the smaller Roman letter a, of a step
in time, and the symbol, such as A, of the moment from which this step was conceived
to be made, in order to form a complex symbol, a + A, recording this conception of
transition, and denoting the moment (suppose B) to which the step was supposed to
conduct (Hamilton 1853, 5).
In other words, the operation (+) combined symbols representing (i.e. "time steps" and "space
steps". In 1837, Hamilton had argued that any transition (or "step") symbolized using (+) should be
regarded as a "mental act" that could be conducted "backwards as forwards [as] in the progression
of time." Hamilton claimed the expression, B = a + A, denoted "the conception that the moment
B might be attained, or mentally generated, by making (in thought) the step a from the moment A"
(Hamilton 1853, 5-6). If the symbol B-A were considered to be an ordinal relation between two
moments, the rules of arithmetic would then tell us that a "step from one [moment] to another"
could be symbolically represented as, B - A = a. The mathematician could even use the equation
above as a symbol for "one common step," such that the identity (B — A) + A — B determined the
difference between two moments as a "relation." In his 1853 preface, however, Hamilton focuses on
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the "ordinal relations" at play—"ordinal relations" that need not be situated within a "Science of
Pure Time." Rather, algebraic rules acting on unknown symbols produce universal relations even
when no a priori intuition of time-based progression is assumed.
Shifting views ofsymbolical algebra
Hamilton admits that while it is true that in earlier decades he had believed meaning ought to
precede manipulation, he no longer believed that to be the case. He still did not believe that
symbolical algebra should be conceived of as purely linguistic or conventional, but he no longer
believed all algebraic elements required predetermined definitions in order to produce powerful and
meaningful results. Useful conclusions could emerge even when algebraic manipulation preceded
definition. In a footnote, Hamilton identifies his intellectual benefactors in this conversion of
opinion. His Lectures had been deeply inspired by the algebraic thinking then dominant in England.
In having maintained previously a view "so little supported by scientific authority" (i.e. his view of
algebra as the "science of pure time"), Hamilton states he had become well aware of his deficiencies
as a symbolical algebraist. He writes,
I am very willing to believe that (though not unused to calculation) I may have habitually
attended [in the past] too little to the symbolical character of Algebra, as a Language, or
organized system of signs: and too much (in proportion) to what I have been
accustomed to consider its scientific character, as a Doctrine analogous to Geometry,
through the Kantian parallelism between the intuitions of Time and Space. This is not a
proper opportunity for seeking to do justice to the views of others, or to my own, on a
subject of so great subtlety: especially since, in the present work, I have thought it
convenient to adopt throughout a geometrical basis, for the exposition of the theory
and calculus of the Quaternions. Yet I wish to state, that I do not despair of being able
hereafter to shew that my own old views respecting Algebra, perhaps modified in some
respects by subsequent thought and reading, are not fundamentally and irreconcilably




In referring to Ohm, Hamilton had in mind Ohm's Versuch eines Vollkommen Consequenten Systems der Mathematik
(Berlin, 1829). With Peacock, he had in mind the Treatise on Algebra (1830), Report on Certain Branches of Analysis
(1834),35 Arithmetical Algebra (1842), and Symbolical Algebra (1845).
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I by no means dispute the possibility of constructing a consistent and useful system of
algebraical calculations, by starting with the notion of integer number; unfolding that
notion into its necessary consequences; expressing those consequences with the help of
symbols, which are already general in form, although supposed at first to be limited in
their signification, or value; and then, by definition, for the sake of symbolic generality,
removing the restrictions which the original notion had imposed; and so resolving to
adopt, as perfectly general in calculation, what had been only proved to be true for a
certain subordinate and limited extent of meaning. Such seems to be, at least in part,
the view taken by [Ohm and Peacock]: although Ohm appears to dwell more on the
study of the relations between the fundamental operations, and Peacock more on the
permanence of equivalent forms (Hamilton 1853,15).
Thus, Hamilton recognizes that interpretation is subordinate to the universal relations that emerge
through symbolical analysis.
Indeed, in his "Preface," Hamilton states he now accepts the legitimacy of symbolical algebra as a
philosophical and methodological tool. Yet, in placating his Kantian colleagues, he also adds this
does not necessitate an entire abandonment of his Kantian intuition. Hamilton writes,
I confess that I do not find myself able to frame a distinct conception of number, without
some reference to the thought of time, although this reference may be of a somewhat
abstract and transcendental kind. I cannot fancy myself as counting any set of things,
without first ordering them, and treating them as successive: however arbitrary and
mental (or subjective) this assumed succession may be. And by consenting to begin with
the abstract notion (or pure intuition) of TIME, as the basis of the exposition of those
axioms and inferences which are to be expressed by the symbols of algebra, (although I
grant that the commencing with the more familiar conception of whole number may be
more convenient for purposes of elementary instruction), it still appears to me that an
advantage would be gained: because the necessity for any merely symbolical extension
of formulae would be at least considerably postponed thereby. In fact (as has been
shewn above), negatives would then present themselves as easily and naturally as
positives, though the fundamental contrast between the thoughts of past and future,
used here as no mere illustration of a result otherwise and symbolically deduced,
without any clear comprehension of its meaning, but as the very ground of the
reasoning (Hamilton 1853,15).
Hamilton's aim, therefore, is to go beyond Peacock's "principle" generalization and abstraction in
order to make the algebraic rules governing the combinations of "time-steps" the foundations for a
new symbolical algebra altogether. In supporting the symbolical program, Hamilton uses his 1853
"Preface" to usurp it to some degree, by arguing that the regular principles of arithmetical algebra,
which Peacock had used as the basis for his symbolical algebra in 1845, were too limiting and that
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they ought to be replaced with the broader foundations formed by the algebra that governs
"couples". Hamilton concludes, therefore, that Peacock's phraseology—which defines symbolical
algebra the "science of suggestion"—should be reinterpreted more broadly, as a means of
"build [ing] up afterwards a new structure of purely symbolical generalization." "If the science of time
were adopted," he writes, "instead of merely Arithmetic, or (primarily) the doctrine of integer
number," a grand new mathematical system could emerge (Hamilton 1853, 16).
From Hamilton's new perspective, symbolical algebra encourages a highly suggestive and open-
ended system of symbolical operational analysis, which allows for the adoption of new sets of
foundational guidelines. In Hamilton's mind, however, those new guidelines were his own. In
building upon this programmatic call for action, Hamilton prefaces his account of quaternions by
describing them as an instantiation of meaningful mathematics formed, in the first instance, by the
establishment of new foundational rules in symbolical manipulation (Hamilton 1853). Hamilton
writes,
It will be perceived, by those who shall do me the honor to read this work with
attention, that I have employed a method of transition, from theorems proved for the
particular to expressions assumed for the general, which bears a very close analogy to
the methods of Ohm and Peacock (Hamilton 1853, 16).
The equivalences generated through analysis justify the extension of couples into triplets and then
into quaternions—the last of which, Hamilton believes, constitute the forefront of a new revolution
in analytical thought.
Triplets to quaternions
Given that his work on couples had previously led to various "unsuccessful" extensions into
"triplets," Hamilton re-emphasizes the superior benefits to be gained by adopting a methodology
based upon the pursuit of symbolical equivalences. Hamilton starts his account of quaternion
mathematics with a discussion of his past attempts to develop a triplet system. He recollects that he
had initially attempted to compare two "triads," each of which represented three moments in time.
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He had compared, for instance, three moments such as, Bi, B2, B3, with three other moments, A3, A2,
A3. His aim was to obtain a "triad of ordinal relations," or a "triad of steps in time," which he hoped
would be represented by the following expression:
(Bj, B2, B3) — (Ai, A2, A3) = (B! — Ai, B2 — A2, B3-A3).
In that set up, the "constituent steps" of the triad would be denoted as:
(Bi — Ai) = a1( (B2 — A2) = a2 , (B3-A3) = a3,
so that,
(Bi, B2, B3) = (81,32,33) — (Ai, A2, A3)
Representing a triad of steps "symbolically" produced "in thought" another moment-triad. Hamilton
initially succeeded in showing how the moment-triads could be added (as above), subtracted,
multiplied and divided by other number-triads in a manner analogous to the same processes for
couples. In so doing, three "distinct and independent unit-steps" emerged—a primary, a secondary
and a tertiary (i.e. 11( 12,13). In addition, other "unit-numbers" also emerged, "each of which might
operate, as a species of factor, or multiplier, on each of these three steps, or on their system"
(Hamilton 1853, 18). Those unit-numbers were represented as by x1,x2,x3. Fully written out in triad
form, the unit-steps took the form of (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1), where a triad of steps could be
represented as rl1 + sl2 + tl3, where r, s, t represents three numerical coefficients (positive or
negative).
Yet, although 12,12,13 represent three "steps in time," and although triplet factors (m, n, p), "by
which [the] step-triplet was to be multiplied, or operated upon," could be put into the analogous
form mx1 + nx2 + px3, a full triplet system still eluded Hamilton. The extension of his findings
posed several problems, one of which was the unwieldiness of the resulting algebra. For instance, in
explaining the distributive property of this proposed system, Hamilton found that nine products
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emerged from the combination of a number-triplet with a step-triplet. In proceeding to develop
those nine step-triplets into nine trinomial expressions of the following form,
y.9 = V.5.11! + 1/-5.212 + V.0.3I3,
Hamilton found that twenty-seven symbols of the form 1f gh resulted, each of which served to
represent a fixed numerical coefficient (i.e. a "constant of multiplication"). Problematically, as with
the analogous coefficients he had used in multiplying couples, the twenty-seven coefficients of the
triplet combinations had to be pre-defined in order to produce a "perfectly definite step-triad" in the
multiplication of a number-triad by step-triad.
In addition to the unwieldiness of the system, Hamilton found various departures "from ordinary
analogies of algebra," one of which included the fact that the "product of two triplets may vanish
without either factor vanishing" (Hamilton 1853, 22). Though Hamilton had been prepared to widen
the narrow limitations of legitimate algebraical operations in order to develop his system further,
the various problems he encountered in combining two triplets led him to deem the resulting
systems overly "arbitrary" and not worthy of further development.
The geometry of triplets
At about the same time as Hamilton was abandoning his pursuit of general sets of n moments,
certain new "motivations"—namely, his reading of John Warren's Treatise on the Geometrical
Representation of the Square Roots of Negative Quantities (1828)—deepened Hamilton's interest in
pursuing a geometrical analysis of triplets. Hamilton states that he took up Warren's book in the
hopes of advancing his "triplet" efforts. Thus, having faced the seemingly insurmountable algebraical
"arbitrariness" associated with extending operations on couples to operations on triplets, Hamilton
turned his efforts towards geometrical presentations of the same relations.
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Note that Hamilton had encountered Argand's account of the geometrical presentation of imaginary
numbers in Peacock's Report on Certain Branches of Analysis (1834). That encounter first led him to
reconsider the addition and multiplication of directed lines in space. Previously, Hamilton had
represented such addition and multiplication only in algebraic terms as "couples". On his reading of
Warren, however, he turned to considering the addition of lines as the "composition of motions, or
of forces, by drawing the diagonal of a parallelogram" (Hamilton 1853, 32-33). Hamilton tells his
reader that various contributions to the study of V—1, including the work of Abbe Buee (1806),
Benjamin Gompertz in his The Principles and Applications of Imaginary Quantities, Book II, Derived
from a Particular Case of Functional Projections (1818), John Wallis's much older Treatise of Algebra
(1695) and, most recently, De Morgan's Trigonometry and Double Algebra (1849), had provided him
with "a perfectly clear interpretation" of the symbol V—1 with regards to operations on right lines in
a given plane. In those accounts, V^l denoted "a second unit-line, at right angles to that line which
had been selected to represent positive unity" (Hamilton 1853, 33-34).
All of the attempts listed above, however, were limited to one plane. Of them, Hamilton wrote,
When it was proposed to leave the plane, and to construct a system which should have
some general analogy to the known system thus described, but should extend to space,
then difficulties of a new character arose (Hamilton 1853, 34).
Hamilton recalls that, in the 1830s, he had tried to extend those accounts to points on the surface of
a sphere, interpreting the points as "moments". He had failed to produce any useful results.36 Yet,
"among [his] papers," Hamilton contends, there were hints of another approach. In his 1853
"Preface", Hamilton claims to have rediscovered his own symbolical work from the 1830s. He writes
that he had contemplated the fact that, "while lines in space might be added according to the same
36
Charles Graves (1812-1899), the eventual bishop of Limerick and mathematician, had worked on an extension using two
couples laying in perpendicular planes. In that account, a system could be generated in which "two new imaginaries", i
and j, served particular roles. The symbol i caused a directed line in space to rotate through a 90° angle about the z-axis,
while j caused "a line to revolve through an equal angle in its own vertical plane (that is, in the plane of the line and of
z)". Graves had multiplied together the triplets x + ij + jz, x + iy' + jz' such that he obtained (in using a "peculiar" set
of rules for multiplication) a third triplet of the form: x + iy + jz . Graves noted that multiplication of triplets in this
manner would not be a distributive operation, although it would be commutative (Hamilton 1853, 38). Graves's
approach is of "historical" interest, Hamilton notes—presumably because Graves toyed with the notion of abandoning
particular algebraic principles (such as the law of distribution) in order to develop a new system.
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rule as in the plane, they might be multiplied by multiplying their lengths, and adding their polar
angles" (Hamilton 1853, 39). When first toying with this idea, Hamilton had become aware of
Warren's geometrical account of imaginary numbers, in which the author had used the parameters
x = r cos 6 and y = r sin 0. Hamilton's aim was to extend Warren's approach to three dimensions
by employing the coordinate transformations x = r cos 0 ,y = r sin 6 cos 0, and z = r sin 9 sin 0
in order to define the multiplication of lines in space. He found, however, that the approach did not
satisfy the distributive principle, leading him to abandon his efforts once more.
By the early 1840s, Hamilton had been put under pressure by the Board of Governors at his
university. Recall the Board had demanded evidence of Hamilton's professional research outputs.
Though he does not mention that fact in his "Preface," he does note that his friend and colleague,
the bishop Charles Graves (1812-1899), proffered an article in which Graves had sought to represent
"usual imaginary quantities of algebra, each by a corresponding unique point on the surface of a
sphere" that lay about the origin with a radius of 1. In his approach, Graves had expressed
r(cos 6 + V—1 sin 9) using the triplet (x,y, z), in which he assumed the triplet met the condition
x2 + y2 + z2 — 1. Graves also claimed rules obtained from such operations would be analogous to
similar operations in the "more general case," where x, y, z are entirely independent of one another.
Graves's idea was based upon a previous suggestion of De Morgan's that one could represent points
on the surface of a sphere (Hamilton 1853). Hamilton adopted De Morgan's claims and he used
Graves's paper as a basis upon which to develop his own triplet system, picking up the pieces of the
disarrayed puzzle he had left unfinished in the late-1830s.
By 1843, Hamilton laid out his objective as that of finding an analogy between the algebraic
expression of a triplet system and the study of lines in space. His aim was to "retain the distributive
principle, with which some of his formerly conjectured systems had been inconsistent." At first,
Hamilton supposed he "could preserve the commutative principle also, or the convertibility of the
factors as to their order" (Hamilton 1853, 43). In place of his previous use of x1,x2,x3 , Hamilton
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now employed the symbols of 1, i,j, such that a numerical triplet could be expressed as x + iy + jz.
The idea was to interpret x,y,z as three different axes, where the triplet denoted a line in space
running through the coordinates. By analogy to couples, for which Hamilton had defined i2 = —1,
he defined j2 = —1, for "triplets", which he "interpreted as answering to a rotation through two
right angles in the plane of xz, [just] as i2 = —1 had corresponded to such a rotation in the plane"
(Hamilton 1853, 44). Based on those two definitions, and assuming that ij = ji, the multiplication
of two triplets resulted in the following symbolical display:
(a + ib + y'c)(x + iy + jz) — (ax — by — cz) + i(ay + bx) + y'(az + cx) + ij(bz + cy).
The solution was still problematical, however, as the product ij lacked any meaning apart from its
definition within this particular symbolical system. Hamilton did not "at once see what to do with
[it]" (Hamilton 1853, 44). The theory of triplets, as he had symbolically defined it in previous years,
required that ij be another triplet of the form ij — a + if] + jy, where the coefficients of a,/?, y
were constants. Thus, Hamilton recounts, he was initially at a loss as to how to adapt the new
symbol ij so as to reflect "some guiding geometrical analogies" (Hamilton 1853, 44).
The mathematician recollects that his first successful attempt at understanding the above symbols
occurred once he had more fully adopted the symbolical algebraic philosophy of Peacock and De
Morgan. Assuming that b and c were proportional to y and z, whatever those symbols referred to
(though, geometrically speaking, he noted their proportionality could refer to the fact the entities
lay in the same plane), the last term of the product—namely, ij(bz + cy)—would disappear, and
the product of two triplets would produce a three-termed result
ax — by — ca + i(ay + bx) + j(az + cx).
That result could then be interpreted as a line with factor lines defined by factor triplets—namely,
(a + ib + jc) and (x + iy + yz).
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Hamilton recalls he had been inclined to consider the product ij as equal to 0, since the term
ij(bz + cy) had disappeared from the overall product. However, when he considered the factor
triplets as being co-planar, he found that b and c were proportional to yz and z. Thus,
bz — cy — 0.
This meant that the fourth term might well have vanished from the final product mentioned earlier
not because ij = 0, but because bz = cy, and therefore the expansion of ij(bz + cy) would equal
0.37 The upshot of this latter consideration, he found, was that the following identity held:
ij = -ji.
In addition,
ij = +k,ji — —k,
where "k" was not defined.
Hamilton recalls the product of two triplets ought to have produced the following "quadrinomial"
form:
(a + ib + yc)(x + iy + jzj = (ax — by — cz) + t(ay + bx) + jjaz + cx) + k(bz — cy).
He observed the squares of the four coefficients of 1 ,i,j,kk did produce the following identity (in
which no relation was assumed between a, b, c, x, y, z):
(a2 + b2 + c2)(x2 + y2 + z2) = (ax — by — cz)2 + (ay + bx)2 + (az + cx)2 + (bz — cy)2.
Based on those findings, Hamilton states that instead of seeking out triplets of the form (a + ib +
jc) or (a, b, c), he realized it would be more effective to use "quaternions" of the form (a + ib +
jc + kd) or (a, b, c, d), where the "triplet" arises as a particular instance (i.e. as an "imperfect form"
37
Hamilton's rules for expanding such multiplications indicate the expansion is equivalent to the sum of ib.jz and jc.iy,
which is zero if the triplets are co-planar.
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of quaternions).38 The problem now was to define the symbol, k, which Hamilton had simply defined
as "some new sort of unit operator." Not only did Hamilton have to find a symbolical definition for
k but he also had to determine the meaning of the products that emerged in the symbolical
combination of that symbol with the other component parts of the system—namely, ik,jk, ki, kj. in
so doing, Hamilton recalls, "it seemed natural" that after having assumed i2 = j2 = —1, ij =
k, and ji = —k, he ought to similarly assume ki = —ik = — i2j = +j, and that kj = ijk = j2i =
—i. These assumptions seemed appropriate, he states, even though the definition of k2 "was less
obvious" and "for a while" he was "disposed to consider this square as equal to positive unity"
(because i2j2 = +1). In his manipulations, however, Hamilton realized it would be more convenient
to simply suppose "in consistency with the foregoing expressions for the products of i,j, k" that
k2 = ijij = -iijj = -i2j2 = _(_i)(_i) = -l.
In sum, "all the fundamental assumptions for the multiplication of two quaternions" were completed
by the early-1840s, he concludes. They can be summarized by the foundational rules of quaternions:
i2 = j2 = k2 = — 1; ij = —ji = k; jk = —kj = i;ki = —ik = j.
Consequently, the multiplication of two quaternions can be summarized as follows:
(a, b, c, d)(a , b , c , d ) = (a , b ', c", d."),
or equally,
(a + ib + jc + kdj(a + ib + jc + kd s) = a + ib" + jc + kd",
assuming that the following four conditions are satisfied by the constituents of the quaternions
being multiplied:
a = aa — bb — cc — dd ,
38
It is result that emerges when kd does not exist.
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b" — (ab + ba) + (cd - dc ),
c" = (ac + ca) + (db — bd'),
d — (ad — da) + (be — cb ).
Claiming to have been unaware of Euler's theorem regarding the sum of four squares, Hamilton
writes that "on trial" he had come to discover the above expressions for a ,b ,c ,d" had the
following modular property:
a"2 + b"2 + c"2 + d"2 = (a2 + b2 + c2 + d2)(a 2+b2 + c2 + d2).
Thus, if a line is represented by a triplet of the form ix + jy + kz (rather than the former version
x + iy + jz), then the product of two lines in space could be represented by a quaternion. The
geometrical significance of this construction is "very simple." For example, take the following
product of two lines in space (represented by triplets):
(ix + jy + kz)(ix + jy + kz') = w + ix + jy' + kz ,
where the following conditions are met,
w ' = —xx — yy — zz ,
x" = yz — zy ,y = zx — xz ,z — xy — yx .
In this case, the w" part of the product is entirely independent of ijk and represents the "product of
the lengths of the two-factor lines, multiplied by the cosine of the supplement of their inclination to
each other" (Hamilton 1853, 33).39 This part of the quaternion—the independent w"—is the part of
the quaternion system that Josiah Willard Gibbs (1839-1903) and Oliver Heaviside (1850-1925) later
39
The other part of the quaternion in this example (namely, w + ix + jy + kz ) represents a line in space, which has
a length equal to that of the product of the two lengths of the original lines, multiplied by the sine of their inclination
relative to one another. This part of the quaternion also has direction. That direction is perpendicular to the plane in
which the original factor lines lay; its direction of rotation depends upon the original direction of rotation about the
positive fc-axis from the positive semi-axis of i towards that of j.
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deemed useless in their own development of vector analysis in the post-1880s era. For Hamilton,
however, it was the key to the usefulness of quaternions, as it allowed for a combined discussion of
scalar and vector "magnitudes" in one fell swoop.
In summarizing his development of the quaternion algebraic system, Hamilton writes,
When the conception...had been so far unfolded and fixed in my mind, I felt that the
new instrument for applying calculation to geometry, for which I had so long sought, was
now, at least in part, attained" (Hamilton 1853, 33).
Hamilton recalls first presenting his quaternion definitions to the Royal Irish Academy at a council
meeting in October 1843 and again, one month later, at the same institution's general meeting. At
those meetings, Hamilton did not present all aspects of his quaternion mathematics; he avoided, for
instance, any discussion of the non-commutative aspect of the system which, required better
"metaphysical (or a priori)" justifications than he had proposed previously (Hamilton 1853, 33). In
the Lectures, however, he provides that justification by arguing it stems from the fact "no one
direction in space is to be regarded as eminent above another" (Hamilton 1853, 33). In other words,
the direction of two lines multiplied together is not determined uniquely unless the directions of the
lines are predetermined. In such cases, if the two lines in question lie along a similar axis (i.e. they
are "co-axal"), then their product follows the rules of arithmetical algebra. If a and (3 are the two
lines in question, then a/3 — (3a - 0. But if the two lines are not rectangular (i.e. perpendicular)
then a(3 + (3a — 0.
Hamilton concludes his algebraic account of quaternions by offering one last definition of the
rotating operators. The quaternion is best understood as a quotient of two directed lines in three
dimensional space—i.e. the product of a symbolical operation. In a footnote, Hamilton indicates he
had first developed the definition of a quaternion as a "geometrical quotient" in a series of papers
published in the Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal in the late-1840s. In those papers, he
had attempted to build upon the philosophy of Peacock's Symbolical Algebra (1845) in extending it
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to a category he termed "Symbolical Geometry". He wanted to "allow a more prominent influence
to the general laws of symbolical language," and to this extent he had "sought to imitate the
Symbolical Algebra of Dr. Peacock." In his interpretation of the quaternion as a quotient
(represented as b h- a), Hamilton emphasizes the role that "operation" plays in producing a
meaningful solution. The "fundamental property is ... conceived to be, that by operating, as a
multiplier (or at least in a way analogous to multiplication), on the divisor-line, [a quaternion]
produces (or generates) the dividend-line, b." Thus, it satisfies the following identity:
(b + a) x a = b.
This involves an extended analogy to multiplication from normal arithmetic, given that it implies an
operation that affects both length and direction, and also because it does not commute. The term
"quaternion" is particularly fitting, therefore, because the comparison of the lengths of two directed
lines is contained in one number (or ratio) and the comparison of their directions is contained in a
three-termed triplet, where one term denotes the angle between the two lines, while the two
remaining terms denote the "aspect of the plane of that angle, or the direction of the AXIS of the
positive rotation in that plane, from the divisor-line (a) to the dividend-line (b)" (Hamilton 1853,
33).
Throughout the remainder of his Lectures, Hamilton offers various geometrical and "physical"
applications that had been suggested to him by Herschel over the course of the previous decade. He
extends particular thanks Cayley, De Morgan, William Fishburn Donkin (1814-1869), the Graves
brothers, and William Spottiswoode (1825-1883), whose works had inspired his development of
quaternions. Hamilton notes also that it was De Morgan's speculations in 1844 of an "algebra of the
nth character" that had encouraged his own speculations on sets of moments in space (Hamilton
1853, 33). Indeed, throughout his Lectures, the influence of the symbolical algebraists is manifest. In
the first chapters of the book, Hamilton discusses the "general views respecting the four signs,
-I—Xt" and the "addition and subtraction of lines corresponding to the composition and
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decomposition of vections, or motions; line plus line, and line minus line" in great detail. In Chapter
II, he introduces a definition of the quaternion as a quotient (between two directed lines in space),
where the -h sign is described as taking on a new and "extended" meaning to indicate both a change
in length and direction. In the same chapter, Hamilton introduces his terminology of "tensors" and
"scalars", where a "tensor" refers to the magnitude of direction in a directed line, while a "scalar"
refers to the "reals of ordinary algebra." In Chapter Three, Hamilton explains how the product of a
scalar and a vector (that is, the product of a number and a directed line) is itself a directed line with
a particular length. The symbols ix,jy,kz are presented as three rectangular lines that can be
mapped onto the Cartesian system of co-ordinate space in three dimensions, by indicating a line
from the origin (0,0,0) to a point (x,y,z). In Chapter Ten, Hamilton offers an elaboration of the
non-commutative character of the composition of "versions", where a version operation results in a
change in angle towards a particular hand (i.e. around a particular axis) within a particular plane. The
symbols i,j, and/c are then denoted to be vector-units; they are further defined as "quadrantal
versors" (or "semi-versors"), and each is said to be represented by the square root of negative one,
V=1.
Conclusion
Hamilton's "Preface" reflects some of the varied terrains he was navigating through as he produced
and legitimated his quaternion mathematics in the 1840s and 1850s. Specifically, I have highlighted
here the motivations he drew from the terrain identified as "Irish Science", where he played a role in
promoting Protestant-led scientific developments, as well as the terrain identified as "symbolical
algebra in the mid-century", which motivated Hamilton to respond to the dominance of Peacockian-
influenced analytical practices in England. Thus, the "Preface" should not be read as a direct account
of how Hamilton actually developed his quaternions. For example, though he recounts much trial-
and-error in his efforts, there is little doubt that there was much more trial-and-error than Hamilton
admits. But more importantly, Hamilton suggests his process of proceeding—i.e. the methodologies
he used in those trial-and-error efforts—were largely symbolical algebraic. That is to say, they were
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driven by a focus on the operations governing symbolical manipulations, rather than considerations
of the geometrical behavior of vectors. This was not truly the case. As part of Hamilton's trial-and-
error period of investigation in the 1840s, he attempted many geometrical resolutions to the
problem of squaring a triplet (Graves 1882; 1885). Hamilton's unwillingness to elaborate fully upon
those previous efforts in his "Preface" is a bold indication of the degree to which he felt that, in
order to gain legitimacy in the eyes of English symbolical algebraists, he had to present his work as
the production of analytical manipulations that sought to determine operational equivalences
between the components of quaternions. In part hoping to satisfy his Irish funders, and in part
hoping to gain credence with English algebraists, Hamilton crafted an account of his mathematical
works that he hoped would achieve both. His admittance that conceptions of "pure time" still
weighed upon him indicates, however, that Hamilton viewed his conceptions as potentially
extending beyond Peacock's principle of abstraction. Somewhat like De Morgan during his "second"
stage of engagement with Peacock's "principle," Hamilton's aim, as stated in his "Preface," was to
gain notice for having pushed beyond the boundaries of Peacockian symbolical algebra, by adopting
a version of symbolical geometry that possessed underlying notions of time-based sequences.
By 1858, with the help and encouragement of Tait, Hamilton also began to conceive of the possibility
of his quaternions serving as a Tripos exam subject. Tait raised the possibility of quaternions forming
part of the developing corpus of symbolical algebraic material being institutionalized within the elite
confines of Cambridge's coaching classrooms.40 We turn then to a more detailed account of the
"terrains of knowledge" that Tait navigated through as he engaged with quaternions in order to
40
Hamilton's work in quaternions has been analyzed from a multiplicity of normative perspectives. Altmann (2005), for
instance, argues that Hamilton got his own account of quaternions "wrong." Altmann contends that Hamilton confusedly
treated both axial rotations and rotations through an angle as though they were the same thing. In looking to highlight
Hamilton's misdemeanor, Altmann offers an account of a quaternion-like approach proposed by another actor, Olinde
Rodrigues (1795-1851). Rodrigues had also developed a four-termed rotational system. Rodrigues's history is beyond the
parameters of this study, as are analyses of whether or not Hamilton got it "wrong." In fact, the latter consideration is
not a concern for social historians, as the focus for such historical analysis should be on determining what it is that
Hamilton saw himself as doing, as opposed to normatively determining whether he was "right" or "wrong" in acting as
he chose to.
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Chapter Three: Peter Guthrie Tait and quaternion engagements,
1858-1880
Introduction
On August 19, 1858, Peter Guthrie Tait (1831-1901)—then professor of mathematics in Queen's
College Belfast—wrote his first letter to Sir William Rowan Hamilton. He recalled:
I attacked your volume on Quaternions immediately after its appearance, and easily
mastered the first 6 lectures—but the portions I was most desirous of understanding,
viz. the physical applications of the method, have given me very considerable trouble;
and, but for your offered assistance, I am afraid I should have had to relinquish all hopes
of using Quaternions as an instrument in investigation, on account of the time I should
have had to spend in acquiring a sufficient knowledge of them.
I have all along preferred mixed, to pure mathematics, and since I left Cambridge where
the former are comparatively little attended to, have been busy at the Theories of Heat,
Electricity &c. Your remarkable formula for
as the square of a vector form, and various analogous ones with quaternion operators,
appear to me to offer the very instrument I seek for some general investigations on
Potentials, and it is therefore almost entirely on the subject of "Differentials of
Quaternions" that I shall trespass on your kindness (Wilkins 2005, 2).41
The focus on the differentials of quaternions, and their physical applications to theories of heat,
electricity, and vortex motion would come to serve as defining themes in Tait's later quaternion
publications, the most widely-received of which appeared after Hamilton's death in 1866.
At the time of his initial communication with the Irish mathematician, Tait had only just begun to
establish a professional identity. He was an able mathematician trained in symbolical analysis at
Cambridge. Yet, he was also a mathematician who had chosen to pursue a career in "mixed
mathematics" (later known as "applied mathematics"). Tait's career choices were not arbitrary. They
41
There is a discrepancy with regards to the equation cited in this letter. Knott (1911) quotes the same equation as does
a2 a2 a2
Wilkins, but he writes it as: —? H t -I Knott's (1911) form is a correct representation of what Hamilton intended,
dxdy*- dz
although I have kept Wilkins' version for the sake of citing the edited text properly.
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were the result of the specific terrains of knowledge he found himself navigating through from the
1850s onwards.
Though Tait was born in Dalkeith (on April 28th, 1831), his mother moved the family (including Tait
and his three siblings) to Edinburgh following their father's death in 1837. In Edinburgh, John
Ronaldson, Tait's uncle, was able to help raise the children. Ronaldson was a banker—a middle class
tradesperson working within Edinburgh's increasingly affluent urban community in the mid-century.
He knew well how important social mobility was for a fatherless and penniless boy like his nephew.
Thus, Tait's education and training began early. Ronaldson served as the first conduit through which
the young Tait was able to access contemporary scientific discourse and instrumentation. The
amateur natural philosopher took his nephew on geological walks, engaged him in telescope studies
of the stars and planets, and exposed him to newly developed techniques in photography.
Ronaldson sent Tait to the Edinburgh Academy, where the latter studied classics for four years with
the popular headmaster, James Cumming, and mathematics with James Gloag (1795-1870). Included
among his friends at Edinburgh Academy were Lewis Campbell (1830-1908), later a renowned
classics scholar, and James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879). Though both of those youngsters were ahead
of Tait by one year, they trailed him in the Edinburgh Academical Club Prize for mathematics in 1846
(Knott 1911).42
Having graduated from the Edinburgh Academy, Tait studied for one semester at the University of
Edinburgh in 1848, where he was first exposed to symbolical algebra in the natural philosophy
courses of James D. Forbes (1809-1868). Tait's more regimented exposure to mathematics also
began in Edinburgh, under the tutelage of Philip Kelland (1808-1879). Kelland had graduated from
Cambridge in the 1830s, during the rise of the first generation of symbolical algebraists. He prepared
Tait for some of the symbolical techniques the young student would later encounter at Cambridge.
When Tait did finally enter Cambridge in 1848, he was subjected to the same style of Tripos
42
Conversely, Tait came in third, behind Campbell and then Maxwell for the classics prize. In 1847, Maxwell beat Tait,
coming first (Knott 1911, 4-5).
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cramming as were his fellow students. By 1852, the year of Tait's graduation, there was no mention
of Hamiltonian quaternions, or any vectorial systems for that matter, on the Tripos. Not surprisingly,
when Tait picked up the Lectures on Quaternions (1853), published a year after his graduation, he
soon discontinued his reading and left the bulk of the book unread, likely concluding it to be of little
relative worth to any wrangler budding with the hope of becoming a professional mathematician in
Britain. Thus, despite Hamilton's efforts in his 1853 preface to paint himself in the image of
symbolical algebra, a la De Morgan and Peacock, his system remained unwieldy, massive and, most
importantly, irrelevant to Tripos-oriented students and recent graduates. In the years immediately
following his graduation, Tait viewed quaternions and Hamilton's Lectures as professional dead¬
ends.
It was not until 1858, after Tait had already spent some months working in the laboratory of Thomas
Andrews (1813-1885), a chemist at Queen's College Belfast that Tait chose to re-engage with
Hamilton's treatise on quaternions. When he did so, however, he was treading upon socio-
intellectual terrain that differed significantly from that of Cambridge's mathematical milieu.
Cambridge had provided Tait with the navigational tools of symbolical analysis; but Belfast provided
him with the varied conceptual tools of natural philosophy. Those natural philosophical tools helped
Tait to diversify his early mathematical training, imbuing him with the motivation to use
mathematical analysis in the service of natural philosophy. And encouraged by Andrews, who lauded
Irish science, Tait began to view Hamilton's non-commutative symbolical algebra as a potential tool
in the further development of Irish and, later, Scottish science.
Cambridge and Belfast were not the only intellectual terrains relevant to Tait's navigations. As with
any actor living in any cultural setting, Tait's life was composed of an infinite number of terrains of
knowledge, although only four will be discussed here. The most salient terrains to note include,
Cambridge and Belfast's mathematics in the 1850s; mathematical traditions at the University of
Edinburgh in the 1860s; industrial Scotland and its lucrative "science of energy"; and Presbyterian
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politics and its sectarian divisiveness in the mid-century. Each of those terrains overlapped with one
another to generate a complex environment within which Tait's natural response was to use
symbolical algebraic analysis in tackling both mathematical and natural philosophical problems, and
to identify and justify his analytical practices by appealing to claims of "efficiency"—claims that he
had learned to make due to his navigations through Scottish Presbyterianism and northern theories
of thermodynamics. The aim of this section will be to paint a picture of Tait's diverse intellectual
topology as it developed and shaped his approach to, and engagement with, those cultural-historical
artifacts known as "quaternions". In so doing, we will see how his quaternion outputs were the
product of the unique terrains that Tait navigated through, and which provided him with the
motivation to use quaternions in meaningful ways.
An overview of Tait's productions, 1858-1880
During his tenure at Cambridge, Tait began to develop his publication profile by co-authoring a book
aimed at the typical Tripos student. It was a text replete with practice problems and exam-style
solutions. Entitled A Treatise on Dynamics of a Particle, and published in 1856 with W.L. Steele as co¬
author, the text was in its nascent phases while Tait was still an undergraduate. He continued to
work on it throughout his employment as a fellow at Peterhouse College for two years thereafter.
Given Tait's position within the milieu of Cambridge coaching, it is not surprising that the Treatise—
his first major publication—was styled along the lines of a typical Cambridge coaching text. It
contained little discussion of the foundational principles of natural philosophy or dynamics, both of
which served as focal points for Tait's later career outputs. In addition, although Tait had already
read through the first half of Hamilton's Lectures in 1853, his analytically-minded Treatise made no
mention of Hamilton's alternative algebraic system or of its potential uses in dynamics. Evidently,
the Lectures had made no impression upon the young mathematician by the end of his Cambridge
career.
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The introduction to Tait and Steele's Treatise indicates why this was. In that introduction, the
philosophical stance the authors adopt is representative of their four years of Cambridge training.
The educational reforms introduced by the previous generation of symbolical algebraists ensured
that the young Tait emerged fully equipped with the belief in hand that abstract mathematical
presentations could capture the essence of universal relations—not all of which required natural
phenomenal or geometrical equivalents. Furthermore, those natural phenomena that were known
to exist, such as motion, could be discussed analytically (i.e. in symbolical mathematical terms)
without recourse to empirical or experimental knowledge. In the Treatise, Tait called this approach
"purely geometrical," by which he meant that geometrical relations between particles in motion
could be compared and manipulated using the basic rules of algebra. Tait and Steele thus claimed:
Although the idea of some physical cause is necessary when we consider the effects
produced on the motion of a particle, yet there are many properties of motion which
may be arrived at without having recourse to anything but the abstract idea of motion
itself. Such properties are to be regarded as purely geometrical, in contradistinction to
others which depend on our experimental knowledge of the constitution of matter, and
the idea of Force (Tait and Steele 1856, xi).
It is in this Treatise that one also finds Tait's first published definitions of important concepts such as
"dynamics," "statics," "kinetics" and "kinematics"—definitions that demarcated the experiential
from the analytical. The authors identified "Dynamics" as the science that investigates "the action of
Force." Dynamics, they said, can be divided into two sub-categories: statics and kinetics. Statics
focuses on the study of forces that "compel rest or ... prevent change of motion," while "kinetics"
focuses on the study of forces that "produce or ... change motion." In kinetics, one must consider
both the forces at play and their effects upon the bodies whose motion they change. Meanwhile, the
field of inquiry that explores the characteristics of the forces that cause change (without worrying
about the nature of the bodies being acted upon) includes "kinematics". This latter field was the
domain of inquiry that the two young authors focused their efforts upon. Tait and Steele argued that
"kinematics" included Newton's calculus of fluxions. The authors made sure, however, to subjugate
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Newtonian mathematics to (what they considered to be) the superior technique of "differential
calculus." In so doing, Tait and Steele distinguished between Newton's "fluxions," which did not
invoke any notion of "limit" or "infinitesimal" (as understood in the post-Cauchy world), and
"differential calculus", which did.
In then characterizing their book as one of "kinematics"—or "pure mathematics"—Tait and Steele
added to the 19th-century institutionalization of the distinction between "pure" and "mixed"
mathematics. Having played upon a vocabulary that was popular in Cambridge, the young authors
effectively produced a book that became an immediate success. It proceeded to become one of the
most popular teaching texts of the century. A second edition was produced a decade after the first; a
seventh edition was issued by the end of the century. Yet, by the mid-1860s, Tait was already
lamenting that he had ever produced such a book. In fact, in the preface to his second edition
(published after Steele had died), Tait decried the dry, o-philosophical approach that he and Steele
had unwittingly adopted as recently graduated authors. He declared the text to be a perfect
indication of the sort of rote learning and poor insight that Cambridge students often relied upon,
emphasizing the prominence of those students who "crammed" their way through the obstacle
course of the Tripos exam and who, in Tait's view, often failed to understand the physical
phenomena underlying mathematical manipulations.
In the preface to his 1865 edition, for instance, Tait wrote:
I am glad of the opportunity, presented by the call for a second edition, to make
reparation for many faults of the first ... the whole of the second Chapter has been
rewritten, upon the basis of the corresponding portion of Thomson and Tait's Natural
Philosophy which, though as yet unpublished, was printed off nearly two years ago (Tait
and Steele 1865, viii).
Tait then tacitly criticized his former Cambridge-inspired "pure" mathematical approach in writing:
To several important theorems more than one demonstration has been appended: with
the object of exhibiting the use of the various processes by applying them to the
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deduction of results of real value, instead of to the solution of [Tripos] "Problems" of
unquestionable absurdity (Tait and Steele 1865, ix).
And although Cambridge coaches, like Isaac Todhunter (1820-1884), had told Tait they liked the
book well enough in its original form," Tait lamented the fact that support had
prevented me from attempting a thorough alteration of style which I had contemplated,
viz. to cease breaking up the subject into detached propositions—specially fitted for
"writing out".431 retain my own opinion, however, that this is not the form in which such
a treatise ought to be written; although there can be no doubt that it offers certain
advantages to the student whose sole object in reading is to pass an examination (Tait
and Steele 1865, ix).
In sum, Tait bemoaned the fact the Treatise was "intended to be merely an analytical one." He even
guided his reader to locate "the full discussion and experimental demonstration of the elementary
principles on which the analysis is founded" by referring "to works on Natural Philosophy; of which,
so far as mere Abstract Dynamics is concerned, we have a more admirable example in [Newton's]
Principia" (Tait and Steele 1865, ix). All of these lamenting regrets and natural philosophical
concerns emerged only in the 1860s, however, well after Tait had become inculcated into the
northern "science of energy" and its concomitant science of "thermodynamics". In 1858, there were
no such laments. There was only a shifting socio-intellectual terrain, upon which Tait trod in his
efforts to further define himself professionally.
That shifting terrain had allowed Tait to engage with the world of experimentation in Thomas
Andrews's laboratory in Belfast; it had also allowed him to become immersed in the technically-
minded world of engineering that had long motivated industrial practice in Belfast. Thus, although
Tait's ties to symbolical algebra—and its abstract algebraic manipulations—still informed his
research motivations at the end of the 1850s, he had also begun to experience a transformation in
his professional and intellectual identities. Consider, for instance, the terms of reengagement that
defined Tait's uptake of quaternions from 1858 to 1860. Tait's initial interest in corresponding with
Hamilton was not to laud the latter's algebra as a worthy system in "pure mathematics"; it was,
43
"Writing out" was the phrase used to refer to a student's ability to reproduce a set answer to typical Tripos questions.
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rather, to speculate over Hermann von Helmholtz's recent account of vortices and the possibility of
using quaternions to express vortex motion in space. Entitled "Ueber Integrale der
hydrodynamischen Gleichungen, welche den Wirbelbewegungen entsprechen," and published in
Crelle's Journal (July 1858), the article by Hermann von Helmholtz that initiated Tait's interest in
quaternion mathematics explored the equations that represented motion in a "perfect fluid" (i.e. a
fluid that experiences no friction and which cannot be compressed). To do so, Helmholtz invoked the
following equations, which are known as "Euler's equations" (Epple 1998):
1 dp du du du du
X = 1- u E v V w —
hdx dt dx dy dz
1 dp dv dv dv dv
Y = E U h V h IV
h dy dt dx dy dz
1 dp dw dw dw dw
Z = 1- U h V h IV
h dz dt dx dy dz
du dv dw
dx~^ dy~^ dz'
where u,v,w represent the velocity components of the fluid at any given point with coordinates
x,y,z. The components of the external force are given by X, Y, Z, while h represents the density of
the fluid and p its pressure. Helmholtz's objective was to analyze cases in which there is no velocity
potential throughout the entire fluid.
Tait became engaged with Helmholtz's account because he was interested in the mechanical
interpretation of "potential flows" (where "potential flow" indicates the existence of differing fluid
velocities at differing points in a fluid). Helmholtz had used the notion of an infinitesimal in Euler's
equations to argue that any instantaneous movement in an infinitely small portion of fluid could be
decomposed into a translation, an expansion, and a compression in mutually orthogonal directions,
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along with a rotation about a particular axis, where the rotational axis would have the following
cosine proportionals:
dv dw dw du du dv
dz dy ' dx dz dy dx
Helmholtz then argued the angular velocity of that infinitely small movement is proportional to the
square root of ^2 + T]2 + <"2. To describe these very specific infinitesimal rotations, Helmholtz
introduced a new vocabulary, including "vortex lines" and "vortex tubes" (Epple 1998, 312-313).
That which most interested Tait was Helmholtz's decomposition of an infinitesimal motion in a fluid
into a translation, a compression (or expansion), and a rotation about an axis. Having previously read
parts of Hamilton's account of quaternions in 1853, which offered an account of scalar contraction
(or expansion) of a directed line along three real axes, and a "vector" change in the line's angular
direction, Tait saw an aesthetic resemblance between Helmholtz's speculations and Hamilton's
quaternion symbolism. He wondered whether Hamilton's algebraic system could be used to rewrite
Helmholtz's speculations in alternative mathematical notation. Indeed, Tait did eventually learn to
use Hamilton's notation of i,j, k to represent the imaginary components of a given quaternion, and
Va, Sa, and Ta to represent, respectively, the quaternion's versor, scalar and tensor parts. He also
learned to use Hamilton's differential operator,
d d d
y=iTx+% + kTz
to denote the velocity field of any fluid (u, v, w) as a "vector function."44 Lastly, Tait would later
come to conclude that differential operations on a "vector function" could be interpreted as the
kinematical fluid flow in a velocity field and that this was proof that quaternionic accounts could
intuitively represent physical events occurring within fluids (Epple 1998, 317-318).
44
He would learn to show how local rotations could be determined by the direction and length of the vector part of
Hamilton's differential operator, as applied to the velocity field.
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According to at least one historian, it was this "amalgamation of quaternion analysis and flow
thinking, made possible by Helmholtz's treatment of vortex motion, [that] served as the central
motivation behind [Tait's] crusade for quaternion methods" (Epple 1998, 318). No doubt,
Helmholtz's theory of vortex motion did initially spark Tait's memory and cause him to reconsider
the aesthetic form of Hamilton's quaternions. However, Epple's (1998) claim that this constituted
Tait's primary motivation for re-engaging with quaternions in a detailed manner is an
overstatement. Tait's interest in quaternion presentations of vortex motion sparked his initial
correspondence with Hamilton, but it was not the primary reason that Tait chose to engage with
quaternions for a decade thereafter, especially as given the degree of opposition he faced from close
colleagues, such as Thomson. Tait's work in vortex motion did not even constitute a major theme in
his initial correspondences with Hamilton from 1858 to 1860. Rather, the topic that most vibrantly
coloured Tait's correspondence with Hamilton was the quaternionic account of the equation for
Fresnel's wave surface. This topic choice indicated that Tait's motivations for re-engagement with
quaternions were more complex in nature than a mere desire to translate vortex motion into a new
symbolical language. Given the fame associated with Hamilton's account of Fresnel's wave surface,
and his linked "prediction" of canonical refraction, it is likely Tait saw quaternions as a candidate for
original research and immediate publication. With Hamilton's help, the transformation of the
equation for Fresnel's Wave Surface into quaternionic form constituted original and noteworthy
research, and (as Tait hoped) it might benefit from Hamilton's previous scientific fame as associated
with his canonical refraction "prediction" in the 1830s.
Thus, Tait's engagement with quaternions in the 1850s was the result of varied motivations—some
of which were related to his symbolical mathematical background, some of which related to his
budding new interests in natural philosophy, and some of which related to his interests as a
developing young professional in need of recognized publications in order to establish a name for
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himself. In other words, Tait's terrains of knowledge were overlapping, thus providing him with
several motivations for engaging further with quaternion mathematics.
Those terrains overlapped in even more complex ways throughout the 1860s, when Tait became
professor of natural philosophy at the University of Edinburgh. During that decade, Tait published
the Sketch of Elementary Dynamics (1863) with Thomson. Those two authors also produced their
much-lauded account of science-to-date, A Treatise on Natural Philosophy, Volume 1 (1867), and
Tait followed up with his solo Sketch of Thermodynamics (1868). In addition, both Tait and
Thomson—sensing, perhaps, the unpalatable nature of their voluminous Treatise (1867)—added to
their thermodynamic roster by producing the more succinct account of "energy" in the Elements of
Natural Philosophy (1873). That stream of thermodynamic literature, flowing as it did from the
lecture halls and laboratory rooms in Edinburgh and Glasgow, indicates the degree to which Tait and
Thomson were embedded within northern "energy" science, with its concomitant notions of
"conservation" and "dissipation" (Wise and Smith 1989). Thus, although Tait's exploration of
quaternions was initially motivated by his training in symbolical algebra, and his professionalizing
objectives, his later "energy" science commitments came to motivate his engagements with
quaternions in specific ways well into the 1870s.
From 1859 to 1865, Hamilton was engaged in completing a second book on quaternions, the end
product of which was the opaque and poorly-received Elements of Quaternions (1866) (published
one year after his death). In continuing with his attempts to legitimate his mathematical system
within the symbolical algebraic framework, Hamilton's 1866 production did not stray far from the
symbolical accounts of quaternions that the Irish mathematician had originally offered in his
Lectures (1853). Thus, despite Tait's movements towards thermodynamics, Hamilton stayed deeply
entrenched within his own Irish world of Cambridge-inspired "pure" mathematics. Indeed, when
Tait's solely-authored account, An Elementary Treatise on Quaternions (1867), appeared one year
later, its preface indicated not only how much the "Tait" of 1867 had come to differ from the "Tait"
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of 1858, but also how much the Tait of 1867 had come to diverge from Hamilton in general. Tait had
become a natural philosopher who used quaternions to advance his natural philosophical agenda;
Hamilton had remained a mathematician who used the underpinnings of symbolical algebra to
justify his quaternion productions as respectable Irish science.
Throughout this transformative period in Tait's academic life, the Scotsman was also involved (as
were most other academics at the time, wittingly or not) in the politico-religious events that
pervaded Scotland's public institutions. As an example of his navigations through the world of mid-
century Scottish Presbyterianism, consider Tait's co-authored biography of James D. Forbes—Life
and Letters of James David Forbes (1873). Recall that Forbes had been elected to the post of
Edinburgh's chair of natural philosophy following John Leslie's death in 1832. That appointment was
largely considered to be the result of Forbes's Tory alignments. Forbes's competitor for the job was
the radical reformist Whig David Brewster. Recall that Brewster had been intimately connected with
Henry Brougham, the later Lord Chancellor and joint founder (along with Brewster) of the BAAS in
the 1830s.45 At the time of Forbes's appointment, the success of the BAAS was far from certain, and
Brewster's alliance with Brougham was as much a liability as it was a resource. Prominent Tory
advocates entrenched at the university throughout the early- to mid-19th century favoured Forbes's
connections over Brewster's own. Thus, it was the conservative Forbes that served as Edinburgh's
top natural philosopher from 1832 onwards (Horn 1967).
Given that Forbes was Tait's first instructor in natural philosophy, it is understandable that the
Scottish mathematician harboured a sympathetic and nostalgic view of Forbes's life. Tait's
Presbyterian and conservative political views further bolstered those sentiments, solidifying them
into a lifelong respect for his former teacher. This held true despite the fact that Brewster was
45
As a Dissenter, Brewster had found that most university appointments were cut off to him. With Brougham's support, he
was eventually ensured a government pension later in life of £100 per annum (which increased in 1836 to £300 a year).
It was this same connection that allowed Brewster to be later knighted and appointed to the principalship of the United
Colleges of St Leonard and St Salvator at the University of St Andrews in 1838. Late in his life, in 1858, he was elected—
again through Brougham's influential positioning—to the post of vice-chancellor of the University of Edinburgh, an office
that he used to promote scientific experimentation in the arts curriculum (Morrison-Low 1984).
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eventually elected vice-chancellor of Edinburgh university—a post that granted him considerable
control over the nature and content of Edinburgh's undergraduate curriculum, including Tait's
natural philosophy courses. Indeed, Tait would even come to agree with Brewster on important
matters, including the promulgation of increased scientific experimentation within Scottish
universities and the establishment of a laboratory at the University of Edinburgh. Yet, Tait never
shared Brewster's dissenting political opinions. Rather, he clung to a long-standing conservativeness
throughout his life, and his biography of Forbes serves as a poignant reminder of that fact. Tait's
unwavering political stance aligned itself with that of Forbes—a Tory in politics and a devout Church
of Scotland practitioners.
Those politico-religious views cannot be distinguished from Tait's mathematical and scientific
outputs. In fact, Tait eventually issued what was his most controversial "scientific" publication in
response to what he perceived to be the threat of irreligiousness in Britain, born in the form of
Darwinism and agnosticism in the mid-1860s. The Unseen Universe: or Physical Speculations on a
Future State (1875) was jointly authored by Tait and the Scottish natural philosopher Balfour Stewart
(1828-1887). Originally published anonymously, The Unseen Universe constituted nothing less than a
religious diatribe attacking Darwinist and secular accounts of archaeological history and the
universe's origins. The book coincided with the publication of Tait's natural philosophical lectures,
Recent Advances in Physical Science (1876), which further advanced a "scientific" account of the
unapologetic metaphysics put forward in their 1875 book. Those efforts led both to ridicule and
criticism by young secularist mathematicians and scientists, including Clifford. They also led to
worried hand-wringing among established scientists, such as Thomson. Yet, Tait did not waver in his
religious views or in his public expression of them. Near the end of the 1870s, he had become so
confident in his religious-scientific stance—which included his overarching belief in the
unidirectional dissipation of a (Divine) "potential" universe—that he published Paradoxical
Philosophy: A Sequel to the Unseen Universe (1878), again with Stewart as co-author. That text was
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an extension of the claims made in 1875 and 1876, but this time with an explicit by-line and no
attempt at anonymity. Tait was no longer interested in merely satisfying the needs of Tripos
crammers or, what he perceived to be, misled mathematical purists. Rather, in a bold attempt to link
his northern Presbyterianism to the "science of energy", Tait demonstrated he was interested in
explaining the ontological structure of the entire universe. His aim was to engage in a grand
metaphysical project—an objective that defined many of his mathematical navigations until the end
of the century.46
Cambridge and Belfast mathematics
An account of the "terrain of knowledge" that was Cambridge in the early 1850s will help to explain
why the young Tait was able to engage meaningfully with quaternions in the late 1850s. Tait entered
Cambridge three years after Peacock had published his Symbolical Algebra (1845). At the time of
Tait's entry, Cambridge had already experienced significant curricular reforms favouring symbolical
algebra a la Peacock, Babbage and Herschel. More than ever, the university was being identified
with its unique mathematical curriculum, especially because its mathematical degree provided the
opportunity for social mobility among middle-class students. Although many Cambridge students
aimed for a post within the clergy, mid-century mathematics students often had their sights set on
new professional careers within academia. Students who graduated as "wranglers" could bet on a
college fellowship or future employment within a university, technical institute, primary or
secondary school.
Yet, although Cambridge's mathematical curriculum had managed to increasingly attract non-
aristocratic students, the demographic composition of the university's overall student body had not
actually changed when compared to the first half of the century. The sons of aristocrats still
46
The brief account offered here is not a complete synopsis of Tait's publications from 1858 to 1880. In his moralistic
dialogues, religious discourses, and mathematical researches, Tait proved to be a diverse and prolific writer. He issued a
number of smaller articles in popular and specialist forums, related not only to quaternions and the "science of energy",
but also to knots, golf ball dynamics, graph theory and meteorology. He also wrote a plethora of obituaries for fellow
scientists and mathematicians.
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constituted the institution's bread and butter (Warwick 2003). Thus, Tait's Cambridge was a school
at an historical crossroads. It was moving towards an era in which symbolical analysis dominated the
mathematical curriculum entirely and provided middle-class men opportunities for social mobility,
while at the same time relying on its ancient socio-demographic roots for legitimacy and economic
stability.
The world of "wrangler" mathematics that Tait entered into, and which he became representative
of, was largely dominated by young men emerging from industrial, middle-class, and Anglican (or
Presbyterian) families. Between 1830 and 1860, students entering Cambridge remained
overwhelmingly representative of the class of Briton who could claim an "upper class" (i.e. landed
gentry) gentleman as a father (Becher 1984). Conversely, the majority of wranglers (i.e. those
studying for an honours bachelor degree in mathematics) hailed predominantly from those families
in which the father was a "professional", i.e. a businessmen, a banker, or a lawyer. In fact, only 7.7
per cent of wranglers' fathers were "titled or gentry." Cambridge's wranglers were, therefore,
disproportionately representative of the country's rising industrial class.47 In addition, they
overwhelmingly represented urban, rather than rural, settings. Of the 220 wranglers for whom
educational histories are available, the City of London and its surrounding counties produced a
disproportionately high number (more than 45 per cent of the 260 English wranglers of the period)
(Becher 1984, 100-101).48
One area where wranglers and regular students did overlap was in their religious creed. Apart from
the well-known scandals involving the non-graduation of Babbage, and the departure of De Morgan,
on religious grounds, only 15 wranglers from 1830 to 1860 were identified as "non-Anglican", and
five of those were Presbyterian (the only religious group permitted to take an honours degree
without swearing faith to Anglicanism) (Becher 1984, 104). As a Scottish Presbyterian, Tait never
47
It was also disproportionately industrial in origin when compared to the country's top public schools. In Britain, 67 per
cent of students at top public schools could boast aristocratic lineages (Becher 1984).
48
Many of those wranglers had attended urban universities, such as King's College (25 wranglers) and University College
London (10 wranglers), prior to matriculating at Cambridge.
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faced the type of religious discrimination reserved for faith-based minorities, such as the Jewish
James Joseph Sylvester (1814-1897), who was denied a degree based on his faith.49 Still, for religious
majorities and minorities alike, a high rank on the Tripos constituted the best means of socio¬
economic advancement.50 Tait's case was no different. Throughout his undergraduate career, Tait's
choices as to which subjects he devoted most time to were shaped by his overarching need to
pursue those opportunities that would conduce to social and economic security. As Knott (1911) has
pointed out, Tait could not rely upon a wealthy family or any other form of independent financial
security once he completed his studies. In entering the halls of Peterhouse in 1848, Tait found
himself enmeshed in an educational matrix in which the prestige of top status on the Tripos
constituted a primary means of propelling oneself from financial insecurity into a respected
professional post.
The world of Cambridge mathematics that Tait entered into was also shifting one. The 1840s had
witnessed repeat protests by Whewell and others, who argued against private coaching, which they
viewed as undermining the liberal and moral nature of a Cambridge degree. Whewell contended a
Cambridge degree ought to encourage students to intuit underlying physical structures, rather than
merely regurgitate well-accepted solutions to analytical and symbolical problems. Whewell also
argued the unregulated and rapid rise of analysis, and the crammed nature of private tutoring,
forced students to skip important steps in physical intuition. On Whewell's view, Cambridge's Tripos-
oriented culture was guilty of churning out a flock of standardized students who reproduced
49
The removal of religious testing as a credential for an honours degree did not occur in Cambridge until 1858, six years
after Tait's graduation. Sylvester had attended the University of London in 1828 at the age of 14 to prepare for entry to
Cambridge; he subsequently graduated 2nd wrangler in 1837, though he was denied his honours degree because of
Jewish faith. Following the repeal of the Test Acts, Sylvester was eventually awarded an honours degree by Cambridge in
1872 (Hunger Parshall 2006).
50
The range of career choices for former wranglers was large. Of the 212 wranglers (out of 296), for whom later
occupation could be determined, the total number of different career paths was 25, including academe, law, business,
politics and the military (though the latter three were less popular than might be expected given the parentage of the
students). Academe was, by far, the most-often pursued career path, indicating that students did not enroll in
Cambridge in order to carry on the family business. Rather, nearly half (or 43 per cent of the top ten wranglers of each
year from 1830 to 1860) sought careers in academe (including "higher", "lower" and "other" academic institutions), of
which about 60 per cent of those in lower education (where higher-level mathematics was not usually taught) had dual
careers in the clergy. Another 27 per cent in higher education (university and public schools, for example, where higher
mathematics and science was a part of the main curriculum), also held dual career posts in the clergy.
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memorized solutions quickly but who did not grasp the underlying foundations of their solutions.
Recall that Peacock had similarly worried about the extent of private tutoring at the university. But
his concerns centred more specifically on the issue of regulation, or lack thereof, which he felt
allowed for too much variation in the standards of coaching (Warwick 2003, 101). Over the course of
the following decade, a compromise was struck between the university's administrators and its
critics, including Whewell and Peacock. The university accepted Whewell's suggestion that it should
divide the curriculum into two parts: "permanent" and "progressive", where the former related to
matters of geometry, mechanics, optics and elementary calculus (i.e. "permanent" in the sense of
having been practiced for many decades), and the latter related to nouveau topics in higher-level
symbolical algebra and analysis, which included analytical and celestial mechanics. However,
contrary to Whewell's hopes private coaching would continue. In addition, new regulations
formulated in 1846 by a special university syndicate (and implemented in 1848, the year of Tait's
entry) extended the examination period to eight days (previously six), where the first three days of
the exam were to be devoted to elementary subjects in mathematics, and the remaining five days
were to be devoted to honours topics, testing those branches of higher level mathematical analysis
that distinguished wranglers from ordinary students.
During this reform period, some of Peacock's suggestions with regards to coaching were also
adopted. On Peacock's recommendation, the Board of Mathematical Studies was established—its
role being to govern and standardize the content of the Tripos. Ironically, it had been the old ad hoc
process of coaching and examining students that had initially allowed Peacock to introduce
continental d-notation questions in the 1817 exam (despite the fact that such continental
techniques were—at the time—of interest only to a small group of students). The newly created
Board was given the task of abolishing topics that it found to be overly speculative and too
experimental. The problematical topics in question included electricity, magnetism, and heat—all of
which lacked "any axiomatic principles whatsoever," the Board argued (Warwick 2003, 102). The
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result was that Peacock legislatively enshrined an institution-wide emphasis on symbolical analysis
and kinematics, rather than allowing the curriculum to absorb or reproduce any developments in
experimental and natural philosophy—a move that defined Cambridge mathematical degrees until
well into the 1870s (i.e. when the Cavendish laboratory was finally, though controversially,
established). The Board recommended that, given the high number of subjects being introduced and
examined ad hoc, in previous years, "... the mathematical theories of electricity, magnetism, and
heat should not be admitted as subjects of examination."51 In the following year, the Board further
recommended "the omission of elliptic integrals, Laplace's coefficients, capillary attraction, the
figure of the earth considered as heterogeneous, &c, besides certain limitations of the questions in
lunar and planetary theory." As President of the Mathematical Society, J.W. Glaisher, later
recounted,
In making these recommendations, the Board expressed their opinion that they were
only giving definite form to what had become the practice in the examination, and were
only putting before the candidates such results as they might themselves have deduced
by the study of the Senate House papers of the last few years (Glaisher 1886, 20).
Those combined curricular reforms meant that, by the time Tait entered, Cambridge's curriculum
had become highly homogenized.52 Tait entered Peterhouse just as the Board's content reforms
were being implemented. The subjects that would later constitute the core of his scientific career-
namely, heat, magnetism, and electricity—had been excised from the curriculum, accounting
therefore for Tait's early focus on "pure mathematics" and "kinematics" in the Treatise on Dynamics
of a Particle (1856).
51
As Glaisher explains, "The introduction of a new subject had been generally preceded by the publication of a work, by a
Cambridge mathematician, in which it was treated in a manner adapted to the examination" (Glaisher 1886, 19).
52
Only in 1865 would the Board recommend any slight modification to its reformist rules, stipulating the inclusion of
Laplace's coefficients and the "figure of the earth, considered as heterogeneous." Otherwise, as Glaisher recounts, the
exam manifested a fairly homogenous set of analytical questions between 1848 and the late-1870s. Both Peacock and
Hopkins were satisfied with aspects of the Board's efforts. It created for the first time a regular syllabus material that
could be used to teach standard Cambridge students, as well as its top achievers. Whewell remained unconvinced and
perturbed by the amount of higher-level analysis still present in the examination syllabus. He alone felt the university's
curriculum should focus on the skills of the lowest achiever, such that even the least competent student could see the
mind of God at work in the design of the universe (Warwick 2003 94-96,102).
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The second generation ofCambridge symbolical algebra
By the early 1840s, as Peacock was composing and publishing his second editions of the Treatise on
Algebra (1842-1845), emerging around him was a community of "Whig mathematicians of the
second generation" (Smith and Wise 1989). Among the "older generation", Lagrange's technique of
using the Taylor series expansion to represent derivatives had been popular; it was now falling out of
favour. There was a push to include the notion of a "limit", although Cauchy's "formal" approach
(which introduced epsilon-delta notation) did not fully satisfy Cambridge mathematicians, either.
Thus, the newly emerging approach to limits still relied upon a lingering sense of infinitesimals—i.e.
quantities that got infinitely smaller and smaller. This approach defined the derivative, say —, ordx
df (x) f(x+h)—f(x)
dx , as the limit of the ratio , where "h" approaches zero. However, that approach had
raised its own problems. For instance, the limit did not exist if the ratio became infinite as h
approached zero. Thus, the burden of proof was on the mathematicians using the technique to show
that the ratio remained finite as h -» 0.
Whewell's resolution to the issue was to advocate a more traditional "intuition" of a "limit," which
he expressed in his Doctrine of Limits (1838). In 1842, Augustus De Morgan published a slightly
different account of limits in his Differential and Integral Calculus, where he reintroduced the notion
of a limit as "ultimate ratios," arguing they required no aid "whatsoever from the theory of series, or
algebraical expansions" (De Morgan 1842, 3). De Morgan's aim was not to return to a traditional
notion of the "intuition" of limits as Whewell had done, but rather to edify students by making more
explicit the physical processes occurring in the computation of a limit. De Morgan contended that
students not well-versed in higher analysis required help in formulating the concept of a limit in
physical or geometrical terms. The epistemological benefit of his approach, he said, was that it
would encourage better mathematical "reasoning" overall. In his textbook, De Morgan applied the
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notion of limits to problems in mechanics and geometry, which would have resonated well with his
UCL students.53
A decade later, James Thomson (senior) followed De Morgan's lead and published a second edition
to his Introduction to the Differential and Integral Calculus (1848) for use by his Glaswegian students.
In that text, Thomson identified De Morgan as one of the "latest and best writers" to have "made
the Method of Limits, or, what is virtually equivalent, the Infinitesimal Method, the basis of their
treatises" (Smith and Wise 1989, 170). Thomson's appreciation for De Morgan came largely through
the conduit of his son, William, who had by then become an active participant in the second
generation of symbolical algebraists at Cambridge. Those students considered Whewell to be an
obstacle to the further advancement of mathematics. In contradistinction to Whewell's insistence on
an "intuitive" approach to limits, young analysts such as Gregory and Thomson praised De Morgan's
approach. Thomson expressed his praise in letters home, in which he also applauded Peacock's
symbolical algebraic philosophy more generally (Smith and Wise 1989, 171). As a student at
Cambridge during the height of these mid-decade debates over the nature of symbolical algebra, the
young Thomson became a believer in De Morgan's style of thinking. Thomson followed De Morgan
in accepting the general analytical faith that symbolical reasoning expressed universal truths and
that those truths are not reliant upon empirical content for their justification. However, like De
Morgan, Thomson also noted that such truths are largely irrelevant to most daily happenings. They
are not applicable to industry or machines. They do not produce usable results. Upon emerging from
Cambridge, Thomson was, in many ways, a De Morgian—a student inspired by Peacock's symbolical
algebra, but De Morgan's specific interpretation it.
In responding to the apparent student-led rejections of his ideas, Whewell complained in 1845 to
Herschel that "the most active students [are] being encouraged to study rather the latest
improvements, contained in memoirs, journals and pamphlets, than the standard works of
53
De Morgan's textbook was written for the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, as well as for his students at
UCL.
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mathematical literature." Whewell likely had in mind Gregory and Smith's Cambridge Mathematical
Journal, given that the CMJ represented the youngish group of reformist mathematicians (including
Thomson) among whom Peacock and De Morgan had become leaders in symbolical analysis (Crilly
2004). Among, this second generation of analysts, Whig politics and educational reform had fused
with industrial concerns in more than just the metaphorical ways in which Babbage and Herschel
had previously used manufacturing metaphors to serve as images of the symbolical mind at work.
Here now was a group of young mathematicians whose aim it was to become professional
mathematicians, and who did not oppose working within an industrialized context. Students such as
Archibald Smith (1813-1872), R.L. Ellis (1817-1859), Thomson and Tait all came from, or had
connections to, Scotland or Ireland—the industrial heartlands of the British Empire. This group of
"northern Whigs and their commercially oriented peers" transformed the pursuits of gentlemanly
science more broadly in Britain, rendering possible "a regular profession of mathematics" (Smith and
Wise 1989, 176).
Two key features characterized this new generation of professionalizing mathematician. They were
the hunt for "power" and the desire for "efficiency". These overriding objectives can be indentified
in the mathematical and scientific pursuits of the actors in question. These principles were manifest
in mathematics, for instance, by stipulating that the highest principles to be attained in
mathematical research were generality of expression (power), simplicity of technique (efficiency),
and utility of results (industrial applicability). The "symmetrical method" in mathematics involved
expressing the equations of analytic geometry in a manner such that figures could be described in
space without reference to particular axes. Rather than expressing the equation of straight lines as
y = kx + b, one could express the general line as mx + ny = c, so that the "coordinates appear
symmetrically and the equation has the same form for all orientations of the axes." Smith had
applied this in his 1835 method in simplifying a derivation that Ampere had given of Fresnel's wave
surface. Whereas Ampere's derivation had taken 32 pages, Smith was able to extract the wave
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surface in symmetrical form in two pages of analysis. It was a method lauded and publicized in
subsequent issues of the CMJ, which stipulated that submissions had to be short, to the point, and
entirely symbolical. In effect, Smith's solution had set the new standard for mathematical
"efficiency" (for an account of the CMJ's standards see Crilly (2004); for an account of its place
within mathematical literature more generally see Bartle (2005)).
Young actors such as Gregory, Sylvester, Boole and Cayley played a foundational role in promoting
this succinct, symbolical approach at Cambridge, in particular by providing more generalized
accounts of differentiation and integration, thereby extending the methodology advocated by
Peacock and De Morgan in the second half of the century. The nascent stages of this symbolization
of differentiation and integration is indicated in a letter from William Thomson to his father a few
months after his arrival to Cambridge in 1841. In that letter, Thomson writes,
On Thursday I got an examination paper in algebra from Hopkins. Almost every question
in it was on the principles of algebra, and seemed to inculcate most of Peacock's views,
with which I am beginning to agree. Mr Cookson had lent me Peacock, and so I was able
to answer most of the questions, I hope in the way he wished. I have been calling two or
three times on Gregory, and he seems to take quite the same view of the principles of
algebra. He has been doing a great deal in finding the values of definite integrals, in a
very curious way, by the separation of symbols. He has given one specimen of the
method, which I believe is his own discovery in the Math. Journal, and others in his
"Examples." He is not however quite clear about the principles of it yet (Smith and Wise
1989,181).
The "separation of symbols" technique mentioned in Thomson's letter can be explained as follows.
In differential calculus, the symbol ^ had indicated the operation of differentiation. That symbol
had not been used previously to indicate an entity that could itself be operated upon. Gregory,
however, chose to treat as though it were a magnitude that could be operated upon. Gregory
ax






Gregory treated the "y" contained in the symbols for differential operations as though it were a
quantity that could be manipulated using the regular rules of distribution. This meant the entire
bracketed part in the latter equation could be treated as one operation acting on y, which could be
symbolized as f which could then be treated as a linear function of the operation In
Gregory's symbolical terminology:
f(iL)y=B(xX
where the inverse equation is,
y = /_15W-
The latter equation could then be used to solve the differential equation for y, or to integrate it, if
/_1 represented a meaningful inverse operation in calculus (analogously to how it represented an
inverse quantity in normal algebra). In sum, Gregory's "separation of symbols" method meant that
/_1 could represent a linear function of the operation of integration just as / could represent a
linear function of differentiation (Smith and Wise 1989, 181).
Gregory worked to link algebra and calculus at an abstract level. He claimed the two approaches did
not differ based on the unit of analysis (in algebra "quantity" was manipulated; in calculus
"operations" were manipulated), because all "quantity" could be represented as "operations."
Quantities such as a and x could be regarded as operations on unity, i.e. a(l) and x(l). Gregory
ripped a page out of Peacock's text and applied it to problems of differentiation and integration in a
manner that had not been advocated for before (at least not in Britain), but for which the
philosophical resources of "symbolical algebra" provided justification. Consider, for example,
Gregory's claim that a(x) and anx constituted the operations of a performed on x and a performed
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n times on x, respectively. For Gregory, the theorems of algebra are only true if the rules of
combination of operations are also true. This was a reapplication of Peacock's "principle of the
permanence of equivalent forms" extended to include operational symbols. Gregory argued,
"Whatever is proved of the latter [algebraic] symbols, from their known laws of combination, must
be equally true of all other symbols which are subject to the same laws of combination" (Smith and
Wise 1989, 182). The regular rules of algebraic operations performed on symbols assumed to
represent quantity held also for symbols assumed to represent operations in differentiation and
integration. If the following rules held in normal algebra, namely:
aman(x) = am+n(x) index rule;
a[b(x)] = b[a(x)] commutative rule; and,
a(x) + a(y) = a(x + y) distributive rule,
then the following rules are also true in a newly extended form of algebra. That is:
dmdn{x) = dm+n (x);
d(x) + d(y) = d(x + y).
In sum, if a particular procedure or operation holds in normal algebra, it also holds in symbolical
representations of differential equations (Smith and Wise 1989, 182).
By relying upon the Peacockian tradition in symbolical algebra, Gregory and his colleagues were able
to extend basic operations to complicated and, at times, seemingly meaningless symbolical
expression. The "terrain of knowledge" that is described by Cambridge mathematics in the mid-
century included those new mathematical practices. As Gregory wrote in 1841, interpretation with
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regards to empirical reality was an important part of science, but not a necessary part of symbolical
algebra:
Algebra takes cognizance only of the laws of combination of the symbols, and not of
their meaning—in the eye of that science the symbol and the operation are identical.
When we turn to the interpretation of our results, we must of course consider the
meanings of the symbols—but such interpretation is out of the province of Algebra, and
belongs to the science, the operations of which are symbolized (Gregory 1841, 2).
Thomson's practices at the time also indicate how strongly the symbolical algebraic terrain of
knowledge that was Cambridge mathematics contoured the engagements of budding
mathematicians across the country. Having read Gregory's paper, "On the Integration of linear
differential equations with constant coefficients," (published in the Cambridge Mathematical
Journal), the 17-year old Thomson furnished his own contribution to symbolical analysis just before
arriving to Cambridge in 1840. That paper (his third submission to the journal), "On the uniform
motion of heat in homogenous solid bodies, and its connection with the mathematical theory of
electricity," was eventually published in the CMJ in 1843. In it, Thomson argued that if a problem in
one domain of physics could be presented in the same mathematical form as a problem in any other
domain of physics, then the solution determined for the first problem must also hold in the second.
It was in this manner that Thomson linked "heat" to "electricity".54 Thomson's use of analogy in
natural philosophy drew on Gregory's use of analogy in algebra, where mathematical operations are
analogous across differing sets of mathematical symbols, although Thomson did diverge from
Cambridge's mathematicians in applying the method to physical operations across differing sets of
physical entities, his inculcation into the new generation of Cambridge symbolical algebra had
equipped him with the tools and motivation required to translate natural philosophical concepts into
algebraic form throughout the remainder of his life.
54
For an account of Thomson's use of analogies, see Roche (2008).
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The successful Scotsman
Tait and the young WJ. Steele (Tait's later co-author) both arrived at Peterhouse in 1848. Both were
identified early on as potential high wranglers. The expectation was that Steele would prevail as
Senior Wrangler. In his personal notebooks, Tait recounted his arduous preparation for the Tripos.
From December 1851 to January 1852, he devoted five to six and a half hours per day revising. On
January 8th, he began to study again after a "Brief Respite from Torment" behind him. During the
following eight days, his study time ranged between five-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half hours each
day. On the last day of preparation, January 19th, he wrote across the page of his diary, in large
capital letters "L'ENFERI", indicating the beginning of the exam period (Knott 1911, 8).
Despite the hell Tait felt himself to be experiencing, his studying paid off. Fie ranked first among his
colleagues, with his winning achievement recounted in friendly terms by J.D. Hamilton Dickson in the
Magazine of the Peterhouse Sexcentenary Club for the Michaelmas Term (1902). Dickson wrote,
How the old gyp's face used to light up as he told the story of that January morning
when the Tripos list was read. One gyp was in the Senate House to hear the list, and as
soon as Steele's name came out as Senior Wrangler he was to rush out and make a
signal by stretching out his arms like a big T; another gyp near the 'Bull' was to repeat
the signal; and a third at the College gate was to rush in with the news. When that list
was read and Tait's name came first the gyp nearly collapsed, but hearing Steele's name
next he recovered, and noting on that Peterhouse was first, rushed out, made the signal,
and fled with all speed to College to correct the pardonable error he had telegraphed
(Knott 1911, 9).
Placing first on the Tripos was a social achievement as much as it was a mathematical one. When
Tait discovered the result, he telegraphed home: "Tait Senior, Steele second, tell Gloag." The
message was curt, but meaningful. James Gloag, Tait's former mathematics teacher, received it
promptly, and his elated reception was documented in the Chronicles of the Cumming Club:
When intelligence reached the Academy of the great event, Gloag was "raised" and out
of himself with excitement. "Have ye hard the news aboot Tait?" he asked of everybody
he met, M— among others. "No," answered M—, "he's got a Bishopric, I suppose, or
something of that sort." "No, Sir, it's not Archibald Cam'ell Tait it's Peter Guthrie Tait, a
vary different parson—Senior Wrangler, Sir," and off he went to spread the news (Knott
1911, 9).
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On January 31st, Tait also wrote to Sir Doyle Money Shaw, president of the Cumming Club (a group of
former students of James Cumming, master of Edinburgh Academy), describing his rank in poetic
excitement:
My dear Doyle,
I'm all in a flutter
I scarcely can utter, &c., as
the song has it:~
I AM SENIOR WRANGLER!
Tell it to the Cumming Club—&c.
&c. and believe me
yours very sincerely,
PETER GUTHRIE TAIT, B.A. (Knott 1911, 9)
Tait had reason to boast and his former classmates had reason to celebrate.55 Among the top 300
wranglers from 1830 to 1860, only 20 were or Scottish origin and at least one of those would come
after Tait (namely, James Clerk Maxwell, 2nd Wrangler, 1854) (Becher 1984).
Tait's personal euphoria would not last long, however. For the next two years, he worked as a
college fellow at Peterhouse College, where he found himself shoved back into the Tripos system,
now with the aim of training others to perform as he had on the examination. Though Tait might
not have resented the experience with as much disgust as he would later claim to have, he did recall
his job had become that of "eagerly scanning examination papers of former years, and mysteriously
55
In recognition of his grand achievement, the Cumming Club organized a special meeting in Tait's honour. The club's
Chronicles reported that Gloag and the Academy Master felt Tait deserved to have a "banquet specially designed to do
him worship." Indeed, the fever of support was so strong that traditional rules were broken and energetic festivities
ensued, unlike any the club had previously experienced. As Knott recounts: "For once the exclusive rule of the Club was
broken through, and invitations scattered with a lavish hand amongst those—and they were many—who beyond the
limits of the Class, held kindly memories of Tait and of the Academy.... It was a high occasion for them all. Gloag could
hardly divest himself of the idea that he was the hero of the occasion, such credit did he take to himself... Festive
conversation was at fullest swing—that is to say, many talkers, few listeners—when suddenly the scene of revelry was
broken in upon by an ominous 'boom.' Tongues were still for a moment, but only for a moment. Then once again,
clearer, deadlier than before, the "boom" is heard above the clatter of tongues. In a moment the mystery is solved. The
President, Doyle Shaw, ever active for good, or evil, from his end of the table as it approached the gallery, had observed
peeping over the edge of this gallery, at an inviting angle, the rim of a big drum. Straightway the idea arose that by well
directed vertical fire this tempting object might be reached. The first orange discharged hit the mark unobserved by the
company, but the second "boom" discovered all. The idea was hailed as a brilliant one that only needed development.
The entire dessert, organs and apples, was soon expended. Then the thought occurred to Doyle Money Shaw to improve
upon his original idea. While the practice was still going on he managed cleverly to 'swarm' up one of the pillars with the
intention of capturing the big drum. But on arriving at the spot and with shout of ecstasy he announced to those below
that the entire band instruments were there. Without a moment's loss of time these were handed down, and from hand
to hand; and nothing would serve these festive spirits but the "Conquering Hero" in Tait's honour" (Knott 1911, 10).
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finding out the peculiarities of the Moderators and Examiners under whose hands their pupils are
doomed to pass" and then spending his life "discovering which pages of a text-book a man ought to
read and which will not be likely to 'pay'" (Knott 1991, 11). Tait remained critical of the Tripos
system for years after his graduation, despite pandering to it in his early publications. In speaking to
his Edinburgh students a decade after having entered Cambridge, Tait stated,
The value of any portion as an intellectual exercise is never thought of; the all-important
question is—Is it likely to be set? I speak with no horror of or aversion to such men; I
was one of them myself, and thought it perfectly natural, as they all do. But I hope such
a system may never be introduced here (Knott 1911, 11).
Tait's 1860s recollections are somewhat unfair to the worth of the exam, however. Without doubt,
the Tripos had come to represent issues at the forefront of mathematical research at Cambridge and
across Europe. New and unexpected questions also often led to fruitful research among graduates.
The CMJ, for instance, regularly published short articles with proposed solutions to past Tripos
problems. Those answer solutions often gave rise to other new publications. Near the end of the
19th-century, Edward Routh (one of the university's famed "coaches") recounted how Hopkins's
technique of "infinitesimal impulses"—a notion that Hopkins had used to clarify difficult problems in
dynamics to his students—was eventually "published" in the form of a Tripos question in 1853, set
by one of Hopkins's former pupils. Following that examination, Arthur Cayley (Senior Wrangler,
1842), Tait and Steele all published solutions to differing Tripos problems using the same technique
(Warwick 2003, 157-158). The intimate relationship between mathematics as it appeared on the
Tripos and active research as it played itself out on the pages of expert publications, such as the
CMJ, helped to create a newly emergent culture of Tripos-inspired professional research at
Cambridge in the mid-century (Warwick 2003). It was this practice-ladenness of Cambridge's "pure"
Tripos mathematics of the 1840s and 1850s that first allowed Tait to use quaternions in (what he felt
were) meaningful ways, as he entered his first professional post in 1856.
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A Belfast story
As Tait finished his youthful schooling in Edinburgh and then approached the mid-point of his
university training at Cambridge, Ireland was being weakened by starvation and emaciated by
famine. Political cries for deep legislative reform emerged as part of the multifarious reactions to the
country's undeniable socio-economic degradation. In broad terms, Ireland's population could be
characterized as having been composed of three groups: politically-dispossessed Catholic peasants
(many of whom lived as tenants on Anglo-Irish land, and many of whom operated within the socio-
financial confines of a subsistence economy); politically dominant and wealthy Anglicans; and a small
group of Presbyterians, which peppered the Irish landscape and which mediated between Catholics
and Protestants in an undefined mid-way citizenship of quasi-subjugation and quasi-
empowerment.56
Over the course of the 19th-century, the bulk of the island "continued in a state of commercial and
industrial backwardness," although the North of Ireland began to approximate Scotland's
Clydeside—one of the great workshops of the British Empire (Smith and Wise 1989, 8). By 1800,
Belfast had transformed itself into a major commercial and industrial centre, replete with factories
and political ideals to accompany its transformation. By the 1820s, the city had opened the world's
first cross-channel steamer service to the Clyde, fuelling the entire country's population boom. By
the 1840s, the population of Belfast had ballooned to over 70 000 people, compared to a mere 20
000 in 1800, rendering it Ireland's biggest and most prosperous town. The principles of
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Though small in numbers, the Irish Presbyterians formed well-organized dissenting groups of faithful practitioners. At
times, Presbyterians constituted a cohesive political force, establishing venerable Presbyterian institutions that were
used to lobby government throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. These three groups navigated around one another,
sometimes forming useful partnerships, while at other times clashing in economically and politically-motivated violence
(Smith and Wise 1989, 4-5). In this tripartite division, political struggles over public institutions often took on religious
overtones, recasting the politics of power into the politics of faith and allegiance. In 1791, a new non-denominational
political force also emerged, colouring the landscape in unprecedented ways. The Society of United Irishmen coalesced
with the objective of uniting disparate religious worshippers across the country. That group's aim was to establish
legislatively-supported religious toleration, ending thereby the legal inequity existent between practitioners of differing
faiths. Highly popular for a brief time, the "united" Irish front was eventually defeated in 1798 by the Act of Union
between Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. The Union established an Anglo-Irish (Protestant) political partnership.
Although it failed to initiate a socio-cultural homogenization across the country, it did mitigate some of the radical zeal
that had been evident in the north of the country throughout much of the 18,h-century. As Presbyterians increasingly
moved away from supporting the United Irish cause, and moved towards supporting the Anglo-Irish accord in the hopes
of gaining increased political representation, fewer "united" Irishmen gained prominence in public life.
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"improvement" and "enlightenment" coloured the pages of the region's newspapers. In 1806, those
ideals materialized in the form of public educational institutions that aimed to redress the region's
past sectarian divisions, by running non-denominational programming. One such institution was the
Belfast Academical Institution, founded in part by William Drennan (1754-1820), a former United
Irishman, who had agitated for Catholic emancipation. That institution accepted latitudinarian-
minded academics, such as the senior James Thomson, who became professor of mathematics from
1814 onwards.57
Industrialization was not, however, a panacea for all internecine politicking and heartache in Ireland.
By the late-1810s, the Academical Institution lost its government grants due to the overtly religious
views of its headmasters. Though those grants were reinstated in 1828, the institution continued
facing pressure from radical branches of the Presbyterian community, which had long opposed non-
sectarian education. That meant some institutions in Northern Ireland were being pressured to
move away from the country's hard-earned reputation for latitudinarianism and non-sectarianism,
and towards renewed religious divisiveness. Despite the denouement of radical politics in Ireland in
the late 18th-century—a phenomenon that had informed the liberal and latitudinarian views of
57
The Belfast Academical Institution formed its curriculum with the aim of satisfying the needs of Belfast's newly
industrializing environment as well as its diverse religious needs. Though Drennan's school still produced ministers for
various sects of religious practice, it also provided widely-popular lectures in arithmetic and geography. In response to
the demand for technical topics, James Thomson also published textbook, A Treatise on Arithmetic in Theory and
Practice (1819), in which he emphasized "Mercantile Arithmetic." Questions on navigation, insurance, land, commodities
and manufactures featured prominently (Smith and Wise 1989, 15). It was within this context of latitudinarian appeal
and industrialization that Thomson became an early and enthusiastic supporter of the introduction of continental
techniques to Ireland, representative—as he felt they were—of France's revolutionary and republican democracy.
Writing an anonymously authored review in the Belfast Magazine (1825) on the state of science in Scotland and Ireland,
Thomson had argued: "Since the days of Newton ... British mathematicians have been far surpassed in several branches
of science by their neighbours on the continent. This has been particularly the case in the higher and more difficult parts
of pure mathematics, and in physical astronomy; in which the Bernoullis, Clairault [sic], D'Alembert, Euler, Lagrange and
Laplace, have made such discoveries as will form monuments of glory, not only to themselves, but to Mankind. These
great men pursued the path pointed out by Newton, and explored the mechanism of the universe, with such masterly
power, and such distinguished success, as must ever be considered among the most glorious triumphs of mankind ...
While ... the men of Science in Britain were wasting their time and talents, some in restoring the ancient geometry of
Greece, and some in following servilely and implicitly the manner in which Newton presented his investigations, without
being actuated by the spirit by which he was directed in his researches." Thomson further contended: "To follow, at the
present day, the modes of investigation employed by the original discoverers ... to the exclusion of the new aids of
science, is as absurd as it would be to reject the use of the steam-engine as a prime mover for machinery" (Smith and
Wise 1989, 17-18). Recall that Babbage had previously argued productive modes of manufacturing were manifest in
automated machines just as symbolical and analytical modes of thinking were manifest in the mind's power to efficiently
abstract. A decade after Babbage had made his argument, Thomson linked continental mathematics to the progressive
development of the country's industrial ethos. The Academical Institution where Thomson taught for over a decade
served as a microcosmic instantiation of Ireland's grander industrial development.
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actors such as Thomson—a certain degree of re-radicalization occurred in the mid-19th century.
Ireland was increasingly caught up in vehement debates over the extension of the franchise to all
religious parties and the establishment of equal legal status for all its religious practitioners.58 In fact,
it was due to these renewed religious divisions that James Thomson eventually found the academic
environment of Glasgow more conducive to his latitudinarian outlook, leading him to relocate there
with his family in the 1830s following his wife's death (Smith and Wise 1989, 12).
The Ireland that Thomson left, however, was similar to the Ireland that Tait would encounter upon
arriving to Belfast in 1854, two decades later. Having left the staid political environment of
Cambridge, Tait arrived in a city and a country where long-reigning instability, internecine battle and
explicitly propagandized religious vitriol had characterized the bulk of recent history. It was a
colourful, passionate and influential environment for any impressionable person to walk into. And
while the Thomsons had left in disgust, seeking a less divisive realm of existence, Tait stayed on in
Belfast for six years, absorbing the local culture of unapologetic religious expression and explicit
religious diatribe—an experience that explains, to some degree, why it is that Tait felt comfortable
publicly expounding upon his own religious-scientific views in later years, even though his colleague
William Thomson did not.
Tait at Queen's College
Of the most salient aspects of Tait's work in Belfast, the first was his collaboration with the chemist
Professor of Chemistry, Thomas Andrews (1813-1885), which taught him how to become an
experimental natural philosopher. The second was his engagement with Hamilton's calculus of
58
The provocative political spirit of its varied ethno-religious communities embodied itself in the 1840s in a group of Ulster
liberals, who formed into the Ulster Constitutional Association. The Association had as its mandate: "To obtain for
Ireland an equalization of all rights, franchises, and benefits with Britain; and the closest possible assimilation of laws
and institutions of both countries; to the end, that, by complete incorporation, the system of imperial legislation may be
rendered permanently beneficial to the interests of the United Kingdom, and thus strengthen and perpetuate a
connection advantageous, if maintained on such principles, to the people of both countries, and essential to the
preservation of this great empire in its commanding position among the nations of the earth" (Kennedy 1949, 242).
Throughout the remainder of the decade, the Ulster Constitutional Association issued calls for reform to local
government, pushed for "extended federalism" with parliaments in England, Scotland and Ireland, and encouraged local
political elections and financing (Kennedy 1949, 246).
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quaternions, which allowed him to publish unique mathematical research at the outset of his
professional career. By the time Tait arrived at Queen's College in 1858, Andrews had been
appointed Vice-President of the university. Andrews had studied at Trinity College, Dublin in the
early 1830s at the height of Hamilton's fame over the prediction of canonical refraction, (he had
gained distinctions in both classics and science). He went on to study at the University of Edinburgh,
gaining his MD before returning to Belfast to initiate his medical practice and teach chemistry. After
taking up the Vice Presidency at Queen's College, he became known to the scientific world as the
author of papers on the subjects of voltaic action and heat of combination (Harden 2004). An Irish
patriot in politics, though not an explicitly nationalist one, Andrews was also a socially-active
Irishman who had volunteered to help feed impoverished sufferers during the famine. As an
academic, he associated Hamilton's name with Irish renewal. In his support of Tait's quaternion
engagements, there is a sense in which Andrews sought to encourage Irish productions that could
propel the scientific reputation of Ireland forward following the socio-political strife the country had
recently experienced.59
When Tait initially mused about picking up the Lectures on Quaternions (1853), it was Andrews who
supported his efforts to do so. It was also Andrews who wrote to Hamilton with a letter of
introduction for the young laboratory acolyte. Indeed, Andrews created a fertile terrain upon which
Tait initiated and maintained his correspondence with Hamilton in the late-1850s. In an early letter
to Hamilton, dated November 22nd, 1858, (composed only five days after Tait had received his first
response from the Irish mathematician), Tait wrote he was unlikely to show anyone in Ireland or
England his initial quaternionic research given that "none of my intimate friends are engaged in the
study of Quaternions ... save as regards my answering Dr. Andrews, who is much interested in my
progress, and asks me now and then about it" (Wilkins 2005, 15). The fertile terrain provided by
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Little academic work has been carried in the case of Thomas Andrews. Tait and A. C. Brown's co-authored The Scientific
Papers of the Late Thomas Andrews (1889) constitutes a useful starting point, although little historical analysis exists
surrounding Andrews's role in the history of Irish science.
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Andrews's mathematical encouragements allowed Tait to engage with quaternions within the
loosely-bound world of Belfast's natural philosophy and mathematics curriculum.
Tait's initial engagement with quaternions can be understood by appealing to his overlapping
"terrains" of knowledge—namely, Cambridge's symbolical algebra and Belfast's experimental,
natural philosophy. Recall that mathematical topics such as electricity, heat and magnetism had
played no role in Tait's specific education at Cambridge, as they had been excised from the
curriculum just prior to his arrival. Furthermore, there had been no experimental education to speak
of at Cambridge (the Cavendish laboratory being decades away from established). However, by
virtue of Andrews's mentorship in Belfast, Tait was able to learn about experimental science through
his informal laboratory apprenticeship from 1854 to 1860. It was an apprenticeship that led to
formal publications as joint papers with Andrews on the liquefaction of ozone gas—publications that
helped Tait launch and establish his professional career as a natural philosopher. As Tait's
biographer later recalled,
Tait gave efficient aid, more particularly in the calculations involved, and in the
construction of much of the apparatus used. He proved such an apt pupil in the art of
glass blowing that ere long Andrews gave that part of the manipulation over to his eager
and energetic companion. Tait used to speak with intense admiration of the extreme
care and patience with which Andrews carried out all his researches. Each difficulty or
discrepancy as it arose had to be disposed of before progress could be reported and the
investigation advanced a stage. At times indeed, the patient care of the skilled
experimenter must have chafed somewhat the brilliant young mathematician, ever
eager to get to the heart of things; but no amount of argument or theorising on Tait's
part could move the master from the steady tenor of his way. Years after when Andrews
in his failing health visited Edinburgh Physical Laboratory to inspect a set of his own
apparatus for the liquefaction of gases it was at once a privilege and an inspiration to
witness the deep affection and admiration with which Tait regarded his whilom
colleague (Knott 1911, 13).50
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In a reminiscent letter to Andrews's wife following the death of her husband in 1885, Tait make clear his long-standing
debt to Andrews. He wrote: "It does not become me to speak of the irreparable loss which you and your family have
suffered. But it may bring some consolation to you to be assured that there are many, in many lands, whose sympathies
are sincerely with you; --and who lament, with you, the loss of a great man and a good man. For my own part, I feel that
I cannot adequately express my obligation to him whether as instructor or example. I have always regarded it as one of
the most important determining factors in my own life (private as well as scientific) and one for which I cannot be
sufficiently thankful, that my appointment to the Queen's College at the age of 23 brought me for six years into almost
daily association with such a friend" (Knott 1911, 13).
149
In addition to Andrews's laboratory skills, Tait's other Belfast colleagues included a variety of people
involved in an array of natural philosophical endeavours. Wyville Thomson was an experimental
scientist who would later go on to lead the Challenger Expedition. And James Thomson, the brother
of William Thomson, was an engineer who had long-focused his efforts on engine dynamics
(Rowlinson 2003). Much in contrast to his encounters with mathematicians and symbolical
algebraists at Cambridge, Tait's Belfast experiences included a coterie of professional colleagues
who inculcated him into the world of industrially-motivated laboratory and experimental research.
The importance of those figures cannot be overstated. Tait credited Andrews with the skills he
gained in experimentation, which later qualified him to open up, equip and run a laboratory in
Edinburgh in the 1860s. In addition, working with the coterie of friends mentioned above, Tait was
exposed to the world of instrumentation. On a trip to Paris in 1855, for instance, he visited the city's
Exposition, where he studied the scientific objects and instruments on display. In an enthusiastic
letter sent to Andrews on September 21st, 1855, Tait stated he had begun to identify as an
"experimentalist" and that he felt that his role in Andrew's laboratory, and in Belfast's world of
science, had become a central one.61 Thus, while in Belfast, Tait was encouraged to lecture on
"mixed" mathematics. His "mixed" lectures constituted supplements to Professor John Stevelly's
lectures in Natural Philosophy, which Tait ran as voluntary classes for Honours students. He offered
advanced accounts of dynamics that allowed him to "escape from the comparative dreariness of
Pure mathematics into the satisfying realities of Applied" (Knott 1911,12).
Yet, it would be a misrepresentation of Tait's navigations to assume that Cambridge had become a
distant memory. On the contrary, Tait continued to offer his students additional tutorial sessions in
61
In greater detail, Tait wrote to Andrews: "I have made attempts to see Ruhmkorff, Soleil, and Tyndall. The former was
out of the way, Soleil was in Glasgow, and I believe so was Tyndall. I extracted from the woman in Soleil's shop all the
information they could give about the Saccharimeter. I saw the instrument, pr. 260 fr., and bought a description of it and
its use by Moigno. i found and examined all the electromagnetic apparatus in the Exposition, and it was my decided
opinion that an instrument in Ruhmkorff's stall called "Appareil de Faraday" was the very thing for us ... I hope you agree
with me in the matter of the apparatus for Faraday's experiments. The only objection that I could see to it is that
possibly it might not be powerful enough; but of that you will be a much better judge. Not far from Ruhmkorff s there is
a collection of clockwork and along with it a small machine for exhibiting the permanence of the plane of rotation. I have
not seen the gyroscope itself—this machine seemed to me not only comparatively useless, but even dangerous" (Knott
1911, 64).
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"pure" mathematics, preparing them for higher-level analysis, even though no exam similar to the
Tripos existed in Ireland. He formed small groups outside of regular lecture hours and performed as
any good Cambridge coach should, by assigning Tripos-style exercise problems to his students on a
regular basis. Rather than experiencing a radical break with the past, Tait's socio-intellectual terrains
of knowledge had become layered. He was now working within multiple conceptual environments
rather than turning explicitly away from any one in particular. As Tait engaged with quaternions
more profoundly, his mathematical practice remained analytical in nature, though his
interpretations of symbolical processes began to invoke natural philosophical metaphors and
justifications.
Quaternion engagements, 1858-1860
In the early months of 1858, Tait read Helmholtz's article on vortex motion. After obtaining
Andrews's support, Tait wrote to Hamilton stating his interest in pursuing the matter further using
quaternion algebra. However, he also mentioned he felt uncomfortable with many aspects of
Hamilton's algebraic analysis. Over the course of their ensuing correspondence, Tait and Hamilton
negotiated over the meaning of quaternions; they also pursued the particular problem of translating
the equation of Fresnel's wave surface into quaternionic form; they discussed the potential
usefulness of the algebraic system with regards to a variety of other natural scientific concerns
(including heat and magnetism); and they deliberated over the possibility of publishing textbooks
that Cambridge coaches would be prone to use. Through this correspondence, it became clear that
despite their common interests in these matters, Hamilton and Tait's respective uses of quaternions
were not identical. For Hamilton, mathematical truth exists prior to experimental and inductive
truth. Experimental truth is merely a particular instantiation of a priori knowledge and a priori
knowledge can only be garnered through rational speculation of universal relationships. Though
Hamilton had adopted certain aspects of the symbolical network's principles, he had done so
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primarily to advance the legitimacy of his quaternion system at a time when symbolical algebra was
increasingly popular at Cambridge.
For Tait, on the other hand, mathematics was becoming a mere hand-maiden to science. Tait had
initially demonstrated his adherence to his Cambridge training in symbolical analysis, when he
adopted the view that algebraic relationships are "true" in a conventional sense, as opposed to an
ontological sense. That view was manifest in his jointly authored text with Steele. By the late-1850s,
however, Tait began to adhere to a natural philosophical perspective that emerged prominently
from his experimental experiences with Andrews, in which ontological truth could be only be
determined via observational and experimental data. Tait had come to see mathematics as a tool-
one that could be used by science, but which was not prior to it.
In his letters to Hamilton, Tait's rhetorical stance on the meaning of quaternions was coloured by
references to his overlapping and shifting terrains of mathematical and natural philosophical
knowledge. In his first published paper on quaternions, entitled "Quaternion investigations
connected with Fresnel's wave-surface" (May 1859), Hamilton's influence in terms of subject matter,
and Cambridge's influence in terms of the symbolical algebraic approach, are both patently clear. By
his second paper, "Quaternion investigations connected with electro-dynamics and magnetism"
(January 1860), and certainly by his third paper, "Quaternion investigation of the potential of a
closed circuit" (October 1860), the intellectual terrain of Belfast's natural philosophy emerges more
prominently. Let us therefore take a closer look at Tait's first publication, along with Hamilton's
correspondences at the time, to get a better sense of how Cambridge's early-century symbolical
philosophy contoured Tait's initial engagements with Hamilton's conceptual artifacts.
Tait's first foray into the world of non-textbook publications opened with subject matter that was
dear to Hamilton's heart—the equation for Fresnel's wave surface. This was the same surface
Hamilton had discussed in 1832, and which he had used to make his "prediction" of canonical
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refraction. In a letter to Hamilton (dated November 13th 1858), Tait noted that he had attempted to
derive the equation of Fresnel's wave surface using quaternions. Yet, it was not an easy task. He
wrote,
For a week I have been hard at work trying to deduce the equation to Fresnel's wave-
surface by a process purely quaternionic, starting from the data employed by Archibald
Smith in the Cam. Math. Journ. As yet I have only deduced the directions of the planes
of polarization for any wave-front—and the law connecting the velocities of the two
rays. These come out with admirable simplicity.
In attempting to find the equation to the surface, I have come upon a terrible array of
Versors. Of the latter, I have still a sort of horror, arising principally I suppose from my
having as yet avoided the use of them on every occasion in which it was possible
(Wilkins 2005, 11).
In a manner reflective of his Tripos training, Tait then concluded:
In writing this I hope you will not imagine for a moment that I am asking a hint from
you—for where no new principles are involved (and this is only a case of elimination, as I
have got easily enough over the differential part of the question) I cannot see that I
should be justified in pursuing such a course—besides, I am fully alive to the advantage
of a desperate struggle with unfamiliar processes, and intend to succeed (Wilkins 2005,
12).
Tait was treating the problem as a piece of Tripos book work; he was hoping to solve it through
continued algebraic manipulation, just as he would have worked to solve difficult Tripos-style
questions during his student days (for an account of "bookwork" at Cambridge, see Warwick (2003)).
Hamilton, meanwhile, claimed he had already applied quaternionic analysis to Fresnel's wave
surface in prior years. He had never published those results. But in his response to Tait (dated
November 19th 1858), he said he would review his materials from the 1830s to see whether he could
reacquaint himself with the equation and whether his more recent attempts at a quaternionic
account of the wave surface had produced any meaningful mathematical forms. From Hamilton's
perspective, Tait's interest in the subject proved to be a useful opportunity to revivify his poorly-
received quaternion research and to push forward with new publications. Tait's willingness to focus
on "Fresnel's wave surface" flattered Hamilton's expertise.
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Recall that Fresnel's wave surface refers to a particular wave front that forms as light radiates from a
point within a crystal, where the speed of light varies in accordance with the direction of travel.
Hamilton had initially used Cartesian coordinates to describe properties of that wave surface in the
1830s. In his correspondence with Tait, he now saw the possibility of devising a quaternionic
representation that would be free of Cartesian coordinates. His stated aim was to highlight the
geometrical properties of the surface, which he felt would more clearly emerge when the equation
and its derivative were translated into quaternions. In a lengthy letter dated December 3rd, 1858,
Hamilton explained to Tait that his understanding of the wave surface was based upon his 1833
paper, in which he had introduced the issue of conical refraction. Hamilton recalls,
I had, at the time, taken care to give a correct statement of Fresnel's views, so far as I
had access to the chief Memoirs in which they were contained, [thus] I suppose that the
following may be an adequate translation of them into the language of quaternions
(Wilkins 2005, 32).
In translating the equation for Fresnel's wave surface into quaternions, Hamilton stated he was
seeking a "physical theory," where he would offer a deduction of the "EQUATION of his WAVE
SURFACE" by assuming Fresnel's "principles, but [by] my own methods." In this account, Hamilton
defined p as a vector of ray-velocity that is "drawn within a doubly refracting crystal from any
assumed origin O," and, p as the "corresponding vector of wave-slowness." In addition, "S" stood for
a scalar entity, and "5p" denoted the "Fresnel Vibration," which referred to the vibration "in the
crystal, or in its ether, [as] estimated on Fresnel's hypotheses." Using these definitions, Hamilton
presented the following quaternionic identities to Tait:
Spp — —1 ,Sp8p = 0 ,SpSp — 0.
He then proceeded through a series of algebraic transformations to arrive at the claim that the
equation of Fresnel's wave surface in quaternionic form would be as follows:
_ (Sap)2 (S/gp)2 (Syp)2
p2 — a2 p2 — (32 p2 — y2
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Hamilton declared that the "physical significance" of this equation was (at least to himself)
immediately visible in ways previously unforeseen. "If I had ever read [of those interpretations], or in
any other manner learned before today," he wrote, "I must confess that I had totally forgotten"
(Wilkins 2005, 35).
First, the format of the quaternion equation immediately suggested to Hamilton the following
identity: 0 = SpVSp. This latter equation meant that the ray-velocity multiplied by "Fresnel
vibration" (VSp), along with a scalar magnitude, would result in a perpendicular product (where, in
the current context, "0" indicates perpendicular lines). In Hamilton's words, "The elastic force, VSp,
of the ether, called into play by the displacement, Sp, is perpendicular to the direction p of ray-
propagation in the crystal" (Wilkins 2005, 36). That physical interpretation emerged from the rules
governing quaternion mathematics, Hamilton argued. It was one of the reasons he believed
quaternion mathematics led to better geometric interpretations of physical phenomena.
Interestingly, we might note here, Hamilton was increasingly willing to revert back to his old belief in
geometric meaningfulness and physical interpretations, as he discussed the Fresnel wave surface
with Tait. The focus on symbolical algebra as worthy in and of itself began to fall by the wayside in
their correspondence, belying the Peacockian rhetoric found in Hamilton's 1853 preface.
That is not to deny that Hamilton's treatment of the problem was still symbolical in nature. Indeed,
at the end of his letter to Tait, Hamilton juxtaposes Fresnel's Cartesian representation of the wave
surface with his own quaternionic presentation to argue that, of both algebraic forms, the
quaternionic version was superior in presentation. Hamilton writes Fresnel's "own form of the
Equation" was:
(x2 + y2 + z2)(a2x2 + b2y2 + c2z2) + a2b2c2
= a2(b2 + c2)x2 + b2(c2 + a2)y2 + c2(a2 + b2)z2.
The same wave surface written in quaternionic format is:
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p2{(Sap)2 + (S/?p)2 + (Syp)2} + a2p2y2
- (P2 + 72)(S«p)2 + (y2 + a2)(SPp)2 + (a2 + /?2)(Syp)2.
Though perhaps not self-evident to an external or uninitiated observer, Hamilton declares the
second representation to be "simpler" and better. The Irish mathematician justified his view by
arguing,
A feature, which cannot have surprised you, but which might naturally strike a
reader unaccustomed to quaternions, in the whole of the foregoing investigations
respecting Fresnel's Wave, is the FEWNESS OF THE SYMBOLS employed, and the
FULNESS OF MEANING attached to them (Wilkins 2005, 44).
Hamilton argued that if one were to ignore the steps involved in the algebraic manipulations—i.e.
the "signs of operation"—then "we have used, I think ... scarce any but the following letters",
p, to denote the vector of ray — velocity;
u, to denote the vector of wave — slowness;
t, to denote the vector of Mac Cullagh s vibration;
v to denote the vector of Fresnel s elasticity.
On Hamilton's view, a,/?, y, "denote certain vector-constants of the medium." They are not
considered to be additional "letters". Hamilton further argues the symbols i,j,k were not to be
counted as extra symbols either, as they can be taken for granted (given they constitute
foundational rules for quaternions), while the variables a, b,, x, y, z, r should not count as additional
"letters" either, as since they are only "alluded to" in the algebraic manipulations he had performed.
Lastly, the small scalar symbol Sm should not be included as an add-on, as it "had entered only to be
eliminated." Thus, Hamilton concludes, "I would (I think) be doing injustice to the subject, & to
yourself, if you were to suspect yourself of any merely personal or friendly partiality, in regarding (as
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I hope that you do regard) this paucity and interpretability of the signs as an advantage [to
quaternions]" (Wilkins 2005, 44).
Hamilton defined simplicity as the "paucity" of symbols evident in his quaternionic manipulations,
and he presented this as an objective characteristic of the system itself, after strictly selecting only a
small group of symbols to characterize as new "letters" (the others being excluded by virtue of the
fact that they were "foundational" or "assumed" in Hamilton's view). This selectivity allowed
Hamilton to claim that the quaternionic account of Fresnel's wave surface introduced a new era in
simplicity and elegance. The selection of items mentioned in the list above, and their
characterization as "scarce", was a value judgment on Hamilton's part—one that was informed by
his pre-existing adherence to the superiority of quaternion mathematics, and one that was
motivated by his desire to legitimate the system in Tait's eyes.
Tait adopted Hamilton's language and began to laud the perceived simplicity of the system (i.e. the
"paucity of symbols") in his own quaternionic work on Fresnel's wave surface (Wilkins 2005). In early
1859, he noted his amazement at the potential for simplification, which he felt quaternionic
transformations brought to mathematical research. In a letter dated January 3rd, 1859, Tait wrote,
About quaternions in general, I may remark (as indeed I very frequently feel) that the
processes are sometimes perplexingly easy—by which I mean that one is often led in a
step or two and without at once knowing it to the solution of what would be by ordinary
methods a work not so much of difficulty as of labour. This however I take it must form
one of its great excellencies in the hands of a person very well acquainted with it. A
drawback to a beginner, but (as I am gradually being led to perceive) an immense
advantage to one well-skilled in the analysis, is the enormous variety of transformations
of which even the simplest formulae are susceptible; a variety fully justifying a remark of
yours which not many months ago used somewhat to puzzle me. if I had gained nothing
more by reading this subject than the facility of making problems and transformations
for Examination papers (especially in Trigonometry) and so saving an immense amount
of time and trouble, I should have considered myself amply rewarded; but I hope in time
to be able to apply it to perfectly original work (if anything can be quite original in these
days). I make these remarks because you expressed yourself willing to hear anything I
had to say on the subject, and because at present they are indissolubly connected with
all my ideas on quaternions (Wilkins 2005,123-124).
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Yet, despite Tait's enthusiasm, quaternions still posed various problems, some of which contradicted
his own claim that the system was simpler than Cartesian-based algebra. In a letter written to
Hamilton on March 2nd, 1859, Tait recounted the various difficulties he faced in dealing with certain
"wave-investigations," especially as they related to "the problem of the wave front for which there is
the greatest angular separation of the rays." That problem had led Tait to some "complicated and
almost intractable [quaternion] equations" (Wilkins 2005, 161).52 Despite the characterization of
"simplicity", therefore, Tait soon discovered quaternions required intensive mathematical labour
and inventiveness to be rendered "simple."
Revealingly, in his first published paper on Fresnel's wave-surface, Tait admits that quaternions do
not actually provide any benefit over and above the classical Cartesian approaches, or any benefit in
cases where direction is found to be unimportant. He concludes, therefore, that although "the
Calculus of Quaternions in general ... appears to me to possess in a marvellous degree the attributes
of simplicity and suggestiveness," still "the treatment of the wave-surface is perhaps not a question
in which its superiority over Cartesian methods is at once so marked, as it is in all cases where no
direction in space is regarded as preeminent" (Tait 1898, 1-2). Yet, rather than relent and turn back
on his overall claims, Tait continued to seek out other examples where quaternionic expressions
could, in fact, be deemed "simpler" and more productive than their Cartesian equivalents. For
example, Tait argued a quaternionic approach to the wave-surface would be perhaps useful in
demonstrating that "the three directions of the axes of elasticity may be at once reduced to two
reference lines (the wave, or the ray, axes), and a still farther reduction obtained by the introduction
of a certain linear and vector operation [was possible]" (Tait 1898, 2). This claim highlights Tait's
intention to move forward with his quaternion investigations, indicating his continued belief in the
view that quaternions simplified mathematical problems, despite the difficult examples he faced
above.
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Nonetheless, he was "unwilling to try the last resource of putting the [problematical equations] in x,y,z coordinates
until [he could] show the impossibility of solving it (if it be impossible) quaternionically" (Wilkins 2005,161).
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To bolster his own position, Tait offers a basic example of—what he takes to be—an undeniable use
of quaternion mathematics. He considers the representation of ellipsoids. When put into their
quaternionic form, ellipsoids gained in simplicity, he contends; furthermore, the quaternionic
account of ellipsoids leads to more productive results. If the vector semi-axes of an ellipsoid are
identified as ai, bj, ck (where i,j, k are the quaternion rectangular vector units), the equation of the
ellipsoid can be represented in quaternionic format as follows (where 5 indicates a scalar value):
In his demonstration of the productiveness of the quaternion approach, Tait invokes Hamilton's
previous presentation of an ellipsoid, which had relied upon the quaternion variables




Tait claims this form is equivalent to the better known Cartesian form:
2 2 2
x y z
h — H = 1
a2 b2 c2
T = (ip + p/c) — k2 — i2,
where:
ac (a + c) L/(a2 — b2) , y/(b2 — c2) ^
2 (a — c) j ab 1 be
and
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Note that i and k are "tensors:
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If one supposes that a> b > c, then the symbols t and k represent "vectors perpendicular to the
planes of the circular sections of (a)" (Tait 1898, 2). Using a bit of algebraic manipulation, Tait
demonstrates that Hamilton's account and his own are, in fact, equivalent, such that:
(Sip)2 (Sjp)2 ([Skp)2
_ T2Qp + pk)
a2 b2 c2 (k2 — i2)2
Tait also shows Hamilton's description of an ellipsoid leads to a slew of other useful algebraic
identities, including the following:
j2l + J2k = i(a2 + c2);
2 2
k — i = ac;
1
TYCXk = — (a2 — c2);
ac
TO - k) = —;
J .Vlk - v(q2 ~ b2) v(^2 _ c2)-
In using this ellipsoid example to highlight all of the algebraic identities that emerge from quaternion
analyses of old problems, Tait claims that quaternion mathematics gives rise to symbolical identities
not evident in inert Cartesian presentations of similar problems.
Tait's training in Cambridge's symbolical analysis is evident. Apart from the individual symbols i and
k—which are specifically defined—interpretations of the algebraic identities listed above are meant
to follow after the algebraic manipulation has taken place. Not only is Tait unconcerned with the
necessity of predefining the various components of these mathematical manipulations, but he also
writes as though the ontological reality of those symbol is a distant after-thought. Thus, despite the
initial problems Tait had faced in invoking quaternions in an analysis of Fresnel's wave surface, the
ellipsoid example proved that quaternions could generate new and exciting universal algebraic
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relationships, many of which, Tait speculated, might contain room for further physical interpretation
in the future (though he nowhere provides such interpretations).
The epistemic choices Tait made throughout his first quaternion publication can be summarized as
follows. He presented algebraic analysis as leading the investigation. He followed his Cambridge
training in symbolical analysis by manipulating symbols and generating equivalences without feeling
constrained by any the obligation to discuss the particular meanings of those manipulations. In Tait's
mind, quaternionic analysis led to the construction of sleek, new algebraic equivalences, which
might support geometrical or physical interpretations, but which did not necessitate such
interpretations in order to be deemed valid.
By the end of 1858, Tait was a clear supporter of the quaternionic approach, or, rather, of its
perceived benefits to symbolical algebraical research. He saw it as fruitful, productive and, at times,
elegantly simple. Yet, he still harboured some reservations. In a paper published soon after his first
account of Fresnel's wave surface, Tait reverted to discussing some of those lingering difficulties he
had encountered in his earlier efforts to translate known equations into quaternionic form. Entitled
"Note on the Cartesian Equation of the Wave-Surface" (1859), Tait's paper offers the following
equation for the wave-surface:
a2x2
a2 — r2
+ &c. — 0,
where,
r2 - x2 +y2 + z2,
could be rewritten as,
x2
. n o n I 8lC ■ 0,
ozcz — r^
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and where the following identity consequently holds:
r12 = a2x2 + b2y2 + c2z2.
Although he "was led to [this transformation] by a quaternion process," Tait explains the quaternion
approach itself is not "so simple as the obvious algebraic verification" (Tait 1898, 20). Tait's claim in
this brief publication is historically useful. He acknowledges that quaternions do not always
constitute a simpler method of mathematical analysis. His choice to continue pursuing the technique
in light of these serious difficulties must, therefore, be explained.
Indeed, there were a number of reasons for why Tait's reservations would have been mitigated,
leading him to continue working on quaternions despite the presence of so many obstacles. The
possibility of generating original publications and the (hoped for) professional recognition that
would accrue as a result, motivated Tait in important ways. In a letter to Hamilton dated November
22nd, 1858, Tait noted:
There is one point however on which I would like your opinion. It is this—If I should ever
publish anything involving the "equation of envelopment" XI, must I cite it as yours, or is
the use I made of it in a particular case [in a previous letter] when I had the equation but
deduced it by the consideration that a certain product of two vectors (a'Vafo) was to
be a scalar or at least to have its vector part always zero for an infinite number of
directions of a , Vaa> remaining constant—which was absurd unless Vaco — 0—is that
use, antecedent to receipt of your VII & XI [letters from Hamilton], sufficient to put it on
a level with other results deduced from your book without your assistance (Wilkins
2005, 15)?
To see Tait in the light of his recent Cambridge education is to see him in the light of a
professionalizing culture of mathematics—a culture in which it had become normal, and expected,
for former Tripos wranglers to publish soon after graduation, thereby establishing a name for
themselves. One of Tait's aims, therefore, was to gain Hamilton's support (so as to avoid claims of
plagiarism or priority disputes) and to publish certain aspects of his quaternionic analysis to build his
professional status.
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The pressure to publish soon after graduation motivated the behavior of more than a few top
wrangles in the mid-century. Consider, for instance, the case of George Sesslar (Senior Wrangler
1858). In 1859, one year after his graduation, Sesslar published an article in the Quarterly Journal of
Pure and Applied Mathematics in which he offered a "solution of certain problems in Rigid Dynamics
by a new artifice, referring the data to movable axes." As Warwick (2003) has pointed out, that "new
artifice" was a time-saving tool taught to Sesslar by the Cambridge coach Edward Routh (Senior
Wrangler 1854). After Sesslar published his article, Routh complained bitterly. He declared the
technique had been known years earlier, openly suggesting that Sesslar had unapologetically stolen
Routh's work (Warwick 2003, 160). Sesslar's choice to publish his solution to a Tripos problem, which
used a technique that had been shown to him in the privacy of a coach's classroom, helps to
highlight the competitive nature of mathematical professionalization at the time. The pressure to
publish, and the need to establish a name as a mathematical authority, had become an overriding
objective in the lives of young Cambridge graduates. In part, this was due to the growing cohort of
graduating men who were competing more fiercely for scarce academic posts scattered across the
country's universities and technical institutes. As soon as Tait had graduated, he entered that
competition. Tait and his fellow graduates were willing to publish on topics that were still in a state
of development, so as to gain the potential opportunity of having a relevant question set on a future
Tripos exam and thus having the topic gain greater and a more formal recognition.
The publishing motivation underpinning Tait's engagement with quaternions throughout 1859 led
him to labour on through the difficulties he had faced and to ignore his own reservations over
matters of "simplicity" in quaternion mathematics. Indeed, only two months into their
correspondence, Tait wrote to Hamilton saying that he would submit a short paper to the
Philosophical Magazine or the Quarterly Journal on the "Advantages of Quaternions over the
ordinary Cartesian Methods." He admitted it was not for the,
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sake of giving anything very new, but merely to record my vote in favour of the method,
and if possible induce others to take it up—for I am now as fully convinced of its great
practical value, as I was from my first slight acquaintance with it delighted with its
novelty & elegance (Wilkins 2005,17).
And in a letter to Andrews, written July 21st, 1859, Tait noted some early success as a result of his
efforts:
My paper on the Wave-surface has reached me ... —and I have been asked by several
men of note, to whom I have sent copies, to publish an elementary work on
Quaternions. Todhunter of Cambridge, about the best authority on matters of that
sort, is one of them—and I have written to Macmillan (the publisher) to enquire about
terms etc...
Sir W. Hamilton has expressed his satisfaction with the project—and has only asked me
to refrain from laying, or trying to lay, new metaphysical or other foundations for the
Theory, wishing to reserve such for himself; and I am quite sure that I shall not feel this
in any way a restraint (Knott 1911, 65).
Visions offame
The tone of the Tait-Hamilton correspondence at this point reveals broad themes. Apart from the
evident focus on developing a quaternionic approach to Fresnel's wave theory, the correspondence
abounds in accounts of Hamilton's sense of excitement and trepidation at the thought of
quaternions being revivified. In an exuberant letter issued early in the correspondence, Hamilton
writes to Tait,
You are, by this time, quaternionist enough to admit, as I trust, that whatever may be
the future success (in such hands as your own, for example) of Quaternions as an
Instrument of Investigation, they furnish already, to those who have learned to read
them ... a powerful ORGAN OF EXPRESSION, especially in geometrical science, & in all
that widening field of physical inquiry, to which relations of space (not always easy to
express with clearness by the Cartesian Method) are subsidiary (Wilkins 2005, 21).
In a later letter, written in 1859, Hamilton further acknowledges,
I cheerfully confess that I consider myself to have, in several respects, derived
advantages, as well as pleasure, from the Correspondence. It was useful to me, for
example, to have had my attention recalled, to the whole subject of the Quaternions;
which I had been almost trying to forget; partly under the impression that nobody cared,
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or would soon care, about them. The result seems likely to be, that I shall go on to write
some such "Manual",--not necessarily a very short one... (Wilkins 2005,139).
From 1858 to the end of 1859, Hamilton envisioned the possibility of his name emerging, once again,
as a prominent voice in British mathematics and science. He envisioned a new symbolical-
geometrical approach to mathematics in which analytical Cartesianism would give way to analytical
Hamiltonianism. And this latter approach would more profoundly and more directly indicate the a
priori nature of space. One of the main benefits of quaternions, Hamilton contended, was that they
did away with pre-existing assumptions about the geometrical nature of space. Rather than absolute
measures of location based upon arbitrary axes, quaternions offered relativistic relations between
positions in space. In a letter to Tait, written in 1858, Hamilton argued, "... the CALCULATION OF
QUATERNIONS admits of being brought to a much greater degree of simplicity; & to a state which
shall assume much less, of previous geometrical knowledge" (Wilkins 2005, 61). All of these claims
were still speculative on Hamilton's part, but his exuberant hopes for the potential uptake of his
ideas serves as a notable motif throughout his letters to Tait.
Another theme to emerge in their correspondence is Hamilton's uncertainty, even suspicion, with
regard to the speed and diligence with which Tait had adopted and manipulated quaternion algebra.
In a letter dated December 6th, 1858, he writes,
I have read,--that is to say, in the open air, & without pen or pencil at hand,-the first
sheets of your "Quaternion Proofs": and must say that they appear to me to be
wonderfully elegant; and to exhibit a very remarkable degree of mastery (so far) over
the calculus of quaternions, used as an instrument, or expression, and of investigation.—
It would interest me much to know, whether (previously to our present correspondence)
you had received ANY assistance from any other students of that Calculus. Or did you
learn all that you had acquired, from the BOOK itself, combined (no doubt) with your
own private exercises, of various sorts?—If the "Lectures on Quaternions" have been
your ONLY Teacher, I must consider the result of such a state of things to be not merely
creditable to your OWN talents and diligence, but also complimentary to, and evidence
of, some (scarcely hoped for) didactic capabilities of my Volume; which ought to tend to
console me, under my artistic consciousness (as an author) of the many faults of
execution, that if I could afford the expense of bringing out a New Edition, I should be
more likely to make it a NEW WORK (Wilkins 2005, 92-93).
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In his ongoing efforts to legitimate quaternions, Hamilton wished to suggest that a small community
of "quaternionists"—"other students," that is—did indeed exist and had existed for some time.
To solidify his role as progenitor of the quaternion system, the Irish mathematician further queried
Tait so to determine whether he had been influenced by that small community, which Hamilton
considered himself to be the leader of. Hamilton tells Tait,
In Dublin, indeed, there exists a little "School" of Quaternionists, developed partly by
the Lectures and Examinations, which Charles Graves and myself have given or held, and
the Professor's brother, my old friend, John T. Graves, (repeatedly mentioned in my
Preface,) called my attention, about a year ago, to a highly favourable, and very
eloquent article, in the North American Review, for July, 1857, on the subject of the
Quaternions, & of my Book. But a conscientious Author wishes rather to be read, than to
be praised: and therefore I should like to be informed, what drew your attention to my
Book, & whether you had any personal assistance in studying it (Wilkins 2005, 92-93)?
Tait responds the following day, acknowledging Hamilton's influence on his nascent work. Yet, he
makes sure to identify those independent terrains of knowledge through which he felt himself to be
navigating alone or, at least, independently of Hamilton. Tait writes,
With regards to my study of Quaternions, I may affirm with some certainty, that when I
ordered your book, on account of an advertisement in the Athenaeum, I had NO IDEA
what it was about. The startling title caught my eye (in August /53) and as I was just
going off to shooting-quarters (in my native district on the Tweed) I took it and some
scribbling paper with me to beguile the time if a day were unusually wet or stormy.
Circumstances however did not favour me, for the weather was good, and game
plentiful, and I was generally too fatigued in the evenings to make much of
Mathematics. However, as I told you in my first letter, I got easily enough through the
first 6 lectures,-and I have still a good many notes I made at that time, from which it
now seems to me that I had not then fully appreciated the simplicity of the method ...
On my return to Cambridge I set to read other things, and to write my recently
published Treatise on Particle Dynamics. The Theories of Heat, Electricity & Light have
since occupied much of my spare time, and it was only in August last that I suddenly
bethought me of certain formulae I had admired years ago at p. 610 of your Lectures—
and which I thought (and still think) likely to serve my purpose exactly. [[The matter
which more immediately suggested this to me was a paper of Helmholtz' in Crelle's
Journal (Vol. IV) which I was reading in July last as soon as we received it, and which put
the subject of Potentials before me in a very clear light. The title (in German) I forget-
but an M.S. translation of my own which I have now beside me is headed "Vortex-
motion." It refers to the integration of the general equations in Hydrodynamics when
udx + vdy + wdz is not a perfect differential.]] On this I asked Dr. Andrews with whom
I was then at work if he was sufficiently acquainted with you to give me a letter of
introduction.
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Tait then adds that he is,
not even acquainted with anyone who knows aught of Quaternions (except Boole of
Cork—with whom however I have not exchanged a remark on the subject, and who I
suspect looks on them in their analytical capacity only). So you see that if there is any
credit in my progress it is entirely to your Lectures & Letters that it is due (Wilkins 2005,
97-98).
Tait was making it clear that the small group of supposed "quaternionists" that Hamilton had
identified with could lay no claim to Tait's own innovative research—by lack of association, neither
could Hamilton.
Not to be cut loose, however, Hamilton reminds the young mathematician, in a circumlocutory way,
that the latter's recent developments of quaternion mathematics were ultimately dependent upon
the former's original ideas. In a letter initiated on February 15th 1859, Hamilton recounts:
Your N° 30 [a previous letter of Tait's] is not at my hand, & I must confess that I only
glanced at it, being pressed about other things when it arrived, & hoping to read it
carefully, after some time. The LOOK of the ijk convinced me, perhaps too easily, that
you had not yet hit upon the method which I proposed some years ago,-though it is not
so fresh, clear, & vivid in my present recollection, as to dispose me to submit, without
some brushing up, to a competitive examination on the subject,-and which I think that I
communicated in 1857 to Mr Salmon. Ungrateful brutes that the quaternions must be,
they wish, whenever they can safely do it, to cut the acquaintance of their old friends
and benefactors, the aforesaid i,j,k\ ... You must know that I have lived (very calmly)
through a perfect storm of ridicule, in my own city. Dr Wall,-the Vice Provost,-a man
whom I really love, & venerate, & who made no objection, when it came to the point, to
the allocation of some money from the College Chest, to assist me in bringing out my
book,-was one of those who set the example. The product of ij not equal to y'i!!!
monstrous. Even Charles Graves was, for a moment, almost seduced from his
allegiance—or at all events (being a very prudent man) he began at one time to doubt
the POLICY of going on with quaternions. With one of his gravest faces, he said to me
one day—perhaps 8 or 9 years ago,-"You cannot conceive, Hamilton, what a prejudice
exists against the Quaternions:-and that, among people who have not examined them."
Should you prefer, I replied, that it should exist in the minds of persons who had
examined them? ... But without seeking farther "to unsphere The Spirit of Plato",-let me
be permitted to congratulate you, (as well as myself,-most sincerely do I add this last
objective case,) on your having taken up the quaternions. They will owe MUCH to you:
but I think that you also will owe something to them. This may be only the natural vanity
of an author; but I believe that an early appreciation of genius wins a corresponding
appreciation, in its due time, from mankind, for itself: even if not accompanied, as in
your case it is, & will be, by independent acts of discovery (Wilkins 2005,131-132).
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Despite its loquacity, Hamilton's message is clear. Tait was bound for fame based upon the
likelihood of his "future" discoveries; but, as Hamilton emphasizes, none had yet been uncovered.
Furthermore, Hamilton viewed Tait's developments as extensions of his own foundational work.
Thus, he warns, it would be subject to the same level of criticism Hamilton himself had faced in
previous years. Perhaps realizing Tait's independence on the matter, however, Hamilton also
supported the idea that, together, the two mathematicians could override any remnants of the
traditional opposition to the non-commuting algebraic system. In this partnership, however, Tait was
expected to play the role of sturdy sidekick.
Indeed, Hamilton's general lack of support for Tait in both public and professional domains suggests
that Hamilton's intent was to treat the young researcher as a backroom aid, rather than as an equal,
professional colleague. In delivering a "communication" to the Royal Irish Academy (April 12th 1859),
Hamilton noted he had specifically failed to mention Tait's name. He also wrote to Tait to explain
how he had secured room for publishing a small article ("which may stretch into two or three") in
the Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy, by offering a short verbal communication on Fresnel's
wave surface and Hamilton's own "Symbolical Forms for its Equation." At no point, however, did
Hamilton mention Tait's name as second author to that proposed publication, or even as a
supporting actor in the general investigation of the topic. Hamilton writes to Tait that, although "you
may be surprised that I did not mention your name, I could account for it in many ways." Hamilton
claims he had not mentioned Tait's name because he had been uncertain as to whether he, himself,
would deliver the abstract to the society's meeting. As he ended up having the abstract delivered on
his behalf by Graves, he felt that mention of Tait's name was inappropriate, as it would have caused
confusion. Hamilton further claims there would be time enough in the future to mention Tait's
name, adding that his own hopes for success with the renewed quaternions lay in Tait's "discretion".
Hamilton expected Tait to keep their letters confidential, at least until the publication of his second
quaternion textbook. The historian is therefore presented with a slew of unconvincing apologia that
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paints Hamilton as a skeptical and suspicious mathematician—one who hoped to harbour more than
a little of the praise that would accrue from a revivified account of his algebraic system.
In order to advance these self-interested goals, Hamilton began to issue a number of stipulations,
dictating the terms according to which future publications on quaternions could be issued. Thus, the
third theme to emerge in the correspondence between Hamilton and Tait was Hamilton's insistence
upon determining the nature and style of the publications that would inevitably emerge from Tait's
research. Hamilton was keen to demarcate his professional bounds of authority. He underlined the
need for Tait to refrain from engaging in metaphysical discourse regarding the "principles" of
quaternions, and insisted, rather, that Tait leave those philosophically important discussions to
Hamilton himself. Over the spring of 1859, Hamilton also wrote to Tait to express the fact that his
hopes, fears, and ambitions were totally dependent upon Tait's willingness to play by the rules. In
conciliatory tones, Hamilton wrote to Tait on July 10th, 1859, to remind him that he did not want to
invoke a sense of competition or rivalry with his young follower, but,
If I shall go on to speak of my views, wishes, or feelings, on the subject of future
publication, I request you beforehand, to give any such expression of mine your most
indulgent construction; & not to attribute to me any jealousy of you, or any desire to
interfere, in any way, with your freedom, as author and critic.
Despite his gracious attitude, Hamilton underlined the historical status of quaternions, noting that
mathematicians such as Mobius had already recognized the worth of Hamilton's system long before
Tait's arrival. As a newcomer, Tait was also a latecomer. The quaternion path, Hamilton contended,
was a well-trodden one, and Tait's injection of new "physical" problems in quaternionic analysis
could not compare with the developments that had already taken place. Hamilton wrote:
If we were altogether strangers, I could have no right to address you, on such a subject
at all. A German Pamphlet, or Short Essay, has been recently sent to me by Mobius,-the
"recognition" to which I lately alluded,-though the Author has recognized me before,
especially in connexion with hodographs,-and of course I did not expect him to have
asked my leave, previously, to discuss in public, my Associative Principle of
Multiplication of Quaternions. The perfect independence of our researches has a charm
& value of its own. But between you & me, their case is perhaps not exactly similar; as
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we have so freely corresponded, & as you are an author in the same language, & of the
same country:-England, Scotland, & Ireland, being here held to have their sons
compatriots.
To Mobius's excellent Pamphlet, it is likely that I may return. Meanwhile I trust that it
cannot be offensive to you if I confess ... that in any such future publication on the
Quaternions as you do me the honour to meditate, I should prefer the establishment of
"PRINCIPLES" being left, at least for some time long,--say even 2 or 3 years,-in my own
hands. Open to improvement as my treatment of them confessedly is, I wish that
improvement, as least to some extent, to be made & published by myself.
Although Hamilton saw worth in encouraging his acolyte to develop quaternions, he also saw
potential for the diminution of his own reputation if he failed to control the specific outputs of the
young mathematician.
Hamilton saw his own role as that of authorizer of all that was to be foundational to the subject; he
saw Tait's role as that of provider of examples and practice problems.64 As Hamilton put it:
Briefly, I should like (I own it) that no book, so much more attractive to the
mathematical public than any work of mine, as a book of yours is likely to be, should
have the appearance of laying a "FOUNDATION": although the richer the
"SUPERSTRUCTURE," on a previously laid foundation, may be, the better shall I be
pleased. I think therefore that you may be content to deduce the Associative Law, from
the rules of i j k; leaving it to me to consider, and to discuss, whether it might not have
been a fatal objection to those rules, if they had been found to be inconsistent with that
PRINCIPLE.
Again, on some points which are harder to swallow, at first starting,-the associative
principle seeming rather to be a truism than a paradox,-such as the assertion that the
product of two vectors is generally a quaternion, & that the square of any one vector
may always be equated to a negative scalar,-I should think it might be fairer to me, (you
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In his maneuvering, Hamilton often emphasized the use of developing "physical" applications for quaternions, while at
the same time underlining the overarching importance of his own metaphysical starting principles. He wrote to Tait: "It
will interest me to endeavour to understand, after a while, at least the nature and tendency of the researches of Dr.
Andrews & yourself, on the subject of Ozone. Little as I have pursued such studies, even in books, you may judge from
my Presidential Addresses, pronounced on the occasions of delivering Medals (long ago), from the Chair of the R.I.A ...
that physical (as distinguished from mathematical) investigations have not been wholly alien to my somewhat wide, but
doubtless very superficial, course of reading.—You might without offence to me, consider that I abused the license of
hope, which may be indulged to an inventor, if I were to confess that I expect Quaternions to supply, hereafter, not
merely mathematical methods, but also physical suggestions. And, in particular, you are quite welcome to smile, if I say
that does not seem extravagant to me to suppose, that a full possession of those a priori principles of mind, about the
multiplication of vectors;-including the Law of the Four Scales, & the Conception of the Extra-spatial Unit,-which have
as yet been not much more than hinted to the public,-MIGHT have led, (I do not at all mean that in my hands they ever
would have done so,) to an ANTICIPATION of something like the grand discovery of OERSTED: who, by the way, was a
very a priori (and poetical) sort of man, himself, as I know, from having conversed with him, & received from him some
printed pamphlets, several years ago. It is impossible to estimate the chances given, or opened up, by a new way of
looking at things; especially when that way admits of being intimately combined, as you well know, with calculation of a
most rigorous kind" (Wilkins 2005, 209).
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will pardon my using the first word that suggests itself,) & at least as likely to promote
the sale of your book, if you were to leave all a priori & metaphysical grounds for such
positions to be maintained by me, than if you should profess or propose to deduce them
otherwise, than from the fundamental FORMULAE,
i2 = j2 = k2 = ijk = -1.
Hamilton concluded by delineating what he hoped to discuss in his own upcoming publication,
indicating thereby what it was that Tait was not to discuss. He wrote:
But my peculiar turn of mind makes me dissatisfied without seeking to go deeper into
the philosophy of the whole subject, although I am conscious that it will be imprudent to
attempt to gain any lengthened hearing for my reflections. In fact I hope to get much
more rapidly on to rules & operations, in the MANUAL, than in the LECTURES; although I
cannot consent to neglect the occasion of developing more fully my conception of the
MULTIPLICATION OF VECTORS, and of seeking to establish such multiplication as a much
less arbitrary process, than it may seem to most readers of my former book to be
(Wilkins 2005, 228-230).
Following the end of the summer vacation of 1859, Tait responded to Hamilton's various letters on
the matter of publication style and content. He tentatively sought clarification on those "rules" of
publication that had caught him off-guard. In a letter dated September 7th, 1859, Tait wondered:
I am to assume (I suppose) the laws of i,j, k—and the distributive property (with
explanations of course)—and thence deduce the associative—but I suppose I am at
liberty to give a condensed outline of the method employed in your Lectures (Wilkins
2005, 233).
Hamilton responded, in minute detail, outlining the boundaries that Tait ought not to trespass in
their future publication endeavours, jointly or otherwise. He stated,
You were once pleased to ask my opinion, as to whereabouts you should begin, in your
own treatment of the subject. It would be a delicate thing for me to offer any advice
upon, especially as it known to many of my friends that I have long been intending to
publish a "Manual of Quaternions", myself; and in fact wrote, & showed, a part of one,
as a specimen, at least 3 years ago. But, speaking generally, I might venture to suggest,
as perhaps convenient for all parties, that you should, for the present, take for granted a
great deal of first principles; for instance, the fundamental laws of i j k: and proceed at
once to examples, or applications, such as you will doubtless be found rich in. I mean
only, during such time as you can spare, just now, or soon, to the task of composition, as
connected with the quaternions: doubtless you will find it useful, or perhaps even
necessary, to prefix to your work some short account of the nature & rules of the
Calculus itself.
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What would seem to me the BEST arrangement, if practicable , would be this:—that my
Manual should appear before your Treatise, and should (prospectively) refer to it, as
expected soon to be published, & to furnish more numerous & more interesting
EXAMPLES, than my own book will contain; while you might (if you thought fit) refer
reciprocally, your readers to that book of mine, (the Manual, rather than the Lectures,)
as containing a fuller Exposition of PRINCIPLES, & on the grounds for their admission,
that it would suit your plan to put forward (Wilkins 2005, 238-239).
With one foot still firmly planted in his generational need to justify the symbolical approach itself,
and one foot embedded in the hopeful world of Tripos publications and dynamics (from which
examples for quaternion mathematics would emerge), Hamilton saw himself as the expositor of the
metaphysical and foundational aspects of the algebraic system. His hope was to clear a path for
himself as the continued leader in quaternion research.
Many of Hamilton's concerns over metaphysics and mathematical foundations washed over Tait
with little resistance. In part, this was due to the fact that, by the late 1850s, Tait's focus was still on
developing textbooks useful for Tripos training, rather than on any philosophical exegeses. His
diligence was largely motivated by his professional navigations. Recall that the training of wranglers
at Cambridge had produced a veritable industry of textbook production and consumption. Tait was
well aware of that industry. His first publication with Steele was testament to that fact. As Tait
reiterated, he was approaching the quaternionic accounts of Fresnel's wave surface from the
perspective of a student writing "book work" and preparing for the Tripos. On March 18th, 1859, Tait
wrote to Hamilton to tell him he was working on translating some "illustrative problems" into
quaternions—problems he had met with in Cambridge papers in past years.55 In a short note written
to Hamilton in April 1859, Tait admitted, "When I first read Art. 563 of your Lectures I thought it
about as hard a piece of bookwork as I had ever met. It is less formidable now, but still not easy"
(Wilkins 2005, 187). Thus, Tait's aim was to produce a Tripos-style textbook that would be bought
65
One such problem was to "Find the locus of the centre of a sphere which touches two given lines in space." Tait modified
the problem to read: "Find the locus of the centre of a surface of the 2nd order whose axes are given in ratio and
direction, and which touches two given lines." To attack it Tait defined the vectors
/? and y as parallel to the given lines and 2a as the common perpendicular. Fie then approached the problem using
vectors (Wilkins 2005, 163-164).
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and sold at Cambridge, and which would help to establish his professional status in the competitive
world of examination.
By the mid-1860s, those motivations would change, however, largely due to the fact that Tait had
begun to navigate through a "terrain of knowledge" characterized by the metaphors and interests
associated with northern energy science (for further details related to Tait's movements away from
Hamilton, see Appendix Two).
Tait's move into natural philosophy and religiosity
In the preface to his Scientific Papers (1898), in which Tait republished his early quaternionic
publications, the elderly natural philosopher recalled that his early quaternion publications had been
mostly composed prior to any significant correspondence with Hamilton. Tait tells his reader,
Among the more detailed papers are the earlier of those in which quaternions are
employed. These were written while I was endeavouring to familiarise myself with the
new calculus, and were, in great part, worked out before I had any communication with
Sir W. R. Hamilton except through his Lectures (1853); a fascinating book, which, by
great good fortune, I had taken with me on a vacation tour as a companion for wet days.
When I made Hamilton's acquaintance a year or two later, through Dr Andrews, I
submitted to him some of the more formidable difficulties which I had met in the study
of his great work, and the hints I thus obtained were of much use to me in finally
preparing these papers for publication (Tait 1898, v).
Tait's historical rendering of his engagement with quaternions is, however, questionable. In his
correspondence with Hamilton from 1858 to 1860, much more than just a "few hints" were passed
from Hamilton to Tait. Indeed, the two mathematicians relied heavily upon one another to develop
and legitimate their developing ideas, in particular with regards to the quaternion rendering of
Fresnel's wave surface. Tait's 1898 claim that he had worked solo on his early quaternion
publications should be read as part of his legitimization efforts—efforts that became prominent in
the 1890s, by which time Tait was engaged in a distinct and independent debate with Gibbs and
Heaviside over their respective developments of vector analysis. The historical account offered in
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the Scientific Papers is meant to recollect the past so as to situate Tait at the forefront of
groundbreaking quaternion research vis-a-vis Gibbs and Heaviside in the mid-century.
While acknowledging that his early quaternion efforts did not present any "new" material, Tait did
suggest he had offered presentations in a "new" language. Recall that Tait's quaternion publications
from 1858 to 1860 had highlighted his belief that symbolical analysis is productive and worthy in its
own right. In line with his late-Peacockian and De Morgan-influenced studies at Cambridge, he also
held that it could produce mathematical identities that might have meaningful applications in
natural philosophical contexts. Thus, although the contents of those early publications "were a
translation of other men's investigations," they were also translations "into a vastly superior (though
at the time they were written all-but-unknown) language" (Tait 1989, vi). In his following two
papers, both of which were published after six years in Belfast, it is evident that new natural
philosophical (or "physical") concerns were making themselves apparent in Tait's approach to
mathematics, leading him to increasingly define mathematics as a hand-maiden to science. Let us
turn then to an account of those two papers to get a sense of the shifting terrains through which Tait
was actually navigating at the time of their composition.
While Tait's first paper on quaternions had dealt with Fresnel's wave surface, his second paper,
"Quaternion investigations connected with electro-dynamics and magnetism," linked two emergent
themes in Tait's natural philosophic life in Belfast.56 Published in the Quarterly Journal of
Mathematics (I860),57 Tait used his second paper to describe "the particular cases of the mutual
action of galvanic currents, and of the forces exerted by permanent magnets on each other," in
which he emphasized "the superiority of the Calculus of Quaternions over the ordinary analytical
65
Neither "electrodynamics" nor "magnetism" were subjects taught to Tait at Cambridge during his studentship there.
Rather, they were topics that he had been exposed to in Belfast, while in the presence of Andrews and James Thomson
(brother to William Thomson), the latter of whom had been appointed professor of engineering at Queen's University in
1857.
67
A short continuation of this paper appears 10 months later in October 1860, also in the Quarterly Journal of
Mathematics, and is entitled "Quaternion Investigation of the Potential of a Closed Circuit" (Tait 1898).
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processes of Geometry of Three Dimensions" (Tait 1898, 22). In the introduction to that paper, Tait
wrote:
A comparison between the processes employed in this paper and those of Ampere
(Theorie des Phenomenes Electrodynamiques, etc., many of which are well given by
[Michael] Murphy in his Electricity) will at once show how much is gained in simplicity
and directness by the use of Quaternions. The gain in simplicity will be noticed in the
investigations of the mutual effects of permanent magnets, where the resultant forces
and couples are at once introduced in their most natural and direct forms (Tait 1898,
22).68
The claim that quaternions could present natural phenomena in a more "natural" and "direct"
manner than could Cartesian algebra is one that Tait would come to repeat often throughout his
career.
In the present article, Tait summarizes Ampere's experimental laws as follows:
I. Equal and opposite currents in the same conductor produce equal and opposite
effects on other conductors, whence it follows that an element of one current has no
effect on an element of another which lies in the plane bisecting the former at right
angles. II. The effect of a conductor bent or twisted in any manner is equivalent to that
of a straight one, provided that the two are traversed by equal currents, and the former
nearly coincides with the latter. III. No closed circuit can set in motion an element of a
circular conductor about an axis through the centre of the circle and perpendicular to its
plane. IV. In similar systems traversed by equal currents the forces are equal.
To these laws, Tait adds "the effect of any element of a current on another is directly as the product
of the quantities of the currents and of the lengths of the elements" (Tait 1898, 23). It is
understandable that Tait would envision the use of quaternion mathematics in such an electro-
dynamical system. The combined effects of the various forces that represent electric currents in the
"laws" mentioned above could be algebraically represented as four-termed entities, composed of a
length measure and three directional measures. And though the article is still, primarily, a work of
symbolical (and analytical) algebra, Tait does make explicit his view that natural philosophy—that is,
experimental natural philosophy—could work symbiotically with quaternions. For instance, in
Section 9, Tait considers the "whole effect" of an electrical circuit when the conductor being used is
68
Tait admits some of the "conciseness of the method is lost by the necessity of going out of the way to prove results in
Quaternions, a step which would not be requisite if the Calculus were more generally known" (Tait 1898, 22).
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straight and "indefinitely extended in both directions." In such an instance, Tait considers a vector
perpendicular to the conductor (symbolized by hf) found at the extreme end of the solenoid (the
coiled wired through which an electric current is run to generate magnetism). In four lines of
quaternion mathematics (in which Tait invokes a particular integral he had developed to represent
the effect of a "closed or indefinitely extended" circuit), he produces a pithy little expression
(— CA^1 Vrj^, which describes the fact that the "whole effect" of the circuit under investigation is
"perpendicular to the plane passing through the conductor and the extremity of the solenoid, and
varies inversely as the distance of the latter from the conductor." Tait then claims, "This is exactly
the observed effect of an indefinite straight conductor on a magnetic pole, or particle of free
magnetism" (Tait 1898, 26).
Nowhere does Tait cite exactly which particular experimental observations he is referring to,
although it is likely he got them from Murphy's Elementary Principles of the Theories of Electricity,
Heat and Molecular Actions (1833), a book written by the Reverend Robert Murphy at Caius College,
Cambridge for "the use of students in the university" in the years when theories of electricity and
heat were still on the Tripos examination. In Murphy's old Cambridge textbook, the electrical
phenomena discussed are based upon the works of Simeon-Denis Poisson, from his varied memoirs
on electricity, magnetism and molecular action, and M. Ampere, from his Theorie des Phenomenes
Eiectrodynamiques Uniquement Deduite de TExperience (1827).69 Murphy writes about mathematical
considerations in combination with experimental confirmations of "some of the results deduced"
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With regards to the theory of heat, Murphy writes that his textbook is based on the work of Fourier in his Theorie de la
Chaleur (1822). Ironically enough, it was Whewell's suggestion, as indicated in the preface to his Dynamics (2nd Edition)
(1836), that someone should compose such a text. Seeking to provide a mathematical treatment of developments in
natural philosophy, Murphy produced the test for use by Cambridge students. The irony emerges in the fact that it was
Whewell who later deemed these subjects to lack proper foundations, and fought for their exclusion from the
undergraduate curriculum.
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(Murphy 1833, vi).70 In a chapter devoted to "Electricity in Magnified Substances," he writes, of "the
action of a system of magnetic particles",
It was discovered by Oersted, that Voltaic conductors act on magnets, and conversely
that magnets act on Voltaic conductors: if an electrical discharge be passed through a
conductor in the form of a helix, a steel needle placed parallel to the axis of the helix
and within it becomes strongly magnetized: lastly, a Voltaic conductor attracts iron
filings to its surface while transmitting electricity, but when the transmission is
discontinued, the filings immediately drop off (Murphy 1833,133).
Near the end of his chapter, Murphy adds:
The evaluation of the magnetic actions on external points, whether the system be at rest
or in motion, depends on the solution of the equations [presented in the chapter]; M.
Poisson to whom this theory is due, has made applications in his third memoir on
Magnetism, to the case of a homogeneous sphere, hollow or solid, turning round its
axis, and influenced by terrestrial magnetism, and has shewn that the effect of the
rotation is very nearly equivalent to that produced by a force normal to the plane
passing through the axis in the direction of the influencing action of the earth... (Murphy
1833, 145).
In Tait's discussion of the extremity of a solenoid (i.e. a helix-figured conductor), it may well be that
he had Oersted or Poisson's findings in mind, as presented by Murphy. The fact the experimental
works of Oersted, Poisson, Peter Barlow (1776-1862) and Francois Arago (1786-1853) emerge in
Tait's quaternion publication indicates the presence of a developing terrain of natural philosophical
knowledge.
Before moving to Edinburgh to serve as professor of natural philosophy, Tait issued a final paper on
quaternions. That brief (two-page) account of a "Quaternion investigation of the potential of a
closed circuit," published in the Quarterly Journal of Mathematics, built upon Tait's earlier
"Quaternion investigations connected with Electrodynamics," in considering the "potential of any
system upon a unit particle at the extremity of ywhere F(y) is a function representing the
potential C. Tait argued that if F(y) = C, the differential of this potential function, in quaternion
70
Murphy explains the first part of his book focuses on the functions needed to mathematize electrical phenomena. The
second part considers "the manner in which electricity is disposed in bodies, previous to its becoming sensible by the
action of electro-motive causes"—an aspect of electrical studies Murphy thinks has "not been before made the subject
of mathematical investigation" (Murphy 1833, vi).
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notation, would be S.vdy = 0, where v is a vector normal to the potential function and represents
the "direction of the force" and S represents a scalar value (Tait 1898, 33). Tait manipulates the
differential for the potential function using the algebraic rules of quaternion mathematics to argue
that v also represents the force "in magnitude". Invoking an expression that had been developed in
his previous quaternion paper, which represented the "vector force exerted by a small plane closed
circuit on a particle of free magnetism," Tait presents the potential of a closed circuit as being
proportional to a "solid angle subtended by [the] circuit." He concludes that his quaternion account
is equivalent to the result obtained for finite circuits when one uses the older technique offered by
Ampere, in which one breaks up a finite circuit into an "indefinite number of indefinitely small ones"
(i.e. an infinite number of infinitesimally small circuits) (Tait 1898, 34).
In his study of the history of vector analysis, Crowe (1967) has argued that Tait served as a mere
"transitional" role in the history of vector calculus, applying Hamilton's quaternions to a series of
well-known problems in physics that had been previously dealt with using traditional Cartesian
coordinates. Tait's account of Ampere's finite circuits, might lead one to agree with Crowe in this
regard. In fact, Tait even identified himself as not presenting anything "new," so much as showing
the improved style of argument, the sleekness of design, and the labour saved in employing
quaternions. For instance, in his "Formulae connected with small continuous displacements of the
particles of a medium," published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Edinburgh (1862), Tait
writes,
Although most of the results deduced in this Note have been long known I venture to
offer it to the Society on account of the extreme simplicity of the analysis employed, and
the consequent insight it affords us into the connection of various formulae (Tait 1898,
37).71
Yet, contrary to Crowe's account of Tait's contributions—and contrary, perhaps, to Tait's view of
himself at the time—Tait's actions do demonstrate that the Scotsman was doing something situated,
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In that "Note" Tait invoked Hamilton's "nabla" operator to show the effect of applying the differential operator to a
scalar function is to produce a vector that represents "in magnitude and direction the most rapid change in the value of
the function" (Tait 1898, 38).
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something idiosyncratic, and something unique. The varied terrains of knowledge that Tait had trod
upon by that point led him to view quaternions not only as simplifying mathematical tools, but also
as efficient engines that produced mathematical products for potential uses in natural philosophy.
Quaternion mathematics wasted less energy by avoiding unnecessary mental labour, and within the
context of the 1860s, they became (in Tait's view) the more moral approach to mathematics.
Scottish Presbyterianism had imbued practitioners such as Thomson and Tait with a moral sense of
scientific duty, mandated by the need to preserve the finite stock of God-given energy in the
universe. Wasteful mathematical techniques were to be condemned as much as wasteful engine
operations, wasteful labour, or wasteful moral behaviour. Tait argued the only inefficiencies to be
observed in the lengthy quaternion proofs he often presented were the direct outcome of the
calculus of quaternions not being "more generally known" (Tait 1898, 22). In other words, greater
facility with and wider circulation of quaternion mathematics (i.e. through its inclusion on the Tripos)
would greatly improve the state of mathematical knowledge in general, by improving its efficient
uptake on a national scale.
Tait had also begun to emphasize the De Morgan-influenced aspects of his symbolical algebraic
training—namely, that mathematical results are most laudable when interpreted in physical ways.
Thus, unlike Hamilton, Tait began to focus on the physical interpretations of certain symbolical
transformations. This led him to explore those natural philosophical circumstances in which
quaternions could best be put to work. Forces could be represented using couples and their
resultants, and this algebraic representation of directed lines in space offered direct and unmediated
insight into the nature of the physical universe. As the three-dimensional analogue of couples,
quaternions provided the natural philosopher and mathematician with unmediated insight into
spatial ontology. It was in this manner that Tait sought to put quaternions to use, hoping they would
come to serve a role in the grand experimental-philosophical project then being formulated by Tait
and Thomson—namely, a unifying theory of the structure of the universe as a whole.
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The University ofEdinburgh, an institution in flux (1840-1870)
At the start of the 18th-century, the University of Edinburgh was still little more than an Arts College
with a divinity school attached. Its role as the provider of clergy for the Church of Scotland had
become institutionalized through its primary curricular focus on "Divinity, Oriental Languages, [and]
Ecclesiastical History." The university expanded its scope over the course of that century. A Chair of
Mathematics was established and taken over by successive generations of the Gregory clan, and
courses in medicine began to attract a wider array of students. But the changes that effectively
launched Edinburgh into a period of more standardized educational provision with competitive
examinations, student prizes, honours degree options, and mandatory matriculation fees occurred
primarily in the 19th-century (largely as the result of financial pressure linked to Britain's involvement
in the Napoleonic wars).
Leading into the 19th-century, Edinburgh was already considered one of the best universities in the
country. Horn (1967) argues that part of the reason for this high level of respect was the nature of
the Scottish curriculum, which, contrary to Oxford and Cambridge, had continued a commitment to
wide-ranging and broad education. At the dawn of the 19th-century, Oxford had chosen to focus its
undergraduate curriculum on classics and logic; Cambridge, narrowed its focus on mathematical
foundations. The University of Edinburgh, and its cousin institutions in Glasgow, Aberdeen and St.
Andrew's, clung to the notion of a broad liberal arts curriculum—one that sought to expose students
to multiple subject areas, including classical languages, biblical study, rhetoric, mathematics and
"universal civil history".72
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As Thomas Jefferson would declare in 1789, Edinburgh's curriculum was "unrivalled" anywhere in the world (Horn 1967).
Jefferson's claim was justified, perhaps, by the large number of Edinburgh graduates that century who were later
elected as Fellows of the Royal Society (60 were from Oxford; 85 from Cambridge; 79 from Edinburgh; and 32 from other
Scottish universities). No doubt, Edinburgh played a central role in the flourishing of intellectual life in 18th-century
Scotland.
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Yet, the first decade of the 19th-century, also brought with it severe financial constraints, as course
fees dropped off and the university entered a period of sustained economic turmoil.73 Although
tenure at the Scottish universities was as much a guarantee of lifetime employment as it was for
professors at English universities, the basic salaries paid to Scottish professors were puny by
comparison. Most professors collected class-based fees to survive. Although the university could
boast a student population numbering approximately 2,000 by 1800, most of those students avoided
matriculating in order to skirt matriculation fees. And because many students also chose to take only
one of two years' worth of courses, thereby avoiding graduation fees,74 the university's coffers
suffered heavily. Those two factors combined led to periodic bouts of financial tension at the
administrative level, and cantankerous debates between university professors and the town council
governors who managed the school's finances.75
Edinburgh could still, however, lay claim to an undisputed reputation in liberal arts well into the
1820s. In fact, the university served as the model for the nascent metropolitan university in London,
i.e. University College, London. Yet, there was a growing sense of frustration from within. The
combination of poor funding for the university, and a lack of income from student fees for
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The university hit a financial rut in the 1790s when, in the midst of building repairs, expansions and renovations, private
funds dried up as British citizens—including Scottish investors—were pressed upon by increased war taxation and
encouraged to invest in war bonds. Some buildings, including the central part of a western block (which was later to
form the Natural History museum) was left in half-finished state, its beams exposed and its upper level unroofed. Only in
1801 would parliament hand over another £5000 to help complete the unfinished, and now rotting, building section
(Horn 1976, 90). Yet, while the French Revolution had soaked up financial support for the university in the form of
private investment, it had conversely channeled more students—primarily English sons of aristocrats—to attend its
courses. In normal circumstances, those sons would have been sent abroad for their education. Lacking the ability to
attend school in France, or in other parts of Napoleonic Europe, students saw Scotland as an ideal option for foreign
studies.
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Note that matriculation fees in Scotland were generally quite low, holding true to the longstanding Scottish tradition of
not excluding any able young man from pursuing higher education. However, due to the diversion of private investments
and donations from the university towards the anti-Napoleonic war effort through war-based investments, the
university doubled its matriculation fee in 1806, arguing that the 18th-century fee was "too small in present times for the
purchase of books to the Library." Nonetheless, given that a minority of students bothered to matriculate—choosing,
rather, to simply attend courses and not graduate formally—the increase did little to improve the living standards of
regular professors or their ability to expand their respective research facilities (Horn 1967, 101).
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Due to the continued financial stranglehold that the university and town council found themselves in, no new chairs in
any department were created between 1760 and 1862. Proposed chairs in Celtic Literature and Antiquities (1807),
Comparative Anatomy (1816), Intellectual Power (1823), and Political Economy (1825) were rejected. However, as
Morrell (1972) has pointed out, not all of the rejections were the result of a lack of funding alone. The patronage of a
new chair often threatened other professors, who relied—as has been mentioned—on student attendance to generate
fees as income. The rise of new chairs sometimes threatened the sustainability and profitability of other professor's
courses; thus, the chairs in Comparative Anatomy, Intellectual Power and Political Economy were all rejected by the
Senatus after vociferous professorial opposition (Morrell 1972, 47).
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matriculation and graduation, led to a series of highly critical and controversial accounts of
Edinburgh's higher educational system.76 One such account emerged in the Reverend Michael
Russel's View of the System of Education at Present Pursued in Schools and Universities of Scotland
(1813), in which the school master berated the teaching of varied new and modern topics (especially
in natural philosophy). He lobbied for a return to the curricular focus of Euclidean geometry,
Aristotelian logic and classical languages. Another criticism proffered by J.C. Lockhart, Sir Walter
Scott's son-in-law, in Peter's Letters to his Kinsfolk (1819), lambasted the lack of organized student
housing, and student codes of conduct, including the failure of the university to institute any sort of
dress code for classes or graduation ceremonies. Lockhart referred to the "slovenly and dirty mass"
of students who resulted in a "contaminating atmosphere" on campus. The critical author pointed
out that English fathers rarely sent their sons to college with less than £300 per annum in spending
money, while in Scotland, "Any young man who can afford to wear a decent coat, and live in a garret
upon porridge and herrings, may, if he pleases, come to Edinburgh, and pass through his academical
career, just as creditably as is expected or required" on less than £30 per annum. In 1825, The
Modern Athens (1825) followed up arguing the "Athenian university... has sunk to rise no more"
(Horn 1967, 116-117).77
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There was opportunity to be found in growing student demand for technical expertise, fuelled in part by the
government's need for military expertise during the Napoleonic era. Some professors simply started offering more
saleable course content, attracting thereby higher student numbers and pocketing increased income as a result. The
practice of marketing one's courses continued well after Napoleon had been sent to St Helena. Professors, such as James
Pillans (1778-1864), Professor of Humanity and Laws, and John Leslie (1766-1832), Professor of Mathematics, simply
rearranged their courses in order to offer supplementary classes. In 1822, for instance, Pillans created a third course in
humanities for his advanced students, while Leslie began to offer a course of "special physics" that he aimed at the
"general physical science" student, who wanted to complete a course in physics within three years. In 1826, William
Wallace (1768-1843) proposed replacing his own course in calculus with one that covered astronomy; he also proposed
introducing the potential subjects of geography, navigation, gunnery and fortifications to attract more students. Lastly,
Thomas Charles (1766-1844) introduced a popular laboratory course in Chemistry and Pharmacy, which was managed
and taught by an assistant (Horn 1967, 95-97). Thus, despite the financial constrains put on the university itself,
professors—who largely lived from their student attendance fees—began to reflect the demands of the military and civil
service by extending, altering and reshaping their course offerings. In addition, extra-mural teaching became the norm
for many faculties and departments, in particular in medicine, which students appealed to so as to bolster poor lecturing
elsewhere, and to gain knowledge not provided within university lectures. In a student's guide to the university, printed
in 1820, a catalogue of extra-mural lectures offered in Edinburgh was included; it ran to five pages, and included one or
more of the courses in all medical subjects normally taught at the university (Horn 1967, 109).
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Despite its apparently pathetic provision of university life and education—at least according to critics such as Russel and
Lockhart—student numbers actually increased throughout the first two decades of the 19th-century, resulting in a
record-setting 2,400 students by 1823. The university administration also aided the blossoming of its student body by
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Due to such publicized concerns over the status of the venerable Scottish institutions, the British
government launched a Royal Commission exploring the state of the Scottish universities. The
commission's creation was, in fact, precipitated by telling events—a public quarrel between town
council and professors at Tounis College (the university's medieval name, by which it was still then
referred) had erupted over authority and administrative control. The aim of the commissioners was
to downplay the role of the Scottish Kirk in shaping university policy and curricular content. They
also sought to insert, in the place of the church, a formal relationship between the university and the
Crown.78 That government-led initiative resulted in the 1826 Scottish Universities Commission,
established by Robert Peel, then Home Secretary.79 The commission produced a series of stipulations
that altered the nature of Scottish university degrees for the next four decades. For instance, the
Commissioner's final report, which emerged in 1831, stipulated that the universities of Scotland
specify the objectives of their respective degree requirements and offer a reformed course load in
order to better serve the prevalent social and economic needs of the country. The commissioners
also stipulated that universities in the North acquire new funding structures so as to avoid the sorts
of financial constraints and tugs-of-war that had hamstrung their operations in the past. One of the
key outcomes of the commissioners' report was the transference of authority in decision-making
allowing the production of various student-run magazines and publications. Many of those publications were short-lived
in nature, though they nonetheless provided a unifying force for a student body that had often only the local taverns as
locations for joint socializing and politicking. Student publications such as The Cheilead or University Coterie (1826-1827)
served as a platform upon which students could advocate for housing and new courses; those publications also served as
a medium through which student alumni could organize themselves. As one contributor to The Cheilead was keen to
argue, "There is not such a disjointed body of alumni in the whole world" as that to be found among Edinburgh alumni
(Horn 1967, 136). That was to change from the 1840s onwards, when it was Edinburgh's alumni that would begin to fund
the university's various new scholarship programs, student prizes and even new academic chairs.
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The commissioners claimed the Scottish universities "possess scarcely any ecclesiastical feature, except that they have a
certain number of professors for the purpose of teaching theology, in the same manner as other sciences are taught."
Horn (1967) claims this was an understatement, which ignored the statutory tests that had been imposed upon all
professors elected by the legislation governing the university since Queen Anne's reign. However, when the Presbytery
of Edinburgh did try to influence the choice of professor of mathematics in 1805 by enforcing the religious tests, the
Senatus responded by noting no professor over the past half century had been called upon to actually undertake the
tests. Thus, the Commission officially recognized what had de facto became the case already in Edinburgh—though
presumably an institution affiliated with and serving the Church of Scotland, most professors were not explicitly required
to follow particular church doctrine. The role of the church in determining professorial choices would become contested
again, however, with the Disruption in 1843.
79
Although Davie (1964) has contended this was the beginning of the end for the independent Scottish curriculum, other
historians have argued the main instigation for the commission came from a group of well-informed Scottish participants
who knew all too well about the struggles existent between the town councils and the Scottish universities—struggles
that had degraded and diminished the ability of the universities to produce independent research or even to offer
regular courses (Morrell 1972).
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away from the Town's Council to a University Court, composed of representatives from both the
professional and lay populations.80 One other important aspect of the commission was its focus on
the role of alumni in university affairs. The Commissioner granted alumni the automatic right to vote
for members of the new governing University Court. This latter move brought into the institutional
fold those generations of Edinburgh alumni who, in previous years, had had no reason to maintain a
continued interest in their alma mater. The increased engagement with graduates mobilized alumni
into lobby groups in later years, leading some to spearhead efforts for further reform to the
curriculum in the 1850s.81 When parliament effectively passed the Universities (Scotland) Act of
1858 (based on the 1831 Commissioners' report), certain other standardized aspects of higher
education, which had been missing in Scotland, and which had come to disadvantage Scottish
graduates, were enshrined legislatively. Although the open lecture-style of Edinburgh had long been
applauded for its liberalizing effect, the emergence of newly standardized tests for the British civil
service demonstrated a gap between the skills of Edinburgh graduates and those required at the civil
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Indeed, it was the parliamentarian Joseph Hume, radical M.P. for Aberdeen and Lord Rector of Marischal College who
first approached Peel in 1825 with regards to a setting up a Royal Commission. The protracted struggle between the
Town Council and the Senate in Edinburgh was well-known; the Council was composed largely of the university's
patrons, and it was responsible for the election of approximately two-thirds of the university's chairs, as well as overall
supervision of university affairs. As one observer of the times suggests, the members of that council "omnipotent,
corrupt, impenetrable ... Silent, powerful, submissive, mysterious, and irresponsible, they might have been sitting in
Venice" (Morrell 1972, 42). Certainly Peel was aware of a slew of other concerning problems. Hume made the case for
the efficient amalgamation of the two Aberdeen colleges, Marischal and King's College. Peel was aware that the
problematical Apothecaries Act (1815) had raised difficulties for medical graduates of Edinburgh and Glasgow who
wished to practice in England; he was aware that Edinburgh's Town Council seemed to favour, at the time, loyal Tories in
its election to chairs, rather than the most qualified candidate. A plethora of concerns coloured Peel's engagement with
the Scottish universities, which was a relationship he could not avoid as being Home Secretary meant he was, at the
same time, patron for the Regius chairs of Scottish universities (Morrell 1972, 41). In the end, it was a dispute over which
body had ultimate right to determine qualifications for graduation—the Town Council or the Senate—that led to the
Senate applying directly to Peel and George the IV for the establishment of a commission. Morrell's (1972) assessment
of the situation is that: "For these thirty-three men, mainly merchants and craftsmen, university patronage was merely
one of many activities: they were open to corruption, particularly when they were intellectually incapable of judging the
academic worth of candidates; and they enjoyed many opportunities for satisfying their personal and political interests."
This is not to say the Council was always incompetent in its election of chairs. The 18th-century had witnessed the
election of many individuals who would become eminent representatives of their field, including: Dugald Stewart
(mathematics, 1747-1772); John Playfair (mathematics, 1785-1805); and John Leslie (natural philosophy, 1819-1832)
(Morrell 1972, 43).
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At the time, a group of graduates formed the Association for the Improvement and Extension of the Scottish Universities.
Headquartered in Edinburgh and led by James Lorimer, later professor of Public Law, the group advocated for increased
parliamentary funding to provide the financial sustenance required to add new chairs of research to the universities. By
the 1850s, with industrialization in full bloom and the French Revolution and its war-based requirements a distant
memory, the push for expanded technical and specialist teaching fell on newly appreciative political ears. The
Association sought to mimic the examination tactic used in England, especially at Cambridge—i.e. the appointment of
external examiners—in order to bolster standards of examinations and ensure students were treated fairly by
disinterested professors.
184
service level. The 1858 Act institutionalized a recommendation made by the commissioners to offer
a more "regular and systematic course of study" in Arts for those students who aimed at an honours
degree and especially for those students who aimed at a professional career. The Act ensured that
repeat attendance in a regular course of study over "successive" years was required to qualify for a
graduating degree. In addition, competition motivated by new prizes and the attainment of
"academical honours" was rendered an objective for all upper-class students, especially for those
intending careers in the church or in law. Regular examination was stipulated as preceding the
award of a B.A. or M.A. degree, and examination for the M.A. degree could not follow sooner than
one year after the B.A. had been completed. Lastly, the Act decreed that examinations would be
carried out by examiners appointed by the Senatus, rather than the professors heading the subjects
being examined, so as to avoid subjectivity in grading (Horn 1967).
To some degree, the Act merely institutionalized practices that had informally come into existence in
Edinburgh throughout the intervening decades. For instance, in the 1830s, the Professor of Natural
Philosophy, James D. Forbes, siphoned from Cambridge's Tripos the technique of using written
questions as a form of examination in lieu of the oral style of examination that had long-dominated
Edinburgh's courses. Forbes, Kelland and others also adopted the practice—already rendered a
cultural norm in Cambridge—of using textbooks for the purposes of lecturing and examining
students. Though Hamilton (in philosophy) and Kelland (in mathematics) were both concerned about
an over-emphasis upon written questions (the answers to which could be memorized or deduced
from the texts ahead of time), by the end of the decade both had accepted and propagated the
norm of standardized testing. Students who wished to receive the degree of M.A. from the Faculty
of Arts had to complete three days of examination in Classics, Mathematics and Philosophy.
The 1858 Act also changed the financial structure of the university. In addition to mandating
matriculation and graduation fees, the Act's political inclusion of alumni in university governance
was a boon to the school's private funding. From 1860 onward, the university opened "a new
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chapter in its history, stripped of nearly all its old endowments, and now dependent financially upon
its fee income from various sources," including government grants, revenues from Leith harbour,
student fees and private endowments.82 One outcome of this increase in wealth was the rapid
creation of a slew of new chairs meant to bolster both the research outputs and academic appeal of
the university. Dr. John Muir founded the Sanskrit Chair in 1862; another private benefactor founded
the Chair of Engineering in 1868; Sir Roderick Muchison founded the Chair of Geology from his
private funds in 1871, and, in the same year, the Merchant Company founded the Chair in Political
Economy and Mercantile Law. The Trustees of the Reverend Dr. Andrew Bell later founded, both in
Edinburgh and St. Andrew's, Britain's first chairs in education in 1876. As an indication of how much
of a novelty all of this administrative and academic activity was, note that from 1582 to 1862 (a 280-
year period) only two new chairs had been created from private funds. By comparison, from 1862 to
1882 (a 20-year period), seven chairs had been funded with a total endowment figure of £58,000 in
private funds (Horn 1967, 186-188).
One issue not addressed by the commissioners was the establishment of a specific "science" degree.
The commissioners had believed there would be little long-term interest for such a degree. Yet, the
Great Exhibition of 1851 heightened fears across Britain that the country was again falling behind in
its technical and engineering superiority. In his 1859 speech as President of the BAAS, Prince Albert
stated,
We may be justified in hoping, however, that by the gradual diffusion of Science, and its
increasing recognition as a principal part of our national education, the public in general,
no less than the Legislature and the State, will more and more recognize the claims of
Science to their attention; so that it may no longer require the begging-box, but speak to
the State, like a favoured child to its parent, sure of his parental solicitude for its
welfare; that the State will recognize in Science one of its elements of strength and
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The Representation of the People (Scotland) Act of 1868 granted graduates of Scottish universities a vote in determining
who would be the parliamentary representative of their respective universities. This newly granted parliamentary vote
added to the inducements to graduate, thus increasing revenue from graduation fees. Meanwhile, in 1864, Dr John
Muir, who founded the Chair of Sanskrit, also formed the Association for the Better Endowment of the University of
Edinburgh. The combination of increased privileges—both professional and political—associated with graduation and
the marketing efforts of Muir's Association led to a windfall in private endowments, such as the 1879 endowment
donated by Dr. Vans Dunlop, which was sufficient for 18 £100 scholarship for three years running (nine in Arts, eight in
Medicine, and one in Law) (Horn 1967, 186).
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prosperity, to foster which the clearest dictates of self-interest demand (Morrell 1973,
356).
After being appointed to the chair of natural philosophy in Edinburgh in 1860, Tait soon rectified the
omission of a science degree. Four years after his arrival, the university bowed to Tait's consistent
lobbying for the establishment of an experimental laboratory (similar to the one he had worked in at
Belfast). The Senatus then introduced the degrees of Bachelor and Doctor of Science, both of which
could now be taken in mathematics and science (Horn 1967, 179).
Tait in Edinburgh (1860-1880)
The chair of natural philosophy at the University of Edinburgh had become vacant in 1860, when
James Forbes retired from the position. Competing against a list of candidates that included Maxwell
(then at Marischal College) and Routh (a rising "coach" from Peterhouse College), Tait succeeded in
part due to his apparent lecturing abilities. As the Courant of Edinburgh reported at the time,
It will be no disrespect to the warmest friends of the successful candidate, and we do
not mean to dispute the decision of the curators, by saying, that in Professor Maxwell
the curators would have had the opportunity of associating with the University one who
is already acknowledged to be one of the remarkable men known to the scientific world.
His original investigations on the nature of colours, on the mechanical condition of
stability of Saturn's Rings, and many similar subjects, have well established his name
among scientific men; while the almost intuitive accuracy of his ideas would give his
connection with a chair of natural philosophy one advantage, namely, that of a sure and
valuable guide to those who came with partial knowledge requiring direction and
precision. But there is another power which is desirable in a professor of a University
with a system like ours, and that is, the power of oral exposition proceeding upon the
supposition of a previous imperfect knowledge, or even total ignorance, of the study on
the part of pupils. We little doubt that it was the deficiency of this power in Professor
Maxwell principally that made the curators prefer Mr. Tait...We have never heard Mr
Tait lecture, but we should augur from all we can learn that he will have great powers of
impressing and instructing an audience such as his class will consist of, combined with
that conscientious industry which is so necessary in a successful professor (Knott 1911,
16-17).
What is revealing about the Courant account is that the competition for the post was one fought,
primarily, between two Scots: Maxwell and Tait. The Courant ignores entirely the other candidate,
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and Englishman, Edward Routh. One can, therefore, imagine that a factor much more important
than Tait's lecturing ability helped him to succeed in his effort to gain the chair—namely, his Scots
ethnicity.83
That is not to say that Tait lacked in particularly useful lecturing qualities. On the contrary, as one of
his students, J.M. Barrie, recounted in vivid and romantic overtones in An Edinburgh Eleven: Pencil
Portraits from College Life (1894):
Never, I think, can there have been a more superb demonstrator. I have his burly figure
before me. The small twinkling eyes had a fascinating gleam in them; he could
concentrate them until they held the object looked at; when they flashed round the
room he seemed to have drawn a rapier. I have seen a man fall back in alarm under
Tait's eyes, though there were a dozen Benches between them. These eyes could be
merry as a boy's, though, as when he turned a tube of water on students who would
insist on crowding too near an experiment, for Tait's was the humour of high spirits
(Barrie 1894, 46-47).
Tait was apt to calling himself a "lecturing machine" whose aim it was to instruct the youth of the
country in "the common sense view of the universe we live in" (Knott 1911, 18).84
In terms of content, his lectures remained largely untouched from 1860 to 1881, except for the
addition of supplemental material from his own publications throughout that period.85 Typically, Tait
dwelt on the "properties of matter" as an introduction to his natural philosophy courses-
properties, he argued, that constituted the foundations upon which a more detailed study of
experimental natural philosophy could take place. Tait also spent the first few days of his course
talking about "means by which we gain knowledge of the physical universe." As his biographer later
recounted:
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Kelland had, in fact, been the only non-Scot, English-trained academic to be appointed to a post in the University of
Edinburgh by the time Tait joined the institution's faculty.
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Among his students, Knott (1911) identifies three groups: the first group included those students who simply pursued an
ordinary degree, and for whom Tait served as little more than a natural philosophy lecturer; the second group included
those students who gained intimate knowledge of Tait through the Advanced Classes and optional laboratory course;
the third group included those students who served as Tait's personal laboratory assistants.
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Tait's lectures notes were mostly just "jottings of headings with the experiments indicated and important numerical
values interspersed." In his original notebook, "which was still in use in 1881, these headings were entered with
intervening spaces so as to allow for additions as time went on." In 1881, Tait rewrote his notes into a "smaller octavo
book" which he used until he stopped lecturing (Knott 1911, 19).
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The conceptions of time and space, and the realities known as matter and energy, were
introduced and placed in their right setting from the physical standpoint. These
preliminaries disposed of, Tait began his systematic lectures on the properties of matter.
His aim was to build a truly philosophical body of connected truths upon the familiar
experiences of the race. In ordered sequence the various obvious properties of matter
were considered, first, in themselves, then in their theoretical setting and their practical
applications. Thus, to take but one example, the discussion of the divisibility of matter
led to the consideration of mechanical sub-division and of the elementary principles of
the diffraction and interference of light, illustrated by colours of soap films, halos and
supernumerary rainbows. The fuller explanation of these was, however, reserved for a
later date when the laws of physical optics were taken up in more detail. In this way the
intelligent student was able during the first two months to gain a general outlook upon
physical science. The nature of the course may be inferred from the contents of his book
The Properties of Matter; but no written page could teach like the living voice of the
master (Knott 1911, 20).
Tait lectured on the "properties of matter" for three hours a week, and he devoted two days a week
to dynamics. Having "disposed" of the "properties of matter," Tait then turned to the subjects of
"heat, sound, light and electricity." With regards to sound, light and electricity, however, Tait had
only a few "systematic notes of geometrical optics but none on physical optics or electricity," while
the "properties of matter" occupied more and more of the finite number of weeks in each session,
as Tait included more elaborate experiments on the matter of atoms, the ether and vortex tubes
(Knott 1911, 20).
Despite Tait's status as a natural philosopher and an experimentalist, his philosophical outlook was
not that of the Baconian sort. On the contrary, he emphasized the lack of certainty and the
"untrustworthiness" of the senses, urging students to "illuminate the dark places with the light of
reason, with the search light of scientific imagination" (Knott 1911, 20). Tait believed in a rationalist
approach to knowledge, where natural law emerges and manifests itself in partially perceived
physical phenomena. Tait's epistemological stance reflects his inculcation into that hybrid Lockean
school of empiricism/rationalism that had provided the symbolical algebraists of the early century
with justifications for their methods. For Tait, as for his predecessing colleagues, knowledge is
gained through a process of abstraction. However, set within the natural philosophical and religious
terrains of Scotland, that meant that experimental knowledge provided particular and temporal case
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studies from which the natural philosopher could abstract universal relations—relations indicative of
God's ordered universe. Tait held that universal equivalences in symbolical analysis were not
enough; ultimate truth can only be accessed by applying mathematical equivalences to experimental
knowledge in order to abstract physical relations and natural laws.
The degree to which experimental manifestations of particular natural philosophical concepts
constituted crucial aspects of Tait's daily life as a lecturer in Edinburgh is demonstrated in Tait's
recollection of the first lecture he delivered to students on November 5th, 1860. Tait recalls,
fancying that a dry technical lecture to commence with might perhaps keep off rather
than attract amateur students, I gave a set of experiments—the most striking I could
muster—professedly without any explanation—in fact gave them as examples of the
objects of Nat. Phil...I gave a 20 m[inute] lecture on the study, and the arrangements for
the present session, and then plunged into the paradoxes. I reserved as the last the
beautiful one of balls and egg shells suspended on a vertical jet of water, as they cannot
be shown without some risk of a wetting to the performer and the nearest of the
audience. Tomorrow I bring into play the large American induction coil, and show the
rotation of a stream of violet light in vacuo round a straight electromagnet. I shall also
show an inch spark in air ... and the discharge by it about 10 times per second of a jar
with about 2 square feet of tin foil. There is no self acting break—for safety the
interruption is made by a toothed wheel worked by hand—which for short experiments
is much preferable. I shall also show the huge Coin magnet (made under Plucker's
direction) which took six of us to heave it up a gently inclined plane into the class room
this afternoon (Knott 1911, 23).
Thus, Tait's lectures included mathematical applications that reflected both his years of training in
analysis and his newly developing natural philosophical interests. Fourier analysis, Green's Theorem,
and the "theory of strains" which, as Knott recounts, "was, indeed, a subject peculiarly his own,
[where] many of his demonstrations, although given in ordinary Cartesian coordinates, were
suggested by the quaternion mode of attack," played prominent roles in Tait's courses (Knott 1911,
22). From 1868 onwards, Tait also had access to the Physical Laboratory.86 The young professor thus
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During his initial years at Edinburgh, Tait often wrote to his friend and former colleague, Thomas Andrews in Belfast,
recounting his experimental approach to natural philosophy at his new university. In many of those letters, Tait
expressed his appreciation for Andrews' experimental methods and training. He also wrote to tell Andrews about his
ongoing experiments. On January 29, 1861, Tait wrote: "My dear Andrews, I would have written to you sooner, had not
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offered voluntary courses in experimental natural philosophy. Although the material covered therein
was not examined for the ordinary degree at Edinburgh, Tait trained students in the methods of
experimentalism that he had absorbed during his years of work in Andrews's laboratory.87
Tait's quaternions, 1860-1870
Working within this environment of Edinburgh's standardized curricular demands, Tait produced
four more journal articles on quaternions in 1862, 1863, 1868, and 1870, respectively, as well as an
"introductory" textbook entitled Elementary Treatise on Quaternions (1867). All of those
publications, except for one, were written before Tait opened his experimental laboratory in 1868.
Tait's focus on quaternions in the first half of the 1860s was, in part, motivated by a continuing lack
of experimental space within which he could carry out his own thermodynamical research, even
though he had become a part of the northern group of natural philosophers then working on the
"science of energy" (a group that included Thomson, Joule and Rankin among others). And although
Edinburgh's financial fortunes were set to improve, given the imposition of the 1858 Act and its
revenue-generating recommendations, the first large private endowments did not start to flow into
university coffers until the late-1860s. Thus, given Tait's lowly paycheque and the substandard salary
he and other professors at the university still received, his 1867 quaternion textbook constituted an
important income-generating opportunity. There was a lucrative aspect to quaternion maths in
my hands been full of the January Examinations, and some experiments which Principal Forbes asked me to make ... In a
paper which is I believe to appear in the Phil. Mag. for February, and which was read some weeks ago at the R.S.E., he
states that few people living have ever seen Ampere's experiments for the repulsion of a current on itself—and that he
had never succeeded in getting it. At his request I tried it, and succeeded with a single cell of Grove's battery. With
twelve cells the floating wire almost jumped out of the trough! As there is some slight objection to this form of the
experiment on account of the thermoelectric effects which occur at every change of metal in the circuit, I devised a
floating conductor of glass tube full of mercury to replace the copper wire. The mercury is so much worse a conductor
than copper that it required four cells to give a good effect" (Knott 1911, 67). And at the end of that year, he wrote to
Andrews to say: "I find that i cannot manage to visit Belfast at present—my simple reason is that I am to bring home
from Glasgow (where I am going to stay a day with Thomson) two galvanometers and an electrometer on Saturday
next—and I must have one galvanometer and electrometer fitted up during the holidays, as I shall just have reached the
critical point of Radiant heat when we stop. The new galvanometer works by reflexion, and can therefore be easily
shown to a large class, which was impossible with needle ones—besides it is delicate enough to show an effect even by
frog-currents..." (Knott 1911, 67).
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Tait charged an initial fee of two guineas for students wishing to use the laboratory in the first winter session, after
which time no further fees were issued even if the student continued to work in the laboratory throughout the year.
Those students who returned to the laboratory courses after the first session were nicknamed "veterans"; Tait used the
"veterans" as experimental assistants in the same way he had served Andrews in Belfast. Knott himself was one of those
"veterans", having served in the laboratory from the late-1870s to early 1880s.
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Scotland. Tait aimed to lecture on the matter using his own textbooks in his advanced courses, while
his sympathetic colleague, and later co-author, the Cambridge-trained Philip Kelland, taught the
topic as part of his mathematical courses in analysis. Driven thus by the combined needs of
publishing within professional journals and generating supplemental income, Tait continued his
research into quaternions by more explicitly morphing them into tools for use in natural philosophy.
Indeed, Tait's papers of 1862 and 1863 diverged significantly in tone from those he had produced in
the late-1850s. In his later papers, Tait specifically identified quaternions as natural philosophical
tools, rather than as symbolical analytical tools. For example, in his "Formulae Connected with Small
Continuous Displacements of the Particles of a Medium," published in the Proceedings of the Royal
Society of Edinburgh88 on April 4th, 1862, Tait first promised "on a future occasion to give large
further developments especially bearing on physics" (Tait 1898, 37). The natural philosopher went
on to use quaternion calculus to discuss the equation of "one of a system of surfaces," symbolized
by Fp = C, where the differential of the equation is S.vdp — 0, and where "v is a vector
perpendicular to the surface, and its length is inversely proportional to the normal distance between
two consecutive surfaces," and dp is a tangent vector to the surface (which is perpendicular to v),
and 5 is a scalar value. If the surface is equipotential or isothermal, then -v represents the direction
and magnitude of the force or vector-gradient of temperature at any point on that surface. Tait




which, according to the rules of quaternion algebra, gives
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Given Tait's lack of status as a fellow of the Royal Society of London, he was not likely to publish in that venerable
institution's journal. His association with the Royal Society of Edinburgh was useful in that it provided a vehicle for his
quaternion publications. Yet, given the niche nature of quaternion mathematics, it is also likely the Proceedings of the
Royal Society of Edinburgh constituted the only journal that would have published Tait's quaternion researches.
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The result of this operator is to transform the equation for the system of surfaces mentioned above
into v, a vector perpendicular to the surface. As Tait put it,
It follows that the effect of the vector operator V, upon any scalar function of the vector
of a point, is to produce the vector which represents in magnitude and direction the most
rapid change in the value of the function (Tait 1898, 38).
In his paper, Tait used the "nabla" operator to consider the quaternion expression for a variety of
small (i.e. infinitesimal) particle displacements on various surfaces, including the surfaces of spheres
and spheroids.
In his 1863 paper, Tait pushed even further in his natural philosophical musings, saying that his aim
was to give his reader an "idea of the nature of the physical applications of quaternions." That paper
demonstrates that the "quaternion operator" (referred to earlier using Hamilton's terminology of
"vector operator") can cause "many interesting and important transformations" on any vector,
where the vector of any point can be denoted by p = ix + jy + kz. Tait demonstrates the
symbolical transformation of a "simple example," as well as "more complex functions," to argue the
application of the quaternion operator to both vectors and to quaternions results in rotations and
distortions of the original vectors and quaternions. One solution to Vq = a, where q and a are
quaternions, is q — Sfp + Vep + (pp, meaning that a quaternion that is operated upon by the
"quaternion operator" produces yet another quaternion. Such transformations "present no
difficulty" in the symbolical sense—they are due to the algebraic rules governing quaternion
mathematics. Tait's focus is, therefore, on "the ready applicability to physical questions of one or
two of those [quaternion transformations]," which he says is "a property of great importance, as it
may now be asserted that the next grand extensions of mathematical physics will, in all likelihood,
be furnished by quaternions" (Tait 1898, 45).
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As a first example, Tait looks at a as the vector-displacement of a point in a homogeneous elastic
solid. If we use p to represent the pressure produced, then we find that the pressure "p" can be
represented quaternionically as p = kSVa. This means the pressure produced in a homogeneous
elastic solid is equivalent to some constant "k", which depends upon the compressibility of the solid.
When k = 0, then pressure is also zero. Otherwise put, SVa = 0, where the scalar value "S" of the
quaternion and the transformed quaternion, a, are operated upon by "nabla" (Tait 1898, 45). Tait
interprets this finding "physically" by citing Thomson's previous claim in the Cambridge and Dublin
Mathematical Journal, that "The forces produced by given distributions of matter, electricity,
magnetism, or galvanic currents, can be represented at every point by displacements of such a solid
producible by external forces" (Tait 1898, 45). Tait presents this finding of Thomson's in "quaternion
form" so as to "show the insight gained by the simplicity of the [quaternion] method." He concludes,
we can represent the "vector-force exerted by one particle of matter or free electricity on another"
as being a — (where "T" refers to the tensor part of the quaternion being deploy.
Tait also considers the case of a small closed current to determine the comparative effect of a free
particle or element of current versus a closed current or magnet. The quaternion presentation of
these problems indicates the "effect of an element of a current on a magnetic particle is expressed
directly by the displacement, while that of a small closed current or magnet is represented by the
vector-axis of the rotation caused by the displacement" (Tait 1898, 46). In Tait's mind, quaternion
mathematics allows for the better visualization of what is going on at the microscopic level in nature.
Because a quaternion can represent both magnitude and rotational displacement, its use allows for
easier comparisons between phenomena—some of which may involve magnitude displacements,
others of which many involve rotational displacements, and others of which may involve both
magnitude changes and rotational displacements at the same time. All of this understanding is
compacted into fewer symbols in quaternion accounts (as compared to Cartesian accounts), Tait
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claims, thereby allowing for greater efficiency in mathematical thought and improved physical
understanding.
The "science ofenergy," 1850-1870
In 1845, William Thomson struggled to determine the total force of attraction between two
oppositely charged spherical conductors. This complicated conundrum had stumped various
practitioners before him. Thomson's solution occupied only three lines of analysis (Wise 1989). His
solution was the combined product of his training in Cambridge-style analysis, which had
familiarized him with the notion of converging series, and his belief in the normative metaphors of
"work" and "efficiency". Those latter terms served as organizing metaphors in political economy,
social affairs, and scientific theories in Scotland. For example, Thomson's solution to the spherical
conductors problem ultimately showed that the "ponderomotive force"—or the total force of
attraction—between two spheres charged by a battery that maintains a potential difference (I/)
between them can be represented as the "total tendency of the system to minimize its work
content" (Wise 1989, 264).
The belief in the virtues of minimizing work in physical systems was a notion already existent in
diverse forms within the northern world of steam engine manufacturing. For Thomson,
"Work" was not an abstract concept, nor merely the capacity of an engine; it was a
motivation, a goal of action, the source of value and progress in the modern world, both
material and moral. 'Waste' was its opposite, the source of decadence (Wise 1989, 265).
This opposition of "work" and "waste" was not peculiar to industrializing Scotland, either, although it
found its greatest expression there. "Work" and "waste" were products of previous Enlightenment
efforts in revolutionary France, where the working poor had opposed the wasteful actions of the
ruling aristocratic classes. In mathematical circles, the efficient work produced by alegebraic
techniques, as espoused by Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, served as a means of eliminating useless
and wasteful mathematical procedures. Intellectual "work" was opposed to intellectual lethargy. The
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principles of "balance" and "equilibrium" entered in the metaphor of a "lever". For Condillac,
analysis was like a "lever of the mind." To think is to "weigh, balance, compare" (Wise 1989, 271).
Thus, balanced equations, such as x — 1 = y + 1, and x + 1 = 2y — 2, allowed for the
determination of solutions of unknowns, by balancing known constants with unknown variables in a
system of equations. The early British algebraists adopted these Enlightenment metaphors,
advocating for the efficiency of the symbolical approach. Universal relationships—or balanced
identities—could be determined using succinct and productive methods, as opposed to relying upon
the wasteful and inefficient methods of geometry.
Through his Cambridge training, as well his upbringing within the Scottish industrializing north where
his father had advocated for the development of industrially-applied mechanisms in the engineering
sciences, Thomson had become steeped in the metaphoric language of "work," "equilibrium" (or
balance) and "efficiency". The fact his scientific outputs and mathematical analyses reflected this
language indicates it was more than mere imagery for the scientist. "Work," "efficiency" and
"balance" were ontological characteristics of the world. From the early 1850s, Thomson, along with
his colleague in engineering, Macquorn Rankine (1820-1872), introduced the terms "actual energy"
and "potential energy"—offering, thereby, an equation for balanced energy distribution in the
universe. Along with the Mancunian experimentalist, James Prescott Joules (1818-1889), Maxwell
and Fleeming Jenkin (1833-1885), Thomson constructed a "science of energy" through the re-
interpretation of works already written on heat and heat transfer by the French military engineer,
Sadi Carnot (1796-1832), and his publicist, Emile Clapeyron (1799-1864), as well as Rudolph Clausius
(1822-1888). He also used his own and Joule's experimental findings. Thomson (later with Tait)
became enmeshed in the construction of a science of "thermodynamics" based upon evaluations of
"heat loss," "work done" and "efficiency" gained in material engines.
The phrase "science of energy" first found the light of day in Rankine's 1855 paper, entitled
"Outlines of the Science of Energetics," delivered to the Glasgow Philosophical Society. Rankine had
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called for the fuller establishment of a science "whose subjects are material bodies and physical
phenomena in general." In 1857, Maxwell then drafted a paper, revealingly entitled "Sketch of an
Introduction to the Higher parts of Mechanics, being the Science of Energy as it relates to the
Motion and Rest of a Single Particle, of Two Particles or a system of Particles, this system being
either of invariable form, elastic or fluid." The phrase "science of energy" only really gained
widespread public recognition, however, in the 1860s, when Tait and Thomson jointly published
their Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867), and when Tait followed up with his Sketch of
Thermodynamics (1868).
The "science of energy," as expressed by Rankine, Maxwell, Thomson and Tait presented a world
that was no longer governed by action-at-a-distance "forces". Nor was it governed by discrete
particles moving through massive voids. Rather, the physical phenomena of the universe were to be
explained in terms of a continuous matter—an ether—that possessed "potential energy", the
transference of which into "kinetic energy" results in a unidirectional dissipation in the total stock of
the universe's usable energy over time. In addition to offering a "balanced" account of energy
distribution, this northern account was also situated within the Presbyterian terrain of universal
degradation and moral obligation. The Presbyterian universe had been set into motion by God. It
was governed by basic laws (in so far as God followed his own rules) and the "energy" inherent in it
existed by the grace of divine power. The Day of Judgment is embodied in the form of the dissipation
of useful or "potential" energy. In other words, the total "energy" of the universe remains constant
and the amount of "potential" energy is in steady decline. The universe is irrevocably losing
"potential" energy, and thus becoming less useful and less inhabitable for humans as time
progresses.
The upshot of this physical theory was moral in nature. The northern scientists viewed it as a moral
duty to conserve energy, as "energy" it is only temporally available. Wasteful work was deemed
immoral, and wasteful mathematics was an insult to the divine order that God put into place. It
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became the normative duty of natural philosophers to determine the best means of conserving
energy and preventing the inevitable dissipation. Tait's engagement with this unidirectional "science
of energy", and the network of metaphorical artifacts it possessed, helps to explain, in part, why he
continued to engage with quaternions following Hamilton's death in 1865, despite the fact
Hamilton's Elements of Quaternions (1866) had been poorly received, and despite the fact Thomson
famously refused to allow Tait to use quaternions in their joint Treatise (as Thomson claimed there
was no demonstrable benefit to the technique). From Tait's perspective, quaternions were less
wasteful, more efficient, and, thus, more moral in nature (for more details related to the "science of
energy," see Appendix Three; for an account of Tait's revised Treatise on the Dynamics of a Particle
(1865), see Appendix Four).
An Elementary Treatise on Quaternions (1867)
Recall that Hamilton had insisted upon Tait delaying his Elementary Treatise on Quaternions until
after the former had published his own revised account of quaternion mathematics. Hamilton's text
did eventually emerge in 1866, a year after his death. As far as can be gleaned from Tait's obituary
account of the Irish mathematician, Tait showed no sign of regret or annoyance at the fact he had
had to delay his own quaternion textbook due to Hamilton's stringent stipulations. Rather, he lauded
Hamilton as a "genius" whose name will "undoubtedly be classed with those of the grandest of all
ages and countries, such as Lagrange and Newton" (Tait 1866, 37). Perhaps such praise is not
surprising given that an obituary is not the place to lambast one's former (and now deceased)
colleague. Nonetheless, by the mid-1860s, Tait had diverged from his Irish colleague and
correspondent in important ways. Rather than viewing new symbolical systems as justified in and of
themselves, he had begun to relegate symbolical mathematics to second-class status vis-a-vis
natural philosophical knowledge. Tait had become a "natural philosopher, using mathematics for the
elucidation of what might be called the metaphysics of molecular actions." In addition, Tait's
"abhorrence of long and intricate mathematical operations is strongly expressed more than once"
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(Knott 1911, 113). Thus, one of the motivations powering Tait's continued pursuance of quaternion
mathematics was its perceived ability to short-cut mathematical computations, thereby allowing for
greater efficiency in the pursuit of, what had become, the overarching science of Tait's career-
namely, thermodynamics.
The first edition of the Elementary Treatise was published in 1867; the second edition in 1873; the
third, with significant changes due to Tait's interaction with Cayley, was published in 1890. It is the
first two of these editions that concerns us here. Tait uses the first edition of the Treatise to highlight
the simplicity and efficacy of quaternions, and also their applicability to experimental findings. This
latter emphasis is clear in the examples he uses as "problems" in the text. Note the Elementary
Treatise still embodies the Cambridge-inspired symbolical algebraic philosophy in its algebraic
manipulations; however, the approach is now delivered upon a terrain deeply contoured by the
northern science of energy. Tait, for instance, demonstrates in Chapter V an idiosyncratic approach
to quaternions in his discussion of the solution of equations (an approach not adopted previously by
Hamilton). Tait expounds upon his view that the linear vector function can be used in accounts of
"strain". Tait had considered "strains" in fine detail the Treatise on Natural Philosophy, also
published in 1867. But whereas the consideration of the malleability and flexibility of a surface
occupies a series of pages in Thomson and Tait's textbook, Tait deals with it in the matter of a few
lines of quaternion analysis in his Elementary Treatise on Quaternions. Tait does defer to Hamilton,
but he adds "I have not servilely followed even so great a master, although dealing with a subject
which is entirely his own" (Tait 1867, vi).
In the Preface, Tait warns his reader that the text is being published years after his "best" quaternion
work had been carried out, by which he was presumably referring to his years of correspondence
with Hamilton. Due to Hamilton's request to delay his publication, as well as the new duties Tait had
encountered within the domain of responsibilities bearing upon him as natural philosophy professor
in Edinburgh, it had been years since Tait had engaged with quaternion analysis in as flurried a
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manner as he did in the late-1850s. The natural philosophy professor emphasizes the current text
was also finalized and polished off at the same time that he and Thomson were heavily engaged in
writing their Treatise—a text in which the economy and efficiency of nature, as manifest in the
conservation and dissipation of energy, are central themes. It is not surprising to find, therefore, an
emphasis on the economy of quaternion techniques in the present text. The notion of "efficient",
non-wasteful work had already been present in Tait's earlier publications. He, as with many young
Presbyterians and other northern religious actors, had been influenced by the theological notion of
the universe's demise and the human duty to effectively and efficiently steward God's resources. In
1867, those claims emerged distinctly. Tait writes the examples chosen for the present text,
"though not specially chosen so as to display the full merits of Quaternions, will yet sufficiently show
their admirable simplicity and naturalness."
In an important divergence from Hamilton, Tait says he has also kept in view "as the great end of
every mathematical method," the physical applications of quaternions. In addition, he treats the
subject of quaternions "as much as possible" from a geometrical, instead of an analytical, point of
view. It is possible to premise the properties of i,j,k, and then to construct from them the whole
system "just as Hamilton himself dealt with Couples, Triads, and Sets." Although this method "may
be interesting to the pure analyst... it is repulsive to the physical students, who should be led to look
upon i,j, k from the very first as geometric realities, not as algebraic imaginaries" (Tait 1867, vii-viii).
Thus, Tait sets out his textbook as an exegesis on the geometrical nature of quaternion mathematics.
Notably, this later claim is mostly a pedagogical one. As we will see, Tait's presentation of
quaternions is still driven by symbolical algebra, rather than geometrical induction. He presents the
claim—in line with the late-Peacockian and De Morgian doctrine—that geometrical and physical
interpretation is possible and desirable within symbolical analysis, but the geometrical "proofs" he
offers remain heuristic, rather than foundational.
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Indeed, despite Tait's stated intentions to move away from pure analysis, he notes the most
important aspect to grasp with regards to quaternions is their non-commutative nature in
multiplication. Tait writes,
The most striking peculiarity of the Calculus is that multiplication is not generally
commutative, i.e. that qr is in general different from rq, r and q being quaternions. Still it
is to be remarked that something similar is true, in the ordinary coordinate methods, of
operator and functions: and therefore the students is not wholly unprepared to meet it.
No one is puzzled by the fact that log. cos. x is not equal to cos. log. x, or that is
not equal to —Jy. Sometimes, indeed, this rule is most absurdly violated, for it is usual
ax v
to take cos2x as equal to (cosx)2, while cos~1x is not equal to (cosx)-1. No such
incongruities appear in Quaternions; but what is true of operators and functions in other
methods, that they are not generally commutative, is in Quaternions true in the
multiplication of (vector) coordinates (Tait 1867, viii).
Tait's tricky language deploys the claim that the commutative principle is akin to a problem in the
order of operations, such that abandoning the commutative principle is the equivalent of simply
assuming a new order of operations. Tait uses this to rhetorical effect. His underlying suggestion is
that symbols in themselves hold no weight. The meaning of the operation is not to be located in the
constituent symbols or in their ordered presentation; rather, it is to be found in the physical
interpretation wrung out of the operation. More to the point, in Tait's mind, certain physical
phenomena can be represented by non-commutative operations. This justifies the existence of a
symbolical operation that might, otherwise, seem out of place in the more traditional cannon of
mathematical rules.
As for the place of quaternions in the grander history of Cartesian geometry, Tait makes clear the
former system is superior. He writes,
It must always be remembered that Cartesian methods are mere particular cases of
Quaternions, where most of the distinctive features have disappeared; and that when,
in the treatment of any particular question, scalars have to be adopted, the Quaternion
solution becomes identical with the Cartesian one. Nothing therefore is ever lost,
though much is generally gained, by employing Quaternions in preference to ordinary
methods. In fact, even when Quaternions degrade to scalars, they give the solution of
the most general statement of the problem they are applied to, quite independent of
any limitations as to choice of particular coordinate axes (Tait 1867, viii-ix).
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Tait adds that in
seeking to supply a real want (the deficiency of subjects of examination for
mathematical honours, and the consequent frequent introduction of the wildest
extravagance in the shape of data for [Tripos] "Problems"), [there] is [a] danger of
making too much of such elegant trifles as Trilinear Coordinates, while gigantic systems
like Invariants (which, by the way, are as easily introduced into Quaternions as into
Cartesian methods) are quite beyond the amount of mathematics which even the best
students can master in three years' reading. One grand step to the supply of this want is,
of course, the introduction into the scheme of examination of such branches of
mathematical physics as the Theories of Heat and Electricity. But it appears to me that
the study of a mathematical method like Quaternions, which, while of immense power
and comprehensiveness, is of extraordinary simplicity, and yet requires constant
thought in its applications, would also be of great benefit. With it there can be no "shut
your eyes, and write down your equations," for mere mechanical dexterity of analysis is
certain to lead at once to error on account of the novelty of the processes employed
(Tait 1867, ix).
And although quaternions are "novel," they are rooted in a long-running and venerable tradition
related to V—T.
In Chapter I of the Elementary Treatise, Tait introduces the issue of the meaning of V—1. Still
ambiguous and still considered by some mathematicians to be unjustified, Tait argues it is important
to provide a history of that interesting symbol, and its related functions, so as to demonstrate the
undeniable use of extending the imaginary system. Tait writes,
For more than a century and a half the geometrical representation of the negative and
imaginary algebraic quantities, -1 and V—T, or, as some prefer to write them, — and
—1/2, has been a favourite subject of speculation with mathematicians. The essence of
almost all of the proposed processes consists in employing such quantities to indicate
the direction, not the length, of lines (Tait 1867, 1).
It had become routine, by the 17th-century, to support the notion that if "positive quantities were
measured off in one direction along a fixed line, a useful and lawful convention enabled us to
express negative quantities by simply laying them off on the same line in the opposite direction."
This is the essence of the "Cartesian method" as it is employed in "Analytical Geometry and Applied
Mathematics." By the end of the 17th-century, Wallis had developed the Cartesian argument further,
adding that one could "represent the impossible roots of a quadratic equation by going out of the
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line on which, if real, they would have laid off." This is equivalent to considering V—1 to be a
"directed unit-line perpendicular to that on which real quantities are measured" (Tait 1867,1-2).
Over the course of the following 24 pages, Tait narrates an uncontested history in which quaternions
emerge out of two centuries of devoted mathematical work aimed at developing Wallis's claim. In
many ways, Tait builds upon Hamilton's similar claims, as issued in the latter's preface to the
Lectures (1853). Firstly, he accounts for how it is that in a plane of two dimensions (where
rectangular axes are used), each unit of length along Oy, can be considered to be +V~ 1. Conversely,
on Oy', each unit length can be —V—I. Meanwhile, Ox becomes a unit of +1 and Ox' becomes —1.
In circular order, the four lines of unit length stated in "positive rotation" (i.e. counter-clockwise) are
1, V—1, —1, —V—1. Secondly, Tait notes that in this series, each term is determined by the
multiplication the preceding term and V—1- Therefore, v—T can also be viewed as an "operator"—
something that acts upon a quantity or position to produce another quantity or position. This
operator is "analogous to a handle perpendicular to the plane of xy, whose effect on any line is to
make it rotate (positively) about the origin through an angle of 90°" (Tait 1867, 2). In this system, a
point is defined by a single expression—an "imaginary expression" such as a + byf—T. This
expression can be considered a single quantity, which denotes the point whose coordinates are a
and b. Alternatively, it can be an expression for the line that joins the point with the origin. In the
latter sense, the expression a + £>V—-T contains a measure of "direction" and "length" for the line
in question, where the line is inclined at an angle tan-1 - to the axis x (a runs along the x-axis, while
the real quantity b runs along the y-axis).89
In his historical narration, Tait contends De Moivre (whose name is now linked now to "De Moivre's
Theorem") led "us still farther in the same direction." Rather than using V—1, De Moivre employed
89
If one were to use V—1 to operate on this symbol, the resulting outcome would be —b + aV—1, which denotes the
point whose x and y coordinates are - b and a; it also denotes the line that joins that point with the origin. The length of
such a line would still be Va2 + b2, but the angle between the line and the x —axis would now be tan-1 — p which is 90:
greater than before (Tait 1867, 2).
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the more general cos a + V^Tsina, which has the effect of turning any line through a positive
angle a in the plane of x,y. Using this approach, the operator V—1 is considered to be a special case
of the more general operator above (when a — |). Algebraic multiplication can demonstrate:
(cos a + V—1 sin a )(a + bV—l) = a cos a — b sin a + V—l(a sin a + b cos a).
This identity contains within it a number of useful interpretations, Tait explains. "The reader will at
once see that the new form indicates that a rotation through an angle a has taken place, if he
compares it with the common formulae for turning the coordinate axes through a given angle," he
writes. In symbolical terms:
Length = -J(a cos a — b sin a)2 + (a sin a + b cos a)2
— Va2 + b2 as before.
b
a sin a + b cos a tan a + 77
Inclination to axis of x = tan = tan r
a cos a — b sin a i o1 — tan a
a
-l b
= a + tan —.
a
The student can thus anticipate the structure of quaternions by recognizing a quaternion can be
represented as N(cosd -Torsin9), where N is a numerical quantity, 9 a real angle, and w — —1.
The difference between this expression for a quaternion and De Moivre's theorem is that w is not
the equivalent of the "algebraic V—1, but may be any directed unit-line whatever in space"—this
being the "chief invention" Hamilton had introduced to mathematics in the previous decade.
In this narrative extending from Wallis to De Moivre to Hamilton, other intervening figures appear.
In the 19th-century alone,
Argand, Warren, and others, extended the results of Wallis and De Moivre. They
attempted to express as a line the product of two lines each represented by a symbol
such as a + byj—l. To a certain extent they succeeded, but simplicity was not gained by
204
their methods, as the terrible array of radicals in Warren's Treatise sufficiently proves
(Tait 1867, 3).90
Tait maintains,
Beyond this, few attempts were made, or at least recorded, in earlier times, to extend
the principle to space of three dimensions; and, though many such have been made
within the last forty years, none, with the single exception of Hamilton's, have resulted
in simple, practical methods; all, however ingenious, seeming to lead at once to
processes and results of fearful complexity ... It was reserved for Hamilton to discover
the use of V—1 as a geometric reality, tied down to no particular direction in space, and
this use was the foundation of the singularly elegant, yet enormously powerful, Calculus
of quaternions (Tait 1867, 4-5).
Quaternions were no longer mere symbols; they were no longer preferable simply for their seeming
elegance and simplicity. They were to be admired, also, for their existence in "geometrical reality".
Tait explains,
While all other schemes for using V—1 to indicate direction make one direction in space
expressible by real numbers, the remainder being imaginaries of some kind, leading in
general to equations which are heterogeneous; Hamilton makes all directions in space
equally imaginary, or rather equally real, thereby ensuring to his Calculus the power of
dealing with space indifferently in all directions (Tait 1867, 5).
Quaternions are entirely independent of any particular axes or "any supposed directions in space";
the calculus of quaternions takes its reference lines "solely from the problem it is applied to" (Tait
1867, 5). Tait has combined the "reality" of geometry with the "reality" of imaginary numbers to
argue quaternions are exceptionally powerful as operators in a new domain of symbolical algebra
that also happens, at times, to have geometrical analogues.
Tait elaborates upon this relativism by drawing a comparison to Cartesian geometry in three
dimensions, which he says is simply a "mere particular case of Quaternions in which most of the
distinctive features are lost." Though quaternions can be generated ab initio, with no reference at all
90
Tait notes a "curious speculation" accredited to Servois, published in 1813 in Gergonne's Annates, is the "only one [of the
intervening mathematical attempts], so far as has been discovered, in which the slightest trace of an anticipation of
Quaternions is contained." In that attempt, Servois "endeavoured to extend to space the form a + 7>V—-T for the plane"
and he is "guided by analogy to write for a directed unit-line in space the form p cos a + q cos (3 +r cos y, where a, (3, y
are its inclinations to the three axes." Servois, however, rejected the idea that p,q,r could be reduced to the form
a + b\f—1 ; Tait argued Servois was wrong in so thinking. Hamilton did reduce them by invoking i,j,k in quaternion
calculus (Tait 1867, 4).
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to Cartesian techniques, Tait draws on the insights inherent to Cartesian geometry so as to avoid
confusion for those students reading the book and for whom the text is primarily directed (Tait
1867, 5). The first lesson is that, if we have two points, A and B, to determine the location of B to A
(whether we use Cartesian or polar coordinates) we must determine both the distance between the
points and the direction in which that distance is to be travelled. A "vector" is that particular line
that takes us from point A to point B (it travels from one point to the other in a definite direction).
"It may thus be considered as an instrument which carries A to B; so that a vector may be employed
to indicate a definite translation in space," he explains (Tait 1867, 6).
Despite Tait's earlier insistence upon "geometrical reality," his pre-established views on the
malleability and conventionality of symbolical thinking prevail and "geometrical reality" is
interpreted upon that terrain. Tait reminds his students,
We may here remark, once for all, that in establishing a new Calculus, we are at liberty
to give any definitions whatever of our symbols, provided that no two of these interfere
with, or contradict, each other, and in doing so in Quaternions simplicity and (so to
speak) naturalness were the inventor's aim (Tait 1867, 6).
For Tait, quaternions can constitute a geometric reality, although that geometry is entirely
constructed and symbolically generated. Thus, Tait proceeds to define a vector as having a specific
length and direction. If AB is represented by a, then we require three numbers to specify the
location of a in space—either three coordinate numbers relative to a specific set of axes, or two
coordinates relative to axes and a directional unit. When two vectors, a and b, are the same length
and parallel to one another, they are considered to be equivalent vectors in space. If the second
vector, CD, is parallel and of equal magnitude to AB, then we can state CD = AB - a. This is an
extension of the "meaning of an algebraic symbol," Tait writes, given that we have now determined
that an equation between two vectors, namely a = /?, where /? refers to the second vector, always
means the two vectors are the same in length and in direction (though not necessarily located at the
same place).
206
Tait then defines + and - symbols in the new "Calculus" by noting that both of these symbols
indicate a translation. If A, B, and C are any three points, such that AB = a, BC = /?, AC = y, then
we can state a + /? = y, or AB + BC = AC. This is simply to say that vectors are to be
"compounded" in both magnitude and direction "like simultaneous velocities." This process is similar
to the addition of coordinates in Cartesian algebra, where the resultant set of coordinates is the
outcome of combining two constituent coordinate pairs, where the symbol (—) simply means that
the direction of the vector has been reversed. In any vector triangle, we find that AB + BC + CA =
0. This result is nothing other than the "well-known propositions regarding composition of
velocities, which, by [Newton's] second law of motion, gives us the geometrical laws of composition
of forces" (Tait 1867, 8). Any vector can thus be resolved into three components that are parallel,
respectively, to any three given vectors.
C
In Tait's text, the multiplication and division of vectors is dealt with in purely symbolical terms, with
images added only for the edification of students. He states that if we "compound any number of
parallel vectors, the result is a numerical multiple of any one of them." In other words, if A, B, C are
in a straight line, then BC = xAB. In this equation, x is a ratio by which we can compare the length
of BC to that of AB. It is positive when B lies between A and C; it is negative otherwise. The ratio
between the two vectors is not only one of magnitude, but also one of direction—in other words, it
is a quaternion.
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Tait then introduces a claim of particular advantage in quaternion calculus—namely, the notion of
three "mutually perpendicular unit-vectors." Those unit-vectors are what Hamilton defined as i,j,k.
It is possible, Tait explains, to express any vector as a composition of multiples of these three unit
vectors. Any vector in (three-dimensional) space can be expressed as p = xi + yj + zk. In this set
up, x,y,z represent lengths (magnitudes) of coterminous edges in a rectangular parallelepiped,
where p is the vector-diagonal, such that the length of that vector is yjx2 + y2 + z2. Tait
demonstrates what it would mean for two such vectors to be equivalent. If w is defined to be any
vector, then tcr = <fi + r\j + (k. If we then state that p = gx, it would mean that the following three
equivalences must hold among the constituent parts of the respectively equivalent vectors:
x = f,y = V.z = <"•
In words, this means that if,
[We] suppose i to be drawn eastwards,;' northwards, and k upwards, this is equivalent
merely to saying that if two points coincide, they are equally to the east (or west) or any
third point, equally to the north (or south) of it, and equally elevated above (or
depressed below) its level (Tait 1867,10).
As for the algebraic rules governing vector combinations, Tait explains that the commutative and
associative laws hold when we combine vectors using both the + and — symbols (or operators). It
does not matter in what order vectors are added or subtracted, the result will always be the same. If




AB + Fc = JF = AD +~DC = Fc + JF.
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In the same parallelogram defined above, we find that:
AD = AB + BD = AC + CD,
or,
AB+JC+'CD^AB + (BC + CD) = (AS + BC) + CD.
In other words, both the associative and the commutative rules of regular algebra hold in vector
algebra when acts of addition or subtraction are performed.
Such operations can, however, be symbolized more concisely, using quaternion notation. Tait
explains that given the equation, p — x(3, where p is the vector that connects a variable point with a
given origin, (3 is a definite vector, and x is an indefinite number that describes a "straight line drawn
from the original parallel to /?," the straight line from A, where OA = a, parallel to (3, has the
equation p = a + xf3. This means "we may pass from 0 to P directly, by the vector OP or p; or we
may pass first to A, by means of OA or a, and then to P along a vector parallel to /?" (Tait 1867, 11).
The equation p = a + x(3, is of utmost importance in quaternion mathematics, as it "enable(s) us to
throw the general equation of a straight line in space." It describes a directed line in space, and if
more indefinite quantities are added, such that
p — ya + x(3, we get an expression for a plane surface, by virtue of the fact the equation describes
the plane in which the lines a and f3 both lie. To extend the matter further, we can stipulate that
P = Y + ya + XP, which represents a three-dimensional space, as it describes a plane that passes
through the "extremity of y, and [is] parallel to a and (3" (Tait 1867,12).
Using the quaternion tools presented so far, Tait proceeds in Section 31 to "prove" a series of well
known Cartesian theorems in geometry using quaternion notation (e.g. he demonstrates, in vector
form, "The bisectors of the sides of a triangle meet in a point, which trisects each of them") (Tait
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1867, 14). In Section 32, he explains how to differentiate a vector with reference to a single
numerical variable, of which the vector is given as an explicit function. He writes,
This process is of very great use, especially in quaternion investigations connected with
the motion of a particle or point [as] it will afford us an opportunity of making a
preliminary step towards overcoming the novel difficulties which arise in quaternion
differentiation (Tait 1867, 22).
And in one of his characteristic revivifications of Newtonian imagery (i.e. characteristic of his 1860s
writing in thermodynamics), Tait makes the claim that, in inventing these innovative quaternion
tools, Hamilton had revivified Newton's "original methods" in differential calculus. Tait writes,
It is a striking circumstance, when we consider the way in which Newton's original
methods in the Differential Calculus have been decried, to find that Hamilton was
obliged to employ them, and not the more modern forms, in order to overcome the
characteristic difficulties of quaternion differentiation. Such a thing as a differential
coefficient has absolutely no meaning in quaternions, except in those special cases in
which we are dealing with degraded quaternions, such as numbers, Cartesian
coordinates, etc. But a quaternion expression has always a differential, which is, simply,
what Newton called a fluxion.
Revealing his continued efforts to idolize Newton, Tait further claims,
As with the Laws of Motion, the basis of Dynamics, so with the foundations of the
Differential Calculus; we are gradually coming to the conclusion that Newton's system is
the best of all (Tait 1867, 23).91
These claims are especially interesting given that Tait's mathematical work is not "Newtonian" in so
far as Newton relied upon induction from geometrical understanding.
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In his obituary of Hamilton, published a year earlier, Tait discusses the revivification of Newton due to quaternion
differentiation. He writes of Hamilton's work that "among the many curious results of the invention of quaternions,
must be noticed the revival of fluxions, or, at all events, a mode of treating differentials closely allied to that originally
introduced by Newton. The really useful, but over-praised differential coefficients, have, as a rule, no meaning in
quaternions; so that, except when dealing with scalar variables (which are simply degraded quaternions), we must
employ in differentiation fluxions or differentials. And the reader may easily understand the cause of this. It lies in the
fact that quaternion multiplication is not commutative; so that, in differentiating a product, for instance, each factor
must be differentiated where it stands; and thus the differential of such a product is not generally a mere algebraic
multiple of the differential of the independent quaternion-variable. It is thus the whirligig of time brings its revenges.
The shameless theft which Leibniz committed, and which he sought to disguise by altering the appearance of the stolen
goods, must soon be obvious, even to his warmest partisans. They can no longer pretend to regard Leibniz as even a
second inventor when they find that his only possible claim, that of devising an improvement in notation, merely unfits
Newton's method of fluxions for application to the simple and symmetrical, yet massive, space-geometry of Hamilton"
(Tait 1866).
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In lauding the "Newtonian method" and Newton's "fluxions," Tait was not directly revivifying
Newton's 17th-century concepts of ultimate ratios and geometrical limits. Rather, what Tait had in
mind was Cauchy's introduction of the 19th-century notion of a "limit". His revivification of "Newton"
was a socio-political move meant to represent quaternions as venerable British productions, just as
Hamilton had sought to present them as venerable Irish productions in earlier years. Though
European mathematicians were mentioned in Tait's historical rendering as discussed above,
nowhere are the highly symbolical concepts of quaternions associated with European mathematical
traditions in analysis. Consider, for example, Tait's account of the following problem. If we suppose p
is the vector of a curve in space, then p can be expressed as "the sum of a number of terms, each of
which is a multiple of a given vector by a function of some one indeterminate." In symbolical terms,
if P is a point on the curve, then OP = p = 0(t)- This means that the vector p can be expressed as a
function of some variable t. Furthermore, if Q is any other point on the curve, then, OQ = p =
= 0(t + St), where St is "any number whatever" (Tait 1867, 23). This symbolism and
vocabulary clearly indicates Tait's inculcation into the post-Cauchian tradition of treating limits
symbolically. Consider also the fact that Tait employs a curve as a function of a variable t (here
"time"), and he describes the determination of the velocity of the point at P as it moves
incrementally along the curve over time. This approach relies upon the notion of an infinitesimal
time progression inputted into a function. The invocation of infinitesimal increments symbolized by





Tait's revivification of the Newtonian method should be read as a legitimization effort—a valiant
attempt to render wholly "British" the quaternion-symbolical technique, and to link to the venerable
institution of Newtonianism to his fledgling project.
Tait recognizes also that there is unforeseen novelty in the method. Herein lays his attempt to
generate respect for his own, and Hamilton's, genius at having discovered and developed the
technique. In Chapter II, Tait explains the operations of multiplication and division of vectors. It is in
understanding these operations that we
Come to the consideration of points in which the Calculus of Quaternions differs entirely
from any previous mathematical method; and here we shall get an idea of what a
Quaternion is, and whence it derives its name (Tait 1867, 32).
If the given vectors are parallel to each other, Tait writes, then it is not difficult to determine the
ratio between them, which will be a purely numerical ratio that refers to the difference in their
lengths. The ratio will be positive if the vectors point in the same direction and negative if they point
in the opposite direction.
The issue becomes slightly more complex if the vectors are not parallel. When that occurs, then the
ratio between the two directed lines involves both magnitude (a length ratio) and direction (a
rotation ratio). If we let OA and OB represent the two vectors in question, and if we draw them from
the same common origin (0), we can reduce the question to finding the ratio between two vectors
that share a common starting point. To determine the ratio between them, we want to know what
must be done to OA to transform it into OB. The following processes exist for doing so:
1st. Increase or diminish the length of OA till it become equal to that of OB. For this only
one number is required, viz. the ratio of the lengths of the two vectors. As Hamilton
remarks, this is a positive, or rather a signless, number.
2nd. Turn OA about 0 until its direction coincides with that of OB, and (remembering the
effect of the first operation) we see that the two vectors now coincide or become
identical. To specify this operation three more numbers are required, viz. two angles
(such as node and inclination in the case of a planet's orbit) to fix the plane in which the
rotation takes place, and one angle for the amount of this rotation (Tait 1867, 32-33).
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The "ratio of two vectors, or the multiplier required to change one vector into another," depends
upon four distinct numbers—hence the nomenclature of "Quaternion" (Tait 1867, 33). The
quaternion operator instigates both a change in magnitude and a change in direction in space. The
quaternion can, therefore, be decomposed into a "stretching factor," which performs a change in
magnitude, and which is called a "Tensor" (denoted by T), and a "turning factor," which performs a
change in direction and which is called a "Versor" (denoted by
U).
As an example, consider the vectors OA = a, OB = /?. If q is the quaternion that changes a into /?
we find that /? = qa, which can also be written in the forms ^ = q, or/?a_1 = q. Those algebraic
identities only hold, Tait says, "if we agree" upon the following equivalences: ~-a — /?cr-1.a = /?■
In so far as those equivalences are agreed upon, the system works to transform one vector into any
other, so long as both vectors are placed at the same starting point. In Hamilton and Tait's notation,
the transforming operator, or quaternion, can be represented as q = TqUq = UqTq, which
indicates that every quaternion is composed of a "tensor," a magnitude ratio between two vectors,
and a "versor," a directional ratio between two vectors.92
Tait's account of why quaternions are not commutative in multiplication (or division for that matter)
is worth elaborating upon as it is this characteristic that eventually renders quaternions unpalatable
to critics such as Thomson. To explain the commutative principle in quaternion mathematics, Tait
considers first a simple quaternion—one in which the tensor has a unit value of 1, and which can
therefore be represented by its versor part alone. When this is the case, a versor can be represented
as the arc of a great circle on a unit sphere. In such circumstances, it is easy to prove that
"quaternion multiplication is not generally commutative." Note that Tait is not studying the
behaviour of directed lines of a unit-circle in order to "prove" the truth of a mathematical principle.
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If a1 and fi, are vectors of unit length parallel to a and B, respectively, then T— = l,U—= U-.
ai a1 a
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Rather, Tait's "proof", i.e. the "great circle", is motivated by pedagogical concerns. The ultimate
proof of non-commutativity in quaternion mathematics is not located in the behaviour of its
geometric analogue; it is located in the definition of equivalences set within the rules of quaternion
mathematics. The non-commutative aspect of quaternions can, however, be geometrically
demonstrated by using great circles on a sphere as a means of enlightening debutant quaternionists.
Tait explains the matter as follows:
QQ
Let q be the versor AB or ==. Make BC = AB, then q may also be represented by
~oc - —
=. In the same way any other versor r may be represented by DB or BE and byOB
0B OE
— or =. The line OB in the figure is definite, and is given by the intersection ofOD OB ° > a 1




Tait concludes, rOD = OS, and qOB = OC. In sum, qrOD — OC, or alternatively qr = = . This
latter identity can be represented by the arc DC of a great circle. Meanwhile, rq is "easily seen to be
represented by the arc AE. In sum, Tait demonstrates qOA — OB, and rOB — OE, whence
(TE
rqOA — OE, and rq — ==. The versors rq and qr can be represented by arcs of equal length, and
they are, therefore, "unequal."93
Based on this geometrical demonstration, it is clear that versor multiplication does not commute.
The propositions developed for simple versors hold also for quaternions, given that the former are a
basic form of the latter (Tait 1867, 37). Using a similar geometrical technique for heuristic purposes,
Tait demonstrates the Associative Law of algebra does hold for quaternions. In other words,
p.qr — pq.r. He also uses geometrical devices to demonstrate that the Distributive Law holds in
quaternion multiplication and division; so too does the Index Law, such that qm ■ qn = qm+n, so
long as m and n are positive. Having established these various rules of the game, Tait argues the
student is now prepared to consider the special rules of quadrantal versors, which give rise to all of
the properties of quaternions.
The properties of the quadrantal versors are those that Hamilton "discovered" in 1843, Tait recalls,
adding they "led almost intuitively to the establishment of the Quaternion Calculus." Tait prefaces
his account by stating,
We shall content ourselves at present with an assumption, which will be shewn to lead
to consistent results; but at the end of the chapter we shall shew that no other
assumption is possible, following for this purpose a very curious quasi-metaphysical
speculation of Hamilton's (Tait 1867, 43).
That assumption goes as follows: suppose we have a system, of three mutually perpendicular unit-
vectors, all drawn from one point, which we will call I,J,K; suppose also that these are constructed
so that a positive (or left-handed) rotation through a right angle about / as an axis brings J to
93
They are generally unequal unless the planes of q and r coincide.
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coincide with K. A positive quadrantal rotation about J will make K coincide with /; when that
rotation is about A", it will make / coincide with /. If we then assume that / is drawn eastwards,/
northwards, and K upwards, then a positive (left-handed) rotation about the eastward line of
/ brings the northward line J into a vertically upward position of K, and so on. The operator that
turns/ into A" is a "quadrantal versor."
The axis of that versor is I, or i, as Hamilton termed it. Thus, we can establish the following
algebraical rules of operation which govern the behaviour of these operators:
K
— = i, or K = ij,
I
- = jt or I = jK,
y = k, or J = kl.
With this understanding in hand, the following algebraic equivalence can be identified:
zi=a
K /'
which means that "a southward unit-vector bears the same ratio to an upward unit-vector that the
latter does to a northward one." Therefore:
-J- = i, or - / = ik,K
-K
— = /, or - K = jl,
-/
— = k, or - / = kj.
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By combining the identities K - ij and -/ = ik, we then find that -J = ik = i(i/) = i2J; therefore,
i2 = —l,j2 = —1, and k2 — —1. In sum, Tait explains, the square of every quadrantal versor is
negative unity.
Tait also provides a heuristic "proof" for this claim in geometrical form per the image below:
[Tait 1867, 45)
[Tait 1867, 46)
For Tait, this geometrical understanding comes after the establishment of, and agreement upon, the
symbolical equivalences stated earlier. Although Tait provides an image to exemplify what is meant
by the related identities, ji = —k, kj = —i, ik = —j, he maintains that quaternions are an
algebraical system governed by algebraical rules. As Tait concludes,
These equations [the three mentioned earlier], along with i2 = j2 = k2 = —1, contain
essentially the whole of Quaternions. But it is easy to see that, for the first group, we
may substitute the single equation ijk = —1, since from it, by the help of the values of
the squares of i,j,k, all the other expressions may be deduced. We may consider it
proved in this way (Tait 1867, 47).
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In so far as the algebraic rules governing quaternions are accepted as legitimate symbolical
equivalences, quaternion operators can be used as devices in physical and dynamical research.
The last consideration Tait makes in his account of quaternions is the alternative manner of
representing quaternions themselves. So far, Tait says, we have considered the quaternion to be a
product of a tensor (a magnitude ratio between two vectors) and a versor (a direction ratio between
two vectors). There is, however, a second way to construct quaternions—namely, as a sum of parts.
~OB
To represent a quaternion as a sum of parts, the mathematician can let == represent any quaternion
(a ratio between two vectors). If one draws BC perpendicular to OA, then OB = OC + CB.
[Tait 1867, 49)
We see, therefore, that OC = xOA, where x is a number, whose sign is the same as that of the
cosine of /LAOB. Since CB is perpendicular to OA, CB = yOA, where 7 is a vector perpendicular to
OA and CB (i.e. it is perpendicular to the plane of the quaternion). Hence, we find that:
OB xOA + yOA
In other words, a quaternion can be decomposed into two parts, where one part is numerical (x),
and the other part is vectorial (7). Hamilton termed these parts a "scalar" and a "vector,"
respectively, and he denoted them by the symbols 5 and V, which were then prefixed to the
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quaternion expression. Using this specific notation, one can express a quaternion as q = Sq + Vq
(Tait 1867, 49).
Using Cartesian coordinates, however, one can also demonstrate that any vector can be represented
also as xi + yj + zk, where x,y,z are numbers (i.e. "scalars," in Hamilton's terminology), and
i,j,k are three non-coplanar vectors, represented in a rectangular system of unit-vectors. If any
scalar is denoted by the symbol w, then the quaternion q can be expressed as q = w + xi + yj +
zk. This version of the quaternion most clearly expresses the "essential dependence on four distinct
numbers, from which the quaternion derives its name," Tait writes (Tait 1867, 51). This latter
Cartesian form most clearly indicates why the "quaternion" is, in fact, called a quaternion. But, Tait
notes, it is a cumbersome means of representing the quaternion. Hamilton's use of 5 and V
summarizes quaternion properties more briefly, and therefore it is Tait's preferred presentation.
Consider, for example, the multiplication of two quaternions, a/?. One finds that in Cartesian
coordinate form, the mathematician must write the following to express the multiplication:
a/? = (xi + yj + zk)(x i + y j + z' k)
= — (xx + yy + zz ) + (yz — zy )i + (zx — xz )j + 9xy - yx')k.
The mathematician can then determine:
(Sa — —(xx + yy + zz ) — (yz — zy )i — (zx xz )j — (xy — yz )k.
Therefore, a[3 =£ /?a. Although the scalar part of this quaternion multiplication is identical, the signs
of the respective vectors are not. Rather than relying on reverting to such cumbersome expansions,
however, Tait invokes Hamilton's 5 and V notation to offer the same account, but more succinctly.
In the multiplication of two quaternions, the mathematician can simply state (Tait 1867, 55),
Sap = Spa, meaning the scalar parts remain equal;
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Vafd = —Vfda, meaning the vector part changes sign.
Throughout the remainder of the chapter, Tait offers various quaternion accounts of problems in
plane geometry, trigonometry, and spherical geometry. He reiterates his belief that the students will
not fail to notice in such examples the simplicity and succinctness of the technique over its Cartesian
equivalent.94 In Chapter IV, for instance, Tait delves into the differentiation of quaternions, which he
says is akin to ordinary differentiation, such that, if r = F(q) is a function of a quaternion, q, then:
dr — dFq — J n |f ^q + — F(q) j.
Tait demonstrates the differentiation of any function of a quaternion, q, leads to an equation of the
form:
dr = f (q, dq),
where / is linear and homogeneous in dq. Tait also describes the technique for determining an
unknown quaternion in a linear function, although he acknowledges an obstacle here. He writes,
No general method of solving quaternion equations of the second or higher
degrees has yet been found; in fact, as will be shown immediately, even those of
the second degree involve (in their most general form) algebraic equations of the
sixteenth degree (Tait 1867, 125-126).
Over the course of the remainder of the book, Tait provides various examples in "geometry of the
straight line and plane," "the sphere and cyclic cone," "surfaces of the second order," "geometry of
curves and surfaces" (in which he introduces Hamilton's vector function), and finally "kinematics" (in
which he demonstrates solutions in vector-velocity, acceleration and strain). It is in this latter
94
Tait also defines Hamilton's "biquaternion", which is a quaternion that includes, as its scalar value, the "normal"
algebraic imaginary number V—T. In this instance, the imaginary number is not a versor but a "number" in the same
sense that a real number is a magnitude in ordinary quaternions (Tait 1867, 81-82).
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chapter on kinematics that Tait reissues some of his earlier published work, as well as some
problems discussed by Thomson and himself in dynamics. Tait demonstrates, for instance, that if a
surface is equipotential or isothermal, then v represents in direction and magnitude the force at
any point or the flux in heat," where v — S/Fp (and where Fp — C is the equation that represents
one surface in a system of surfaces). This problem demonstrates the effect of the vector operator, V,
on any "scalar function of the vector of a point," which is to produce "the vector which represents in
magnitude and direction the most rapid change in the value of the function." The effect of V on a
"vector function," such as a = if + jp + kf, is as follows:
_ fdf dp df\ /dp df\Va--\di + d^ + Tz)-l(Tz-^>-&c-
This "semi-Cartesian" form allows the mathematician to conclude,
if cr represents a small vector displacement of a point situated at the extremity of the
vector p (drawn from the origin), SVct represents the consequent cubical compression
of the group of points in the vicinity of that considered, and Wo represents twice the
vector axis of rotation of the same group of points. Similarly,
( d d d \
s"v=-((^+"d^+<^) = -D'-
or is equivalent to total differentiation in virtue of our having passed from one end to
the other of the vector a (Tait 1867, 268).
This finding closely reflects the work Tait had produced in thermodynamics in the mid-1860s.
In fact, Tait's "applications" deal mostly with problems in vector dynamics, which Tait would have
considered to be most applicable to the developing domain of thermodynamics. And, in the final
chapter on "Physical Applications", the natural philosopher concludes,
by giving a few instances of the ready applicability of quaternions to questions of
mathematical physics, upon which, even more than on the Geometrical and Kinematical
applications, the real usefulness of the Calculus must mainly depend—except, of course,
in the eyes of that section of mathematicians for whom Transversals and Anharmonic
Pencils, &c. have a [sic] to us incomprehensible charm. Of course we cannot attempt to
give examples in all branches of physics, nor even to carry very far our investigations in
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any one branch: this Chapter is not intended to teach Physics, but merely to show by a
few examples how expressly and naturally quaternions seem to be fitted for attacking
the problems it presents (Tait 1867, 277).
The first problem Tait discusses in the chapter is the question of how to account for the forces that
act on a rigid body, in particular when a force, /?, at the point whose vector is a, causes a slight
displacement of the body in question. In such instances, the point a becomes a + Sa, and the whole
"work done" is £S/?5a (which vanishes as the "forces are such as to maintain equilibrium") (Tait
1867, 276). Other problems that appear in the chapter include, not surprisingly, Fresnel's wave
surface and Ampere's theory of electrodynamics. But, Tait concludes with a nudge for his colleague
and co-author, William Thomson, by arguing,
It would be easy to give many more of these transformations, which really present no
difficulty; but it is sufficient to show the ready applicability to physical questions of one
or two of those already obtained; a property of great importance, as extensions of
mathematical physics are far more valuable than mere analytical or geometrical
theorems ... Thomson has shown that the forces produced by given distributions of
matter, electricity, magnetism, or galvanic currents, can be represented at every point
by displacements of [an elastic] solid producible by external forces. It may be useful to
give his analysis, with some additions, in a quaternion form, to show the insight gained
by the simplicity of the present method (Tait 1867, 309).
The general problem of rigid body dynamics that would come to serve as the final theme upon which
Tait would conclude his 1860s discussions of quaternion mathematics, served as the thesis in his
detailed paper, "On the Rotation of a Rigid Body about a Fixed Point," published in the Transactions
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh" (1868). It is to this account we turn now, as the final publication in
a decade through which Tait had developed a personal vision of quaternion mathematics as
contoured by his developing concerns in thermodynamics.
Tait's quaternions, 1868-1870
Tait maintains an adherence to the conventional nature of symbolical algebra throughout the 1860s;
the message concluding his 1868 text, however, is one that resonates more profoundly with his
developing thermodynamic commitments. Tait writes quaternions are useful in mathematical
physics, because they do "work" in an efficient manner. In his paper on rigid body rotation, Tait
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reiterates the notion that quaternions are simple in their structure and thus help to advance
scientific inquiry by offering useful tools for the efficiently-minded mathematical experimentalist.
Tait contends further that,
Although it is very improbable that there remains to be discovered any new, and at the
same time simple, fact connected with a question which has been elaborately treated by
many of the greatest mathematicians of this and the preceding century, the
employment of a new mathematical method may enable us to present some their
results in a more intelligible form, and with far less expenditure of analytical power than
has hitherto been deemed necessary; and it may give us such an insight into the
question, that we shall be able to easily discover the mutual relations among the various
processes which have been already employed; so far, at least, as these differ in principle,
and not merely in the peculiar co-ordinates assumed for the purpose of simplifying the
equations. Such a method is that of Quaternions, which seems to be expressly fitted for
the symmetrical evolution of truths which are usually obtained by the ordinary Cartesian
methods only after great labour of calculation, and by modes of attack so indirect, and
at first sight so purposeless, as to bewilder all but a very small class of readers.
Quaternions afford so clear a view of the nature of the question they are applied to, that
even the student, if he have some little knowledge of them, can often see why a
transformation is made, whose object he would have been unable to discover had the
problem been masked in the unnecessarily artificial difficulties of Cartesian geometry, or
the outrageously repulsive formulae of spherical trigonometry (Tait 1898, 86).
Tait's hopes were running high. There was the potential profitability of his 1867 textbook to keep in
mind should quaternions come to be more widely adopted as examinable mathematical techniques
in Edinburgh and, especially, at Cambridge. There was Tait's continuing need to sell textbooks to
supplement his student fees and to generate income from Kelland's class (in which students were
already learning about quaternions through Kelland's tutelage). Most importantly, Tait still
harboured the vision of a future in which his quaternion mathematics would complement his and
Thomson's publications in the emergent field of thermodynamics, i.e. the Presbyterian-inspired
"science of energy".
With a nod in this direction, Tait's paper on rigid body motion that argues the best existing account
of such motion is to be found in Poinsot's work (1851), "Theorie Nouvelle de la Rotation des Corps,"
published in Liouville's Journal. Though Poinsot had used analytical techniques in his work, his
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research was predominantly geometrical in nature—a fact that nonetheless placed it above the
works of others before him, who had relied solely on "analytical methods" to account for motion in
space. Tait proposed to go beyond Poinsot's account by having "the reader bear in mind that a
quaternion equation is quite as suggestively intelligible, to those who understand it, as any
geometrical diagram can possibly be" (Tait 1898, 87). Tait's emphasis is on quaternions as
geometrical truths. Yet, this is not to say he has abandoned his analytical training; for what Tait
means is that quaternions demonstrate geometrical truths better than even classical geometry does.
He writes,
It is more readily intelligible than diagrams usually are; for, in reading a work illustrated
by figures, we have generally to go through a laborious explanation of what the figure is
intended to represent before we can make use of it for further developments. On the
other hand, a purely quaternionfic] formula draws, as it were, its own figure in the
reader's mind, and saves him at least the trouble just mentioned. In this way every one
has his figures drawn so as best to suit himself, and is not perplexed by having to pick up
the principles on which they have been drawn for him by another, very probably of a
different mode of thought (Tait 1898, 87).
Tait insists quaternions are not like "ordinary so-called analysis," because they can have geometrical
analogues. Yet, they are more powerful than classical geometry, because they make fewer
assumptions and are universalized in symbolical form.
Tait's motivation for the present article is to simplify "by a symmetrical process, the usual modes of
treating the rotation of a rigid body" (Tait 1898, 87). Tait wants to make old processes more efficient
by applying the engine of quaternions to rigid body problems. He writes that, in 1862, he had
become aware of Cayley's paper, "Report on the Progress of the Solution of certain Special Problems
of Dynamics," published in the British Association Report. In that paper, Cayley had offered his
readers an account of rigid body rotation, which sparked Tait's interest in offering a simpler and
more "symmetrical" account of the motion in question. Indeed, it was Cayley's paper that led Tait to
grasp the "notion of attaining symmetry, by seeking the single rotation which would bring the body
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from some initial position to its actual position at a given time, which had been suggested to me by
Hamilton's beautiful results" (Tait 1898, 88).
The "symmetry" obtained by Cayley required, however, "A brilliant display of analytical power at
great expense of time and bewilderment to the ordinary reader." Thus, Tait's aim was to offer a
"neater" account of such symmetry, by offering an account of a "transition [that] can at one step be
effected from any initial position to the actual position of the body at a given time" (Tait 1898, 88).
In his account, every "infinitely small displacement of a Rigid System, one point of which is fixed,
takes place about an instantaneous axis." Tait offers a quaternionic account of the motion of such
infinitesimal displacements, claiming,
The essential difference between this [quaternion] process and the ordinary one,
consists in using rotations about each of the three axes fixed in the body, instead of one
about one axis, followed by another about a second, and then a final rotation about the
first axis instead of the third (Tait 1898, 97).
The quaternion method is faster, more succinct and does the same amount of work but with less
energy wasted on the part of the mathematician. Tait admits the kinematic problem—the one in
which the mathematician must determine the quaternion which "gives the position of the body at
any time"—is more difficult to carry out and "does not appear, so far as I have yet examined the
question, to lead to any very simple expressions." Yet, he states his hope that on a "future occasion"
the problem would be reduced to powerful and efficient results (Tait 1898,125).
By the 1870s, Tait's attention had turned toward the construction of "definite integration, of the
kinds required in physics, applicable to quaternion symbols and not merely scalar variables." In his
paper "On Green's and other Allied Theorems," published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh (1870), for instance, Tait explained he had long consulted Hamilton about the lack of
integral techniques for quaternions—a gap that had hindered the application of Hamilton's vector
(or "quaternion") operator, V, from fulfilling "its promise of usefulness in physical applications."
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Though Hamilton had apparently asserted he was in the process of developing such a technique, it
was never published; upon Hamilton's death in 1866, an unfinished final chapter of his Elements
(1866) suggested he was headed toward such an elaboration, but his efforts were never stated
clearly or in any detail in the unfinished manuscript. Nowhere, Tait notes, did Hamilton leave scraps
of his thoughts on the matter (Tait 1898, 136). Tait, for his part, wants to "supply the want" that
Hamilton had left unfulfilled. In his 1870 publication, Tait indicates he has successfully achieved the
mission in a "simple, though not very direct process." Tait states his approach is not perfect, but it
works "so far at least as to enable me to use quaternions in inquiries connected with potentials."
The work explored Green's and allied theorems in the field of dynamics, making the claim that,
through quaternion symbolism, new and important physical relations were manifest. As Tait argued
in that paper,
Even the little advance that I have made in the present paper has enabled me to see,
with a thoroughness of comprehension which I had despaired of attaining (at least by
Cartesian processes), the mutual relationship of the many singular properties of the
great class of analytical and physical magnitudes which satisfy what is usually known as
Laplace's equation. This is, of course, due solely to the simplicity and expressiveness of
quaternions in general (Tait 1898,137).95
Throughout the 1870s, Tait proceeded to devote the bulk of his research efforts to publishing on
matters of thermodynamics. The only other quaternion text to appear in that decade was his
textbook Introduction to Quaternions (1873), co-authored by Philip Kelland (1808-1879). Kelland had
been the first English-trained (i.e. Cambridge-trained), English-born person to be elected into a
Scottish chair. As professor of mathematics, Kelland had brought with him the Cambridge tradition
in symbolical analysis as it had been taught in the late-1820s and early-1830s. he had been tutored
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His findings in that paper are repeated in a paper entitled "On Some Quaternion Integrals," published in the Proceedings
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1870. He presents the integral,
J Pdp = dsV. UvVP,
where "P is any scalar function of p, and the single integral is extended round any closed curve, while the double integral
extends over any surface bounded by the curve, v being its normal vector." If a — iP + jQ + kR then, / adp =
ff ds(S. UvV a — V. (VUvV)o), for which the vector and scalar parts are equal (Tait 1898, 159).
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by William Hopkins (the famed coach) before graduating Senior Wrangler and first Smith's Prizeman
in 1834. Kelland was therefore trained at Cambridge before the major government-led reforms to
Cambridge's curriculum took effect—the same reforms that effectively excised natural philosophical
topics such as magnetism and electricity from the curriculum. Therefore, Kelland—though a
symbolicist—was not unaware of developments in other fields of natural philosophy. His position at
Edinburgh, in particular during the rise of thermodynamics in the late-1850s and throughout the
1860s, would have put him in a prime position to appreciate the lucrative nature of "applied"
mathematics. Thus, it was Kelland that increasingly sought to incorporate quaternion mathematics
into Edinburgh's mathematical courses, despite their lack of uptake at Cambridge, perhaps hoping
thereby to gain income himself from the rising star of Tait, whose natural philosophy and
experimental laboratory courses were becoming increasingly popular. Kelland also required
textbook sales to supplement his student fees, and textbooks, he knew, were most successful when
they were written to align themselves with specific course content, drawing in potential students to
the lectures being delivered and profiting from those students who required Kelland's math courses
to graduate. Indeed, Kelland had become so accustomed to the textbook culture that it heavily
supplemented his income as a professor in a Scottish university. This is not surprising given that the
1858 Scottish Universities Act reforms had institutionalized standardized examinations and course
requirements at Edinburgh. Kelland's mathematical texts began to replicate the style and tone of
popular coaching texts then in use at Cambridge.
The focus on Peacockian symbolical analysis is evident throughout Kelland's works. Indeed, Kelland's
continued membership within the amorphous community of symbolical algebraists in England who
were trained in the early half of the 19th-century is evident in his Elements ofAlgebra (1860), written
for Edinburgh mathematics students, in which Kelland made specific claims with regards to the
nature of arithmetical and algebraic knowledge. Kelland wrote,
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In a great number of arithmetical operations, it is impossible to carry on a continuous
train of reasoning by means of which the various data are successively introduced in
their proper places, and the conclusions to which they respectively lead, combined and
worked into the final result. It may be that the data themselves depend on the result, or
on some property which can only be expressed at a period subsequent to their
introduction into the calculation; it may be that the required conclusion is only a
particular case of more general considerations, contemplated in, and necessarily
introduced by, the hypothesis. From whatever case it may arise, it will and does
frequently happen that we must of necessity have in view the conclusion itself, or
something involving it, even at the very outset of the solution.
He continued,
Should we attempt to proceed by arithmetic simply, it would be requisite to employ
some specific artifice suggested by the nature of the particular problem, whereby the
introduction of the thing sought might be rendered obvious in the process, and thus the
mind might be relieved from the complex considerations incident to calculations applied
to the thing yet to be found.
The science of Algebra has for its primary object the exhibition to the eye, of all the
operations which in this case would have to be represented only to the mind. Whereas,
in arithmetic, nothing can be represented but that which is known either by the
conditions of the problem, or by the calculations which have resulted from them; in
algebra no operations are suffered to remain without representation. In the former
case, then, the mind has, without assistance, to pursue the track, and to keep in view
both the previous operations and the results which are to be obtained from them to the
full extent in both directions; in the latter, the mind is relieved from all retrospection,
and almost all prospective action, and is concentrated on the point immediately before
it; the eye being made the guide to what is to follow, as well as the depositary of that
which has been effected (Kelland 1860, 1-2).
Algebra is an artifice, Kelland claimed, but one that is useful in that it relieves the mind of
cumbersome duties, by representing individual numbers and objects by symbols, so that "memory is
almost, if not altogether, dispensed with, through the register that is kept of the state of the
operations as they proceed." Rather than recalling specific and temporal instances of real objects,
algebra allows the user to deal with an infinite number of particular instances by relying upon a few
universal algebraical rules. "That, therefore, which constitutes the transition from Arithmetic to
Algebra is nothing more than this," Kelland argued. "That the number required is represented in a
visible form to the eye."
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By the 1870s, Kelland had become a veteran textbook writer. He had produced the Theory of Heat
(1837) a few years after his arrival to Edinburgh, followed up two decades later by Transatlantic
Sketches (1858) and the Elements of Algebra For the Use of Schools and Junior Classes in Colleges
(1860). His final textbook contribution was the Introduction to Quaternions (1873), a second edition
of which was issued in 1882, and a third edition of which emerged in 1904, all jointly authored with
Tait. The book was written for a class of students to whom "quaternions" would have been
introduced as an established part of the symbolical algebraic mathematical canon. Written mostly by
Kelland, the book presents Hamilton's directed lines (i.e. vectors) and quaternions as entirely
justified and not in need of further legitimization. Kelland's text also provides a simply-structured set
of explanations and practice problems meant to train students in quaternion methods as an
established symbolical algebraic field of study. In the preface to the Introduction to Quaternions,
Kelland makes clear that he had "for many years past ... been accustomed, no doubt very
imperfectly, to introduce to my class the subject of Quaternions as part of elementary Algebra, more
with the view of establishing principles than of applying processes."96 In presenting his students with
the underlying principles of mathematics, he has had recourse to the history of mathematics,
mentioning the "names of great men" who helped mathematics become what it was by the 1870s.
One of those great men, Kelland writes, is Hamilton, whose name he thought would eventually be
stamped "with the seal of immortality" (Kelland and Tait 1882, viii).
Kelland justifies introducing quaternions at an elementary level by arguing that quaternions speak to
the founding principles of mathematical knowledge itself. Quaternions "bring those principles face
to face with operations, and thus not only satisfies the student of the mutual dependence of the
two, but tends to carry him back to a clear apprehension of what he had probably failed to
appreciate in the subordinate science" (Kelland and Tait 1882, viii). Kelland's personal appreciation
for quaternions comes from his belief that, "by one uniform process," they offer a wide variety of
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As Tait indicates in the preface to the second edition (1882), Kelland was more concerned with the metaphysics of
mathematical principles than he himself had been.
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results. Hearkening back to the image of symbolical algebra as a theory of efficient mind processes,
as advanced by the early algebraists in the 1820s and 1830s, Kelland writes, "What is of the utmost
importance in an educational point of view" is the fact that "the reader of this subject does not
require to encumber his memory with a host of conclusions already arrived at in order to advance."
Rather, "every problem is more or less self-contained," and this "is my apology for the present
treatise" (Kelland 1882, viii).
The first nine chapters of the Introduction cover the basic rules of quaternions, including a series of
test-style problems meant to familiarise students with addition, subtraction, multiplication, division
and calculus of quaternions. Tait wrote the last chapter, on the application of quaternions to
kinematics, which presents a quaternion accounts of "strain" in fluids and solid bodies. The joint
1873 production did not include any new research; it constituted, rather, an elementary clarification
of quaternion symbolism as issued in an exam-minded workbook for students who were keen to
adopt the new technique then being lauded by two Edinburgh professors, and which Kelland, at
least, had institutionalized in his mathematics lectures and exams throughout the 1860s and 1870s.
Thermodynamics and quaternions in the 1870s
Recall that throughout the 1860s and 1870s, Tait and Thomson had collaborated on a series of joint
projects, the best known of which became their co-authored Treatise. Thermodynamics embodied
the principles of work, efficiency, and productivity. Thus, as Tait collaborated with Kelland to
produce an elementary text on quaternion mathematics, thermodynamics had come to define the
primary terrain of knowledge upon which the natural philosopher trod. To get a sense, therefore, of
Tait's views in thermodynamics as they became more profound in the 1870s, it is useful to appeal to
his lectures on the "physical sciences," as delivered to his class in 1874 and published in 1876.
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One of the most important themes to emerge in Tait's Lectures on Some Recent Advances in Physical
Science (1876) is the idea that "energy" must serve as the overarching and all-encompassing
conceptual category for all science. Tait tells his students,
Just as Gold, Lead, Oxygen etc. are different kinds of Matter, so Sound, Light, Heat, etc.
are now ranked as different forms of Energy, which, as we shall presently see, has been
shown to have as much claim to objective reality as matter has.
For Tait, "energy" exists. It is not mere metaphor. It is not a positivistic image that helps to describe
perceived phenomena. It exists at the ontological level within the structure of the universe. It causes
natural events to occur. "Energy" can be mathematically described—or, rather, the effects of energy
can be mathematized. But, "energy" is more than a mere symbolical equivalence. "Energy" bears
direct relation to ontological reality. As Tait insists, energy "enables us to coordinate all the parts,
however apparently diverse, of the enormous subject of Natural Philosophy."
Furthermore, the notion of "energy" replaces problematical accounts of "force" which, Tait argues,
had long hindered natural philosophical discourse in Britain and abroad. "Force," Tait explains, is
often treated as that which causes some sensation. "But," he warns,
We must be particularly cautious as to the way in which we treat the evidence of our
senses in such matters. Think of Sound and Light, for instance—which, till they affect a
special organ of sense, are mere wave-motions. The sensation is as different from the
cause in such cases as are the bruise and the pain produced by a cudgel or a cricket ball
from the mere motion of those portions of matter before impact on a part of the human
body. In all likelihood a similar (probably a more sweeping statement) is true of force
(Tait 1876, 15-16).
The classical conception of "force" comes from Newton's first Law of Motion, which can be stated
as, "Force is any cause which alters or tends to alter a body's state of rest or of uniform motion in a
straight line." The difficulty with such a law is its claim to identify a "cause," "for this, amongst
material things, usually implies objective existence." By contrast, Tait argues,
in every case in which force is said to act, what is really observed, independent of the
muscular sense (whose indications, like those of the sense of touch in matters
concerning the temperatures of bodies, are apt to be excessively misleading), is either a
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transference, or a tendency to transference, of what is called energy from one portion of
matter to another (Tait 1876, 16).
When such transferences take place, there is a "relative motion of the portions of matter
concerned" and the "so-called force" to be accounted for is the "rate of transference of energy per
unit of length for displacement in that direction." Ultimately, "force ... has no necessarily objective
reality any more than has Velocity or Position" (Tait 1876, 16). In light of these problems, Tait writes,
it has been generally recognized that there is something else in the physical universe
which possesses to the full as high a claim to objective reality as matter possesses,
though it is by no means so tangible, and therefore the conception of it was much longer
in forcing itself upon the human mind. The so-called "imponderables"—things of old
supposed to be matter—such as heat and light, et cetera, are now known by the purely
experimental, and therefore the only safe, method [is to see these as] varieties of what
we call Energy,--something which, though not matter, has as much claim to recognition
on account of its objective existence as any portion of matter.
Tait continues,
The grand principle of Conservation of Energy, which asserts that no portion of matter
can be brought into existence by any process at our command, is simply a statement of
the invariability of the quantity of energy in the universe,-a companion statement to
that of the invariability of the quantity of matter (Tait 1876,17).
In brief, "energy" can be defined as the "ability to do work." And the energy to do work is associated
with the position of an object, i.e. its "potential energy". The energy already present in a body in
motion is termed "kinetic energy" (Tait 1874, 18-19).
Linked to these forms of energy is the concomitant notion of "dissipation." Tait explains that
the Dissipation of Energy is by no means well understood, [and] any many of the results
of its legitimate application have been received with doubt, sometimes even with
attempted ridicule [but] it appears to be at the present moment by far the most
promising and fertile portion of Natural Philosophy (Tait 1874, 21).
Though the principle of the "conservation of energy" stipulates energy can neither be destroyed nor
created in any ultimate sense (apart from the involvement of God in acts of creation), there is
nonetheless a "dissipation" that occurs such that potentially useful storehouses of energy are
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progressively transformed into unusable and dissipated forms of "kinetic" energy. The universe is
headed unidirectionally towards unusable energy status.
In an elongated historical narrative, Tait then tells his students major advancements in mathematical
knowledge had been effected over the previous 20 years. The concepts of space and time had
largely shaped human experience and scientific inquiry. Yet, what those concepts actually define is
still poorly understood. Hamilton had metaphysically defined algebra to be the "science of pure
time," and geometry to be the "science of pure space." Yet, a definite determination of a notion of
"pure time" remained elusive. For instance, even the rotation of the Earth as an absolute measure of
time was "by no means a uniform quantity," Tait explains. Thus, humanity is still awaiting the arrival
of some objective standard that would come in the form of a measurement of the period of
vibration of a molecule of heated gas, such as hydrogen, to determine an absolute standard of time.
Meanwhile, the notion of "pure space" had similarly been torn asunder by "careful scrutiny by
mathematicians of the highest order, such as Riemann and Helmholtz." Indeed, "The result of their
inquiries leaves it as yet undecided whether space may or may not have precisely the same
properties throughout the universe" (Tait 1876, 5). These studies suggest the Earth may be moving
through segments of the universe that are not always composed of the same fundamental
properties—thus leading to varying physical phenomena for which no explanation yet exists. To
study such matters requires "mathematics of a transcendental character" (Tait 1876, 6)—best
developed, Tait explains, through symbolical analytical methods, such as quaternions.
From a Whig historical perspective, the historian might wonder why Tait nowhere links his account
of "space" and Riemannian geometry to his quaternion mathematics, as Clifford would later do,
given that he was clearly aware of Riemann's ideas. Recall the initial "spark" that led Tait to reread
Hamilton's Lectures (1853). In so far as experiments had revealed anything about spatial ontology,
Tait considered "vortex-atoms" to be the most credible model to adopt. Informed by Helmholtz and
Thomson's early conceptions of vortex-atoms, Tait's view of the structure of the universe favoured a
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vortex account, in which physical phenomena are the result of molecular interactions, as opposed to
spatial curvature—a point that Clifford had, by this point, already speculated upon. Tait writes in his
Lectures (1876), Helmholtz's mathematics and Thomson's physical speculations on the fundamental
structures of the universe were "by far the most fruitful in consequences of all the suggestions that
have hitherto been made as to the ultimate nature of matter." Helmholtz had hypothesized that a
vortex-ring could take on any "internal filament" shape. Rather than a simple circle, the ring could be
composed of any number of internal knots. Convinced by Helmholtz's account, Tait felt that complex
rotating structures likely constituted the foundation of the entire universe's microscopic structure.
"Matter may really be only the rotating portions of something which fills the whole of space; that is
to say, vortex-motion of any everywhere present fluid," Tait writes.
Helmholtz had initially mathematized the properties of such "vortex-motion" "in a most beautiful
investigation, in which he broke ground in a department of hydro-kinetics, the difficulties of which,
up to his time, had kept mathematicians almost completely aloof" (Tait 1876, 290). And what
impresses Tait so deeply about that account of atomic structure was its potential to serve as an
absolute model for spatial structure. He claims,
Especially does it give us a glimpse, at least, of an explanation of the extraordinary fact,
that every atom of any one substance, wheresoever we find it, whether on earth or in
the sun, or in meteorites coming to us from cosmical spaces, or in the farthest distant
stars of nebulae, possesses precisely the same physical properties. So convinced are we,
by experiment and observation, that hydrogen, in the farthest nebulae, in the farthest
stellar system, vibrates (when heated) in precisely the same fundamental modes, and in
precisely the same periods, as it does in a Geissler's vacuum-tube in our laboratories;
that, as we have already seen, any apparent exception to this is hailed as a certain
source of information about the relative motion of such bodies with regard to the earth,
and in some cases may give an invaluable method of obtaining their actual distances
from us (Tait 1876, 291).
When vortex rings are forced to collide, Tait explains, they behave by producing shapes that are not
in equilibrium. Because a "circle" is the vortex-ring's most stable state, an elliptical or square vortex-
ring is seen to "vibrate about that circular form as about a position of equilibrium" (Tait 1876, 292).




r (Tait 1876, 292)
Tait states then that quaternions are an exceptionally useful means of describing vortex-motion in
the universe.
It is not, therefore, that Riemannian geometry was unknown to Tait, or that he deemed it
unimportant. It is, rather, that the notion of non-Euclidean geometrical structures came into Tait's
worldview long after Helmholtz and Thomson had already established vortex-atoms a concept by
which Tait could comfortably define ontological matter, and mathematize its structure. Hence, we
find that in Tait's Lectures, in the two chapters on the "structure of matter", non-Euclidean geometry
is not mentioned once. Rather, the various accounts of the "atom"—as either soft and malleable, or
hard and individualized—offer a detailed account of what Tait takes to be the most fruitful and
promising version of microscopic ontology, i.e. "vortex-atoms". Quaternion symbolism fit well within
this "physical" view, as it succinctly describes rotations of rigid body motion at microscopic levels.
Because the vortex-ring is constantly rotating about its core (the outer portion is moving
"backwards" while the inner portion is moving "forwards"), it is easy to see why Tait felt quaternion
mathematics were particularly useful in describing the motion of such rings in nature.
(Tait 1876, 296)
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As Tait argues, the subject of such "rotary fluid motion is such a forbidding one, from a purely
mathematical point of view," and
to investigate what takes place when one circular vortex-atom impinges upon another,
and the whole motion is not symmetrical about an axis, is a task which may employ
perhaps the lifetimes, for the next two or three generations, of the best mathematicians
in Europe (Tait 1876, 298).
And despite the difficulties he himself had encountered in pursuing quaternion descriptions of
vortex motion, Tait alludes to quaternions in the pursuit of those difficult mathematical
speculations, by insisting,
Some mathematical method, enormously more powerful than anything we at present
have [must] be devised for the purpose of solving this special problem. This is no doubt
a very formidable difficulty, but it is the only one which seems for the moment to attach
to the development of this extremely beautiful speculation; and it is the business of
mathematicians to get over difficulties of that kind (Tait 1876, 298).
At the time of writing, Tait had already authored his final chapter in the Introduction to Quaternions
(1873), in which he had emphasized the use of quaternions in describing problems of "strain"—a
phenomenon that represents the sort of distortions that vortex-structures experience in their non¬
uniform and asymmetrical motions about the vortex filament. Tait thus used his 1876 lectures to
enjoin his students to pursue such new and "powerful" mathematical techniques in their scientific
enquiries.
Presbyterian politics and Tait's attack on agnosticism
Tait's particular religious views fed into these mathematical and thermo-dynamical views. As already
mentioned, Tait, along with Thomson and other northern scientists of "energy", viewed the
"conservation" and "dissipation" of "energy" as both scientific fact and moral revelation. One
significant outcome of this belief system, at least on Tait's part, was his public and vitriolic defense
of the all-mighty creator—a theme that became most prominent in his published works in the 1870s
(for a more detailed account of the Scottish Kirk politics that fed into this terrain, see Appendix Five).
An early indication of Tait's vocal religious identity appears in his public debate with John Tyndall,
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then professor of natural philosophy at the Royal Institution. Tyndall had spent years as a surveyor
and teacher of general science before obtaining his doctoral degree at the University of Marburg in
Germany. A critic of the dual concepts of "conservation" and "dissipation", defined by the
northerners, Tyndall argued the notions were religious stand-ins for scientific theory. They
engendered an all-mighty god who was able to randomly intervene to alter any state of affairs. To
Tyndall this was metaphysics—not science. Tyndall chose to delegitimize the northerners' claim to
being the progenitors of "energy" science by locating the origins of the concept of "conservation of
energy" in the works of a German scientist, instead. In a speech "On Force," delivered to the Royal
Institution on June 6, 1862, Tyndall argued the notions related to the transference and conservation
of "energy" ought to be accredited to the German, J.R. Mayer, as opposed to Joule or his colleagues
in Scotland. Joule had initially posited experimental relationship between work and heat in the
1840s. Indeed, it was Joule's work on heat relations that attracted Thomson to the subject, when the
former published his 1843 article, "On the Mechanical Value of Heat." Tyndall recognized Joule's
claims, but he qualified them by saying Mayer had, in fact, already calculated the mechanical
equivalent of heat "from the velocity of sound in air" in 1842 (Lloyd 1970, 212).
What ensued was a battle for legitimacy fought out on the pages of various publications. The effort
to legitimate the emergent field of "thermodynamics" as a Scottish affair was no small business
(Smith 1998). It not only engendered a claim to fame on part of the actors involved, but it also
implied a right to generate wealth on the basis of corollary and marketable patents or textbooks.
Tait, therefore, urged Thomson to respond to Tyndall's unprecedented attribution of primacy and
originality to Mayer. The result was an article entitled "Energy," co-authored by Thomson and Tait
and published in the October issue of Good Words, a religiously-minded family publication. That
article reconstructed the history of "energy" by relegating to Mayer a minor role. Tait and Thomson
wrote,
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It especially startles us that the recent attempts to place Mayer in a position which he
never claimed [read creator of the heat-work relationship], and which had long before
been taken by another [read Joule], should have support within the very walls wherein
Davy propounded his transcendental theories (Lloyd 1970, 216).
In Tyndall's responded to the Good Words article, the Irishman pointed out the religious and non-
scientific nature of the publication in which Tait and Thomson had published their article. Tyndall, an
open agnostic, claimed he had been tardy in responding to the article, because the authors had
made such a poor choice in choosing Good Words as their publishing vehicle. Tyndall wrote,
When ... it is known that the other articles in the number to which I refer, bear such
titles as "The Childhood of Jesus," "The Trial Sermon," "The Bands of Love," "At Home
with the Scriptures," & etc. I think I may be excused if the article on Energy, in the
scientific sense of the word, imbedded in such matter as those titles indicate, escaped
my attention (Lloyd 1970, 216).
Tait and Thomson's claims were not proper science, Tyndall claimed, given that they had chosen to
publish in a non-scientific and non-credible journal. A public debate between Tait and Tyndall
ensued for months.
This public controversy was just one of many instances that indicate the manner in which Tait's
Scottish Presbyterianism overlapped with his other terrains of mathematical and natural
philosophical knowledge throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Presbyterian politics had come to inform
Tait's approach to science and mathematics in profound ways. One means of describing the manner
in which it did so is to appeal to Tait's jointly authored The Unseen Universe (1875).97 That text was
co-authored by Balfour Stewart (1828-1887), a former assistant to Forbes in Edinburgh and director
of Kew Observatory. Following a train accident that left Stewart severely disabled, he was appointed
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In 1874, Tyndall delivered his presidential address before the BAAS at Belfast, at which point he expounded upon the
links between evolutionary theories of the universe and thermodynamical principles of energy. Following Tyndall's
speech, a rumour began to spread around the University of Edinburgh that Tait was engaged in writing a book that
would "overthrow materialism by a purely scientific argument" (Knott 1911, 236). Although initially published
anonymously, "Tait's scientific style" and his "views of the historic development of the modern theory of energy" made
it evident to many of his first readers that he was, indeed, the author, along with Balfour Stewart. The work became so
popular that by 1876 Tait and Stewart had released a fourth edition with their names on the title page. The fourth
edition included an introduction not present in the first, which explained in explicit language the motivation for writing
the book and the objectives of the book. Tait and Stewart introduced that section in response to critics who had, in their
view, failed to understand the proper intention of the authors. A sixth edition was released by the end of the same year
(Knott 1911, 236-237).
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to a professorship of physics at Owens College, Manchester. His publications centred on radiation
and magnetism; following the accident, however, he also began to write profusely on metaphysical
matters in seeking theological justifications for science. Like Tait, Stewart was also imbued with an
evangelical pride in post-Disruption Scottish Presbyterianism. The politics of the Free and
Established kirks in Scotland manifested themselves in Stewart's life choices. A deeply religious man
who believed in an ultimate creator and who disdained nascent "secular" theories of human
evolution, which had begun to dominate English social discourse in the mid-1860s, Stewart was all
too willing to present a theological account of "energy" science. Tait and Stewart produced the
anonymously authored Unseen Universe as a means of describing scientific discovery as the slow
revelation of Divine power. By 1876, the book had become wildly popular. Just one year after its
initial publication, the authors issued a revised 6th edition, though this time their names appeared on
the byline.
In the preface to their 6th edition, Tait and Stewart clarify that, although their scientific claims rely
heavily upon the unquestioned truth of the "Principle of Continuity", which they hold to mean that
nothing is created or destroyed instantaneously, the authors do not,
assert the eternity of stuff or matter, for that would denote an unauthorized application
to the invisible universe of the experimental law of the conservation of matter which
belongs entirely to the present system of things (Stewart and Tait 1876, vii).98
In other words, empirical knowledge is sound and trustworthy, though it is inherently temporal. It is
transient and subject to the whim of the creator. Assertions of the absolute existence of any
scientific law or object conceptually usurp the central figure of God. The premise of the book is the
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Tait and Stewart note their surprise and annoyance at the misuse of their words a year after first publishing the Unseen
Universe. "Pages of so-called 'extracts' from our book have been strung together, now by some writers of the High
Church school, anon by writers of the very lowest Evangelical type, in each case with absolute disregard of their original
collocation and surroundings, and the result is of course as utterly unfair a representation of our meaning as could
possibly be given," they write. "These 'extracts,' which are always scrupulously enclosed in inverted commas, are not
merely altered in meaning by being arbitrarily detached from the context—they are often altered by the insertion of
terms (e.g. luminiferous force!) which we, as scientific men, could not possibly have employed" (Tait and Stewart 1876,
ix). A study of the uses of the Unseen Universe, and the varied responses it evoked both popularly and within the closed
circles of scientific practice, would indicate the degree to which the scientific community of Britain in the 1870s was
composed of a heterogeneity of religious opinions, many of which shaped scientific outputs in fundamental ways.
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simple claim that "Science" and "Religion" are not incompatible foes. This "ought to be self-evident
to all who believe that the Creator of the Universe is Himself the Author of Revelation," the authors
write.
Yet, agnostic and atheist accounts of scientific phenomena had unduly "alarm[ed] even the firmest
of human faith" (Stewart and Tait 1876, ix). To counter the agnostic views then becoming popular,
Stewart and Tait contend they are not propounding a simplistic argument from design. It is not the
case that an appreciation of nature—even a detailed, experimental appreciation—necessarily tells
one anything about the nature of God's mind. Rather, "The statements in the New Testament
scriptures regarding God are necessarily mysterious," but the "mystery can be no test of their truth
or falsehood, inasmuch as it must in such regions be the almost inevitable accompaniment of truth."
Rather,
The question is not whether they are mysterious, but whether they are consistent with
themselves, and with the knowledge we derive from other sources. We therefore
devote considerable portions of this volume to a proof that the conception of god which
the majority of Christians derive from the New Testament is in no way inconsistent with
that deduced from scientific principles (Stewart and Tait 1876,19).
The conclusion they came to is that, insofar as "continuity" and the "conservation of energy" hold
true, there must be life after death.
The "unseen universe" contains that "energy" that is temporally visible in the "seen universe", but
which is invisible once it dissipates from "potential" to final "kinetic" forms. What ultimately forms
the "kinetic" universe beyond the observed cannot be determined by any experimental findings or
any natural philosophical musing. The reconciliation between science and religion indicates that
revelation compliments scientific data rather than opposing it. The "disbelievers in such a doctrine"
(specifically, in the doctrine of life after death) "form a minority," the authors recognize, and,
at the same time it must be acknowledged that the strength of this minority has of late
years greatly increased, so much so that at the present moment it numbers in its ranks
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not a few of the most intelligent, the most earnest, and the most virtuous of men
(Stewart and Tait 1876, 23-24).
Interesting for the present study is the fact that the words "mathematics" and "algebra" appear
rarely in The Unseen Universe. In fact, the only mention of "mathematics" that appears in the text is
at the end of the text, where the authors quote William Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), who, in his
Principles of Science: a Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method (1874), had stated the benevolence of
an almighty power is constantly in question given that even the slightest experience of pain or
sorrow suggests God is not so benevolent after all. Jevons had also noted the philosophically
problematical nature of non-Euclidean geometries, arguing "If we cannot succeed in avoiding
contradiction in our notions of elementary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate purposes of
existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clearness?" (Stewart and Tait 1876, 254).
Jevons concluded, therefore, that we are "finite minds" attempting to understand "infinite
problems", and we are constantly faced with illogical outcomes in the form of disharmonies. For
Stewart and Tait, however, these "disharmonies" are not proof of linguistic, experimental or
mathematical "illogic". They are mere proof of the limitations of human knowledge, and they
necessitate a belief in the "unseen universe", where the contradictions of illogic are unraveled.
The lack of much mathematical discussion in The Unseen Universe might strike the reader as odd,
given that both Stewart and Tait were trained mathematicians and given that both had devoted
significant portions of careers to the elaboration of mathematical techniques and mathematized
physical phenomena. The omission is not so surprising, though, when considered in light of Stewart
and Tait's aim in writing the book. Their primary aim was to publish a popular book for wide-spread
consumption, not a textbook or treatise. We find, therefore, no detailed mathematical formulae or
even mathematical representations of thermo-dynamical processes. We do find a segment on the
historical rise of "energy" science, where mathematical objects are discussed in colloquial terms. For
example, Stewart and Tait begin by making the experimental claim that "Experience of the most
varied kind consistently shows us that we cannot produce or destroy even the smallest quantity of
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matter" (Stewart and Tait 1876, 101). The authors discuss other mathematics in general terms by
referring to the heroic role of scientists, such as Hamilton, whose notion of directed magnitudes had
come to play an important part in describing the physical phenomena that experimentalists had
observed over the past "thirty or forty years." In the story of historical progress from vis viva to
"energy of motion," or "kinetic energy," scientists had been given a helping hand by the
mathematical tool of directed quantities, which Hamilton had discovered.
More importantly, however, the Unseen Universe and its religious underpinnings explain why Tait
attacked Clifford's Elements of Dynamics and his Common Sense of the Exact Sciences in the 1880s—
two books that propounded Clifford's views on quaternion and bi-quaternion mathematics. Tait was
not opposed to Clifford's mathematical claims, although they differed in many ways from Tait's own
claims. He was opposed, rather, to Clifford's religious views—or, rather, the lack thereof. When
Clifford read the first anonymous edition of the Unseen Universe, he responded to it in no uncertain
terms (see Chapter Four). Indeed, Clifford led many agnostic attacks on metaphysics and any
attempt to relate divinity to scientific knowledge. Tait reflected upon Clifford's harsh reviews in a
letter written to Roberston Smith, a theologian and scholar of Semitism, on June 5th, 1875. Tait
wrote,
You have of course seen Clifford's painful essay in the Fortnightly Review ... [and] an
advanced ritualist, MacColl, has cracked us up in a letter to the Guardian last week. This
week the Spiritualist said that with a few slight changes the book would be an excellent
text-book for its clients. The Edinburgh Daily Review says we are subtle and dangerous
materialists. Hanna (late of Free St John's here) says "the work is the most important
defense of religion that has appeared for a long time." Which of these is nearest the
truth (Knott 1911, 239)?
Tait's Presbyterian brand of Christianity had, by the mid-1870s, formed an integral part of his
identity as a natural philosopher and mathematician. In 1878, for instance, Tait chose to further
defend this Presbyterian progression in an article published in the International Review (November
1878), entitled "Does Humanity demand a New Revelation?" He contended,
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It would therefore appear, from the most absolutely common-sense view—independent
of all philosophy and speculation—that the only religion which can have a rational claim
on our belief must be one suited equally to the admitted necessities of the peasant and
of the philosopher. And this is one specially distinguishing feature of Christianity. While
almost all other religious creeds involve an outer sense for the uneducated masses and
an inner sense for the more learned and therefore dominant priesthood, the system of
Christianity appeals alike to the belief of all; requiring of all that, in presence of their
common Father, they should sink their fancied superiority one over another, and frankly
confessing the absolute unworthiness which they can not but feel, approach their
Redeemer with the simplicity and confidence of little children.
To question the underpinnings of God in science, or scientific development, is to futilely act against
the fundamental ignorance of humanity. As we will see in the next chapter, Clifford attempts to do
just that. And so, insofar as Tait opposed Clifford's mathematical works, it was an opposition that
emerged from Tait's navigations through a deeply religious terrain of Scottish Presbyterian belief—a
terrain that equipped him with a particular sense of what constituted moral thinking, in
mathematics and otherwise.
Conclusion
From studying symbolical algebra at Cambridge to working as an experimental natural philosopher in
Scotland, Tait trod upon multiple overlapping "terrains of knowledge" in his intellectual pursuits.
Despite Tait's detailed correspondences with Hamilton, he did not engage with quaternions exactly
as Hamilton had. Whereas Hamilton had emphasized the symbolical algebraic aspects of quaternions
in order legitimate his work in the eyes of his British colleagues at Cambridge, Tait did not question
the symbolical underpinnings to quaternion analysis. The symbolical algebraic nature of quaternions
was, to him at least, an unquestioned given. As a budding young mathematician, Tait's immediate
focus was, rather, on writing textbooks for the Tripos-oriented culture at Cambridge. Quaternions
started off as a potentially lucrative research topic for Tait; they satisfied a need to professionalize
through publications and to produce money-making textbooks so as to draw in students to Tait and
Kelland's lectures at the University of Edinburgh. By the mid-1860s, Tait viewed quaternions as a
potential tool in thermodynamics; their efficiency and simplicity were representative of a more
moral form of waste-avoiding mathematics.
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Tait's engagements with quaternions varied according to the prominence of the particular terrains of
knowledge that he was navigating through at certain points in his career. Those terrains equipped
him with the symbolic algebraic tools he needed to engage with quaternions meaningful and also
the conceptual resources required to reinterpret quaternions, as he did later in his career. In
explaining why Tait engaged with quaternions from the 1850s to his 1880s criticism of Clifford, the
historian must appeal to those terrains (i.e. the symbolical algebraic, professional, thermodynamic,
and moral terrains) that provided him with a realm of possible and legitimate actions, and which also
motivated him to use quaternions in ways that he felt were reasonable and meaningful.
Clifford used many of Tait's claims with regards to quaternions in specific ways. He also rejected
many of Tait's other, mostly religious, claims. It is to Clifford that we turn now to understand how he
engaged with quaternions while navigating through entirely different "terrains of knowledge" and
how he therefore defined, analyzed and utilized quaternions in unique ways.
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Chapter Four: William Kingdon Clifford and quaternion
engagements, 1863 to 1879
Introduction
From the rise of Darwinist discourse to the laying of the Transatlantic cable, mid-Victorian British
society was caught up in a storm of conceptual reorganizations and neo-categorizations. Biologists
reclassified the organic history of humans; medical doctors responded to popular imagery that
reordered the contemporary body;99 and the national government (of William Gladstone) sought to
recast poverty, penury and social decay as communal problems in need of government intervention.
The reorganization of gender roles meant that women—their bodies, their intellects and their
professional aptitudes—became a matter of debate in unprecedented ways. John Stuart Mill (1806-
1873) advocated for the rights of women in theoretical form, and Florence Nightingale (1820-1910)
put words into action by successfully raising over £50,000 to open a professional school of nursing
for female students at St. Thomas' Hospital. Meanwhile, the secular environment of UCL constituted
the first non-ecclesiastical environment to test Mill and Mary Wollstonecraft's (1759-1797) theories
about the admittance of female students on equal academic terms.100 Throughout Britain, class- and
gender-based hierarchies were facing pressure to reform.
The rise in popular science literature also opened up new domains in citizen engagement, forcing
scientists, mathematicians and educationalists to take up disputes within the cultural settings of
community lecture halls and quotidian publications. Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), Alfred
Russel Wallace, (1823 -1913), Tyndall, Tait and Clifford all took up the challenge. Others, including
notable members of the Royal Society and the BAAS, reacted in reactionary ways, seeking to define
science by its aloofness and independence from popular modes of expression (Lightman 1997).
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The publication in 1866 of a picture depicting Jean Battista dos Santos with an extra leg and two penises, for instance,
became a site of cultural dispute between established medical practitioners who sought to safeguard traditional
categories of the "body" and "medicine", and populist critics who sought to establish anomalies as standards for new
norms (Gates 1997).
100
UCL first opened its degree-granting doors to women in 1878; King's College came under pressure to do the same, and
finally opened its Ladies' Department of King's in Kensington Square in 1885.
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Throughout this period, Britain also experienced deep-rooted political and economic
transformations initiated by Gladstone (1809-1898). As leader of the Liberal Party, and Prime
Minister from 1868, Gladstone defined a socio-political milieu which formed consensus around
issues of national elementary schooling, justice reforms, civil service reforms, and home-rule for
Ireland. Though defeated in 1874 by the Conservative Benjamin Disraeli, Gladstone continued to act
as a vocal and passionate critic of government policy,101 lambasting Disraeli's disastrous approach in
Turkey's Eastern European escapade (then known as the "Eastern Crisis"), and criticizing British
support for Turkish military repression in the Balkan states. Gladstone's efforts to uphold the rights
of minorities served as a defining theme throughout his years in power. It was during Gladstone's
initial years as Prime Minister, for example, that that the country sought to redress the rampant
poverty and religious segregation that individualistic Victorian ideals had entrenched in the
collective psyche as personal, rather than social or national, problems.
It was during the Gladstonian administration that humanitarian-esque organizations, such as the
Century Club (1865-1881), also saw their most active years. The Century Club involved an elite group
of politically active men, many of whom had graduated from Balliol College (Oxford) or Trinity
College (Cambridge), and many of whom were active lawyers, journalists or social theorists
throughout the 1870s. One of the club's mandates was to serve as a catalyst for university reform-
its primary objective being to transform Oxford and Cambridge as "bastions of Anglican privilege into
non-sectarian centres of scholarly excellence" (Kent 2008a). Among the club's members were Walter
Bagehot (1826-1877) and Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), both of whom were writers for the
Saturday Review. Writers for other publications, such as the Fortnightly Review, the Cornhill
Magazine, Macmillan's Magazine and The Reader (edited by Herbert Spencer) also populated club
ranks. The metaphysical views of members varied, but they were predominantly liberal and agnostic.
Vocal members, such as the parliamentarian Lord Amberley (formerly John Russell), used the club as
a soapbox upon which to lobby for the provision of contraception, while others, including the English
101
Gladstone was elected back into power in 1880.
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critic and essayist, Walter Pater (1839-1894), the writer, Albert Osliff Rutson (1838-1890), and the
reporter for the Pall Mall Gazette, John Addington Symonds, used it to preach the virtues of political
homophilia. Other members used the club to advocate for the northern political cause in the
American civil war, to demand reform to the British monarchy, and to push for the protection of
trade unions across the country.
Another Gladstonian organization—and one in which Clifford was an active member—was the
Metaphysical Society (1869-1880). Boasting a membership of 62 people who were public figures
across Britain's philosophical, moral, scientific and theological spectrum, the Metaphysical Society
was founded by the architect and impresario, James Knowles (1831-1908), friend of Alfred
Tennyson. The apparent inspiration for the group came from Tennyson's experience with
Cambridge's Apostles Club (Kent 2008b). Knowles devised the idea of creating a London-based
organization similar to the Apostles in which emergent debates over the theological and moral
implications of Darwinian, Huxleyan, Spencerian and Millian views could be hashed out. Some well-
known potential participants declined membership, including Mill, Spencer, and the financier and
creator of the journal Mind, Alexander Bain. Others joined eagerly. They included Huxley, Bagehot,
Tennyson, the utilitarian philosopher, Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), the jurist and legal affairs author,
Frederick Pollock (1845-1937), and Gladstone himself.102 Over the course of the decade, Clifford
delivered three papers to the Metaphysical Society, all of which advanced a materialist conception
of "mind," in which "mind" was presented as nothing other than a conglomeration of contiguous
particles and energy transference.
Prominent discourses in Britain reflected the re-ordering, restructuring and recasting of "nature"
and its concomitant social categories. Not surprisingly, Clifford's religious and metaphysical outlooks
underwent serious and irrevocable change from his inculcation into Cambridge in 1863 to his early
death as a UCL professor of mathematics in 1879. Clifford's involvement in societies that lobbied for
102
Gladstone chaired the society from 1874 to 1875.
247
more democratic educational provisions—including the improved provision of university education
for working-class men and women—put him in opposition to cohorts of more established members
within the country's burgeoning scientific community. But it also opened doors to communication
with members of those groups that sought more profound alteration to scientific practice, in
particular those influential agnostics and supporters of the theory of natural selection who had
formed the exclusive dinner club known as the "X-Club". Clearly, Clifford navigated through various
"terrains of knowledge" throughout his short career as a student at Cambridge, and later as a
professional mathematician in London. While a student at Cambridge in the mid-1860s, Clifford had
been exposed to a symbolical algebraic curriculum heavily defined by the second generation of
algebraists, such as Cayley and Sylvester. By the 1870s, however, Clifford's mathematical training at
Cambridge had become contoured by his wider socio-political interests. After receiving his M.A., for
instance, Clifford sailed with an English expedition to observe the solar eclipse in December. His ship
hit poor weather and was ship-wrecked near Catania, Italy, but despite the life-threatening nature of
the voyage, Clifford never expressed regret for embarking on the trip. If anything, it motivated his
interest in developing theories in physics and astronomy, as well as geology, evolution and
experimental science more generally.
As Clifford first encountered quaternions in the late-1860s, he did so while navigating through the
"terrains" of Cambridge symbolical algebra and Darwinism—both of which he was exposed to as a
young student in the middle of the decade. Not surprisingly, Clifford adopted a sense of
conventionalism in mathematics, which was based on the idea that, because humans are constantly
evolving, our symbolical equivalences cannot be deemed a priori, universally true or "permanent,"
as Peacock would have had it. By the end of the decade, that belief developed into to a sense of
Riemannian-inspired "empiricism" in symbolical analysis. For Clifford, it was not enough to just
interpret symbolical analysis after the fact, as De Morgan would have it. Rather, the mathematician
ought to try to understand spatial ontology in his mathematical manipulations. Hence, Clifford
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developed his understanding of symbolical geometry as a series of "steps in space"—a concept that
came to define his pedagogically-minded accounts of quaternion mathematics in the 1870s. Thus,
the "terrain of knowledge" identified here as "non-Euclidean geometries in Britain" also played a
significant role in contouring his engagements with quaternions. By the 1870s, Clifford entered into
a final "terrain of knowledge", identified here as the educational structure of University College,
which led him to publish textbooks on his "dynamics," i.e. his quaternion mathematics. In order to
understand why Clifford engaged with quaternions in the symbolical algebraic, conventionalist and,
even, empiricist ways that he did over the course of those two decades, the historian must appeal to
these overlapping "terrains" in Clifford's life—"terrains" that constituted an intricate and complex
conceptual topology through which Clifford navigated over the course of his brief career.
Clifford's early education, a briefoverview (1860-1868)
Born in Exeter, William Kingdon Clifford (1845-1879) grew up in a single-parent household after his
mother died from childbirth. His father, a justice of the peace named William Clifford, sent Clifford
to Templeton's school in Exeter for his initial studies. Clifford then moved to King's College, London
in 1860 at the age of 15. He spent the next three years of his life studying a curriculum based on
classics, mathematics, and natural philosophy (including some experimental courses). This part of
Clifford's early education is interesting as it provided him with fertile preparation for his later move
to Cambridge. By the 1860s, King's College had become a historically interesting institution in its
own right. It was initially established in 1829, by the Duke of Wellington, then Prime Minister, with
the support of King George IV. The primary motivation behind its foundation was the establishment
of an alternative, urban, London-based university that could rival the secular "Godless college in
Gower Street"—namely University College, London, which had been founded a few years earlier in
1826. King's College was established with the specific aim of advancing and entrenching the Church
of England's doctrine. It underwent a significant realignment in its curricular duties in 1836 when,
together with UCL, it formed the University of London—an institution with the explicit aim of
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educating working- and middle-class men. King's nonetheless retained a specifically religious
mandate.
By the time Clifford entered its halls in 1860, King's had become one of the pre-eminent urban
colleges in the country, where men from working- and middle-class backgrounds could gain an
education in a variety of subjects. Just as University College, London had been influenced by the
broad-based and liberally-minded Scottish curriculum (many Scots, including Brewster, had aided in
the formation of UCL's original liberal arts curriculum), King's had been established with a Scots
curriculum in mind. Though many of its students aimed for a career in the Anglican Church, the
university also became an urban conduit through which young men, such as Clifford, could train in
their teenage years in preparation for entry to Cambridge's undergraduate program.
By 1860, King's could claim the special ability to aid students in this regard. The university had
appointed Maxwell to the post of Professor of Natural Philosophy, which he held from 1860 to 1865.
Maxwell was able to pass on his skills as Senior Wrangler to help prepare students for the Tripos-
oriented curriculum at Cambridge. According to Maxwell's correspondences, although the syllabus
for his lectures at King's in the first session of 1860 followed the general syllabus used by his
predecessor, Thomas M. Goodeve (1821-1902), who had authored Elements of Mechanism (1860),
Maxwell made sure to add an emphasis on "fundamental principles," including lectures on
mechanics, "properties of matter," and characteristics of heat. He also supplemented his lectures
with mathematical analyses of the same topics. Whereas Goodeve had devoted much time in his
second and third-year classes to astronomy and mechanics, Maxwell offered advanced courses in
mathematics that included rigid body dynamics, the motion of an incompressible fluid and its
applications to electricity and magnetism, as well as accounts of waves and their applications to
sound and light.103 King's, therefore, provided Clifford with a strong foundation in analytical
1
In the 1861-62 session, Maxwell deleted his mathematical lectures from his elementary classes, citing the toll that
teaching duties were taking on him. Over the course of the five years that he was at King's, his classes began to
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mathematics prior to his entry to Cambridge. Given its Anglican orientation, and Maxwell's
conservative religious views, King's did not challenge any of Clifford's religious beliefs.
With a King's College education in hand, and High Churchman beliefs firmly in mind, Clifford entered
the halls of Cambridge University as a student at Trinity College. His aim was to complete a
mathematical degree in the hopes of securing social and financial security. But as Pollock recounts in
his later biography of Clifford, the young mathematician-in-the-making was also "reputed with truth
[to be] an ardent High Churchman" (Clifford 1886, 2). Within the evolving and socially active
atmosphere of Cambridge's undergraduate life, Clifford soon began to diversify his extra-curricular
activities and his metaphysical belief structures began to crumble. He became an active athlete at
the university and a vocal member in various student organizations.104 He was exposed to varying
anti-Church reformist attitudes and a plethora of critical literature in socio-political and educational
matters. His High Churchman attitudes faded away and were replaced by distinct anti-Church
sentiments. Pro-Darwinist discourse entered his vocabulary and, by 1866, Clifford was awarded the
college declamation prize for an oration on Sir Walter Raleigh. He was elected to the university
debating club and the Cambridge Conversazione Society (another name for the Apostles Club),
where he was exposed to vigorous and lively debate related to Darwin's Origin of Species (1859), as
well as the works of Spencer, Mill, Benedict de Spinoza and Guiseppe Mazzini. In his biographical
sketch, Pollock notes that the literary exposure Clifford experienced at Cambridge altered his
opinions on most religious matters. They shattered his High Church Anglicanism and instilled the
increasingly focus on matters of sound, light and radiant heat, the properties of bodies "as affected by pressure and
heat" and "magnetism and electricity" (Maxwell 1990, 3).
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Pollock recalls Clifford taking more pleasure from an account of his athletic ability in Bell's Life than from accounts of his
academic prizes. Pollock also recalls Clifford writing to him in 1869, as a fellow at Trinity, saying "I [Clifford] am at
present in a very heaven of joy because my corkscrew was encored last night at the assault of arms: it consists in running
a fixed upright pole which you seize with both hands and spin round and round descending in a corkscrew fashion."
Perhaps not unlike other Cambridge men at the time, for whom undergraduate education was also a time of generating
long-lasting friendships, Clifford and Pollock engaged in the stunts normal to young people engaged in the process of
maturation. As Pollock recalls, "[Clifford's] nerve at dangerous heights was extraordinary. I am appalled now to think
that he climbed up and sat on the cross bars of the weathercock on a church tower, and when by way of doing
something worse I went up and hung by my toes to the bars he did the same" (Clifford 1886, 5).
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young man with a deep-rooted belief in agnosticism—a belief that would last throughout the
remainder of his adult life.
By 1867, Clifford emerged from his Cambridge training ranked Second Wrangler on the Tripos exam
(and second Smith's Prizeman). Opinions on his standing were mixed. While many of Clifford's
athletics friends were amazed that he had achieved as high a rank as Second Wrangler (given his
apparent lack of study time and his explicit devotion to sporting activities) (Lewis 2006), Clifford's
coach, Percival Frost (1817-1898) (Senior Wrangler, 1839), had actually expected Clifford to rank
first. Frost accredited Clifford's second-place finish not only to his abundant engagement in non-
curricular activities, but also to his lack of adherence to the standard mathematical curriculum.
Indeed, as Pollock recalls of Clifford's undergraduate days,
Clifford's mathematical course at Cambridge was a struggle between the
exigencies of the Tripos and his native bent for independent reading and research
going far beyond the subjects of the examination; and the Tripos had very much
the worse of it. If there was any faculty in which he was entirely wanting, it was
the examination-faculty ... it is my belief that, from the point of view to which the
class-list is an end in itself, Clifford omitted most of the things he ought to have
read, and read everything he ought not to have read (Clifford 1886, 9).
Another one of Clifford's teachers, James Joseph Sylvester (1814-1897), concurred in the matter. In a
letter to Pollock, Sylvester writes,
I believe there is little doubt that he [Clifford] might easily have been first of his
year had he chosen to devote himself exclusively to the University curriculum
instead of pursuing his studies, while still an undergraduate, in a more extended
field, and with a view rather to self-culture than to the acquisition of immediate
honour or emolument (Clifford 1886, 9-10).
That is not to say Clifford failed to engage with his Tripos training. On the contrary, Clifford's early
mathematical publications from 1863 to 1867 (all produced while he was still an undergraduate)
indicate a deep engagement with the mathematical topics he was being taught as part of his Tripos
preparations. Flowever, Clifford's self-guided studies, including his private reading of Flerbert
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Spencer, Charles Darwin and other social and political theorists of the mid-century, provided him
with alternative conceptual resources—resources that he eventually used to recast non-Euclidean
geometries in the light of "differentiation" and "integration" in evolution. And although Clifford did
not graduate Senior Wrangler, a second-place finish was enough to garner him a fellowship at Trinity
College, which he held from 1868 to 1870. During his first public lecture as Trinity fellow, Clifford
discussed a topic entitled "On some of the conditions of mental development." In that lecture, he
elaborated upon Spencer's account of the biological evolution of the brain, demonstrating himself to
have become a Spencerian-Darwinist on most evolutionary matters, as well as a radical secularist
and a gifted orator. Socially-charged and politically abrasive speeches came to colour Clifford's
career over the course of the following decade. The issue of class-based education, as well as the
improvement of educational standards among the poor and women, increasingly entered into
Clifford's discourses, especially after he was appointed Professor of Applied Mathematics at UCL in
1871.
The University ofCambridge and the morphing ofsymbolical algebra,
1860-1870
As in Scotland, with the Scottish universities commission, England experienced a round of university
reform throughout the 1850s, embodied in the form of a Royal Commission. The commission's
report was presented to parliament in 1852, and the corollary bill was introduced to the house in
1856. That legislation sought to change the university's governing structures, by modifying
Cambridge's constitution in order to allow for the inclusion of young academics in its governing
structures. A new university council (similar to Edinburgh's new university court), was established,
and it was composed of resident masters of arts, university professors, heads of houses and higher
graduates (Heywood 1868). This restructuring maintained Cambridge's link to the Church of England,
given that the majority of the council members were still members of the clerical profession;
however, it allowed for the emergence of a prominent lay element within the professoriate, which
was now granted the ability to choose council members. The majority of new professors appointed
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to the university at the time were laypeople. Many of Cambridge's colleges had, in fact, already
moved toward eliminating religious testing for their fellowships, but the trend was officially
institutionalized in a recommendation to do so by the 1856 commission.105 Smaller colleges,
meanwhile, continued to struggle with the newly secular norms. As Heywood (1868) has concluded:
Reform.,.seem[ed] to be most promoted in the largest colleges, and even there
the assistance of the legislature [was] needed to enable them to open their
fellowships without any subscription to the test of "conformity with the liturgy"
(Heywood 1868, 10).
Despite the resistance of the smaller colleges, and despite the fact official affiliation with the Church
of England was left untouched by the Commission, the increasingly lay nature of the professoriate
meant that students were able to engage with a diversity of literature with greater ease than ever
before from the late-1850s onwards.
College fellowships were, however, still academically elitist in nature. Fellowships to some colleges,
including Trinity, were particularly exclusive. They were generally offered only to those students who
ranked high on one of the "principal" Triposes. Potential fellows had to rank high on college-specific
exams, and only Trinity students could qualify to write the Trinity test. Criticizing this continuing
practice of exclusion and elitism, John Seeley, M.A. Fellow of Christ's College and professor of Latin,
argued in Essays on a Liberal Education (1867) that fellowships should be made available to all
university students (not just high-ranking students from particular colleges). Seeley contended a high
rank on any particular Tripos merely indicated intellectual ability in one domain, whereas "The
fellowship should be a reward of general intellectual merit." This "difficulty" could be resolved by,
requiring all the candidates assumed to be first class men, to write an English essay
upon one of several subjects put before them. In this way you might discover
105
One of the key recommendations made in 1868 by curriculum reformers was that students who had graduated from the
University of London should be offered a scholarship for entry to Trinity, given that those students (which included
attendees at both UCL and King's College) had successfully completed the university's matriculation examination. The
matriculation examination of the University of London corresponded to the former "Little-go" of Cambridge and Oxford,
respectively, and it covered the subjects of Greek and Latin, English language, English history, modern geography,
mathematics and natural philosophy, chemistry, and either French or German (Heywood 1868).
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whether the classical man had any power of thought, and the mathematician any
power of language (Heywood 1868, 6).
Seeley was not alone in feeling the Tripos culture at Cambridge had become parochial and that the
long-running college tradition of granting fellowships based on insular college examinations was
feeding an institution-wide narrow-mindedness. Cambridge was still dominated by private coaches
and private lessons that were heavily exam-oriented. The 1860s brought with it debates over
whether the university should introduce a course-fee system similar to that seen in Scottish
universities, where professors relied upon the attractiveness of their courses to draw in students. To
encourage students to demonstrate broad academic ability, Seeley lobbied for Scottish-style
lecturing, such that every college would be open to the entire body of university students, and "so
that each lecturer might be directly interested in increasing the numbers of his class, and might
receive a capitation fee for each attendant in his lecture room" (Heywood 1868, 6). An expansion in
the number and types of degrees available also occurred, as the Commission mandated that honours
degrees should be offered in law and the natural and moral sciences in addition to traditional
degrees in mathematics and the classics.106 Still, the honours degree in mathematics remained the
most lauded and most widely-recognized exam, and it was awarded only after the completion of
eight days of rigorous examination. In addition, it was the mathematics Tripos that continued to
determine the dissemination of most college fellowships.107
In terms of content, the Tripos differed little in the 1860s from its 1850s version. Clifford's exam
tested students on Euclid and conic sections; arithmetic; algebra; plane trigonometry; statics and
dynamics; hydrostatics and optics; Newton's Principia; and associated problems in astronomy and
natural philosophy (Heywood 1868, 4). The content had changed little from when Tait was a student
106
The Natural Sciences Tripos had come to include the following four branches of science: chemistry; geology; botany;
and zoology. The student could pick one of these four branches to be examined on. The university held its first
examinations in the Moral Sciences Tripos and the Natural Sciences Tripos in 1851.
107
The timing of the examination had not changed much; it was still held at the beginning of January, with the classical
Tripos following at the end of that month.
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a decade earlier. This continuity in exam content was largely due to those stringent reforms (see
Chapter Three) set in place in the 1849-1850 reform period, when the Board of Mathematical
Studies stipulated certain subjects were too "experimental" or too "poorly-founded" to be included
on the exam. In was only in 1865 that a slight alteration to the mathematical Tripos occurred, in that
the Board recommended Laplace's coefficients and the figure of the earth (considered as
heterogeneous) be added. Then, in a report dated May 8th, 1867, the Board further recommended
35 new subjects be added to the Tripos, including elliptic integrals, elastic solids, heat, electricity,
and magnetism. However, those topics would not appear on the exam until 1873—years after
Clifford had already left the elite hallways of Trinity for the urban passage ways of UCL.
If there was a "terrain of knowledge" that the historian might be led to believe was similar for both
Tait and Clifford in their respective navigations, it would have been the formal content of the Tripos
exam. However, the Tripos did not exist in a bubble. The social surroundings of Cambridge, including
the student organizations each actor participated in and the differing styles of coaching that each
actor was privy to, not to mention the disparate pre-training that Tait at Edinburgh and Clifford at
King's College would have received prior to moving to Cambridge, rendered their Tripos experiences
divergent. Despite the seemingly identical nature of their respective curricula, there were, in fact, a
number of important differences in each actor's respective Cambridge experience. One key
difference includes the individuals who served as coaches to Tait and Clifford. By the 1850s, the
renowned William Hopkins, "senior-wrangler maker," was retiring. In his place a slew of younger
coaches had emerged, many of them having been coached by Hopkins himself (or by John Hymers,
Hopkins's rival). That new generation of coach included the rising stars of mathematics at the time:
Percival Frost (Senior Wrangler, 1839); Isaac Todhunter (Senior Wrangler, 1848); William Besant
(Senior Wrangler, 1850); and Edward Routh (Senior Wrangler, 1854) (Warwick 2003, 231). Clifford
studied with the first and eldest of that new generation—namely, Percival Frost.
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Although little is known about Frost, Karl Pearson (1857-1936) was able to later compare Frost to
Routh, as Pearson had studied under both. Pearson recounted that Frost was a "dear old boy," an
engaging conversationalist who would often get sidetracked into discussions on theology,
mathematical paradoxes, or illustrations of dynamical principles. His tutoring regime was nothing
like the strict and regimented training ground established in Routh's classrooms (Warwick 2003,
237). Frost was an unusual choice as coach for someone who aimed to be top wrangler. From 1865
to 1880, Clifford was Frost's only student to achieve a rank in the top three wrangler positions. It is
possible that Clifford was attracted to Frost due to the latter's wide-ranging interests. It is also likely
that, as one of the less sought-after coaches, Frost was less expensive than Routh, and more fitting
for a modest budget. No record of Clifford's reasons for choosing Frost exists, although the fact
Clifford was awarded a "small" scholarship to go to Cambridge indicates he likely had few funds to
throw around.
The choice nonetheless ended up being a fruitful one, in both mathematical and social terms. It led,
for instance, to a long-term friendship between the two men. Frost recounts in a letter to Clifford's
posthumous biographers that,
We were capital friends, yet I was so much engaged with a large number of pupils
that I did not see very much of him except in a professional way [during Clifford's
fellowship years]. Even when he came to see me out of his working hours we used
to get upon some mathematical curiosity, and both being fond of mathematics for
their own sakes, we have often pursued our amusement into the small hours—
once between 2 and 3—for which his tutor called him to account, good-naturedly
excusing him when he heard of how he had been occupied. He often used to
amuse me by solving in his head difficult problems, when some conversation like
the following would take place. Fr. The men in the next room tell me this problem
won't come out: there must be a mistake: just read it over and tell me where the
setter has blundered. CI. (reads it over and thinks a few minutes) I see how it is, he
has, &c., &c (Clifford 1882, xvii).
Given Frost's wide-ranging metaphysical interests, it is likely he played a key role in exposing Clifford
to literature that diverged significantly from the typical stuff of Tripos studies.
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Important, also, for Clifford's mathematical upbringing was the fact that in 1863 Arthur Cayley
(1821-1895) became Sadlerian Professor (a post he held until his death in 1895). A student during
the rise of the second generation of symbolical algebraists, Cayley was at the forefront of a distinct
geometrical school in mathematics that emerged at Cambridge from 1863 to 1940 (Barrow-Green
and Gray 2006). Though Cayley had few pupils, his influence was widely felt in his rehabilitation of
developing conceptions in geometry. Cayley was not simply re-introducing "geometry" as a counter
to the rise of symbolical analysis, or re-positing it in opposition to the reigning dominance of algebra
over the previous 40 years. On the contrary, Cayley's geometry was an output of the symbolical
tradition. According to Barrow-Green and Gray (2006), Cayley ensured "a close correspondence
between the algebra and the geometry." For instance, he viewed "geometry" as including "complex
projective geometry" (Barrow-Green and Gray 2006, 317). In the 1860s, Cayley engaged in a variety
of geometrical developments, including the extension of Riemann's classification of curves. Though
Cayley was "baffled" by some of Riemann's claims, he also served as a conduit through which
students, such as Clifford, were able to access accounts of those works. Thus, Cayley's geometrical
studies formed a distinct kind of "geometrical" knowledge—something altogether different in
nature and approach from that of "geometry", as it would have been understood and taught at
more elementary levels, or even at advanced levels in previous decades.
In addition to Cayley's labours, professional publications in wide circulation at Cambridge, including
the CMJ (also known as the Cambridge and Dublin Mathematical Journal for some years), as well as
the Quarterly Journal of Applied and Pure Mathematics, hosted bouts of debate over the issue of
how to define and delineate between the new "geometry" and "symbolical algebra". The Irishman
and mathematician, George Salmon (1819-1904), as well as the Trinity mathematician, William
Walton (1813-1901), engaged in direct debate over the matter in the pages of the CMJ. While
Duncan Gregory (former editor of the CMJ) and Walton jointly argued that analytical representations
of curves could be deemed valid even when certain aspects of those symbolical representations had
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no imaginable geometrical analogue (i.e. solutions to the analytic form of a circle could have
imaginary as well as real values), Salmon contended that any analytical representation of a curve
that diverged from meaningful geometrical representation should be deemed irrelevant and even
absurd (Richards 1988, 52). The authors agreed to disagree, but their strained consensus come down
to accepting a linguistic distinction between "algebraic geometry," in which spatial structure
determines the realm of legitimate solutions, and "geometric algebra," in which symbolical
equivalences determine the realm of possible solutions. The CMJ continued to host similar debates
over the course of the 1860s and 1870s, and it was within this milieu of symbolical algebraic and
geometrical debate that Clifford was trained to identity as a "geometer"—read, a "symbolical
analytic" geometer.
As with Tait, Clifford's educational "terrain of knowledge" was the product of a profound
transformation in curriculum that had been effected at Cambridge over the first half of the century.
In an account of his Clifford's "geometry," Stephen Smith reveals the situated nature of Clifford's
mathematical practices. Reconciling Clifford's "geometrical" understanding with his "symbolical
algebraic" approach, Smith writes,
Clifford was above all and before all a geometer. Nine-tenths, and more, of the contents
of this volume [Mathematical Papers], including nearly all the systematic researches
recorded in it, are geometrical. It is true that in the treatment of geometrical questions
he shows a marked preference for symbolical methods; and, as might be expected, a
marvelous command over analytical expression. It may even be true that the limitations
involved in a scrupulous adherence to the methods of pure geometry would have been
distasteful to him. Of his skills in the use of these special methods to the "Problems and
Solutions" so liberally contributed by him to the Educational Times afford abundant
proof. But among his more elaborate papers there is perhaps but one, the "Geometry of
an Ellipsoid", which would satisfy purists of the school of Poncelet and Chasles, as being
wholly free form the contamination of analytical methods; and even in this beautiful
application of the method of stereographic projection—in the generalized sense in
which that method is used in modern pure geometry—the "imaginary circle at infinity"
occurs in the first sentence. But, whatever the method employed—and in variety of
method Clifford takes an evident pleasure—the properties of space remain the
perpetual subject of his contemplation. Purely analytical researches undertaken,
without any impulse from or reference to geometry, are few and far between (Clifford
1882, xxxvii-xxxviii).
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Over the course of his Cambridge career, Clifford approached elliptic and Abelian functions from an
analytical-geometrical perspective, and he investigated a particular proposition of Poncelet's
regarding conics, and a theorem of Cayley's regarding elliptic functions, to produce a paper entitled
"On the Transformation of Elliptic Functions," which was both geometrical and analytical in nature.
For Clifford, symbolical analysis drove geometrical investigation.
Clifford's early engagement with Poncelet and Cayley's descriptive (or "projective") approaches to
geometry indicates the consequence of taking this approach. While staunch opponents of non-
Euclidean geometry (including Cayley), saw a dichotomy emerge—one in which the mathematician
had to choose between non-Euclidean geometry or projective geometry—Clifford acted as though
no such dichotomy existed. His early musings on projective geometry were not tossed aside in
favour of his non-Euclidean interests in later years; they were, rather, employed as complementary
forms of investigation. As Smith concludes,
[Clifford] was a geometer of a type peculiarly his own; and his dealings with the
science were characterized by an amount of skepticism and an amount of faith
which one would hardly expect to find combined in a mathematician (Clifford
1882, xxxix).
Clifford's ability to navigate through these varied conceptual environments without feeling the need
to associate irrevocably with one branch of mathematics over another indicates that the Tripos-
oriented, Cambridge mathematical "terrain of knowledge" upon which he trod differed significantly
from Tait's.
Clifford's Cambridge publications, 1863-1871
When set against the background of Cambridge's tradition in symbolical analysis and its Tripos
regimentation, as well as the emerging socio-political and biological discourses popular among
Cambridge's students at the time, Clifford's contributions to professional mathematical journals in
the years spanning 1863 (his entry to Cambridge) to 1870 (his departure, following his two-year
fellowship) constitute artifacts demonstrative of the colourful education that Cambridge offered to
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its students from the mid-1860s onwards. Between 1863 and 1867, Clifford published 10 papers,
most of which broadly mapped onto the subjects he was then learning. His earliest paper, "On
Jacobians and Polar Opposites" (1863), published in The Oxford, Cambridge and Dublin Messenger of
Mathematics, explores determinants. His second paper, "Analogue's of Pascal's Theorem,"
published in the same year in The Quarterly Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics (1864),
indicates Clifford's familiarity with Cayley's work in analytical geometry. It explores, Cayley's
theorem that "Every curve of the mth order, (m not being less than n or p, nor greater than
n + p - 3), which passes through all but ^ (n + p — m — l)(n + p — m — 2) of the intersections of
two curves of the nth and pth orders, passes also through the remaining intersections" (Clifford
1882, 73).
By the time Clifford completed a year and a half of his undergraduate career, he had also produced a
paper (published in two parts, in 1865 and 1866 respectively) under the general heading "Analytical
Metrics." That article indicates Clifford's blossoming interest in the demarcation between different
"types" of geometrical knowledge. It also indicates the sort of vocabulary Clifford had, by then,
adopted and the mathematical culture into which he was being inculcated during that fluctuating
curricular period in mid-Victorian mathematics. In the tradition of Cayley, Clifford introduces his
"Analytical Metrics" paper by demarcating between two types of geometry. He writes,
Any one must have observed that there are two kinds of theorems in Geometry; one
kind having reference to position only, the other kind having reference to magnitude.
Pascal's theorem is an example of the first, or graphic geometry; Euclid is an example of
the second, or metric geometry. It may be possible to state the same theorem in two
ways, so as to make it either metric or graphic. In such a case the graphic statement may
be distinguished by the fact that it is unaltered by projection. In fact, the word graphic is
co-extensive with projective. And so, bearing in mind the properties of projection, we
may define Metric Geometry as that science which has to do with the magnitudes of
angles, distances, areas, and volumes (Clifford 1882, 81).
Clifford goes on to highlight some of the misconceptions regarding geometrical developments over
the previous few decades. He writes,
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It seems, at first sight, as if the method of coordinates, especially in its more complete
homogeneous form, were almost wholly applicable to Graphic Geometry, and
altogether unfit for the study of Metrics. And this idea is strengthened by the fact that
nearly the whole of Graphic Geometry is due to the method of coordinates, while the
science of Metrics has hitherto benefitted by it very little indeed (Clifford 1882, 81).
Clifford invokes the works of Jean-Victor Poncelet (1788-1867) to argue that all circles pass through
the same two points at infinity, and that all angles and lengths can be expressed as "graphic
functions" of those two points. He summarizes Ludwig Immanuel Magnus (1790-1861) in noting that
a "linear transformation is virtually equivalent to projection, and that graphic properties are in fact
those which are unaltered by linear transformation." All "graphic properties, therefore, may be
stated in terms of a finite number of expressions," which include "any set of loci, the invariants, or
functions of the coefficients, and covariants, or connected loci, which are unaltered by linear
transformation." In sum, metric geometry can be analytically reduced to graphic geometry and
graphic geometry is necessarily "of finite extent and exhaustible." This, Clifford contends, is the
value of "Analytical Metrics" (Clifford 1882, 81). It is an approach that can be gleaned from Cayley's
"Sixth Memoir Upon Quantics" (1859), he adds, noting that Cayley had argued metric properties
were not inherent to any given figure. Rather, metrical relations (or properties) exist only in relation
to an "absolute"—a curve that exists in a plane beyond the plane of the figure itself.
Clearly, Clifford's interest in projective geometries stems from his exposure to the works of Poncelet
and Cayley, and Cayley's "solutions" to various problems in projective geometry formed a prominent
theme in Clifford's early publications. For example, in his paper, "On Triangular Symmetry,"
published in Mathematics from the Educational Times (1865), Clifford expounds upon the projective
properties of an equilateral triangle.108 Although none of Clifford's papers up until 1867 constitute a
major production, they did collectively demonstrate his engagement with the geometrical works of
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Clifford also demonstrated an early familiarity with Salmon's geometrical work in a paper published the following year
in the same journal, entitled "On Some Extensions of the Fundamental Proposition in M. Chasles's Theory of
Characteristics." In that paper, Clifford considered a variable system of two points on a right line that are related such
that "when the second point is taken arbitrarily the first has a positions, and when the first point is taken arbitrarily, the
second has b positions; then there are a + b points on the right line at which the system of two points coalesces into
one point" (Clifford 1882, 415).This principle was extended by Salmon in the case of two dimensions, Clifford notes. In
his paper, Clifford attempts to further extend the principle to two directions and to systems of more than two points.
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Poncelet, Cayley and Salmon, as well as his familiarity with those theories of dynamics taught to him
through Routh's Elementary Treatise on the Dynamics of a System of Rigid Bodies (1860).
Meanwhile, Clifford's more popular discourses at the time indicate the degree to which Cambridge
was altering his overall philosophical outlook on life. Clifford delivered an oration in 1866, upon his
acceptance of the Trinity's College Declamation Prize, in which he offered a panegyric of the recently
deceased Master of Trinity College, William Whewell. In that oration, Clifford recounted an apologue
that reflected the nature of knowledge generation as he had then come to view it by then.
Knowledge, he argued, is the product of willingness on part of practitioners to contemplate
alternative theories and to nurture non-standard views in respective fields of study. In his oration,
Clifford narrated the following allegory:
Once upon a time—much longer than six thousand years ago—the Trilobites were the
only people that had eyes; and they were only just beginning to have them, and some
even of the Trilobites had as yet no signs of coming sight. So that the utmost they could
know was that they were living in darkness, and that perhaps there was such a thing as
light. But at last one of them got so far advanced that when he happened to come to the
top of the water in the daytime he saw the sun. So he went down and told the others
that in general the world was light, but there was one great light which caused it all.
Then they killed him for disturbing the commonwealth; but they considered it impious
to doubt that in general the world was light, and that there was one great light which
caused it all. And they had great disputes about the manner in which they had come to
know this. Afterwards another of them got so far advanced that when he happened to
come to the top of the water in the night-time he saw stars. So he went down and told
the others that in general the world was dark, but that nevertheless there was a great
number of little lights in it. Then they killed him for maintaining false doctrines: but from
that time there was a division amongst them, and all the Trilobites were split into two
parties, some maintaining one thing and some the other, until such a time as so many of
them had learned to see that there could be no doubt about the matter (Clifford 1886,
8).
Clifford's metaphorical account of the few fish willing to offer alternative hypotheses was a
reference to the early generation of symbolical algebraists (of which Whewell had been a member).
His use of the term "Trilobite," sounding as it does like a fossil record, was not arbitrary, either.
Clifford's claim that the Trilobites lived long before six thousand years ago was intended to convey
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an evolutionary message, and it was meant to poke fun at those traditional church-based accounts
of the age of the Earth. Clifford's philosophical shift from High Churchman to Darwinist acolyte was
underway.
His philosophical transformation was no simple matter of swapping beliefs, however. As Pollock
recalls, Clifford had become acquainted with Catholic theology soon after he arrived to Cambridge,
demonstrating a thorough knowledge of St. Thomas Aquinas by the end of his first year. In matters
of theological debate, Clifford had initially adopted a Catholic position and he even maintained it
"with extreme ingenuity, not unfrequently [sic.] adding scientific arguments and analogies of his
own" (Clifford 1886, 23). As a first year undergraduate, Clifford believed there was such a thing as
theological insight (i.e. divine grace in Christian theology), which could give practitioners a sense of
certain knowledge, even if that knowledge lies beyond the realm of experimental or scientific and
observable data. That said, Clifford had already expressed distaste for "natural theology" and other
Protestant attempts to scientifically justify God or religious belief through science. By his third year,
however, his quasi-Catholic view of things had broken down, as well. Clifford began to favour the
popular Darwinist sentiment then flooding the university's halls of residence. As Pollock recalls,
For two or three years, the knot of Cambridge friends of whom Clifford was the leading
spirit were carried away by a wave of Darwinian enthusiasm: we seemed to ride
triumphant on an ocean of new life and boundless possibilities. Natural selection was to
be the master-key of the universe; we expected it to solve all riddles and reconcile all
contradictions (Clifford 1886, 24).
Darwinism was an ethical guide governing practice as much as it was an explanatory framework
accounting for origins. It combined, "The exactness of the utilitarian with the poetical ideals of the
transcendentalist," Pollock writes. Of the young men then partaking in this socio-philosophical
phenomenon, Pollock adds, "We were not only to believe joyfully in the survival of the fittest, but to
take an active and conscious part in making ourselves fitter" (Clifford 1886, 25).
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Clifford expressed this mandate in more than a few public ways. In a talk delivered to the Royal
Institution on March 6th, 1868, he associates his developing socio-philosophical views with his
nascent opinions on "mental development." Entitled "On Some of the Conditions of Mental
Development," the lecture formed Clifford's inaugural speech as a Trinity fellow. In his opening
speech, Clifford claims the brain is constantly in a state of "change". He states,
You will see that it is not even true that a character remains the same for a single day:
the mind, leaves its mark, infinitely small it may be, imperceptible in itself, but yet more
indelible than the stone-carved hieroglyphics of Egypt (Clifford 1886, 50).
The "character" of a person is the "history of the entire previous life of the individual"—a history
that is continually in a "state of change." Clifford likens this to the change in the orbit of any given
planet, which, he says, is seemingly constant but which, in fact, undergoes constant fluctuation as
the planet travels through space. Clifford concludes all we can know of the constantly fluctuating
nature of the brain is presented in the characteristics of the people we observe. There is, in other
words, no constant "Law of force" that predetermines how an organism will develop nor how a
planet will orbit.
Yet, if this is the case, and if all occurrences—biological or physical—are the result of random
changes, then how can society ever delineate between good and bad changes?, Clifford wonders.
The answer is found in the "Evolution-hypothesis." The "Evolution-hypothesis" is similar to
Darwinism, he says, though it is not specifically "tied down" to the views of Darwin himself. Rather,
something like a Darwinist account of the mind's material changes accounts for the development of
new traits, including the capacity to entertain new ideas. Clifford admits he is assuming the growth
of an individual can be treated in the same manner as the growth of a species. He is supposing that
"the race of crabs has gone through much the same sort of changes as every crab goes through ... in
the course of its formation in the egg" (Clifford 1886, 57). However, Clifford is keen to point out
certain past "errors" adopted by others who had previously sought to advance the "evolution-
theory." One of those errors is the claim that species, and thus individual members of a species, go
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through continual changes such that they can be organized into a "continuous chain, from the
highest to the lowest [and] that the transition is gradual all through, and that nature makes no
jumps" (Clifford 1886, 58). The Linnaean system, in other words, is a flawed one. Clifford argues it is
so difficult to organize the development of species or their mutual relations that even a diagram (see
below), such as the one Herbert Spencer had offered in his Principles of Biology (1864), cannot
adequately represent the arrangement of existing organisms in a line or chain.
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The most that can be said is that the "Evolution-hypothesis"
represents a race of animals or plants as a thing slowly changing: and it also represents
these changes as connected by fixed laws with the action of the surrounding
circumstances, or, as it is customary to say, the environment (Clifford 1886, 60).
Clifford explains that the sorts of evolutionary changes that can occur are of two types: direct and
indirect. The "direct" action of the environment—the climate and other environmental demands on
our bodies—is clear enough. "Indirect" change is less obvious, though it is just as important. It is
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termed "natural selection" and, according to Clifford, it involves those traits that best allow for
reproduction. Traits that hinder reproduction within a species constitute a "force" of nature that
selects out the weaker organisms, "So that nature gradually weeds out all those forms which are not
suited to the environment, and thus tends to produce equilibrium between the species and its
surrounding circumstances" (Clifford 1886, 61). The results of these two types of change—direct and
indirect—can be categorized into three groups: change in size; change in structure (or shape); and
change in function.
Like the body, the brain undergoes evolutionary transformations, too. "Change in size" occurs with
the acquisition of new knowledge, Clifford argues, suggesting that new brain matter increases with
respect to surface size as new knowledge is acquired. "Change in structure" also occurs over time, as
"ideas, which were only feebly connected, are aggregated into a close and compact whole." In other
words, new neural connections come into existence as humans habituate themselves to, and learn
about, particular relations between objects and ideas. Clifford writes,
The ideas of several different qualities, for instance, which we never thought of as
connected with each other, are brought together by the qualities being found to exist in
the same object. In this way we form conceptions of things, which gradually get so
compact that we cannot ... separate them into their component parts. Portions of our
knowledge which we held as distinct are connected together by scientific theories;
images which were scattered all about are bound up into living bundles by the artist,
and so we find them rearranged (Clifford 1886, 63).
Lastly, "change in function" involves a process by which "men acquire faculties by practice." As
Clifford concludes, "Without any conscious seeking, you must know how often we wake up, as it
were, and find ourselves gifted with new powers" (Clifford 1886, 63). All three types of evolutionary
change are evident in the case of the human mind, and all three are occurring on a continual basis.
This evolutionary understanding leads naturally to the ethical and moral query: What sort of change
is the best sort of change for the mind to undergo? Clifford critically suggests that in asking "What is
that attitude of mind which is likely to change for the better?" we must first ask "What is the
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meaning of better?" In other words, what changes lead to a better situation for the species or
individual within a particular environment (Clifford 1886, 63)? Clifford's response is that changes for
the "better" might be those changes that "differentiate" an individual from its surroundings, or
those changes that "integrate" the individual with its surroundings (the image below indicates
animals "integrating" and "differentiating," according to Clifford).
Both processes can be beneficial (or detrimental) to a species, or an individual member of a
biological group, depending upon circumstances. For instance, the first sign of human
"consciousness," Clifford says, is the perception and recognition of difference (i.e. differentiation).
When a "child's eyes follow the light, this colourless homogenous universe splits up into two parts,
the light part and the dark part," he explains (Clifford 1886, 65). This differentiating process is
important for the survival of the child. Yet, so too is integration. "Integration with the environment
means close correspondence with it; actions of the environment are followed by corresponding
(Clifford 1886, 64)
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actions of the animal/' which allow the organism to survive within its environmental circumstances
(Clifford 1886, 65).
The combined processes of integration and differentiation encompass the following possibilities: a
separation of parts; a connection of parts; a separation from the environment; a closer
correspondence with the environment; a separation from other individuals; a greater degree of
sociality.
Taking these processes and applying them to mathematics, Clifford further argues the "Evolution-
hypothesis" accounts for the development and acceptance of new theories in mathematics and
natural philosophy. As our minds engage in the diverse processes of differentiation and integration,
we find:
more and more of our ideas are put outside of us and made real, [and] our minds are
continually growing more and more into accordance with the nature of external things;
our ideas become truer, more conformable to the facts; and at the same time they
answer more surely and completely to changes in the environment; a new experience is
more rapidly and completely connected with the sum of previous experiences (Clifford
1886, 67).
Importantly, he adds,
The action of these two laws taken together does in fact amount to the creation of new
senses. Men of science, for example, have to deal with extremely abstract and general
conceptions. By constant use and familiarity, these and the relations between them,
become just as real and external as the ordinary objects of experience; and the
perception of new relations among them is so rapid, the correspondence of the mind to
external circumstances so great, that a real scientific sense is developed, by which things
are perceived as immediately and truly as I see you now (Clifford 1886, 67).
Thus, the "best" changes are not those that are forced by nature onto the organism, but rather
"those produced by the spontaneous action of the organism" (Clifford 1886, 69). By encouraging
spontaneous change within oneself, the human organism remains "plastic"—able to adapt ever
more effectively to changing circumstances.
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In citing examples from Huxley and Seeley that describe organisms in the seeming middle ground
between "birds and reptiles," such as pterodactyls, Clifford explains that plasticity in size, structure
and function is of the utmost importance in the long-term development and survival of a species
(Clifford 1886, 70). By analogy, the human mind should seek to assimilate new and unusual ideas
and it should also work to differentiate old, staid theories that have become dogmatic, uncreative
and uniformly believed. Clifford states,
If scientific, [the mind] must not rest in the contemplation of existing theories, or the
learning of facts by rote; it must act, create, make fresh powers, discover new facts and
laws. And, if the analogy is true, it must create things not immediately useful. I am here
putting in a word for those abstruse mathematical researches which are so often abused
for having no obvious physical application. The fact is that the most useful parts of
science have been investigated for the sake of truth, and not for their usefulness
(Clifford 1886, 70).
Clifford had in mind, here, those critics of Riemann, Helmholtz and non-Euclidean geometrical ideas
in general, who had argued that the conceptual tools of non-Euclidean geometry were "useless"
(this criticism will be discussed in greater detail later). Clifford publicizes the value of those
supposedly "useless" mathematical and scientific speculations in his lecture on the "Evolutionary
hypothesis" by issuing a clarion call to his fellow (young) Cambridge mathematicians, and Trinity
college students. He states,
If the mind is artistic, it must not sit down in hopeless awe before the monuments of the
great masters, as if heights so lofty could have no heaven beyond them. Still less must it
tremble before the conventionalism of one age, when its mission may be to form the
whole life of the age succeeding. No amount of erudition or technical skill or critical
power can absolve the mind from the necessity of creating, if it would grow. And the
power of creation is not a matter of static ability, so that one man absolutely can do
these things and another man absolutely cannot; it is a matter of habits and desires. The
results of things follow not from their state but from their tendency. The first condition
then of mental development is that the attitude of the mind should be creative rather
than acquisitive: or, as it has been well said, that intellectual food should go to form
mental muscle and not mental fat (Clifford 1886, 71).
Clifford's usage of the terminology of "differentiation" and "integration" reveals just how
intertwined his views on the foundations of mathematical knowledge had become with emergent
metaphors in the world of Darwinist Britain. For Clifford, the invocation of those terms was not
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arbitrary. His claim that the generation of mathematical knowledge is akin to the process of
generating knowledge more broadly, and that, in both instances, the composition of the mind
determines the nature of what is known, indicates a profound level of conventionalism shaped both
by his mathematical education and his exposure to Darwinism. For Clifford, there is no direct
perception of a priori universal rules or truths. There are only the perceptions obtained by a mind
that is in constant evolutionary flux. Thus, all mathematical knowledge is in flux.
Following his inaugural speech, Clifford went on to produce a series of minor papers on the "theory
of polars" and the "power of spheres." His most important fellowship contribution, however, came
in the form of a 34-page unpublished paper, which his later mathematical biographer, Robert
Tucker, entitled "On the Theory of Distances" (1869).109 This is the first of Clifford's works in which
knowledge of the geometry of Hermann Gunther Grassmann (1809-1877) is mentioned. In it, Clifford
indicates he had read an account of Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre (1844) as published in Crelle's
Journal in previous years. Grassmannian algebra constituted an aspect of the symbolical algebraic
terrain of mathematical knowledge that Clifford engaged with near the end of the end of the 1860s.
It is important, therefore, to offer a brief historical account of Grassmann's algebra so as to describe
certain unique aspects of that terrain.
A briefaccount ofGrassmannian algebra
Grassmann's father, Justus Gunter Grassmann (1779-1852), had been involved in crystallography
studies. Those studies created an environment replete with resources that his son, Hermann, used
to re-formulate the "geometry of extension," for which the younger Grassmann later gained renown
(Erhard Scholz, 1991). One of those resources included the concept of "intellectual construction,"
which was central to the elder Grassmann's philosophy of mathematics, as derived from Friedrich
Schelling's Naturphilosophie (Marie-Luise Heuser, 1991). Justus Grassmann's life works largely
109
Clifford's editor, R. Tucker, ascribed the year 1869 to the paper, which seems reasonable given that Clifford gave notes
of the "preliminary" section of the paper to Olaus Henrici (1840-1918) at that year's BAAS, although sections of the
unpublished paper may have been written subsequent to that date.
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focused on geometry. In particular, they focused on the development of what he considered to be a
new research field that would mediate between natural philosophy and mathematics—namely,
combinatorial geometry. He used the notion of "intellectual construction" to categorize all
mathematical knowledge into three groupings: arithmetic, geometry, and combinatorics.
"Combinatorics" referred to the generation of dissimilar or "unequal" things from one another. This
stood in contradistinction to arithmetic, which considered the generation of similar things from one
another (e.g. numbers). "Intellectual construction" served as a defining motif in Justus's geometry
textbooks.
Justus Grassmann also considered geometry to be based upon the two elements of length and
direction. Length represented a geometrical characteristic of the object, while direction constituted
a "combinatorial" aspect of it. By disregarding direction (i.e. the combinatorial aspect of length), it is
possible to reduce all geometry to the study of one line. If we consider the objects used in
combinatorics to be equal, then all combinatorics reduces to arithmetic. Justus viewed Euclidean
geometry as having done precisely this, because it focused on length (i.e. "magnitude"), and ignored
direction. However, Justus wanted a geometrical system in which position is privileged over length.
He pled, therefore, for an axiom-free geometry; one in which all the notions of the geometry in
question are generated by means of "synthesis"—i.e. construction.
The young Hermann Grassmann, therefore, found himself navigating through specific "terrains of
knowledge" largely constructed by his father, as he worked to develop his own formal algebraical
system. Those terrains included his father's mathematical philosophy of "intellectual construction,"
which served as the starting point for Hermann's own mathematical epistemology, and which
Hermann expounds upon in the introduction to his Ausdehnungslehre. But Grassmann's "terrains of
knowledge" also included the world of 19th-century German mathematics, which had been
transformed in profound ways by Wilhelm von Humboldt's (1767-1835) educational reforms in
earlier decades. Those reforms were aimed at avoiding rote learning and encouraging constructive
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thought. Another terrain that Grassmann navigated through includes the theological discourse of
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), which had been passed on to him through his theology
training in Berlin, and which focused on the symmetrical division of elements into polar opposites.110
Placed within these overlapping environments, the young Grassmann developed a system of
directed magnitudes in /i-dimensional space that he later called the "calculus of extension."
Grassmann's work on "construction" and higher dimensionality in algebra is the outcome, therefore,
of his conceptual navigations through mathematical, educational and philosophical terrains of
knowledge (Lewis 1992).
The first two chapters of Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre (1844) are devoted to the addition and
multiplication of directed lines ("vectors" in Hamiltonian terms; "Strecke" in Grassmannian
vocabulary).111 In Grassmann's geometry, the product of two displacements (or directed lines) is a
directed parallelogram. Because the multiplication of two directed lines involves a process by which
one directed line segment is translated across a space delineated by a second directed line, the
"product" traces out a continuous surface across a particular plane. And because both component
lines have direction, so too does the resultant parallelogram surface. Grassmann introduces here the
notion of a directed area. The plane area thus produced can be multiplied further, i.e. translated
across a third vector. The resulting projection produces a parallelepiped, which has direction
associated with volume.
At times, Grassmann relies upon geometrical imagery to help his readers understand the simple
processes of construction underway here. But he soon departs from geometrical imagery when
moving beyond the three dimensions of a directed volume. For Grassmann, geometrical imagery is
only a heuristic device. The system is ultimately algebraical in nature and it can be extended to
include n-dimensional spaces. Grassmann therefore makes the claim that, "Every vector of a system
110
For an account that challenges the role Schleiermacher played in Grassmann's mathematical philosophy, see Schubring
(1996).
111
For a recent English translation of Grassmann's Extension Theory see Grassmann (2000).
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of the mth order can be expressed as the sum of m vectors, which belong to the m given independent
manners of change of the system" (Crowe 1967, 69). Grassmann insists that geometrical images are
not necessary for the establishment of formal meaning in his algebra. Geometrical imagery is of
heuristic, not foundational, value. Grassmann, therefore, pushes farther in his text with a purely
"formal", i.e. symbolical, version of directed-line multiplication in order to describe those products
that lay beyond three-dimensions.
By the time Grassmann had written his Ausdehnungslehre,112 he had come to view geometry as a
subsidiary realm of mathematical thinking. As he wrote in the "Introduction" to his work,
It had for a long time been evident to me that geometry can in no way be viewed, like
arithmetic or combination theory, as a branch of mathematics; instead geometry
relates to something already given in nature, namely, space. I also had realized that
there must be a branch of mathematics which yields in a purely abstract way laws
similar to those in geometry, which appears bound to space. By means of the new
analysis it appeared possible to form such a purely abstract branch of mathematics;
indeed this new analysis, developed without the assumption of any principles
established outside of its own domain and proceeding purely by abstraction, was itself
this science (Crowe 1967, 64).
Unlike many of his Kantian German contemporaries, Grassmann did not privilege the "intuition" of
geometrical relations. Rather, he reiterates throughout the Ausdehnungslehre, the strength of his
system lies in its purely "formal" (read symbolical) framework. "All principles that express views of
space are entirely omitted, and consequently the beginnings of the science [are] as direct as those of
arithmetic," he writes, adding "the limitation to three dimensions is omitted" (Crowe 1967, 64).
In sum, Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre presents mathematical rules and mathematical products as
constructed entities—not as truths about spatial ontology. As Grassmann explains, "Up to now one
could not go beyond three directions; however in the pure theory of extension the number of
directions can increase to infinity" (Crowe 1967, 66).
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The full title of the work is Die lineale Ausdehnungslehre, ein neuer Zweig der Mathematik dargestellt und durch
Anwendungen auf die ubrigen Zweige der Mathematik, wie auch auf die Statik, Mechanik, die Lehre vom Magnetismus
und die Krystallonomie erlautert (1844). It sold poorly. A letter from his publisher, sent in 1876, indicates that 600 copies
were left unsold by 1864 and they were used as "waste paper"; the remainder, "a few odd copies," had been sold with
the exception of one copy left for the publisher's library (Crowe 1967, 65).
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Recall that one of the "terrains of knowledge" upon which Grassmann trod in his effort to develop
his n-dimensional geometry of directed magnitudes was the theological philosophy of
Schleiermacher, as expressed in that author's Dialektik (1839) (Lewis 1977). The Dialektik is a
compilation of Schleiermacher's lectures at Berlin University from 1811 to 1831, which Grassmann
attended from 1827 to 1830. In his book, Schleiermacher argues that mathematics is divided into the
"real" and the "formal"—a dichotomy replicated to some extent in Grassmann's 1844 text between
geometry and symbolical algebra. For Schleiermacher, the "real" includes those sciences whose
content is based upon that which is "existent" (i.e. observable and inductive facts), while the
"formal" includes those sciences that have as their objects concepts that are purely intellectual in
nature. Of this latter group, "truth consists in the correspondence between the thought processes
themselves," Scheiermacher argued (Crowe 1967, 65). Grassmann viewed his own algebraic system
as a "formal" intellectual construction along the lines of Scheiermacher's definition. Although his
algebraic system was, he noted, applicable to certain geometrical interpretations, it was ultimately
independent of spatial truths in geometry.113
In his "General Theory of Forms," for example, Grassmann highlights the importance of establishing
general, symbolical equivalences that apply to all branches of mathematics. Similar to the manner in
which Peacock had argued for the "Principles of the Permanence of Equivalent Forms," Grassmann
contends that formal algebraic rules can be intellectually generated, rendered internally logical, and
deemed universally valid without reference to natural philosophy or empirical findings. The value of
such construction is located solely in the operational relations manifest between the symbols in
equations. As Grassmann claims,
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Invoking his father's previous terminology, Grassmann categorized mathematical objects into "discrete" and
"continuous" (a division that Clifford later repeated in his own works). He also divided the results of mathematical
operations into "equal" and "same". In his Ausdehnungslehre, Grassmann offers an account of "continuous, different
mathematics," because within multi-dimensional space (which he considers "different", in that it invokes differing
dimensions) points vary continuously (e.g. a varying point produces a line).
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By the general theory of forms, I mean that series of truths which relate to all branches
of mathematics in the same way, and thus presume only the general concepts of
equality and difference, connection and separation (Crowe 1967, 67).
Unlike his English counterparts, Grassmann envisioned the establishment of a mathematical
hierarchy in which equivalent forms constitute a meta-level of mathematical thought, beneath
which all other forms of mathematics branch out into subsidiary categories.
Recall that for Peacock and his colleagues, the categories of normal versus symbolical algebra simply
indicate a bifurcated world in mathematics—two different branches of mathematical inquiry, with
neither subsidiary to the other. Those branches are simply divided by the process of abstraction
involved in each. For Grassmann, a hierarchy does necessarily emerge. He contends,
The general theory of forms should thus precede all special branches of mathematics.
Since however that branch does not as such exist yet, and since we cannot omit it
without entangling ourselves in useless ramblings, we have no choice but to develop this
subject insofar as we need it for our science (Crowe 1967, 67).
Grassmann viewed himself as the developer of an overarching meta-mathematics.
In creating this meta-level of symbolical analysis, Grassmann introduces the notion of "forms", which
are purposely devoid of content. Grassmann first introduces the symbols a and b as related by the
general equivalence,
a~b = b" a.
He also introduces,
(a~£>)~c — a~(b~ c) — a~Z?~c.
The "forms" are (a, b, c) and they are commutative according to whatever operation ~ signifies. The
definition is a "synthetic connection," Grassmann explains. Having established such a synthetic
connection, the mathematician can then go on to create "analytical connections" in which the
connection of two forms occurs "in such a way that when the resultant form is synthetically
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connected with one of the original forms, the other original form results." In other words, if ~ is
taken to mean the analytical connection whereby (a~b) connected to b results in a, one can write
symbolically that:
(a~b)~b = a.
When forms obey this formal connection, they are the equivalent of traditional addition and
subtraction. Grassmann's aim was to present the well-known processes of addition and subtraction
as mere instantiations of more universal mathematical rules. Thus, arithmetic would become a sub-
branch of an over-arching meta-mathematical domain of formalism.
Grassmann goes on in his text to develop a series of other "synthetic" and "analytical" connections.
He concludes by noting similar forms (i.e. forms of the same order, such as two points or two
vectors) generally result in forms of a similar order, at least when they are combined using the two
formal relations noted above. When, however, forms of the same order are combined using




which represents division, the results often differ in "kind" (i.e. in order). For example, vectors—as
directed lines— are forms of the first order. Their product, however, is a form of the second order
(i.e. a directed area). By allowing his "contentless" forms to adopt any value (e.g. numbers, points,
vectors, or directed areas), Grassmann is able to generate 16 different types of symbolical
connections, or equivalences, using the formal rule for the multiplication of forms stated above.
In his 1844 work, Grassmann also develops more fully his notion of "outer" and "inner" products in
the multiplication of vectors. For Grassmann, the "outer product" of two vectors indicates the
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process by which one vector travels along the path dictated by another vector, thereby tracing out
an oriented area. In algebraic terms, Grassmann defines this "connection" as one in which the base
elements of the system (in this case a vector) are represented by e1,e2,e3 ... en and where the
following equivalences hold:
^X^X &y£y 0<
^xi^y ~b &z) ^x^y "T Sjc^Z-
Grassmann's "outer product" allows for the generation of all sorts of "elements" at increasingly
higher orders. For instance, he considers the multiplication of a plethora of vectors, a. b. c. d. e ... ,
such that vector a travels along vector b, and the resulting directed area travels along vector c, and
that resulting directed volume travels along vector d (resulting in a 4th-dimensional directed
"volume"), and so forth. Meanwhile, Grassmann's "inner product" relates "distances to fixed
directions." It is the result of multiplying the lengths of two vectors by the ratio of the angle that
separates them. The product is a non-directed number (i.e. "0", if the two vectors are perpendicular
to one another). When the elements in question are two directed lines that lie in the same line, the
"inner product" is simply the result of multiplying their respective magnitudes. In such instances, the
"inner product" of vector multiplication coincides with normal multiplication in arithmetic.
Grassmann thus produces two types of multiplication for elements within his formal system. The
fact the "outer product" stops being analogous to conceivable geometrical representations once the
products of the elements extend beyond three dimensions leads Grassmann to label the system
"extensive algebra." He defines the system as one composed of rules that govern the behaviour of
contentless formal symbols.
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Due, in part, to the fact that Grassmann's works were received poorly and barely read, and due in
part to the fact that among those German mathematicians who did attempt to read his work there
was a pre-existing bias against the notion of a constructed meta-mathematics that could serve as a
formal governor for all branches of mathematical inquiry, Grassmann's ideas were not adopted by
any of his contemporaries in the 1840s. They were, however, criticized heavily. A revealing example
of the sort of criticism lobbed Grassmann's way is found in a letter from E.F. Apelt (1812-1859),
Professor of Philosophy at Jena, to A. Mobius, the German mathematician. In that letter, Apelt asks
in typical Kantian form,
Have you read Grassmann's remarkable Ausdehnungslehre? It seems to me that a false
philosophy of mathematics is at the bottom of it. The essential character of
mathematical knowledge, that it is intuitive, seems to be excluded from it completely.
An abstract theory of extension such as Grassmann wishes, can be developed only from
concepts; but the course of mathematical knowledge is found not in concepts, but in
intuition (Lewis 1977, 108).
Apelt's concern was that Grassmann had constructed new mathematical entities based upon
internally justified algebraic rules only. Appeals to the intuition of a priori geometrical "truths" are
nowhere apparent. This alone set more than a few mathematical readers against Grassmann's work.
In addition, Grassmann was not a mathematician by training. He had studied theology and philology
at the Berlin University. He did not operate within any network of academic mathematicians. This
too was an important factor resulting in the poor reception of his work. Grassmann did not have the
professional legitimacy to advance his system through any institutional channels or the ability to
institutionalize the approach by teaching it to classes of students, as Tait and Kelland later did with
their quaternions in Edinburgh.
Yet, though Grassmann's work received little recognition or publicity in Germany, or elsewhere for
more than 20 years after it was published, Hamilton did mention it in the "Preface" to his 1853
Lectures, as well as in letters to De Morgan. Hamilton had heard of Grassmann's text in 1852, while
he was in the midst of writing his "Preface." Out of concern for priority rights, he procured a copy of
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the Ausdehnungslehre and began to work through it. His review was initially favourable, as he wrote
to De Morgan on January 31st, 1853:
I have recently been reading (and it is curious that sometimes, when otherwise in
mental activity, I seem to myself unable to read a page, or almost a sentence of German)
more than a hundred pages of Grassmann's Ausdehnungslehre, with great admiration
and interest ... But it is curious to see how narrowly, yet how completely, Grassmann
failed to hit off the Quaternions (Crowe 1967, 86).
Evidently, Hamilton sought to place Grassmann within the same tradition of mathematical
development that he viewed himself as engaged in. But after his initially positive review, Hamilton
came to view the German's contributions as a potential threat to his own status as progenitor of a
non-commutative algebraic vector system. He quickly wrote to De Morgan a few days later stating,
I am not quite so enthusiastic today about Grassmann as I was when I last wrote. But I
have read through nearly all of what I could procure of his writings ... Grassmann is a
great and most German genius; his view of space is at least as new and comprehensive
as mine of time; but he has not anticipated, nor attained the conception of, the
quaternions (Crowe 1967, 86).
Hamilton notes Grassmann's "inner product" has "much analogy to my 'scalar parts' of a
quaternion," and his "outer products" bears resemblance to Hamilton's "vector parts."
Furthermore, "If the notion of combining them had occurred to him, he might have been led to the
quaternions," Hamilton wrote, "but those he seems to me to have altogether failed to perceive"
(Crowe 1967, 86).
Partly through Hamilton and Tait's recognition of Grassmann's work in their respective quaternion
publications, and partly through the publication of sections of Grassmann's system in Crelle's Journal
in the 1860s, more British practitioners became acquainted with the rudiments of the German's non-
commuting vector system two decades after it was initially published.114 Clifford was among them.
He repackaged and reissued those small segments of Grassmann's work that he had become familiar
with through Crelle's Journal and Hamilton's Lectures. In his paper on "distances," for example,
114
See Crowe (1967) for an account of how Grassmann failed to garner support for his mathematical claims until just
before his death in 1877.
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Clifford invokes Grassmannian notation in using single large letters, such as A,B,C, to represent
straight lines in a plane, and single small letters, such a,b,c, to represent points. Two large letters
put together, as in AB, refers to the point of intersection of the lines A and B; two small letters put
together, as in ab, refer to a line joining the points a and b. The equation ABC = 0 means the lines
A,B,C meet at one point (a use of Grassmann's "outer product"), while the equation abc — 0
means that a,b,c lie in one line (a use of Grassmann's "inner product"). Clifford adds some
extensions of his own to this notational system, which he finds "convenient." While an equation can
be represented by its point-coordinates (x, y, z), where the degree of the equation is the "order" of
the curve, Clifford finds it useful to represent the same equation in "contravariant, tangential, or
line-coordinates" (<f,r],(), where the degree of the equation is the "class" of the curve. Clifford
claims his new Grassmannian-inspired notation can be used to investigate relationships between
geometrical entities, such that "absolute values" for (xyz) or (frj() are no longer needed. Their
ratios can be discussed without reference to any absolute magnitude.
In the same paper, Clifford discusses the metric properties of figures in plane geometry which, he
says, depends upon certain "circular points at infinity" denoted by i,j. His intention here to highlight
the properties of figures in spherical geometry "upon the imaginary circle at infinity" (as denoted by
02 or o2). In so doing, Clifford combines aspects of Hamilton's vectors with Cayley's "Absolute" and
Grassmann's directed-line multiplication. His aim is to offer algebraic expressions for "the distance
of a point from a conic given tangentially" and the "distance of a line from a conic given by its
points" (Clifford 1882, 132). Two different geometrical definitions can be obtained for each of these
distances, where the "ratio" of the distances in question is a quantity that Clifford refers to as the
"distance of the curve from the absolute." The mathematicians' task is to algebraically obtain that
ratio, and then translate it into a geometrical analogues. This is not a simple task, Clifford notes. In
the case of a sphero-conic, the ratio of the two distances of a point or line is a quantity independent
of the point or line. "But," Clifford writes, "I have as yet obtained no geometrical definition of it"
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(Clifford 1882, 134). As with many of Clifford's productions up until 1870, this paper was left
incomplete. Yet, it serves as an early historical indication of Clifford's navigations through that
"terrain of knowledge" described here as Cambridge's symbolical algebraic geometry in the mid-
18605, which included, for Clifford at least, early (if incomplete) exposure to certain aspects of
Grassmannian analysis.
Clifford as a fellow, 1868-1870
During his years as a Cambridge fellow, Clifford was under financial and professionalizing pressure.
He needed to establish himself as a respected member of Britain's mathematical community so as to
gain employment at one of the country's universities. To do so, he had to develop his professional
career through publications. At the same time, he had to demonstrate his lecturing abilities. Thus, in
addition to producing draft papers and small published articles, Clifford focused his fellowship on
developing his teaching profile. As part of his socio-professional commitments, we find Clifford
delivering lectures to women students at South Kensington in the spring and summer of 1869.
Throughout that course, Clifford explicates the bases of arithmetic and algebra, and he introduces
nascent notions in non-Euclidean and vector geometry. He also teaches his students about
"boundaries," indicating that boundaries distinguish between two adjacent regions of space—"one
inside and one outside" (Clifford 1882, 628). The surface of any body belongs to both regions of
space. "Congruency" is therefore defined by the boundaries of the objects in question; it means that
a given body can fit the same region of space at all times. Furthermore, all geometrical entities-
including the most basic particles of space—are bounded entities. A point is the intersection, or
boundary, between two lines; a line is the "intersection," or boundary, between two surfaces, and so
on into higher dimensional space.
Throughout the ten lectures, that Clifford delivers to his female students, geometry figures
prominently and geometrical definitions are offered in primarily projective terms. Clifford describes
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a line as the path—i.e. the "locus of points"—that any given point produces as it moves through a
plane. He describes a surface as the path of a line moving through space. He spends an entire lecture
(i.e. Lecture Three) discussing the difference between "projective" and "non-projective" properties
of a body. "Projective" properties are defined as those characteristics that remain constant "in the
shadows of the figure," while non-projective properties are variable. In Lecture Four, Clifford
explains projective "proportions," stating that if "four quantities are proportional, and the first is
greater or less than any fraction of the second, the third is greater or less than the same fraction of
the fourth" (Clifford 1882, 631).
The Lectures, as a whole, however, are not focused on geometry as distinct from algebra or
symbolical analysis. Rather, the lectures focus on a symbolical approach to geometry. Clifford's
lectures at South Kensington, therefore, constitutes a basic introduction to concepts in symbolical
algebra and symbolical geometry. In other words, embedded in this simple course of lectures is a
mathematical-philosophical outlook in which algebraic vocabulary constitutes a primary mode of
expressing geometrical relationships. In Lecture Five, for example, Clifford introduces the "first
principles of calculation" in which he elaborates upon the concept of "operation." "Numbers may be
changed into other numbers by the operation of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division,"
he explains, preparing his students for the more complicated conceptions of "operation" and
"transformation" that follows. Clifford then introduces the concepts of commutative and distributive
multiplication (with regards to normal numbers). He notes these algebraic properties do not hold for
all mathematical objects. As a practice problem, at the end of Lecture Five, Clifford asks students to
"Write in symbolic language..." a given geometrical problem. Thus, Clifford sought to train his
students in the same manner he had been trained. He emphasized the use of symbolical analytical
methods in understanding geometrical relations, including the motion of geometrical entities, such
as points, lines and surfaces in spaces of more than three dimensions. And although Clifford did
teach his students about the Pythagorean Theorem, the properties of a circle, and the "shadows of a
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circle" (or conics), the South Kensington women were also expected to understand that "imaginary"
solutions to curves are reasonable outcomes when the curves in question are situated within a plane
of infinite directions.
By the end of the 1860s, Clifford's navigations through symbolical algebra and symbolical geometry
were also being defined by another overlapping terrain—namely, Riemannian geometry. In his
lecture, "Of Boundaries in General," delivered also in 1869,115 Clifford demonstrates his emerging
allegiance to a new foundational philosophy, as manifest in the empirical mathematical claims of
Bernard Riemann (1826-1866). Clifford tells his audience to "forget that you have ever lived until this
moment." He says,
I want you not to believe a word I say, unless you can see quite plainly at the moment
that it is true; and I shall try only to say such things as you can quite easily verify at once
while you sit there. That is what I mean by asking you to forget that you have ever lived
until this moment: for geometry, you know, is the gate of science, and the gate is so low
and small that one can only enter it as a little child (Clifford 1879, 127).
Clifford explains that all bodies take up space, and in so doing they establish boundaries between
"inside" and "outside." The separating element between those two regions is the "surface" of the
body, which belongs simultaneously to the inside and the outside of a body. The fact there is no
dividing entity between the "inside" and "outside" of any particular body allows for "continuity" in
the physical structure of the universe. He explains,
The idea expressed by the word continuous is one of extreme importance; it is the
foundation of all exact science of things; and yet it is so very simple and elementary, that
it must have been almost the first clear idea that we got into our heads (Clifford 1879,
134).
Simply put, "continuity" means that one "cannot move this thing from one position to another,
without making it go through an infinite number of intermediate positions" (Clifford 1879, 134).
115
Clifford delivered the other three essays in that collection at the Town Hall in Shoreditch in 1874. They were collectively
published with the present lecture in a book entitled Seeing and Thinking (1879).
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The notion of the "infinite" is often a sticking point, Clifford concedes. It is "a dreadful word, I know,"
but it generally means "without any end." It is this concept that, applied to space, justifies the notion
of "continuity" itself, which stipulates that the motion of any body does not experience gaps in its
own existence (otherwise, the motion would be "discontinuous"). "Continuity" is implied in the
notion of any "movement," given that movement depends upon the infinite nature of space. When
something moves through space, an infinite number of new surfaces are created in the process. In
geometry, the notion of "congruency" emerges from this fact. Two "regions of space" are congruent
when "a thing which exactly fills one of them can be made exactly to fill the other by moving it,
without changing its size or shape." If the surfaces of the two regions overlap, they are identical.
"Congruency" is the quality of two bodies that demonstrates they have the same size and same
shape in different regions of space.
Using the combined notions of "congruency" and "continuity," Clifford presents the geometrical
concepts of solid space (or volume), surface (or plane), line and point as "boundaries" between two
regions of space and also as projective productions. Though a point has no dimension, it nonetheless
divides space between where the point is and where it is not. If the point moves (continuously)
across space, it produces a line, which is another surface between two regions of adjacent space. If
that line then moves (continuously) across space, it creates a plane, which is yet another boundary
between one region of space and another. If that surface moves (continuously) across space, it
generates a solid volume, which is yet another boundary between the "inside" and "outside" regions
of space. To use technical language, we could say a line is the "locus of the successive positions of a
moving point," and we could make similar claims with regards to the other projected geometrical
objects. The implication is that such projective objects, and their concomitant boundaries, can be
extended to exist also in higher dimensional spaces, where they would constitute boundaries in n-
dimensional spaces.
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Clifford then proffers an account of his newly developing stance on the "empirical" nature of
symbolical analysis. He explains there is no grand significance to the meaning of a technical term
such as "locus." As with symbolical abbreviations, technical terms such as "locus" have real,
empirical content, even though their use often suggests otherwise. He explains,
I have laid some stress on this [the meaning of the term "locus"], because it seems to be
a fair opportunity for warning you of a very serious danger: the danger of thinking that
there is any mystery in a technical term. So long as you use it merely to save time and
trouble, as an abbreviation, namely, for other simple words or phrases which everybody
can understand, a technical word will be useful and harmless. But directly you begin to
think that there is some hidden and mysterious meaning in it, which cannot be
expressed in simple ordinary words that everybody could understand, there is no end to
the nonsense that it will help you to think and talk. And when I have been using
technical words, and am not quite sure whether I have been talking nonsense or no, I
have one very safe way of finding out. I translate the whole thing into English, that is to
say, into short easy words of Saxon origin (Clifford 1879, 144-145).
Unlike symbolical algebraists of the early- to mid-century, such as Peacock and De Morgan, or
formalists such as Grassmann, Clifford did not consider symbolical mathematical equivalences as
necessarily worthy in and of themselves. Rather, by the late-1860s, he had begun to elevate the
empirical (including the geometrical) to the level of symbolical analysis in terms of inherent worth.
Thus, by the end of his fellowship, Clifford's training in Cambridge-style symbolical analysis had been
overlaid not only by the analytical works of Grassmann, but also by the new "terrain of knowledge"
composed by the empirical conceptions found in the works of Riemann and other "non-Euclidean"
geometers. To clarify, note that Clifford's idiosyncratic twist to the issue of mathematical
foundations appears in his argument that all mathematical forms of knowledge that can be spoken
of, whether they are spoken of in "words of Saxon origin" or in symbolical terms, must have an
empirical meaning. When such meaning cannot be located, the user is "talking nonsense." Such
nonsense in mathematical symbolism had been generated in the past when mathematical
practitioners pursued their craft without consideration for the natural philosophical or geometrical
content filling the symbolatry used. Therefore, Clifford tells his listeners, they "must not imagine that
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the Latin word locus, as used in geometry, means anything more or less than the English word place"
(Clifford 1879, 145).
Even the seemingly basic concept of "number" needs to be deconstructed so that misconceptions
based on mystified notions of mathematical objects are done away with. "Number" refers to
discrete entities—two apples, five points, eight people. By contrast, a "continuous" entity, such as a
line, cannot be broken down into such discrete elements, as it is not composed of individual parts. A
line is not a mere aggregate of points. No matter how many points we line up adjacent to one
another, they will never equate to a "line," he explains. "The failure to make a line does not mean
that you have not taken a large enough number, but that number itself is essentially inadequate to
make points into a line," he states. "So you must be very careful to remember that a line is a
different thing from the aggregate of all the points upon it; the points are on the line, but they are
not the line itself (Clifford 1879, 147). By extension, space is not made up of points or discrete
parts, nor is a solid made up of an accumulation of distinct lines. The "projection" of geometrical
objects is altogether different from the discrete accumulation, or "repetition," of parts. This
highlights the difference in "kind" between geometrically continuous mathematical objects, such as
lines, surfaces and space, and discontinuous entities, such as "number". Symbolism in analytical
mathematics has, in the past, obscured these fundamental differences by representing all objects as
undifferentiated and undefined symbolical entities.
Clifford invokes Riemann's account of geometrical extension as "singly," "doubly," and "multiply"
infinite to clarify his point. The number of points on a line is "singly infinite," he explains, because it
can only vary in one manner. Given that the number of points on a surface "is twice as infinite as the
number of points on a piece of line," a plane surface is "doubly" infinite. By extension, the number
of points in a solid is "triply" infinite. In brief, a point on a line can vary in one direction; thus, it has
one variation. A point on a surface can vary in two directions; thus, it has two variations. A point in a
solid can vary in three directions; thus, it has three variations. This terminology helps to identify
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position in space, Clifford explains. To identify a point on a line, one piece of information is
required—namely, a description of the distance of the point from the end of the line, or from some
other arbitrary point of origin. On a surface, two pieces of information are required—namely, a
description of the point from two axes. In a solid, three pieces of information are required—a
description of the point's distance from three arbitrary axes. In sum, discrete entities can be counted
and quantified, while geometrically continuous entities can only be measured and located according
to relative points of origin. This difference in "kind" (i.e. in spatial extension) of geometrical entities
means they require new symbolical representations in their treatments—representations that may
not, and need not, map onto the symbolical algebraic representations used for discrete entities (i.e.
arithmetic).
This latter point indicates Clifford's Peacockian-inspired symbolical training in that the construction
of new mathematical rules for new, or different "entities," is entirely justified and even laudable.
However, Clifford's conclusion also represents those new terrains overlapping his symbolical and
analytical training. In a revealingly critical tone, Clifford makes an allegorical reference to the views
of those early symbolical algebraists for whom universal algebraic relations were worthy whether
they had any geometrical analogue or not. He states,
You may think it is beneath the dignity of human nature to spend all this time in
contemplating the size and shape of a piece of wood. Very well; it is written in the
fifteenth chapter of the Koran that when Adam was created all the angels were
commanded to worship him. But Eblis, the chief of them, refused, saying, 'Far be it from
me that am a pure spirit to worship a creature of clay.' And for this refusal he was shut
out for ever from Paradise. Now the doom of Eblis awaits you if you fail to give due
reverence to these little obvious everyday things—things that are true of every stone
that lies on the pavement, of every drop of rain that falls from heaven, of every breath
of air that fans you. Like him, you will find with astonishment that the creature of clay
which you despise is the Lord of Nature and the Measure of all things, for in every speck
of dust that falls lie hid the laws of the universe; and there is not an hour that passes in
which you do not hold the Infinite in your hand (Clifford 1879, 156).
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The allegorical reference to that which is made of "clay" refers to Clifford's attempt to rehabilitate
the notion of the "empirical" knowledge in mathematics. While Cambridge mathematicians had
already begun to use the linguistic dichotomy of "pure" versus "applied" mathematics, Clifford
viewed the dichotomy as a false one. The "dust," or physical manifestation of "laws," is not a fallen
version of the pure ideal of symbolical mathematical truth. Clifford issues a clarion call enjoining his
fellow British practitioners to improve upon their lofty mathematical theorizations by studying the
nature of the geometrical in order to justify their symbolical manipulations.
From 1870 to 1879, Clifford increasingly sought to defend the view that those algebraic rules that
could be deemed to be "true" and "universal" were those that had a physical or geometrical
underpinning. Clifford's developing philosophy of mathematics included the notion that
mathematics is the result of inductive, empirical observations, rather than a rationalist abstraction
or experimentalist application to physical and geometrical circumstances. In Clifford's lecture, "On
Theories of the Physical Forces," delivered at the Royal Institution on February 18th, 1870, for
instance, he argues the notion of "force" is presented as an outdated one. The continuous
movement of bodies through space is an observable "fact"—not just a matter of symbolical
"calculation." Flowever, humans are limited in terms of their "causal" knowledge. Any appeal to
"force" is a mistaken attempt to ascribe cause to that which is merely descriptive. As Clifford
states,115
Why does the moon go round the earth? When the Solar system was nebulous, anybody
who knew all about some one particle of nebulous vapour might have predicted that it
116
Indicating his familiarity with Humean skepticism, Clifford contends perceptual knowledge is problematical in that
something as evident as "continuity" in space could be nothing but an illusion. Like a "wheel of life", in which a discrete
series of images spinning around renders a discrete series of images seemingly continuous, our perception of continuity
may in fact be the result of our inability to perceive discrete motion in space. Clifford states: "Here then is an apparently
continuous motion which is really discontinuous; and moreover there is an apparently continuous perception of it which
is really discontinuous—that is, it seems to be gradually changed, while it really goes by little jumps...and the question
inevitably presents itself—is not every case of apparently continuous perception really a case of successive distinct
images very close together" (Clifford 1879, 78). Although Clifford operates based on the assumption that continuity does
exist, he does so only because a discontinuous world would have no room in it for explanation of any sort. It would not
be possible, for instance, to associate any event with a pre-existing phenomenon, because discontinuities in space and
time allow for infinite possible causes. In a discontinuous universe, in other words, dynamical processes could not be
mathematically described, given that the entire framework of the calculus, which measures changes in motion in space
over time, is fundamentally dependent upon the assumption of continuity both in space and time.
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would at this moment form part of the moon's mass, and be rotating about the earth
exactly as it does. But why with an acceleration inversely as the square of the distance?
There is no why; the fact is probably equivalent to saying that the continuous motion of
one body is such as not to interfere with the continuous motion of another. If once so,
then always; the cause is only the fact that at some moment the thing is so,—or rather,
the facts of one time are not the cause of the facts of another, but the facts of all time
are included in one statement, and rigorously bound up together (Clifford 1879, 84).
Phenomena have causes, but humans are not necessarily privy to those causes. The best we can do,
is to generate models for any given phenomenon. Each model, however, can only describe what is
empirically observed. To assume the inverse square law explains gravity, rather than just describes
it, is to be misled.
Clifford expands on these views in a lecture to the Cambridge Philosophical Society delivered in the
same year, in which he hypothesizes about the "fact" of rigid body motion. In that lecture, he
associates the "why" of motion with Riemannian geometry. He argues,
Riemann has shewn that as there are different kinds of lines and surfaces, so there are
different kinds of space of three dimensions; and that we can only find out by
experience to which of these kinds the space in which we live belongs (Clifford 1882,
21).
Although the axioms of plane geometry are true "within the limits of experiment on the surface of a
sheet of paper, we know that the sheet is really covered with a number of small ridges and furrows."
The total curvature of the sheet of paper is not zero. Clifford cites Riemann in saying that
although the axioms of solid geometry are true within the limits of experiment for finite
portions of our space, yet we have no reason to conclude that they are true for very
small portions; and if any help can be got thereby for the explanation of physical
phenomena, we may have reason to conclude that they are not true for very small
portions of space (Clifford 1882, 22).
Clifford absorbs some of those Riemannian empirical-geometrical notions to offer a unique account
of good mathematical practice on his own terms. He contends, for instance, that there is a possibility
these "speculations may be applied to the investigation of physical phenomena." Specifically,
Clifford hypothesizes,
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1) That small portions of space are in fact of a nature analogous to little hills on a
surface which is on the average flat; namely, that the ordinary laws of geometry are
not valid in them.
2) That this property of being curved or distorted is continually being passed on from
one portion of space to another after the manner of a wave.
3) That this variation of the curvature of space is what really happens in that
phenomenon which we call the motion of matter, whether ponderable or ethereal.
4) That in the physical world nothing else takes place but this variation, subject
(possibly) to the law of continuity (Clifford 1882, 21).
For Clifford, the non-flat nature of the physical universe may be the factual cause of the varied
natural phenomena that are sometimes observed empirically to be discontinuous events (e.g.
action-at-a-distance "forces," such as gravity).
By the end of 1870, Clifford had come to the conclusion that "geometry" itself is a physical science—
an empirical art induced from observable facts that despite the fact it is symbolically expressed.
Clifford's navigation through the terrain of Riemannian geometry had provided him with the
conceptual resources required to talk about geometry as an a posterior science rather than an a
priori intuition. As Clifford explains to his students at Trinity College in the last year of his fellowship,
Geometry is a physical science. It is concerned with the sizes and shapes of objects, and
the positions which they may occupy. The doctrines which it teaches on these subjects
are derived from experience extended by hypotheses so as to become precise (Clifford
1882, 524).
Those hypotheses are threefold. The first two Clifford ascribes to Riemann; the last one he ascribes
to Leibniz. Collectively, they include the hypothesis of continuity, which states that surfaces take up
no room, so there is no space between adjacent bodies; the hypothesis of rigid motion, which states
that as a body moves through space, it does not change shape or size; and, the hypothesis of infinite
extent, which states that a point travelling along a line will never come back upon itself, nor would a
line travelling along a plane. Assuming these three hypotheses hold, meaningful geometrical
measurements can take place. For example, in analyzing the position of a point on a straight line,
one can take a fixed point o, and a fixed length oa in a given direction from o, and identify the
position of a point p on the line, by determining the ratio of op to oa and the side of o on which p is
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located. If p denotes the ratio in question, then op = p. oa. Clifford explains p can be understood to
be a command to perform the following action: "Change the value of oa in the ratio of 1 to p." The
equation describes the fact that, in performing this action upon oa, one obtains the value of op,
where op and oa can be regarded as "quantities of motion"—i.e. symbolical representations of
continuous movement through space, as opposed to symbolical representations of discrete entities
(Clifford 1882, 525). "Quantities of motion" are fundamentally geometrical and empirical in nature,
Clifford concludes; they are based upon assumptions of continuity and infinite extent in space, even
though their geometrical behaviour can be summarized in discrete symbolical form.
For example, the geometrical behaviour of line segments justifies the symbolical rules used, Clifford
explains. The "quantity of motion," which carries a point from the position a to another position b, is
a vector. It can be symbolized by ab. That vector is said to be equal to another vector cd "when b is
on the same side of a that d is of c, and at the same distance from it," such that the lines have to
have equal lengths and they must lie in the same direction (Clifford 1882, 525-526). The addition of
such geometrical entities can be represented symbolically as:
ab + be = ac,
or,
ab + be + ca = 0.
If we keep in mind the fact that the symbols represent vectors, then we can determine that the ratio
of two vectors is the "operation which changes the second into the first."
In Hamiltonian language, Clifford describes the same operation as containing two parts: "A tensor or
stretching part which merely alters the length of the vector or the quantity of motion, and a versor
or turning part, which either preserves the direction of motion or reverses it" (Clifford 1882, 526). If
p is the ratio of the "quantities of motion" in the vectors ab and cd, then:
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—7 = ~n, if the vectors are in different directions.
ca
The "operation —1" therefore causes the vector to reverse direction, which is the same thing as
turning twice about a right angle. To turn the vector by only one right angle is to "halve" the
operation above, though not in the sense as halving a discrete quantity.
Rather, "This operation of turning a vector through a right angle is denoted by the letter i." If
aa',bb' are two equal lines that bisect one another at right angles at the point o, then we can




ob = i. oa,
oa = i. ob,
ob = i.oa = — i. oa,




Clifford concludes by explaining the symbolical representation of a complex entity, such as x + iy (or
r(cos(f> + i sin<p) more generally), describes vectorial behaviour in space. Clifford underscores the
fact that vectors do exist and they behave in particular ways. The symbolical rules describing their
behaviour emerges inductively from observing their geometrical traits. In idiosyncratically applying
his Cambridge training in symbolical analysis, Clifford concludes that although symbolical rules are
conventional, they are useful only when they describe things that can be empirically observed in
geometry.
Non-Euclidean geometries in Britain
The history of non-Euclidean geometry in Britain is, in fact, a history of non-Euclidean geometr/'es,
given that none of the geometries in question, or their concomitant philosophical and scientific
commentaries, were introduced in Britain in anything like a coherent package of accepted ideas. The
terrain of non-Euclidean geometries that Clifford trod upon was a varied and diverse one. It exposed
him to the works of Nicolai Lobachevsky117 (1792-1856) and Riemann, as well as the physiological,
biological and philosophical arguments accompanying those works, as manifest in debates between
Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894) and J.P. Land throughout the mid-1870s.
In his late 19th-century retrospective account of the rise of non-Euclidean geometry, the
mathematician George Bruce Halstead (1853-1922) has dichotomized the history of non-Euclidean
geometry into two opposing views. The first was advocated by the "Anti-Euclideans," which included
mathematicians such as M.L Bertrand of Geneva, Legendre, M. Vincent, and Ed. T. Dixon, who tried
"to convict Euclid of imperfection by offering short proofs of his celebrated Parallel-Postulate." The
second was advocated by practitioners who were "the true Non-Euclideans," including Lambert,
Janos Bolyai (1802-1860), Lobatschewsky [sic.], Riemann, Helmholtz, Sophus Lie (1842-1899), Felix
Klein (1849-1925), Clifford and Cayley, all of whom were "ardent admirers of Euclid," but all of
117
There are many variations on the spelling of Nicolai (sometimes Nicolas) Ivanovich Lobachevsky. I have chosen to use
the spelling adopted in Halsted's short biography of the mathematician (Halsted 1894).
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whom were also "makers of two companion geometries, called usually Lobatchewksy's and
Riemann's" (Halsted 1894, 150). Halsted's account is a Whiggish categorization of the place of actors
in the development of non-Euclidean geometries, especially as they practiced their respective crafts
in Great Britain. His bifurcation of geometrical history into these two categories of practitioners
assumes concerns over the legitimacy of the parallel postulate and the construction of alternative
geometrical models were necessarily distinct fields of inquiry. For someone such as Clifford,
however, this was not the case. Both queries also motivated actors such as Lobachevsky, Bolyai and
Riemann.
In his canonical account of the history of non-Euclidean geometries, Roberto Bonola (1955) has
offered another account of non-Euclidean geometry. Bonola views new geometers such as
Lobachevsky, Bolyai and Riemann to be practitioners who developed their respective concepts as
the direct result of geometrical queries posed by their predecessors. This unbroken line of inquiry,
Bonola argues, resulted in three types of non-Euclidean geometry: hyperbolic, elliptic, and parabolic
(Bonola 1955, 199). A linear account of geometrical history is particularly evident in Bonola's account
of "Clifford parallels." Here he writes that Clifford wrote within a tradition that had queried the
nature of Euclid's parallel lines, where Euclid's parallels possess three properties: coplanarity, no
common points, and equidistance. By ignoring the last property, one could simply construct the
geometries of Gauss, Lobachevsky, and Bolyai. One finds that, in so doing,
The parallels which correspond to [the new geometry] have very few properties in
common with the ordinary parallels. This is due to the fact that the most beautiful
properties we meet in studying the latter depend principally on the [equidistance]
condition. For this reason we are led to seek such an extension of the notion of
parallelism, that, so far as possible, the new parallels shall still possess the
characteristics, which, in Euclidean geometry, depend on their equidistance (Bonola
1955, 200).
From Bonola's point of view, Clifford chose to develop a concept of parallels that lauded
equidistance but which ignored the first two properties stated above. For instance, in his
"Preliminary Sketch of Bi-quaternions" (1873), Clifford writes that parallels ought to be defined as
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straight lines in either the same or differing planes, but of which the points of one are always
equidistant from the points of the other. Two cases arise as a result. When the lines lie in the same
plane there is nothing other than the instantiation of ordinary Euclidean geometry. When the two
lines do not lie in the same plane, the parallel lines can only reside in Riemannian space (or elliptic
space)—that is, space in which the internal angle sum of a triangle is greater than 180°. Clifford
summarized this finding by saying that if two straight lines are equal and parallel, and their
extremities are joined, the result is a "skew parallelogram" (Bonola 1955, 206). On Bonola's view,
Clifford's contribution to non-Euclidean geometry is the direct result of his engagement with the
parallel postulate problem, which was presented to him as a coherent set of concerns over the
properties of parallels.
Clifford's conceptualization of parallel lines in "elliptic" space was not, however, a direct response to
the long-standing problem of how to define parallels. Nor was it a direct response to the question of
how to develop differing systems when the various properties of Euclidean parallels are tampered
with. Rather, Clifford's 1873 paper on bi-quaternions was the combined outcome of his navigations
through those varying terrains of knowledge identified earlier, only one of which included the
vocabulary and conceptual resources provided to him by Lobachevsky, Bolyai and Riemann.
Clifford's engagements with non-Euclidean geometries were not limited to the terms of pre-existing
discourses on the problem of "parallels". Nor were those discourses offered to him in the form of a
pre-packaged problem with a predefined set of potential responses. As Gray (1979) has
demonstrated, the ability to draw on analytical language in the 19th-century changed the manner in
which geometrical problems were approached, discussed and analyzed. Not least among those
"problems" was the famed parallel postulate in Euclidean geometry. Although this point is "glossed
over in the expositions which treat the history [of non-Euclidean geometry] as belonging to 'pure'
geometry and foundations," the use of analysis played a crucial role in providing new resources to
describe the potential behaviour of geometrical objects. The works of Lobachevsky and Bolyai are
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important precisely because they were "thoroughly analytic," Gray contends (Gray 1979, 243). Those
two mathematicians rendered the formulae of spherical trigonometry independent of the axiom of
parallels; they defined a surface in space that differs from a plane in that its "parallel lines" extend
into three-dimensional space. Those practitioners also constructed formulae for triangles that hold
true on their hyperbolic surfaces, and which are analogous to formulae for spherical surfaces; and
they concluded from their own formulae that the angle sum of a triangle on such a surface is less
than 180°.
Bolyai's contributions were first published in his father's Tentamen, a work that emerged in the early
1830s. Lobachevsky's works were first published in Russian in small publications in Kasan; later, in
1840, he published a larger text in German. In part, Bolyai was interested in seeking out the
commonalities that existed between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries, while Lobachevsky
was interested more in the elaboration of those non-Euclidean properties that he had generated
himself. Neither author's works were widely adopted at the time, partly due to their respective
locations on the periphery of European institutions (Lobachevsky was a mathematician in Kasan,
while Bolyai was the son of a Hungarian mathematics teacher). The medium each author used to
disseminate his respective works is also revealing. Lobachevsky published his early works in the
Kazan University Messenger in 1829 and 1835. The Messenger was not a widely circulated
publication. A truncated version of his text was later published in a French translation in 1837, but it
too was largely ignored. Lobachevsky then published a German text, Geometrische Untersuchungen
zur Theorie der Parallellinien (1840), which constituted the summation of a course of lectures he had
delivered at Kasan University. However, in it, the author chose not to discuss the three-dimensional
non-Euclidean figures he had discussed in his other, less circulated works.
Bolyai's work, meanwhile, appeared as a Latin appendix to his father's text, Tentamen. The
Tentamen itself focused on the foundations of geometry, arithmetic, algebra and analysis. Farkas
Bolyai (1775-1856) was not an unknown figure; through his studies at Jena and Gottingen in
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previous years he had become a friend of Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), the well-connected and
well-known German mathematician. Consequently, Gauss did, in fact, read the young Bolyai's
appendix and, in a letter to his father, praised the work as reflecting some of his own sentiments on
the matter of the parallel postulate (including the possibility of alternative geometrical models). Yet,
Gauss's moral support was not enough to generate professional recognition for the young Bolyai's
efforts. Bolyai's work remained relatively unknown in Britain until the 1860s (for a detailed account
of Bolyai's work, see Gray (2003)).
In their respective efforts, both Lobachevsky and Bolyai perceived themselves to be doing something
in the geometry of empirical space. Lobachevsky, for example, called for astronomical experiments
to empirically verify the structure of space (Gray 1979, 249). Though this explains little to nothing
about why the works of these two authors were ignored for so long, it does help to explain why
practitioners, such as Clifford, found Bolyai and Lobachevsky's works so useful, given that the British
terrains upon which they operated in later years were ones in which an increasingly dominant
experimentalist community of laboratory scientists had re-evaluated the empirical origins of
knowledge. Clifford's own mathematical navigations had already led him to adopt non-standard
techniques in measuring motion in space, i.e. quaternions and Grassmannian formalism. The
adoption of non-standard metrics in geometry would not have seemed radically out of place.
Noteworthy also is the fact that alternatives to the Euclidean account of parallel lines had also
entered into British discourse in the 1860s, including Philip Kelland's 1863 lecture to the Royal
Society of Edinburgh, entitled "On the Limits of our Knowledge respecting the Theory of Parallels."118
In that paper, Kelland recounted a publication in Crelle's journal some years earlier, entitled
"Imaginary or Impossible Geometry," which had discussed the possibility of a geometry in which the
angle sum in a triangle was less than two right angles. Kelland was referring to Lobachevsky's book.
118
Richards (1988) cites the author as being "John Kelland". However, there is no record of a John Kelland at the University
of Edinburgh. The citation in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh merely states "Professor Kelland." It was,
in all likelihood, the professor of mathematics, Philip Kelland, who delivered this paper to the society.
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Although Kelland had not read the original book, he did find that he was unable to refute the
impossibility of the "acute angle hypothesis" on his own. Nonetheless, he argued the limits of the
hypothesis were too narrow to take seriously and thus of insignificant value (Richards 1988, 71-72).
More prominently, Arthur Cayley published a "Note on Lobachewsky's [sic.] Imaginary Geometry" in
the Philosophical Magazine (1865). In his paper, Cayley called Lobachevsky's work "curious,"
concluding that he would like to see the full working out of a geometrical interpretation based upon
the notion that the angle sum of a triangle could be less than two right angles. This was likely the
first paper that exposed the young Clifford (who was still a student of Cayley's at Cambridge at the
time) to the notion of non-Euclidean geometries.
The burgeoning of interest in non-Euclidean geometries that occurred in Britain in the latter half of
the 1860s was due, however, to the emergence of a series of other publications. The first was
Gauss's correspondence with the astronomer H.C. Schumacher (published in volumes from 1860 to
1863). In his letters, Gauss had written to Schumacher in 1844 mentioning Lobachevsky's work. He
also noted that he had contemplated similar ideas decades earlier. Gauss's professional support,
now issued in a published form, helped to legitimatize Lobachevsky's little-known mathematical
speculations, sparking new interest in Britain and Europe more generally. A few years later,
Guillaume-Jules Houel (1823-1886) published his French translation of Lobachevsky's work in Etudes
Geometriques sur la Theorie des Parallels (1866). One year later, Riemann's Habilitationsvortrag,
which had originally been delivered to the faculty at the University of Gottingen in 1854, was
published in its original German as "Uber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen"
in the Abhandlungen der Konglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschafter zu Gottingen (1867). By the
mid-1860s, therefore, a slew of "new" literature featuring non-Euclidean geometry had emerged in
both French and German, along with two smaller notices by Kelland and Cayley in English.
This quasi-legitimization was further bolstered in a series of interpretive accounts set out by
Sylvester, who mentioned higher dimensional spaces and Riemann's 1866 paper in his 1869
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Presidential Address to Section A of the BAAS. Meanwhile, Helmholtz, who had been active
publishing popular accounts Gauss, Lobachevsky, Houel and Riemann's geometrical ideas in German
journals, followed up by publishing his popular account, "The Axioms of Geometry," in English in The
Academy starting in 1870. Helmholtz then played a prominent role in popularizing Riemannian
geometry in Britain through a series of articles published in Mind. Clifford followed suit soon after,
invoking Riemannian and Lobachevskian claims in his work with elliptic geometrical models in his
papers on bi-quaternions. Along the way, Clifford also offered lectures to the BAAS, the Sunday
Lecture Society, and the Metaphysical Society in which he elaborated upon the physiological
justifications for non-Euclidean geometries.119 Thus, by the early 1870s, a series of publications and
speeches across Britain had highlighted, criticized and lauded "non-Euclidean" geometries.
Recall that Clifford had engaged with Riemann's "elliptical" geometry and n-tuple manifolds as early
as 1869. An account, therefore, of Riemann's geometry is useful in explaining why this was the case.
In the 1850s, it was Riemann's mentor, Gauss, who had encouraged the young acolyte to prepare a
text on geometry for his Habilitationsschrift (possibly Gauss had Bolyai and Lobachevsky's works in
mind at the time). In his Habilitationsschrift, Riemann talked about the "darkness" in geometrical
analysis that had spanned centuries. He had in mind the particular cases of surfaces with constant
positive curvature (i.e. the exterior surface of a sphere). By contrast, the regular Euclidean plane is a
surface of zero curvature. It is flat in all directions. The interesting comparative characteristic to note
about surfaces of zero curvature, such as a plane surface, and surfaces of constant curvature, such
as the surface of a sphere, is that any object described upon either of those surfaces can be moved
about with no alteration to its size or shape. No distortion occurs as a triangle on a plane is moved
about the plane. And no distortion occurs when a triangle on a constantly curved surface is moved
along that surface. From Riemann's perspective, the issue is a geometrical one in that one's
"metric", i.e the system of measurement being used, must be able to distinguish between flat and
119
For an account of the immediate response—in particular the critical responses—of authors such as William Stanley
Jevons to popular accounts of geometry see Richards (1988).
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non-flat surfaces when the person carrying out the measurement is limited to the surface in
question. It is simple to observe such differences between a flat plane and a spherical one when the
observer observes the surfaces from a third dimension, i.e. external to the surfaces in question. It is
not as simple to observe those differences when the observer is located upon the surface in
question, Riemann explains. In spaces of constant curvature, for instance, the sum of all triangles is
determined when the sum of one triangle is determined.120
Clifford's engagement with Lobachevsky's work, meanwhile, first occurred in 1870 only a little later
after his initial reading of Riemann. Clifford wrote from Trinity College on April 2nd, 1870, to say:
Several new ideas have come to me lately: First I have procured Lobachevski, 'Etudes
Geometriques sur la Theorie des Parallels'—a small tract of which Gauss, therein
quoted, says: L'auteur a traite la matiere en main de maTtre et avec le veritable esprit
geometrique. Je crois devoir appeler votre attention sur ce livre, dont la lecture ne peut
manquer de vous causer le plus vif plaisir... It is quite simple, merely Euclid without the
vicious assumption, but the way the things come out of one another is quite lovely
(Bonola 1955, 8).
Clifford reproduces Lobachevsky's claims in a short set of lecture notes used for his mathematics
classes at UCL. In those notes, Clifford lists a series of characteristics (15 in total) that are common to
both Euclidean and the Lobachevskian geometries. The properties include items such as "two
straight lines cannot cut in two points" and "a straight line may be produced indefinitely" (Clifford
1882, 531). Thereafter, Clifford offers an in-depth discussion of hyperbolic spaces in a series of
lectures delivered in 1873 and entitled "Philosophy of Science."
120
The history of the constant "k" is one that deserves more attention. By looking at the manner in which that constant
was introduced in Lobachevsky and Bolyai's works, the manner in which their respectively interpreted that symbols, and
the manner in which later practitioners used that symbolical concept in attempting to discuss problems of important to
their own fields of research, the historian may better be able to offer a social history of geometrical conceptualizations
from the 1820s to the 1870s. Eugenio Beltrami (1835-1899) was able to take this Riemannian concept of curvature and
further mathematize it (something Riemann was limited in doing due to the public nature of his Habilitation (Gray 1979).
The imaginary sphere with radius - is the surface of constant curvature that has a "curvature" determined by
K (curvature) = )2 = (Gray 1979, 246).
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Empirical mathematics in the 1870s
Clifford's navigations through Cambridge's symbolical algebra, including his exposure to
Grassmannian algebra, and his brief encounters with Riemann and Lobachevskian geometry, as well
as his early exposure to the "terrain" of Victorian Darwinism, had produced a complex topology of
interests that motivated the young mathematician's choices. Those "terrains" were manifest, for
instance, when, just over a year after arriving to teach at UCL, Clifford delivered a lecture to the
BAAS, in Brighton, on August 19th, 1872, entitled, "On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific
Thought." In that lecture, the "applied mathematician" argues there is an important epistemological
difference existent between highly technical computations and "predictions." Building a bridge, and
expecting that it should stand based upon past experiences of bridge-building, does not constitute a
prediction. It is, rather, the outcome of a skilled calculation and repeated practice. "Scientific
prediction" requires speculation of truly unknown circumstances. Clifford claims,
The difference between scientific and merely technical thought ... is just this: Both of
them make use of experience to direct human action; but while technical thought or skill
enables a man to deal with the same circumstances that he has met with before,
scientific thought enables him to deal with different circumstances that he has never
met with before (Clifford 1886, 88).
True "prediction" centres on speculation of the unknown, not repetition of the known. The exemplar
here is Hamilton's account of canonical refraction in certain crystals, Clifford says, noting that the
Irish mathematician came to make his "prediction" by considering the ramifications of Fresnel's
theory with regards to the perception of crystals from particular directions. No previous knowledge
of such refraction had existed. Predictions are to be lauded, therefore, because they generate
genuinely new knowledge.
Yet, Clifford admits predictions are also always hampered by the same limitations that hamper
technical measurements more broadly—namely, the limits of human perception. The degree to
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which humans can measure events accurately depends upon their ability to perceive. Scientific
instruments also depend upon human perceptions in being calibrated. Even measuring macroscopic
phenomena, such as gravity, can be problematical. Two falling bodies do not fall towards the centre
of the Earth at exactly the same speed (due to factors such as gravitational pull, location in space,
the tides of the sea and the positioning of the sun, the moon and the other planets, etc.). The
deviation between respective gravitational speeds is too miniscule for humans to perceive, Clifford
argues. The "theoretical" meaning of "exactness" appeals, therefore, to a sort of super-human
observational capacity. Clifford states,
The practical meaning [of "exact"] is only very close approximation; how close, depends
upon the circumstances. The knowledge then of an exact law in the theoretical sense
would be equivalent to an infinite observation (Clifford 1886, 94).
Historically, mathematicians have claimed "theoretically exact" knowledge exists in geometry and
mechanics. "If this had been said to me in the last century, I should not have known what to reply,"
Clifford concludes.
However, by 1872, Clifford tells his audience, no such belief is any longer tenable. Rather, the
foundations of geometry had been thoroughly criticized by two mathematicians, including
Lobachevsky and "the immortal Gauss." Here, Clifford cites Houel's 1866 French translation of
Lobachevsky's German text, Geometrische Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Parallellinien (1840). He
also cites Gauss's letter to Schumacher (Nov. 28, 1846), in which the German mentions his recent
encounter with Lobachevsky's geometry (a decade after having been exposed to Bolyai's account),
and in which he praises the work as creative and original. Clifford states Lobachevsky and Gauss's
works had recently been "extended and generalised" by Riemann and Helmholtz.121 He cites Houel's
1866-67 translation of Riemann's Ueber dis Hypothesen welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen, as it
had appeared in the Annali di Matematica (this being the same paper Clifford would later translate
into English in 1873). And he refers to Helmholtz's English account, "The Axioms of Geometry," as
121
In this lecture, Clifford nowhere mentions Bolyal or Beltrami.
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published in Mind. The conclusion that mathematicians ought to draw from these varied
reconsiderations of geometrical foundations is that
although the assumptions which were very properly made by the ancient geometers are
practically exact—that is to say, more exact than experiment can be—for such finite
things as we have to deal with, and such portions of space as we can reach; yet the truth
of them for very much larger things, or very much smaller things, or parts of space which
are at present beyond our reach, is a matter to be decided by experiment, when its
powers are considerably increased (Clifford 1886, 94).
Clifford is keen to "make as clear as possible the real state of this question," because, "it is often
supposed to be a question of metaphysics, whereas it is a very distinct and simple question of fact"
(Clifford 1886, 94).
There is a difference, he explains, between "exactness" and "universality." What is universally
perceived is not necessarily "exactly" true. The deviation of perceived measurement from any
particular theoretical (i.e. exact-truth) claim might be "inconceivably small, which no experiment
could detect." Yet,
Between this inconceivably small error and no error at all, there is fixed an enormous
gulf; the gulf between practical and theoretical exactness, and, what is even more
important, the gulf between what is practically universal and what is theoretically
universal (Clifford 1886, 95).
A law is "practically universal" when it is as exact, or more exact, than all measurements obtained
experimentally. A law is "theoretically universal" when it is exact in all instances. This latter
definition is, in many ways moot, Clifford argues, because "this is what we do not know of any law at
all."
Clifford accepts, therefore, that mathematical-scientific laws can be established, even though, at
root, they are only ever fantastic approximations and never absolute models. Furthermore, in that
infinitesimal region between exactness and error, there resides an infinite number of possible
alternative explanations of the particular phenomenon being explained. The laws of gases,
electricity, and magnetism, he says, have all been treated in "statistical" ways, such that any
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observed measurement is dependent upon the average number of molecules behaving in any
particular manner. Clifford argues even "the law of gravity" is dependent upon the statistical
behaviour of molecules in space. In other domains of science, too, we find that we must constantly
revise our notion of "exact" and adopt a more conventional approach to that which we deem to be
an observed and measured "fact" of the past. In a vehemently-worded diatribe against absolutist
accounts of exactness and a priori intuitive truth (including mathematical truth), Clifford boldly tells
his audience:
When people are hopelessly ignorant of a thing, they quarrel about the source of their
knowledge. Accordingly many maintained that we know these exact laws by intuition.
These said always one true thing, that we did not know them from experience. Others
said that they were really given in the facts, and adopted ingenious ways of hiding the
gulf between the two. Others again deduced from transcendental considerations
sometimes the laws themselves, and sometimes what through imperfect information
they supposed to be the laws. But more serious consequences arose when these
conceptions derived from Physics were carried over into the field of Biology. Sharp lines
of division were made between kingdoms and classes and orders; an animal was
described as a miracle to the vegetable world; specific differences which are practically
permanent through all time; a sharp line was drawn between organic and inorganic
matter. Further investigation, however, has shown that accuracy had been prematurely
attributed to the science, and has filled up all the gulfs and gaps that hasty observers
had invented. The animal and vegetable kingdoms have a debatable ground between
them, occupied by beings that have the characters of both and yet belong distinctly to
neither. Classes and orders shade into one another all along their common boundary.
Specific differences turn out to be the work of time. The line dividing organic from
inorganic, if drawn to-day, must be moved to-morrow to another place; and the chemist
will tell you that the distinction has now no place in his science except in a technical
sense for the convenience of studying carbon compounds by themselves (Clifford 1886,
96-97).
Thus,
When we say that the uniformity which we observe in the course of events is exact and
universal, we mean no more than this: that we are able to state general rules which are
far more exact than direct experiment, and which apply to all cases that we are at
present likely to come across (Clifford 1886, 97).
Clifford concludes the entire structure of our scientific and mathematical measuring apparatus is
based upon our fallible and inaccurate perceptions. Physiology indicates humans are not equipped
to perceive every source of information, or every aspect of physical reality. The eye is regarded as
the ultimate "optical instrument of human manufacture." Yet Helmholtz, "the physiologist who
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learned physics for the sake of his physiology, and mathematics for the sake of his physics," has
declared, "If an optician sent me [a human eye] as an instrument, I should send it back to him with
grave reproaches for the carelessness of his work, and the demand the return of my money"
(Clifford 1886, 100). We might assume based on the works of Darwin, Spencer and Wallace that the
human eye is in the process of improving due to the effects of natural selection over time; thus,
there is no guarantee of the accuracy of its measurements.
This poor level of perceptive ability had already led to the production of multiple contradictions and
paradoxes in science and mathematics, Clifford further explains, drawing on Riemann's similar claim
in prior years. Starting with Kant, a false dichotomy was established between bounded space and
infinite space. Given that a boundary is that which divides two portions of space, the entire inquiry
into whether space has a boundary or not is a "contradiction in terms." Empirical studies might tell
us whether space is finite or composed of a certain number of cubic miles of distance. In such cases,
there is no reason to assume that scientists will not be able to determine an approximate size of the
universe in the future. If, on the other hand, it is not finite, then knowledge of that "would be quite
different from any knowledge we at present possess." Clifford adds the "contradiction" between
infinite and bounded arises from a false sense of absoluteness and exactness in the "laws of
geometry." He cites explicitly the overturning of that dichotomy as evidenced in Riemann's account
of "unboundedness" and "infinite extent" (two concepts that will be explored shortly in Clifford's
translation of Riemann's paper).
Clifford tells his fellow Association members there is no reason to think new experiences or
empirical knowledge will not shed some light on these matters, though our conclusions will be only
ever "practically exact:"
We may ask if there is any piece of matter so small that its properties as matter depend
upon its remaining all in one piece. This question is reasonable; but we cannot answer it
at present, though we are not at all sure that we shall be equally ignorant next year. If
there is no such piece of matter, no such limit to the division which shall leave it matter,
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the knowledge of that fact would be different from any of our present knowledge; but
we have no right to say that it is impossible (Clifford 1886, 107).
Similarly, when speaking about the "infinite extent of space" as something that cannot, at present,
be perceived,
we may reply that this is only natural, since our experience has never yet supplied us
with the means of conceiving such things. But then we cannot be sure that the facts will
not make us learn to conceive them; in which case they will cease to be inconceivable
(Clifford 1886,107).
Clifford defends the physiological conceivability of non-Euclidean geometries and the empirical
nature of mathematical-geometrical knowledge in general—this being his personal interpretation of
the Habilitation. The degree to which Clifford absorbed that viewpoint as part of his own
professional identity is evident at the end of 1872, when he issued a mathematical article in the
Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society (December 12th, 1872), entitled "Geometry on an
Ellipsoid." That paper discusses the construction of ellipsoids and their basic properties, including
the "lines of curvature" of the ellipsoid. It is an exploratory piece that helps Clifford to pave the
symbolical way toward further developing an algebraic system that can represent rigid body motion
in elliptically curved spaces. It is, in other words, an exploratory piece that indicates his navigations
through the varying "terrains" outlined so far were leading him towards the construction of
biquaternion mathematics.
Clifford's efforts to professionalize
By the early-1870s, Clifford had become a well-known public speaker on varied matters of scientific
interest, as well as a proponent of newly emergent concepts in geometry. Yet, he had not produced
a university textbook or any other major publication of note. As with Tait's appeal to Hamiltonian
quaternions and his concomitant hope that it would launch his publishing career in the previous
decade, Clifford appealed to what he perceived to be an emerging symbiosis between the algebra of
quaternions and the geometry of Riemann in an effort to launch a boldly unique research program.
In a series of lectures entitled "The Philosophy of the Pure Sciences," delivered to the Royal
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Institution in March 1873, Clifford expounds upon the philosophical foundations for this new
mathematical program. In his lecture, Clifford describes the untrustworthiness of visual perceptions.
"When you move," he tells to his audience members, "I seem to see you go continuously from one
position to another through an infinite series of intermediate positions." But regardless of whether
one feels one is perceiving continuity, the electrical-neural stimulus that is actually transmitted from
eye to brain is a discontinuous one. Clifford claims,
the sensitive portion of my retina, which receives impressions, is not itself a continuous
surface, but consists of an enormously large but still finite number of nerve filaments
distributed in a sort of network ... All I can possibly have seen therefore at any moment
is a picture made of a very large number of very small patches, exceedingly near to one
another, but not actually touching (Clifford 1886,183).
In other words, our perceptions are composed of two parts. The first is the physical "sensations"
that stimulate our eyes, muscles and other nerve endings. The second is the "imagined" part, which
allows us to fill in the gaps and perceive the world continuously.
The question to pose, of course, is how does one know when one is filling in the gaps "rightly"? If
part of our perceptions are imaginative, could not the imagination fill in the gaps of the universe
incorrectly? To answer that query, Clifford invokes both the empirical notion of geometrical
knowledge, as advanced by Riemann, along with the Darwinist conceptual tools he had adopted, to
argue the imaginative filling-in of our perceptual gaps does not occur randomly—it is based, rather,
upon learned (both empirical and evolutionary) experiences. He states,
In the first place, out of pictures I have imagined solid things. Out of space of two
dimensions, as we call it, I have made space of three dimensions, and I imagine these
solid things as existing in it; that is to say, as having certain relations of distance to one
another. Now these relations of distance are always so filled in as to fulfill a code of
rules, some called common notion, and some called definitions, and some called




I sometimes imagine that I see two lines in a position which I call parallel. Parallelism is
impossible on the curved picture of my retina; so this is part of the filling in. Now
whenever I imagine that I see a quadrilateral figure whose opposite sides are parallel, I
always fill them in so that the opposite sides are also equal. This equality is also a part of
the filling in, and relates to possible perceptions other than the one immediately
present. From this example, then, you can see that the fundamental axioms and
definitions of geometry are really certain rules according to which we supplement or fill
in our experience (Clifford 1886,185).
Euclidean axioms and postulates train people to intuit flat space and specific sorts of parallel lines.
This is not necessarily representative of the patchwork of reality that we observe discontinuously.
When we perceive motion occurring in space over time, we fill in our perceptions using the assumed
"laws of kinematic" or "the pure science of motion," which we have been trained to believe in. Add
to this the "continuity of things," which is another rule "according to which we fill in our
experience," and it becomes clear that our minds have been trained to organize sensory data in
particular and non-arbitrary ways. Thus, Clifford argues, we come to impose a certain level of
uniformity upon the experiences we perceive.
Clifford then associates his claims with those of Locke and Hume who, he says, had advanced similar
theses. For Locke, our sensations are aggregates of experience, which we naturally bundle together
by experience. For Hume, "causation" is nothing other than a perceived series of events to which we
ascribe uniformity. Those British philosophers, Clifford claims, justify the view that "the supplement
of experience is made up of past experience, together with links which bind together perceptions
that have been accustomed to occur together" (Clifford 1886, 190). Thus, all of our knowledge
claims and all of our "objective" verifications of their truth are fundamentally experiential in nature.
This viewpoint has caused historical controversy in the past, he writes. "After being staggered for
some time by Hume's explanation," Kant eventually responded that not all knowledge can be
experiential for "the axioms of mathematics are absolutely and universally true." According to Kant,
Clifford says, no experience could possibly have informed our understanding of mathematical
axioms. However, everyone in the audience had likely had the experience of concluding that the
angle sum of all the triangles they had ever encountered is the same—namely, 180°. Likely, Clifford's
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listeners felt as though they had known something "which could not possibly be derived from
experience" (Clifford 1886, 191). At the time Kant was writing, that sentiment had been a general
one. "If a man felt absolutely sure that two straight lines perpendicular to the same line would never
meet, however far produced, he could not maintain against Kant that all knowledge is derived from
experience," Clifford explains, adding that Kant assumed that our statements about "Space and
Time" are statements about the phenomena themselves.
The Kantian approach was popular for a time, adopted and promulgated by people such as Whewell,
in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840). Whewell used the Kantian viewpoint to counteract
the emergent views of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), who had argued geometrical images can be
painted in the imagination in a way that is "equal to reality." Clifford paraphrases Mill in saying,
This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a little practice) mental pictures
of all possible combinations of lines and angles, which resemble the realities quite as
well as any which we could make on paper; and in the next place, make those pictures
just as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as the realities themselves.
Furthermore,
The foundations of geometry would therefore be laid in direct experience, even if the
experiments (which in this case consist merely in attentive contemplation) were
practiced solely upon what we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds,
and not upon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take some
objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them ... Without denying,
therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves that two straight lines cannot enclose a
space, by merely thinking of straight lines without actually looking at them, I contend
that we do not believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but
because we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones with quite as much
certainty as we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore,
is still an induction from observation (Clifford 1886, 195-196).
Clifford appeals to Mill as justification of his own view that geometrical knowledge is fundamentally
inductive in nature. It is experiential. Though Mill believed our experiences justify a belief in
Euclidean geometry as true of space, Clifford argues the Millian viewpoint holds even though
alternative geometrical experiences are clearly possible.
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Contrary to Kant, and based on a contemporary interpretation of Mill, Clifford argues we should
consider statements about the world to be utterances about the perceiver, "because these
statements are about me." The uniformity in our perceptions derives from the fact that it is always
the same "me" doing the perceiving, "or at any rate it is a me possessing always the same faculties of
representation," he concludes (Clifford 1882, 193). Clifford used Locke, Hume and Mill as antidotes
to Whewell and Kant to legitimize his engagement with empiricism in mathematics. The symbolical
algebraists of the early century had largely sidelined the importance of empirical foundations
(though De Morgan and Hamilton had sought to re-elevate the "empirical" to some degree). And
they had used Locke to do so.
Clifford's response was to revivify Locke as an empiricist and to invoke other key British figures (i.e.
Hume and Mill) to open up the Pandora's Box of geometrical possibilities in space, thereby allowing
him to advance a Riemannian and Helmholtzian-inspired account of the universe's ontology.
Indicative of this fact is Clifford's claim that he seeks to go beyond Mill. He notes that experience
"tells me that my mental images of geometrical figures are faithful representations of those realities
which are within the bounds of experience." He wonders, however, "What is to tell me that they are
faithful representations of realities that are beyond the bounds of experience?" Answering his own
question, Clifford argues, "Surely no experience can tell me that" (Clifford 1886, 197). Thus, although
geometrical knowledge is induced from experience, certain knowledge still lies beyond perception
altogether. Clifford's objective is to provide justification for those research programs that sought to
invoke geometrical models, such as Riemann's elliptic model and Lobachevsky and Bolyai's
hyperbolic models, to present new possibilities at distances far beyond anyone's perceptive
capabilities. Such speculation should be encouraged, Clifford claims, as events "beyond the limits of
experience" could be described in an infinite number of ways. Clifford therefore seeks to use
empirical knowledge as a foundation, such that symbolical algebra alone is not enough. But he
hopes also to abstract beyond the immediate and perceptible realms of inductive truth.
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To do so, Clifford appeals to Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), who had recently demonstrated that
knowledge is the result of one's evolutionary "self." In other words, one's knowledge claims are the
outcome of one's physiological and intellectual composition, and the intellectual and physiological
composition of one's ancestors, which began "with the first molecule that was complex enough to
preserve records of its own changes" (Clifford 1886, 198). All of those changes had been handed
down through "hereditary descent," and they have affected the manner in which we "perceive"
geometrical truth. The "doctrine of 'forms of intuition'" has some truth, though not the truth
ascribed to it by Kant or Whewell. Rather, the only a priori aspect of knowledge is the biological
preconstruction of our neurological selves, much of which is determined by our hereditary position
within the evolutionary schema. The most common experiences humans have, including that of time
and space, have had an effect upon the common structures of their brains, Clifford explains. Those
experiences have created neurological connections that, over time, have come to support
perceptions of uniformity, continuity and certainty. In typically Victorian tones, Clifford describes the
resulting state of human affairs by quoting from Spencer's Principles of Psychology (1870). "The
effects of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences," he says,
have been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and have slowly mounted to
that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant—which the infant in
after-life exercises and perhaps strengthens or further complicates—and which, with
minute additions, it bequeaths to future generations. And thus it happens that the
European inherits from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papaun. Thus
it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in some inferior human races,
become congenital in superior ones. Thus it happens that out of savages unable to count
up to the number of their fingers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and
verbs, arise at length our Newtons and our Shakespeares (Clifford 1886, 109).
Clifford links this evolutionary picture to the ability of humanity to engage with modern geometrical
knowledge. "The doctrine of evolution itself forbids me to admit any transcendental source of
knowledge," he writes,
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So that I am driven to conclude in regard to every apparently universal statement, either
that it is not really universal, but a particular statement about my nervous system, about
my apparatus of thought; or that I do not know that it is true (Clifford 1886, 200).
Whereas the early algebraists had sought to abstract beyond the "empirical" by producing universal
symbolical equivalences, which they then argued reflected the mind of God, Clifford seeks to
abstract beyond the "empirical" by hypothesizing alternative spatial models, the reasonability of
which, he argues, is representative of the evolutionary state of the "self." Clifford reminds his
audience of the claims made both by Berkeley and Helmholtz, regarding the complexity of
interpreting sensory images as received through the eye. Both authors had argued the retina is a
problematical component of human physiology as it does not transmit images directly to the brain.
For Clifford, the structure of the eye is an indication of the sometimes poor nature of evolutionary
outcomes, which affects knowledge generation.
To exemplify the sort of incomplete outcomes of the "eye," Clifford considers the "postulates of the
science of space," offering herein his own account of the story of Euclid's ascent to "authority" for
the past 22 centuries. Clifford first draws an analogy between the effect of Copernicus who, he says,
introduced the science of the "here and now," as opposed to infinite space and infinite distance, and
Lobachevsky, who, he says, did the same for geometry. In both the Copernican and Lobachevskian
cases, "The knowledge of Immensity and Eternity is replaced by knowledge of the here and now"
(Clifford 1886, 213). Prior to Lobachevsky, the "postulate of superposition" had long reigned
authoritative. It is the belief that a body with a particular shape occupies the same amount of space
anywhere in space. Lobachevsky was among the first, Clifford says, to query the truth of this
postulate and to suppose that at infinite (or just very large) distances, a shape may occupy a
different amount of space. The effect of Lobachevsky "and his successors" was so profound that "the
geometer of today knows nothing about the nature of actually existing space at an infinite distance,"
he says. The geometer can no longer assume that "all parts of space are exactly alike" (Clifford 1886,
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223). Riemann then "accomplished the task of analyzing all the assumptions of geometry ... showing
which of them were independent." Clifford concludes,
This very disentangling and separation of them is sufficient to deprive them for the
geometer of their exactness and necessity; for the process by which it is effected
consists in showing the possibility of conceiving these suppositions one by one to be
untrue; whereby it is clearly made out how much is supposed (Clifford 1886, 228).
Absolutist claims have no place in modern geometry, Clifford concludes. Geometry is, rather, an
empirical craft predetermined only by the evolutionarily-determined neurological setup of the
geometers in question.
Clifford's account ofRiemannian geometry, 1873
By the mid-1870s, Clifford was well-versed in the geometrical theories of Lobachevsky and Riemann.
But it is important to describe in detail the precise manner in which Clifford engaged with those
authors, and in particular Riemann, whose works appear as explicit influences on Clifford's later bi-
quaternion—so much so that I have identified "Riemannian and non-Euclidean geometries" as a
specific "terrain" that overlapped in profound ways with the other environments through which
Clifford was navigating in the 1870s.
The most important artifact to note in this regard is Clifford's 1873 translation of Riemann's seminal
paper, "On the hypotheses which lie at the bases of geometry." Written as part of his German
Habilitation, that paper investigated the origins of geometrical knowledge as Riemann had come to
view it in the mid-1850s within the Gottingen world of German mathematical practice. Riemann had
sought to expand upon the limits of geometrical and analytical possibility to include multiple
dimensions, introducing along the way a new vocabulary to categorize the notions introduced
therein. For instance, in Clifford's translation, Riemann writes,
It is known that geometry assumes, as things given, both the notion of space and the
first principles of constructions in space. She gives definitions of them which are merely
nominal, while the true determinations appear in the form of axioms. The relation of
these assumptions remains consequently in darkness; we neither perceive whether and
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how far their connection is necessary, nor, a priori, whether it is possible (Clifford 1882,
55).
Clifford had adopted a similar stance in his earlier arguments, as we have already seen in his 1869
paper on the "Space-theory of matter." The nature of geometrical "assumptions" (or axioms and
postulates) cannot be known for those regions of space resident beyond the bounds of human
perception, Clifford had argued. In his translation of Riemann's paper, Clifford demonstrates his
continued and renewed interest in these Riemannian claims, especially with regards to the origins of
mathematical knowledge, i.e. geometrical knowledge.
In the translation, Riemann claims one of the reasons for which mathematicians had failed to query
relations in space is that they had not considered the possibility of "multiply extended magnitudes,"
including "space-magnitudes." By starting with the notion of "multiply extended magnitudes," the
concept of a three-dimensional space (or a space of three extended magnitudes) emerges as just
one particular instance in an infinite number of possible space types. The notion of multiple
extensions does away with the assumption that the standards of measurement (i.e. the metric
relations) that may hold in the case of three-dimensions will necessarily hold in other types of
extended space. The problem, as far as Riemann sees it, is to determine which measure relations
hold within specific kinds of space. This, he argues, is a "matter of fact," which, "like all matters of
fact" are "not necessary, but only of empirical certainty." In other words, the metric system that
should be used in any given space (i.e. extended space) is determined through empirical analysis of
the type of space within which the measurement is taking place. However, given that such empirical
analysis is uncertain, due to the fact that the measurer cannot extricate herself from the space she is
measuring, Riemann concludes any metric assumption one makes is ultimately a "hypothesis." At
best, mathematicians are only able to,
investigate [the] probability [of the metric system], which within the limits of
observation is of course very great, and inquire about the justice of their extension
beyond the limits of observation, on the side both of the infinitely great and of the
infinitely small (Clifford 1882, 56).
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According to Clifford, Riemann proffers here an account of n-fold extended magnitudes to explain
that the worth of any metric system is relative to the type of space it is meant to be measuring. In so
far as our definitions allow for "continuous" and "discrete" magnitude, it is possible to talk of
continuous or discrete manifoldness. Discrete manifolds are everywhere; they include collections of
all sorts of discrete entities (i.e. a set of balls). Mathematicians are able to found theories of discrete
magnitudes upon definitions of equivalences within the given manifold. If the manifold includes the
elements of whole numbers, for instance, then normal arithmetic forms a theory of measurement
for that particular manifold. "Continuous manifoldness," on the other hand, is a less common
observation. "Quantity" relates to counting, because one can count discrete entities, while, "quanta"
refers to measurement. While we can identify "quantity" in discrete manifolds relatively easily,
finding "quanta" in continuous manifolds is more difficult. One cannot count continuous
manifoldness, one can only measure and compare it. Such "measure consists in the superposition of
the magnitudes to be compared," Riemann explains. "It therefore requires a means of using one
magnitude as the standard for another." Where there is no standard, two magnitudes can only be
compared when one is a part of the other, in which case the mathematician can only determine "the
more or less and not the how much." Riemann concludes,
The researches which can in this case be instituted about them form a general division
of the science of magnitude in which magnitudes are regarded not as existing
independently of position and not as expressible in terms of a unit, but as regions in a
manifoldness (Clifford 1882, 57).
"Position" is, therefore, crucial. Given that the manifoldness of a given space in which objects are
located is determined by the metric relations between those objects in that region, objects in
differing regions of manifoldness may very well require differing metric relations, as they cannot be
compared in any direct manner.
316
In order to describe how these n-ply extended spaces are constructed, Riemann uses projective
geometry in a manner akin to how Grassmann had described the projection of algebraic forms in
multiple dimensions in his Ausdehnungslehre.122 In the case of a continuous manifoldness, a simply
extended manifoldness will be that in which,
continuous progress from a point is possible only on two sides, forwards or backwards. If
one now supposes that this manifoldness in its turn passes over into another entirely
different, and again in a definite way, namely so that each point passes over into a
definite point of the other, then all the specializations so obtained form a doubly
extended manifoldness. In a similar manner one obtains a triply extended manifoldness,
if one imagines a doubly extended one passing over in a definite way to another entirely
different; and it is easy to see how this construction may be continued (Clifford 1882,
58).
The determination of position in a given n-ply extended manifoldness is, therefore, dependent upon
n determinations of "quantity" (i.e. n-position measures). In a flat n-fold, the curvature of the space
is zero at all points and in all directions. This means that any given measure-relations within that
manifold holds throughout space regardless of direction. "Manifoldness whose curvature is
constantly zero may be treated as a special case of those whose curvature is constant," Riemann
observes. The common characteristic shared by manifolds with constant curvature is that "figures
may be moved in them without stretching," Riemann writes. "For clearly figures could not be
arbitrarily shifted and turned round in them if the curvature at each point were not the same in all
directions" (Clifford 1882, 65). In other words, Euclidean space is the limiting case for all other
uniformly curved elliptic spaces.
In a section entitled "Application to Space," Riemann then states the determination of measure-
relations in any space of "an n-fold extent" allows for the determination of metric properties
elsewhere in that space (assuming flatness at the most fundamental level). Yet, those properties
always remain uncertain and only ever approximate. Indeed, "the question how, in what degree, and
122
It is likely that similar notions of "projection" were passed on to Riemann via Gauss and other practitioners in Germany
at the time.
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to what extent these assumptions are borne out by experience," remains to be resolved. In Clifford's
translation, Riemann writes,
In this respect there is a real distinction between mere extensive relations, and
measure-relations; in so far as in the former, where the possible cases form a discrete
manifoldness, the declarations of experience are indeed not quite certain, but still not
inaccurate; while in the latter, where the possible cases form a continuous
manifoldness, every determination from experience remains always inaccurate: be the
probability ever so great that it is nearly exact. This consideration becomes important in
the extensions of these empirical determinations beyond the limits of observation to the
infinitely great and infinitely small; since the latter may clearly become more inaccurate
beyond the limits of observation, but not the former (Clifford 1882, 67).
Riemann differentiates between "unbounded/less," which relates to "extent relations," and "infinite
extent," which relates to "measure-relations." The German argues that generations of
mathematicians had relied upon the assumption that space is an unbounded, three-fold
manifoldness. Even if this is an empirical reality, and not mere assumption, the "infinite extent" of
space by no means follows from its status as unbounded: "If we assume independence of bodies
from position, and therefore ascribe to space constant curvature [as opposed to assuming flatness],
it must necessarily be finite provided this curvature has ever so small a positive value" (Clifford 1882,
68). In such a situation, we would obtain "flat manifoldness;" objects could move about with no
change in their shape, despite the fact the space is analogous to the surface of a sphere—i.e. it is
"finite".
Questions regarding the infinitely great simply lie beyond the possibility of human observation,
Riemann concludes, although this is not so with the realm of the infinitely small. In fact, "It is the
exactness with which we follow phenomena into the infinitely small that our knowledge of their
causal relations essentially depends" (Clifford 1882, 68). Riemann invests hope in the development
of the infinitesimal calculus and its application to mechanics, which he considers to be fruitful
starting points for the "natural sciences," as those sciences "are still in want of simple principles for
such constructions," as they seek "to discover the causal relations by following the phenomena into
great minuteness, so far as the microscope permits" (Clifford 1882, 68). Riemann hypothesizes that,
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because perceived curvature at the astronomical level is zero, it is likely that constant curvature
prevails in the universe. However, he notes this is only a hypothesis, and wherever we cannot
assure ourselves of constant curvature, then movement (or the measure of movement) is
necessarily position-dependent, as curvature in different regions of space might vary arbitrarily,
including in spaces of "the infinitely small." For Riemann, the validity of geometrical claims is
ultimately dependent upon discovery made in another science—namely, that of "physic".
Riemann's notion of "continuous manifoldness," in which "quantity" is a "measure relation" (i.e. a
comparative ratio), added to the contours of Clifford's intellectual terrains, infusing them with
cogent notions of "empirical" mathematics. Clifford came to view legitimate mathematical
knowledge as that which is generated alongside developing geometrical perceptions and
experiences. In an article entitled "Preliminary Sketch of Biquaternions," Clifford advances this point
of view in a professional arena. The piece was produced in the same year that Clifford issued his
translation of Riemann's paper. It was published in the Proceedings of the London Mathematical
Society (June 12th, 1873). In that paper, the young British mathematician expounded upon
Hamiltonian quaternions in conjunction with Riemannian conceptions of space and the "theory of
screws," as advanced by Robert Ball (1840-1913), then Andrews Professor of Astronomy (and
Hamilton's successor as Royal Astronomer of Ireland). In his account, Clifford represents the need
for a more powerful algebra—one that can allow for the symbolical manipulation of "wrenches" and
"screws" in spaces of multiply-extended dimensions. The first line of Clifford's bi-quaternion text is
revealing in this regards. He states,
The vectors of Hamilton are quantities having magnitude and direction, but no particular
position; the vector AB being regarded as identical with the vector CD when AB is equal
and parallel to CD and in the same sense (Clifford 1882, 181).
Vectors are, however, insufficient, Clifford explains, given that Riemann had demonstrated the
importance of "position." A simple translation of a rigid body can be described using Hamiltonian
vectors, since "all of the particles in the rigid body move through equal distances along parallel
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straight lines in the same sense." In many cases, however, "It is necessary to consider quantities
which have not only magnitude and direction, but position also" (Clifford 1882, 181). The rotational
velocity of a rigid body always occurs about a particular axis, but equal rotations about two parallel
axes should not be considered as "equal," which is what Hamilton and Tait had assumed.
The difference between a system that takes "position" into account and one that does not, Clifford
explains, is manifest in the "geometric calculus" used to describe it. He writes,
In studying the motions of a particle or the composition of couples, the only
construction required is that of the "force-polygon" and the theory involved is that of
the addition of vectors; but in the static or kinematic of solids we require in addition the
construction of the "link-polygon" and there is involved the theory of the involution of
lines in space, or the linear complex (Clifford 1882,181-182).
A "vector" can be associated with the notion of a "translation"—i.e. a "quantity" denoted by a
simple motion. Meanwhile, Hamilton and Tait's "quaternion" is a ratio of two vectors and it
possesses its own magnitude and direction. A "rotor," short for "rotator," extends the "quaternion"
by including magnitude, direction and position. The simplest type of "rotor" motion is a rotation
about a particular axis. While Hamilton and Tait's "quaternion" is an operator that translates and
rotates, Clifford introduces his notion of "rotor" as a more general extension of the Hamiltonian
quaternion. A "rotor" can described a wider variety of rotations (i.e. it can describe a greater degree
of dimensional variation in rotational direction). "A rotor," Clifford says, "will be geometrically
represented by a length proportional to its magnitude measured upon its axis in a certain sense." In
other words,
A rotor AB will be identical with CD if they are in the same straight line, of the same
length, and in the same sense; i.e. a vector may move anywise parallel to itself, but a
rotor only in its own line (Clifford 1882, 182).
Clifford's rotors have magnitude, direction and a particular position within three-dimensional space.
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Appealing then to Ball's notions of "wrenches" and "screws,"123 Clifford explains rotors are only
partially analogous to Hamilton's work. This is because, in Hamilton's work, the addition of two
vectors results in another vector. Only in certain circumstances, however, does the addition of two
rotors lead to a third rotor. If two original rotors lie in different planes, they may never intersect in
their line of action. Therefore,
The composition of two forces whose lines of action do not intersect, or of two rotation-
velocities whose axes do not intersect, gives rise to a system of forces on the one hand,
and the most general velocity of a rigid body on the other (Clifford 1882,182).
As Ball had already demonstrated, a system of "forces" can be reduced to one single force, P, and a
couple, G, whose plane is perpendicular to the line of action of the force (i.e. the "central axis"). Ball
described this system of forces as a "wrench" about a certain "screw," where the axis of the screw, is
Q
the central axis. The pitch of the screw action is the ratio of the couple to the force, or -. By analogy,
the velocity of a rigid body rotating in space can be represented as a rotation-velocity, co, which
travels about a certain axis, combined with a translation-velocity, v, along that same axis. Ball had
termed this combined velocity as "twist-velocity" about a certain screw, where the axis of that screw
is the axis of rotation. By analogy to the system of forces mentioned earlier, the pitch of that axis of
rotation is the ratio of the translation-velocity to the rotation, or —.
For Clifford, this new symbolical terminology refers to new geometrical objects, or "forms." He
writes:
A screw is here a geometrical form resulting from the combination of an axis or straight
line given in position with a pitch which is a linear magnitude. A wrench is the
association with this geometrical form of a magnitude whose dimensions are those of a
123
Ball explains in his textbook, The Theory of Screws: a study in the dynamics of a rigid body (1876), that his "theory of
screws" was mostly developed in 1871 and 1872, during which time he published his developing ideas in the
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London and the Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy. Ball
expresses thanks to the previous works of Chasles, Poinsot and in particular the linear geometry of Plucker for providing
him with the mathematical resources to tackle the problem of rotational motion in space. He also thanks the personal
involvement of his friend, the mathematics professor in Munich, Felix Klein (1849-1925), in helping to bring the present
text to fruition. Relatively little is known about Ball, though Ball's work served as an invaluable store of conceptual
resources for Clifford's development of bi-quaternions.
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force; a fw/sf-velocity the association of a magnitude whose dimensions are those of an
angular velocity (Clifford 1882, 183).
Clifford concludes, therefore, that
just as a vector ("translation-velocity" or "couple") is magnitude associated with
direction, and as a rotor ("rotation-velocity" or "force") is magnitude associated with an
axis; so this new quantity, which is the sum of two or more rotors ("twist-velocity" or
"wrench"), is magnitude associated with a screw ... I propose to call this quantity a
motor; the simplest type of it being the general motion of a rigid body (Clifford 1882,
183).
The sum of rotors is a "motor,"124 and a "motor" constitutes a generalization of Hamilton's
quaternion system, by extending it symbolically to allow for a greater degree of variation among the
directions and rotating magnitudes in question.
To clarify, Clifford explains a quaternion is the ratio of two vectors, "or the operation necessary to
make one into the other." If the vectors AB and AC start from any arbitrary point A, then:
AB is made into AC by turning it about an axis through A perpendicular to the plane
BAC until its direction coincides with that of AC, and then magnifying or diminishing it
until it is of the same length as AC (Clifford 1882,183).
The ratio of these two vectors is the combination of an "ordinary numerical ratio with a rotation;"
Clifford identifies this as a "quaternion" composed of a tensor part and a versor part. Since the point
A is not specified, the quaternion's spatial positioning is entirely arbitrary. It is deemed to be
"completely specified" by its angular magnitude and the direction of its axis alone. In symbolical
terms, the quaternion can therefore be represented as:
124








This refers to an operation performed on AB such that it converts it into AC. Symbolically,
q.AB = AC,
where the axis of the quaternion (the axis of rotation) is perpendicular to the plane of the vectors
(i.e. perpendicular to BAC).
This highlights the fundamental limitation of Hamilton's quaternion mathematics, Clifford argues: "A
quaternion can only operate upon a vector which is perpendicular to its axis." If AF is a vector not in
the plane BAC, then the symbolical expression q.AF "is absolutely unmeaning." It is "very
important," Clifford emphasizes, "to remark that so long as AF means a vector not perpendicular to
the axis of q, the expression q.AF has no meaning at all" (Clifford 1882, 184). Hamilton's system
requires extension so that vectors that are not coplanar can also be compared. It is this extended
system that Clifford identifies as his own system of "rotors," "motors" and "bi-quaternions."




If AC is the shortest distance between the rotors AB and CD, then AB can be converted into CD in
three steps. The first step is to turn AB about the axis AC in order to bring it into the position of AB',
parallel to CD. The second step is to slide it along that axis into the position CD'. The last step is to
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"magnify or diminish it in the ratio" of CD' to CD. The first two operations together form a twist
AC
about a screw with the axis AC, with a pitch determined by, — 7. The ratio of two
arc .meas .of BAB
rotors—i.e. that which converts the first rotor into the second—is a combination of a numerical ratio
with a "twist" (Clifford 1882, 185). In rotor mathematics, the "twist" is defined by a definite screw,
and it is specified when both its angular magnitude and the screw (including the direction, position
and pitch of the screw) are provided.
In drawing an analogy to Hamilton's system, Clifford explains "that just as the rotation (versor)
involved in a quaternion is the ratio of two directions, so the twist involved in the ratio of two rotors
is really the ratio of their axes" (Clifford 1882, 185). As with quaternions, Clifford also acknowledges
his system of "rotors" is limited in its range of activity. A "tensor-twist" can only operate upon two
rotors that meet at right angles to the axis linking them. Clifford therefore works to extend his own
system further, by arguing that if we let t denote
CD
the operation which converts AB into CD, so that t = —, and t.AB = CD; then if EF
be any other rotor which meets AC at right angles, the expression t.EF will have a
definite meaning, viz., it will mean a rotor obtained by sliding EF along a distance equal
to AC, turning it about AC as axis through an angle equal to BAB', and altering its length
in the ratio AB: CD. But if EF be a rotor not meeting AC, or meeting it at any other than
a right angle, the expression t. EF will have no meaning whatever (Clifford 1882,185).
The question, therefore, is whether the ratio between "motors" is restricted in the same way that
the ratio between two "rotors" and two vectors are restricted (i.e. restricted to particular planes of
action). When two motors have the same pitch, the answer is simple: their ratio is a tensor-twist.
The "tensor" is the ratio of their magnitudes and the "twist" is the ratio of their axes. Where the
pitches are not the same, however, the solution is more complicated.
Recall that every motor is composed of a rotor part and a vector part. Its pitch is determined by the
ratio between those two parts. By combining "a suitable vector with a motor ... we may make the
pitch of it anything we like, without altering the rotor part" (Clifford 1882, 186). Converting motor A
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into motor B, requires that we let B' be a motor that has the same rotor part as B and the same
pitch as A, and that we let B — B' + /?, where /? is a vector parallel to the axis of B. In that
b b' b b'
instance, the ratio is represented as: 7 = 7 + 7 Given that 7 is a tensor-twist, t, it is possible to
b b
write: — = t + The last step is to find an operation that converts the motor A into a vector /?. To
do this, Clifford introduces a symbol "whose nature and operation will at first sight appear
completely arbitrary, but will be justified." The symbol a>, when applied to any motor, reduces that
motor "into a vector parallel to its axis and proportional to the rotor part of it" (Clifford 1882, 186).
In other words, go changes a rotation about an axis into a translation parallel to that axis.125 In
symbolical terms, coA = a, where a is a vector. If the ratio ^ is a quaternion, q, such that qa = /?,
b b
the quaternion can be rewritten as /? = qa = qcoA, which means - = qa), and, - = t + qa). This
series of manipulations demonstrates the "ratio of two motors may be expressed as the sum of two
parts, one of which is a tensor-twist, and the other is go multiplied by a quaternion" (Clifford 1882,
187). Clifford notes the ratio between differing motors is not restricted in any way. The system is
open to an infinite number of variations in space, where the general expression for a motor is
a + aofi.
Extending the system further, Clifford then notes that to express the ratio between two motors,
a + co/S and y + cu/?, or 777, one must revert to symbolical analysis alone to invoke an arbitrary
and "meaningless" symbolical term. If we let ~ = R, then q(a + go(3) = y + aoqfi. The symbol qfi
"has at present no geometrical meaning; for, in general, the rotors a,p,y will not be coplanar and
cannot therefore be operated on by the same quaternion q," Clifford admits. However, by invoking
the "calculus of quaternions," all those quantities can be expressed in terms of three rectangular
unit rotors through the origin. As such, the expression 77- "will be a perfectly definite quaternion
r." Although the equation ra = S — q/3 is like the equation q(a + o>/?) = y + a)q/3, in that it is
125
It follows from this definition that, if a> is made to operate twice upon any motor, the effect would be to reduce that
motor to zero: a>2A = 0.
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"purely literal and devoid of meaning," it is possible to manipulate these expressions by introducing
the operator co once more. If one adds "co times the first equation to the second,"126 it is possible to
algebraically obtain (q + cor)(a + co/?) = y + coS, such that the ratio can be symbolized by
the simple expression q + cor. This latter expression is what Clifford terms a "biquaternion."
Although there are difficulties with the interpretation of a "biquaternion"—i.e. it does not denote
the sum of all the geometrical operations that Clifford says can be applied to the motor a + co/?—it
does denote a basic concept that Clifford hoped would eventually constitute a meaningful extension
to Hamilton's quaternions.
In summing his first bi-quaternion efforts, Clifford offers his readers a classification table that
organizes the concepts he relies upon. The table is historically revealing in that it indicates the place
that Clifford gives his biquaternions vis-a-vis Hamilton and Tait's quaternions.
Geometrical Form Qcantitx Example Ratio






















Biquaternions appear as the final and ultimate operation—the generalized form of a system of
operations that measure rigid body motion in space.
Having thus categorized his bi-quaternions, Clifford then invokes Felix Klein's terminology to
distinguish between "parabolic" geometry (the geometry of Euclidean space with no curvature),
"elliptic" geometry (a geometry of Riemann), and "hyperbolic" geometry (the geometry of
Lobachevsky and Bolyai). Clifford identifies his future aim as that of applying his "biquaternion" tool
to Riemannian "elliptic" geometry. Clifford first defines the basis of his geometrical terminology. A
'
Clifford also assumes the distributive law.
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"unicursal space," he says, is a particular sort of algebraic space in which "every system of values"
corresponds in general to "one point," and in which "every point in general" corresponds to "one
system of values." In some cases, certain points correspond to an infinite number of values (i.e. they
correspond an infinite number of coordinates that satisfy a given equation). In other cases, certain
value-systems correspond to a locus of points in space. Projective geometry is an instance of this
latter situation. It is based upon the relations existent between point-equations and their resulting
loci-values in space.127 The "metric geometry of space," which is attributable to Cayley (especially as
presented in his "Sixth Memoir on Quantics" (1859)), is a theory of projective relations between
fixed geometrical forms and all other geometrical forms, Clifford writes. It is a theory of the invariant
relations that hold between certain fixed algebraic forms and all other algebraic forms. The "fixed
form" in Cayley's system is what Cayley termed the "absolute." To determine the types of
projections occurring in a particular space, the mathematician requires an equation for the
"absolute" elements in a given system, whether they refer to points, lines or plane-coordinates.
There are three cases, Clifford explains, which constitute possible models accommodating such
observed space: "elliptic geometry," in which all the of elements of the absolute are imaginary;
"hyperbolic geometry," in which all of the elements of the absolute contain no "real straight lines"
(i.e. "real points situated on the other side of the surface are called ideal" in this instance), and,
"parabolic geometry," in which the surface "degenerates into an imaginary conic in a real plane,"
and "the points of the absolute are mere points in the (real) plane of this conic" (Clifford 1882, 191).
Clifford's personal interest is in the first of the spaces. Within a space deemed "elliptic," by virtue of
its intrinsic curvature, a twist-velocity of a rigid body necessarily has two axes. A motion of
translation along any axis in elliptic space constitutes a similar phenomenal event to that of a
127
These loci correspond to linear equations between coordinates represent planes, and their intersections are lines.
Clifford notes this is a "purely projective definition" and these loci "are not necessarily flat planes and straight lines in
the metrical sense."
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rotation about a polar axis (Clifford 1882, 193).128 Clifford links the concept of elliptic space, as an
empirical possibility, to "bi-quaternions," as a metrical tool that can generate measure-relations in
such spaces.
In Clifford's view, Cayley's projective geometry, Riemann's elliptic geometry, and Hamilton's
quaternions go hand-in-hand. Clifford provides the following account to explain how that is. First, he
relates Hamiltonian vectors and quaternions to his own notion of "rotors":
A fixed point being chosen as origin, let three lines perpendicular to one another be
drawn through it, and let three unit-rotors having these lines as axes be denoted by the
symbols i,j, k. Then every rotor through the origin will be denoted by an expression of
the form ix + jy -f kz, where x,y,z are scalar quantities, or the ratios of magnitudes.
The symbols i,j,k shall have also another meaning; viz., each shall signify the rotation
through a right angle about its axis of any rotor which meets that axis at right angles.
When they are performed on rotors passing through the origin, these operations satisfy
the equations i2 = j2 — k2 — ijk = —1, by the ordinary rules of quaternions; and it is
easy to see that the same equations hold good when the operations are performed on
rotors not passing through the origin (Clifford 1882, 194).
Clifford notes, however, that
the compound symbol ix + jy + kz is also to have an analogous secondary meaning;
viz, a rectangular rotation about the axis of the rotor which it previously denoted,
combined with a tensor ^J(x2 + y2 + z2). It can operate only on a rotor which meets its
axis at right angles. This being so, the ratio of any two rotors through the origin is a
quaternion of the form q = w + ix + jy + kz = w + p, say. The axis p of this
quaternion is perpendicular to the plane of the two rotors. If a be a rotor through the
origin and q a quaternion, the product qx can be formed according to the Hamiltonian
rules of multiplication, and is in general a quaternion r. In this general case the equation
qx = r can only be interpreted by giving to a its secondary meaning; and the translation
of this statement into words is as follows;-lf a rotor be capable of being successively
operated upon by the rectangular versor a and the quaternion q, the final result will be
the same as if it had been originally operated upon by the quaternion r. If, however, the
axes of q and a are at right angles, the scalar part of r will be wanting, and we may write
the equation qx = p. This equation is now susceptible of a primary interpretation; viz.,
the quaternion q operating on the rotor a produces the rotor p; although the secondary
interpretation does not cease to be true (Clifford 1882, 194-195).
Clifford insists upon an empirical view of the matter. He states:
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As Clifford explains, "a twist-velocity is compounded of rotation-velocities about tow polar axes; say these are 0, tp.
Then the motion may be regarded either as a twist-velocity about a screw whose pitch is j and whose axis is the first
Q
axis, or about a screw whose pitch is - and whose axis is the polar axis" (Clifford 1882, 193).
0
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With such conventions, the two sides of the equation (q + r)s = qs + rs (in which
q,r,s are quaternions) have always the same meaning when both are interpretable;
which is what is meant by saying that the distributive law holds good for these symbols
(Clifford 1882, 195).
Hamiltonian quaternions and a Grassmannian sense of abstract "forms," which describe geometrical
phenomena in spaces of more than three-dimensions, along with a Riemannian "elliptical" spatial
model in mind, led Clifford to develop the nascent elements of this unique account of metrical
relations in non-flat space.
In the same year that Clifford issued this first brief account of bi-quaternions, he also delivered a
series of lectures to his UCL class focusing on "motion". Clifford's editor, Robert Tucker, entitled
those notes "Syllabus of Lectures on Motion". In his lecture, Clifford provides his students with a
clear account of what he took to be the study of "Kinematic." It is, he says, "the science which
teaches how to describe motion accurately, and how to compound different motions together,
without considering the circumstances under which motions take place." Clifford talks about "rigid"
body motion, the simplest kind of which is a translation. In a translation, the size and shape of the
given body do not change. A "strain" is another sort of motion, but one in which there is a change in
size or shape. Bodies that change in size or shape are "elastic" bodies, in contradistinction to the
"rigid" bodies above. Complementing "kinematics", however, is the science that teaches one about
the circumstances under which "particular motions take place." Here, Clifford uses Tait and
Thomson's language of "energy" in referring to scientific inquiry that analyzes the "Law of Force." "If
its results are expressed in terms of force," then the science is called "Dynamics". But if the results of
the inquiry are expressed in terms of "energy" then it is the science of "Energetics." "Energetics" is
divided into "statics," which explores circumstances under which bodies are at rest, and "kinetics,"
which explores the circumstances under which bodies are in motion. Static and kinetic studies of
"rigid bodies" are dealt with in relation to the study of "particles," Clifford explains, while studies of
"elastic bodies" are dealt with in relation to "Elasticity."
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Clifford focuses here on "rigid body kinematics." He provides students with a clear definition of a
"translation" of a rigid body. For example,
If two bodies A and B are in motion, the motion of B is said to be compounded of the
motion of B relative to A. The proposition can be similarly stated as: Translations
represented by the sides of a parallelogram compound together into translation
represented by the diagonal (Clifford 1882, 517).
Clifford explains, "A translation is a particular kind of vector, and the composition of translations is
equivalent to their addition as vectors." That composition satisfies the "law" (i.e. the mathematical
equivalence) that, a + /? = /? + a, where "uniform rectilinear motion" (i.e. that in which "equal
spaces are traversed in equal times") is represented by p = a + fit. Clifford also accounts for
"velocity" in vectorial form, explaining that velocity has both magnitude and direction. Therefore, "If
each of two motions has a velocity at a certain instant of time, the motion compounded of them has
a velocity which is compounded of their velocities by the rule of addition of vectors" (Clifford 1882,
522). Clifford invokes Hamiltonian language here with regards to the addition of vectors. Notably,
this is also an example previously discussed by Tait in his 1867 textbook on quaternions. In his own
account of it, Clifford describes the following scenario:
Let AB and AC be the given velocities; complete the parallelogram ABDC. Let also AB',
AC' be the mean velocities during an interval which ends at the given instant; if the
parallelogram AB'D'C' be completed, we know that AD' is the mean velocity of the
resultant motion. Now the interval may be so chosen that for it and all shorter ones
included in it BB' and CC' are each less than half of any proposed length; and therefore
DD', which is their vector-sum, less than the proposed length. Consequently AD is the
velocity of the resultant motion at the given instant (Clifford 1882, 522).
(Clifford 1882, 522)
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Though the example mimics Tait's textbook example from the previous decade, Clifford does not
discuss quaternions further in this series of lectures, and nowhere does he cite Tait.
On the conventional nature ofsymbolical representations
In Clifford's "Further note on Biquaternions," which constitutes Clifford's class notes from 1873 to
1876, the English mathematician continues to build upon his nascent notion of bi-quaternions as it
applies to rigid body motion. He begins by explaining the symbolical nature of the simple arithmetic
statements that "twice three are six" and "six is the product of two and three." Although both
statements are symbolically represented by the mathematical statement 2x3 = 6, they refer to
two different mathematical phenomena. On one interpretation,
3 is a concrete number of things, say three marbles, while 2 is not a number but an
operation, namely, the operation of doubling; and we may read the equation "doubling
three marbles makes six marbles" (Clifford 1882, 385).
The entities manipulated are existent, tangible things—namely, "marbles." The operation refers to
an empirically-observable event. On a second interpretation, however, nothing tangible or particular
is being manipulated. Rather, the mathematical expression above represents a general and universal
abstract rule that applies to anything at all. As Clifford explains,
The second interpretation regards 2 and 3 as abstract numbers, and affirms the
existence of a third number 6 having a definite relation to them which it is convenient to
study, this number so related being called their product; and various meanings given to
the numbers 2 and 3 may lead to various concrete interpretations of the formula
(Clifford 1882, 385).
Either interpretation "may be extended to other things besides numbers," Clifford adds, noting his
intention is to extend these two interpretations such that "all three symbols," including 2,3, and 6,
are regarded as "symbols of operation." We would then read the formula as saying that "doubling
the triple of anything makes the sextuple of it." If we were to approach the problem in this manner,
an equation such as abc = d could always possess two meanings:
1. a times b times c things makes d things;
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2. a times b times c times anything makes d times that thing (Clifford 1882, 386).
The last symbol could be regarded either as a "concrete number," or a "symbol of operation,"
though the other symbols are regarded as symbols of operations only.
In Clifford's second "extension," the symbols are considered not as "concrete numbers", but as
"steps" in space. This requires giving a "double meaning" to the signs + and —. The first meaning
indicates the "direction" of the "step", so that +3 is three steps forward (i.e. addition) while —3 is
three steps backwards (i.e. subtraction). When these symbols are "attached to an operation
performed upon steps," Clifford explains, "they mean retaining and reversing respectively." The
equation (—2)(+3) = —6 has two meanings. It can mean "doubling a step of 3 forward and
reversing it [to make] a step of 6 backwards," or it can mean "to triple a step and retain its direction,
then to double and reverse it," which "is the same as to sextuple and reverse it." Clifford explains
these directed steps can be regarded as "vectors on a straight line along which all numbers are
supposed to be ranged." Furthermore, "By exchanging numbers for continuous quantities we may
deal in this way with all vectors in a straight line." In all equations, "we may regard the last symbol in
every term as either a vector or an operation" (Clifford 1882, 386). This interpretive malleability
stems from Clifford's symbolical analytical training, but it is coloured by his need to interpret the
resulting equivalences in terms of geometrical (read continuous) forms.
But to advance his overall claim—that all meaningful mathematical symbols should have a
geometrical analogue—Clifford embarks upon a more detailed discussion of "imaginary or
impossible quantities." Assuming the law of addition of vectors in a plane holds, and can be
symbolically represented as AB + BC = AC, imaginary "quantities" can be interpreted as the
"operators which convert one vector into another" (Clifford 1882, 386).
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The symbol / denotes an operator that causes the vector to which it is applied to turn counter¬
clockwise through a right angle, such that 1.0A = OA'. Furthermore, given the following ratios,
a = ^j, b = , a and b being ratios of vectors in a line as just defined, it is possible to write that
OB = OM + MB = a. OA + b. OA' — (a + bI)OA, where /2 = —1. Every expression of the form
a + bl is the ratio of two vectors. And every vector in the plane, can be represented by a. OA +
b. OA', if we assign proper values to a and b. To be concise, the mathematician can write OA = j,
OA' = k. As a result, Ij — k and Ik — —j. Thus, we find
(a + bl)(cj + dk) = (ac — bd)j + (ad + bc)k.
This indicates "two classes of expressions," Clifford writes. The first includes those expressions in
which the last symbol in every product is a vector and "all the others" are ratios of vectors. The
second includes those expressions in which all the symbols represent ratios of vectors. It is
important to observe symbolically that cj + dk — (c + dl)j. This observation allows us to generate
the "useful convention" that j is "to be understood as written after every term; so that the complex
symbol c + dl will now mean either a ratio of two vectors as above, or the vector cj + dk" (Clifford
1882, 387). Clifford explains,
This artifice amounts to taking a definite vector as the unit, and representing all others
by means of their ratios to the unit. The success of the artifice depends on the fact that
the product of two such ratios is another ratio of the same kind (Clifford 1882, 387).
Clifford proposes extending this interpretation to vectors in space, such that the operation that
makes one vector into another is of the form a + bQ, where Q "turns through a right angle in the
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plane of the two vectors." Q only operates upon vectors within a particular plane. The "variety" of Q
is therefore "doubly infinite," to put it in Riemannian terminology, as Clifford does. The symbol Q
can be represented as a sort of "handle or axis of unit length perpendicular to the plane." Thus, the
compounded operation represented by bQ turns through a right angle and increases the vector by a
ratio of 1: b (where the operation has an axis of length b).
If Q and R represent two such compound operations, and if we assume there is a vector a on which
they both operate (where this vector constitutes the intersection of the planes of those
compounded operations), then Qa + Ra represents a vector at right angles to a itself, Clifford says.
If S is the rectangular "versor" that converts a into Qa + Ra, such that Sa = Qa + Ra, then the axis
of S is obtained by adding the axes of Q and R as if they were vectors. To represent this action,
Clifford writes S = Q + R, such that, (Q + R)a = Qa + Ra. "By the law of formation of Q + R,"
Clifford explains, it appears that P + (Q + R) = (P + Q) + R = (P + P) + Q = etc., which
represents a "rectangular versor whose axis is the vector-sum of the axes of P,Q,R." This can be
symbolised as P + Q + R, even though the equation, (P + Q + R)a = Pa + Qa + Ra, does not
"admit of interpretation in general, because there is no vector a which is capable of being operated
on by P, Q, and R" (Clifford 1882, 388).
Symbolical analysis drives Clifford's account of vectorial operations here, although Clifford is keen to
also highlight the need for empirical interpretation along the way. The lack of interpretive reality
underpinning (P + Q + R)a = Pa + Qa + Ra does not hinder his analysis; it pushes it further.
Clifford insists interpretations for such vectorial operations can be determined when the meaning of
the symbols being used is extended to more dimensions. Every rectangular versor, he explains, can
be represented by the symbolical form xl + yj + zK, where IJKconstitutes the "three rectangular
versors whose axes are the unit-vectors ijk." As a result, there are two "kinds" of "complex
quantities" to consider. The first is "vectors" of the (Hamiltonian form) p — ai + bj + ck, and the
second is "quaternions" of the form q = w + xl + y] + zK. In addition, the product of any number
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of quaternions is another quaternion, where the units IJK are multiplied according to the
(Hamiltonian) rules:
IJ = K = —//, KI = J = -IK.JK = I = —KJ, I2 = J2 = K2 = -1.
Because we cannot multiply a vector by a quaternion "in general," qp will only be meaningful if p is
perpendicular to the axis of q—that is, when ax + by + cz = 0. Even then, Clifford adds, we cannot
find the value of qp directly by multiplication (even though we have at our hands the formulaic
identities of Ij — k = —Ji,Ki = j = —Ik,Jk = i = —Kj), because the symbols Ii,Jj, and Kk are
"unmeaning" in themselves. It is only when we assume they have the "same value" that the result of
the direct multiplication, qp, is interpretable.
Importantly, the "artifice" by which, "in the geometry of two dimensions the two kinds of complex
quantities were reduced to one, is not applicable here." Although we can symbolically write
ai + bj + ck = (a + bK — cj)i, and thus represent every vector by its ratio to the unit i, "it no
longer remains true that the product of two such ratios is another ratio of the same sort." We might
"attain the desired reduction by a simpler method," Clifford argues. The mathematician could use
the symbols ijk in a "double sense," as both vectors and versors. When p is regarded as a
rectangular versor, the product qp can be obtained as the result of direct multiplication, as in
(w + xi + yj + zk)(ai + bj + ck), where ijk stands for what IJK had previously stood for. An
expression such as pqp is "always interpretable," when all the symbols are regarded as operations
on vectors. And it is "sometimes interpretable" when p is regarded as a vector (i.e. when it is
perpendicular to the axis of pq and "provided we make the formal assumption that i2 = j2 = k2 —
— 1"). Clifford draws the conclusion the "artifice" by which,
one symbol is made to do duty for two meanings is the same in quaternions, which deal
with three dimensions, and in scalars, which deal with one dimension. Namely, the signs
+ and —, which are originally unit-vectors, indicating the direction of a step forward or
backward, receive the additional meaning of versors, retaining or reversing the direction
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of a vector; just as the symbols ijk mean vectors originally, and afterwards are made to
mean versors too (Clifford 1882, 390).
In complex numbers, the "artifice is essentially different," where the "product of two vectors, has
very different geometrical relations to its components," Clifford writes. One can algebraically
demonstrate that all "geometric algebras" that deal with an odd number of dimensions resemble
scalars and quaternions in this regards, while those dealing with an even number of dimensions
resemble complex numbers. Consider, for instance, that the versors IJK can be represented on
"great circles of a sphere." In such a set-up, those versors could be regarded as steps on the surface
of the sphere; if understood in this manner, their ratios lead to the "whole theory of quaternions."
On this interpretation, vectors can only be represented by "points on the sphere supposed to have
definite weights attached to them, proportional to the length of the corresponding vectors." This,
Clifford says, is a geometric algebra of three dimensions "interpreted by means of a space of two
dimensions which has constant positive curvature, namely the surface of a sphere" (Clifford 1882,
390).
Drawing a link to the geometric studies of Riemann, and Helmholtz's physiological studies of non-
Euclidean geometry, Clifford then argues:
In the same way, we may interpret the algebra of a space of four dimensions, which
cannot be imaged, by means of a space of three dimensions having constant positive
curvature, of which a clear mental picture may be formed (Clifford 1882, 390).
Though the mental imagery is difficult, Clifford tells his students to consider "any vertical line" and a
series of horizontal planes that cut through the line at right angles. In "ordinary Euclidean geometry,"
he says,
These planes intersect on the horizon, which is a straight line infinitely distant. In the
geometry of a space of constant positive curvature, or elliptic geometry, the horizon is at
a certain finite distance in all directions from the vertical line with which we started; it
belongs to that particular line, which is called its polar, and is not the same for all
vertical lines. Although it appears to be a great circle when viewed from the
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neighbourhood of its polar, yet if we were to go to it and examine it we should find it
straight (Clifford 1882, 390).
Furthermore,
Points of it which are in opposite directions from a point on the polar are really identical;
and every straight line in this space resembles a circle in being of finite length, so that if
we travel far enough along it we shall arrive at our starting point. Every straight line has
a polar line, which is the intersection of all planes at right angles to it (Clifford 1882, 390-
391).
Clifford offers his students an example. Take a "very small circle on a sphere" and suppose that it
expands "keeping always the same centre." Initially, the circle will be concave inside and convex on
the outside. Once the expansion goes far enough, the circle will become a great circle of the sphere,
which is essentially the same shape on both sides. That is, it is "straight so far as the surface of the
sphere is concerned." In Euclidean space,
If we take a sphere and suppose it to expand, keeping always the same centre, it will
continue to be concave inside and convex outside so long as it is finite; but when the
radius has become infinite, the inside in one direction is the same as the outside in the
opposite direction, opposite points being identical; thus the sphere is of the same shape
on both sides, or is a plane viz., the plane at infinity(Clifford 1882, 391).
In elliptic space,
just as in geometry on the surface of a sphere, this takes place for a finite length of the
radius, not for an infinite length; for every point there is a sphere having its centre at
that point, which is also a plane. Or, which is the same thing, every point has a polar
plane which is the locus of all points situated at a certain distance from it; this distance is
called a quadrant. So also every plane has a certain point in the plane. All lines and
planes perpendicular to the plane pass through its pole, and conversely. The polar lines
of all lines in the plane pass through its pole, and so do the polar planes of all points in
the plane (Clifford 1882, 391).
Whenever two lines are polars of one another, each point on one line is distant exactly one quadrant
from every point on the other. The polar planes of all points of one line pass through the other. In
other words, "every line which is at right angles to one meets the other, and conversely" (Clifford
1882, 391).
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In his 1873 account of bi-quaternions, Clifford had preliminarily offered a "geometric algebra" that
was adapted to fit this form of "elliptic geometry of space." in his interpretation of quaternions on
the surface of a sphere, rectangular versors are represented by quadrants of great circles, such that
a versor accompanied by a tensor, symbolized by xi, can be represented by an arc AB measured on
the great circle i, where tan AB — x. As a result, AB "differs from a vector in a plane in a most
important way," Clifford explains. "For while a vector in a plane is unaltered by being moved parallel
to itself in any direction, AB can only be slid along its great circle, and must not be moved out of it."
Similar quantities in the elliptic geometry of three dimensions are "quantities represented by a
length marked off on a certain straight line, which are unaltered when the length is slid along the
line but not in any other case" (Clifford 1882, 392). These are "vectors having position." Whereas a
vector (in Hamiltonian terms) represents the translation-velocity of a rigid body, "which is
everywhere the same," these new position-dependent vectors represent the "rotation-velocity of a
rigid body, which is about a certain definite axis." It is for this reason, Clifford explains, that he has
termed these position-dependent vectors "rotors." Rotors, he recalls, are added together according
to the law of composition of forces and rotations.
(Clifford 1882)
In other words, if a rotor P along OA were added to a rotor Q along OB, the result gives a rotor R
along OC, making the angles a,/?. Meanwhile, OC is in the plane of OA,OB, and P:Q:R =
sin/?: sin(a + /?), which determines the position and magnitude of the resultant. Clifford says the
parallelogram construction used in Hamiltonian vector addition does not work in elliptic geometry,
"where the plane AOB is the same as that of the surface of a sphere when opposite points are
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regarded as identical." No parallelogram of "forces" can be drawn. Hamiltonian algebra requires
extension to higher-dimensionality.
Given that two great circles always meet one another, any two rotors have a single rotor which is
their "resultant or sum." In three dimensions, this is "not the case," Clifford explains, because in
three dimensions, the axes of the two rotors might not meet, in which case their sum is not equal to
another rotor. "We may however find two other rotors which have the same sum," although that
sum may occur in an "infinite number of ways." Of those, he says, "one is of the greatest
importance, namely, that in which the axes of the two rotors are polars of one another" (Clifford
1882, 392). If each rotor is viewed as representing a rotation about an axis, each of the rotations is
equivalent to a translation along the other axis. In Clifford's geometric algebra of biquaternions,
"rotation about a vertical line is translation along the horizon, and vice versa/' where the resultant of
two rotations can be compounded into one "screw motion" about either of the axes, and this
"describes the most general motion of a rigid body."
Recall that Clifford had previously called this general motion a "motor." He adds here that every
motor is the "sum of two rotors which do not meet;" thus, every motor "has two axes which are
polars of one another." To illustrate the behaviour of motors, the mathematician can draw three
planes at right angles through a point 0, where unit rotors along their intersections are denoted by
ijk. Any rotor through the point 0 is denoted by ai + bj + ck, and the ratio of two rotors takes the
form w + xi + yj + zk, where ijk refer to rectangular versors whose axes are the rotors ijk. The
extension here is not difficult to understand: "In fact, we are merely applying the results of
quaternions to vectors passing through a fixed point and their ratios," Clifford says (Clifford 1882,
393).
Clifford adds another extension to the system by arguing that a> can be introduced to denote the
operation that "converts any rotor into an equal rotor along the polar line of its axis."
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(Clifford 1882)
The result is that u>i,a>j,(ok symbolise rotors that lay along the lines of intersection of the polar
planes of 0, with the three rectangular planes through 0. It is "easy to see," Clifford claims, that any
rotor can be "resolved into two"—one which passes through 0, the other of which lies in the plane
PQR. The former, he says, is compounded of ijk, while the latter is composed of (oi,<x>j,a)k. The
symbolical expression for the sum of a number of rotors (i.e. a motor) is, therefore,
ai + bj + ck + U)(fi + gj + hk) = a + ro/?.
Clifford then extends the system even further by noting that if the versors ijk are "allowed to
operate, not only on rotors through 0 which meet their axes, but on any rotors which meet them at
right angles," then the following algebraic identities can be derived from the resulting geometrical
behaviour: i(coj) = cok = coij] j(cok) = coi = cojk; /c(o)i) = coj = a)ki. These identities indicate
that "motor" operation is commutative with regards to the symbols i,j, k. Furthermore, we find that
coi.coj = k,(ok.a)i = j.coj.wk = i, from which one can determine a)2 = 1. The result of this last
identity leads Clifford to the "very important consequence" that every motor a + cofl can be written
in the equivalent forms (<f + gja + (f — rj)/3 or+ /?) + rj(a — /?), where f = ^(1 + =
j (1 — to) (Clifford 1882, 394). The upshot of these symbolical manipulations is to demonstrate that
the ratio of any two motors can be represented by the symbolical form fp + rjq, or, "which is the
same thing," Clifford says, s + oot, assuming 2s = p + q, t = 2p — q and that p,q,s,t are all
quaternions. The combination of two such extended and generalized quaternions is another way of
representing what Clifford terms a "biquaternion."
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In a presentation to the London Mathematical Society delivered in the same year, Clifford locates his
biquaternion system in relation to a historical lineage of geometric algebras. He identifies those
historical versions of geometric algebra as forming the basis of his own inquiries. Clifford tells the
Society the following works had led up to his own formation of biquaternions:
1806 Argand, Maniere de representer les quantites imaginaires.
Buee, Mem. Sur les qu. Imag.
1827 Mobius, Barycentrischer Calcul.
1831 Gauss [Letters].
1834 Peacock, Doctrine of Operations in Algebra.
1843 Hamilton, Quaternions.
1844 Grassmann, Lineale-Ausdehnungslehre.
1845 Saint-Venant, Multiplication of vectors.
1848 Kirkman, Pluquaternions and Homoid Products.
1853 Cauchy, Clefs Algebriques.
1862 Grassmann, Ausdehnungslehre.
1870 Pierce, Linear Associative Algebra (Clifford 1882, 397).
This list is interesting for a number of reasons. It indicates Clifford's efforts to familiarize himself with
the various texts (European and British) that discuss some aspect of "geometric algebra" as he had
come to define it. It also indicates Clifford's view that Hamiltonian quaternions constitute only one in
a series of geometrical and algebraic analyses of geometry. Not surprisingly, Clifford nowhere refers
to Hamilton's "genius" or Hamilton as the progenitor of directed line concepts and operators, nor
does he mention Tait. Revealingly, however, he does identify his "bi-quaternions" as an obvious
extension of concepts in higher-dimensionality. In 1827, the Barycentric Calculus had represented a
point by a complex number, he writes. Grassmann then demonstrated that one can regard the
symbol ab as the "ordinary symbol for a line joining two points, as the nature of a product." The
algebra of that system is distributive, and Grassmann's "extensive quantities" emerge when ab is
both a line and a product, such that aa = 0 (i.e. (aiti+c^)2 = 0< which requires that iii2 =
such that ab = — ba). Hamilton's system extended further that those two accounts, he argues. In
the "theory of Quaternions," the symbols ijk are used as multipliers. They "represent not things but
operations of turning," Clifford explains. Therefore, i2 = —1, not 0. Those multipliers can be viewed
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as vectors and, as vectors, they represent the geometry of the plane which passes through the ends
of ijk.
Clifford elaborates upon the similarities manifest between Hamilton and Grassmann's respective
systems. The Grassmannian algebra "will be reproduced if we attend only to the vector part of the
binary products, and the scalar part of the ternary" in Hamilton (Clifford 1882, 397). Importantly,
"physical considerations" lead the mathematician to regard i2 as a scalar rather than when i is first
regarded as a vector (not a versor). In such cases, i can be equivalent to either +1 or —1. Clifford
then translates Hamilton's quaternion notation into Grassmannian forms. First, he explains, the
quaternion symbols satisfy the equation ijk = —1, and this, combined with the "assumption" that
p2= scalar, gives all of the "laws of multiplication" of quaternions. If one stipulates that co =
t2,i2, —'n, then in the case that n = 3 (where we assume n units, such that is2 —
+ l,andtrts = —lslt), we may take co to be a scalar. Clifford draws a "very important" distinction
here between the cases where n is odd and the cases where n is even. In the former case, co is
commutative with the symbols l, or col = lco. In the latter case, col = —lco. Hence, when n is odd, co
acts as a scalar; when n is even, it acts as a vector. By making "co = to a scalar in the former case we
are conveniently representing two different things by the same symbols, because they have the
same laws of combination" (Clifford 1882, 398). Thus, one reduces the algebra to 2n_1units when n
is odd, and whenever n is even the symbol co has an even order. If we restrict the system such that
n = 3, the algebra produces quaternions "at once." Meanwhile, when n is even, the symbol co
belongs to the even algebra which contains 2n~2 terms. When n = 4, the even algebra produces
"biquaternions," along with its general expression, q + cor, where q,r are quaternions.
At this stage in his career, Clifford was still reading Grassmann through Hermann Hankel's (1839-
1873) version. Hankel, he says, presents the "extensive quantities" of Grassmann as "alternate
numbers." Those numbers are symbols that possess the property of "polar multiplication," by which
ab — —ba, and therefore whose square vanishes, such that a2 = 0. This system conveniently
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serves to represent "the projective geometry of n dimensions." In plane geometry, if we allow the
symbols ti,t2,t3 to represent three points, then we find the expression a = a1l1 + a2t2 + a3t3
represents a point which is the "centre of inertia of masses a1,a2,a3." If the products l2l3,l3l1,l1l2
are understood to mean those lines joining the fundamental points, then the product of




l3l2l3i is proportional to the area of the triangle abc. It therefore vanishes when the
three points are collinear.
Hamilton's system of quaternions differs from Grassmann's extensive algebra in that, first, the
squares of the units do not equal zero—instead, they equal —1. Secondly, the ternary product is also
made equal to —1. The "interpretation" is at the same time extended to three dimensions, Clifford
says, but that extension nonetheless suffers from a "restriction." Whereas the alternate units
represent "any three points in a plane, and the system deals primarily with projective relations,
Hamiltonian units represent three vectors at right angles, and the system is the natural language of
metrical geometry and of physics" (Clifford 1882, 399). As Clifford had previously mentioned in his
1873 paper, Hamiltonian quaternions are limited to planes that are normal to one another. Clifford
appeals to the Grassmannian system to determine whether there is any sort of analogue between
the Hamiltonian rule that z1z2z3 = —1, and the behaviour of 00 when co when co = lxl2 ... in. His aim
in so doing is to determine the value of co2, and his analysis leads him to conclude there are "four
classes of geometric algebra" according to the value of euro and its associated product col. These
classes of algebra are variously defined by whether co2 = +1 orcu2 — 1, and whether col — lco or
whether rut = — lco (Clifford 1882, 401).
In his classification of algebras, Clifford indicates that no contradiction, or fight for priority, can exist
between the Hamiltonian and Grassmannian systems, let alone any other previous historical
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That is, ab = (a^ + a2i2 + a3i3+ b2i2 + b3i3) = (a2b3 - a3i1)t2(3 + (a3b3 - + (axb2 - a^i^.
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versions of what he took to be proto-algebraic geometrical systems. Rather, in the tradition of
Cauchy and Klein, Clifford identifies the common characteristics unifying those diverse sets of
mathematical analyses, and he highlights the malleable and interpretative nature of these varied
symbolical algebras. In his effort to "classify," by highlighting common characteristics within diverse
algebraic systems, Clifford also makes clear the degree to which evolutionist beliefs in the need to
"integrate" diverse ideas in order to generate evolutionarily advanced modes of thinking motivates
his mathematical work.
By 1878, for instance, Clifford states that he finally had the chance to read Grassmann's
Ausdehnungslehre directly, as opposed to relying upon Hankel's translation in Lectures on Complex
Numbers, or Grassmann's shorter accounts in Crelle's Journal. He says that, upon reading the
Ausdehnungslehre directly, he wished to "express my profound admiration of that extraordinary
work, and my conviction that its principles will exercise a vast influence upon the future of
mathematical science." Clifford acknowledges the overarching superiority of the Grassmannian
approach, and locates Hamiltonian quaternions and his own "bi-quaternions" in relation to
Grassmann's "extensive algebra." Grassmann's is the simplest of all three systems, he explains,
noting that by placing quaternions and bi-quaternions within the Grassmannian system, he is able to
generate "a generalization of them, applicable to any number of dimensions; and a demonstration
that the algebra thus obtained is always a compound of quaternion algebras which do not interfere
with one another" (Clifford 1882, 266).
As an example, Clifford states that in the past he had used the term "polar multiplication" (i.e. a
term recommended by Sylvester) to indicate the product ab has opposite properties at its two ends,
such that ab = —ba, while "ordinary or commutative multiplication" is mere "scalar"
multiplication. The former corresponds to Grassmann's "outer product," which can produce
negative areas, and the latter corresponds to Grassmann's "inner product," which can produce non-
directed magnitudes only. If one considers a system of n units, t1(t2, ...t„, such that the
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multiplication of any two units is polar (i. e. l^l2 — —tone can interpret these elements as points
lying in a flat space of n — 1 dimensions. A binary product is therefore a unit length measured on the
line joining the two points (^2) being multiplied, while a tertiary product is the unit area measured
on the plane through the three elements. By extension, in spaces of three dimensions, one may take
the product of four elements (i.e. points), such as L0,Li,L2-'-3- where the latter three points lay at
infinite distances from the first point, i0.
To understand this process, we must recall there are two interpretations to the notation of any given
product. When we state that 2 x 3 = 6, we can regard 6 as a number "derived from the numbers 2
and 3 by a process in which they play similar parts," in which case both 2 and 3 are concrete
numbers that are operated upon, or "we may regard it as derived from the number 3 by the
operation of doubling," in which case 2 signifies the operation of doubling and 3 is a concrete
number. The Grassmannian system is based upon the former interpretation, such that one symbol
represents a particular operation and the other symbol represents a concrete thing. Here emerges
the conventionalist-empiricist motif running throughout Clifford's mathematical researches. In the
Grassmannian system, he writes, a line is regarded as the product of two points and a parallelogram
as the product of its sides—meaning that the "two factors are things of the same kind and [they]
play similar parts" (Clifford 1882, 267). In a quaternion equation such as qp = a, where p and a are
vectors, the quaternion q is an "operation of turning and stretching" that converts p into cr—it is "a
thing totally different in kind from the vector p," Clifford writes. In order to bring it into the
Grassmannian system, the factors q and p must be interpreted as being of the "same kind." The way
to do this is to view p as a special case of a quaternion. It must be viewed as a rectangular versor.
Yet, "in that case the expression does not receive its full meaning until we suppose a subject on
which the operations p and q can be performed in succession" (Clifford 1882, 268). Clifford does this
by recalling in quaternion mathematics, i,j,k represent rectangular versors that "turn a figure
through a right angle in the three co-ordinate planes respectively." If either versor is applied twice to
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the same figure, the result is that it turns the figure through two right angles (i.e. it reverses the
figure). The following identities represent that phenomena: i2 — j2 = k2 = —1.
Clifford translates those versors into Grassmannian notation, using the four elements,
i0,i\,i2<Lz-Suppose, he says, that i turns the line l0i2 into t0t3; j turns i0i3 into and k turns t0ti
into t0t2. The "turning of i0i2 into l0l3 is equivalent to a translation along the line at infinity at l2l3,"
Clifford explains. Hamilton's notation can be translated into the more general Grassmannian terms.
The symbolical result of this manipulation is that i22 = —1. Similarly, l12 = i32 = —1. The
Hamiltonian identities (i.e. Hamilton's rules of multiplication) can all be translated into
Grassmannian terms as follows:
jk = r3t1.t1t2 = i2i3 = i
ki = = t3i! =j
ij = '2'3-'3Cl = 'l'2 = k
ijk = l2l3.l3lx = ixi2 = -1.
Thus, "to bring the quaternion algebra within that of the Ausdehnungslehre, we have to make the
square of each of our units equal to —1," as pointed out by Grassmann, Clifford writes.
Clifford's ultimate opinion is that the quaternions do not answer to the notion of "Elementargrosse,"
as described in the Ausdehnungslehre, but rather to the binary products of those elements, "from
which supposition, as we have seen, the laws of their multiplication follow at once." This conception
of a product, as derived from factors of the same kind (i.e. as the product of two vectors), had led to
the gradual development in "Hamilton's mind" of replacing the units i,j,k with the more general
symbols 5 and V, Clifford notes. To explain the laws of multiplication using those later symbols,
however, one must draw on a theory of "Erganzung"—namely, the representation of the area ij by a
vector k perpendicular to it. The explanation of this "case," Clifford says, "is by no means so easy."
But, he adds,
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It is instructive to observe that the distinction between a quantity and its "Erganzung,"
i.e. between an area and its representative vector, which, for some purposes it is
convenient to ignore, has to be reintroduced in physics. Thus, Maxwell specially
distinguishes the two kinds of vectors, which he calls force and flow, and which in fact
are respectively linear functions of the units and of their binary products (Clifford 1882,
269).
In other words, Hamilton finished the job only partly. It remains for physicists to finish it completely.
Clifford, meanwhile, locates his own bi-quaternion extensions with the generalized Grassmannian
system. In so far as we have regarded i,j,k as rectangular versors that operate on the quantities
loli> £o£2> lol3> ar|d in so far as these quantities are taken to refer to unit lengths measured anywhere
on the axes in the positive direction, they have magnitude, direction and position. Thus, they are
what Clifford had earlier termed "rotors," as distinguished from vectors, which have magnitude and
direction but no position. Clifford sums up the difference in saying,
A vector is of the nature of the translation-velocity of a rigid body, or of a couple; it may
be represented by a straight line of given length and direction drawn anywhere. A rotor
is of the nature of the rotation-velocity of a rigid body, or of a force; it belongs to a
definite axis (Clifford 1882, 269).
A vector can, therefore, be represented as the difference between two equally weighted points.
Vector ab can be written as b — a, and the symbols t1( t2, i3 refer to unit vectors along the axes. The
versors, i,j,k, will operate upon those vectors in the same way they operate on the rotors
L0Llt i0i2, io^3- In elliptic or hyperbolic geometry of three dimensions, the four points, i0, t1( i2, i3, must
be taken as the vertices of a tetrahedron self-conjugate with regards to the absolute, such that the
distance between each pair is a "quadrant". The product of any even number of linear factors will be
of the same form—namely, that of a biquaternion, which can be "exhibited" symbolically as follows.
If CO = i0Clt2i3, then £ = l2l3' j = £3£1< ^ = £i£2< ancl coi = ZCO = I^q, cjj = jco = i2i0, cok = kco =
i3i0, co2 = 1. In sum, the product of an even number of factors greater than two will always be a
linear function of 1 ,i,j,k,a)i,(x>j,(x)k. It can be expressed in the symbolical form (of a linear
equation) as q + tor, where q and r are quaternions. The multiplication of co with i,j,k is scalar,
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although its multiplication with i0, i1; 12, £3 will be polar. The "effect" of multiplying a system by co is
to change that system into its polar system with regards to the absolute.
Hamiltonian quaternions, Grassmann's algebra, and Riemannian geometry are brought together into
one system that indicates the uncertainty of empirical observations of the behaviour of rigid bodies
in space and the necessary conventionalism of symbolical manipulations. The chief classification of
geometric algebras is according to those of "odd and even dimensions." The geometry of an elliptic
space of n dimensions is the same as the geometry of the points at an infinite distance in a flat or
parabolic space of n + 1 dimensions. In other words, "The theory of points and rotors in the former
is the same as that of vectors and their products in the latter," Clifford writes (Clifford 1882, 271).
Clifford therefore concludes,
The algebra of four units, leading as above to biquaternions, is either that of points and
rotors in an elliptic space of three dimensions, or of vectors and their products in a flat
space of four dimensions. All geometric algebras having an even number of units are
closely analogous to it (Clifford 1882, 271).
In Clifford's view, the symbolical representation of these varying "geometric algebras" helps to
highlight their underlying connectivity. Clifford "integrates" the diverse systems of geometric algebra
that he has identified through his own classification system, which relies upon the generalized
formalism of Grassmann. Unlike Grassmann, however, Clifford's aim—as evidenced by his reference
to Riemann's work—is to highlight the role of these algebraic systems in characterizing the nature of
space itself, as well as the physical phenomena that take place within it. Clifford has analytically
linked the world of flat, Euclidean space to the infinite worlds of higher-dimensional spaces,
including non-flat and (especially) positively curved spaces. The analytical similarities between the
systems imply new physiological and epistemological quagmires, as humans are not always able to
easily distinguish between differing spatial models, especially when living within them, despite the
availability of "exact" measuring tools.
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Luciano Boi (1992) has argued that Clifford's uniqueness lay in his combination of Hamilton's
quaternions, Grassmann's algebra, and non-Euclidean (especially elliptic) geometry. His grand idea,
Boi states, is that algebra constitutes a means of interpreting geometric phenomena and that for
each algebraic operation there exists a geometric analogue. Boi is right to place emphasis on
Clifford's idiosyncratic combination of these conceptual resources. In addition, Clifford emphasizes
the perceptual equivalence of rotation about an axis at an infinite distance with that of a simple
translation upon a positively curved surface. Yet, more than Boi (1992) realized, this latter
interpretation was informed by Clifford's interests in the physiology of perception, and the
evolutionary limitations of human observers. It is to this terrain of knowledge that we turn now.
Clifford's Darwinism
A great deal of space has been devoted already to discussing the fact Clifford drew upon resources
provided by evolutionary theorists, who had gained popularity in Britain following the publication of
Darwin's Origin of Species (1859).130 The "terrain of knowledge" that emerged from those theories,
and the lobbying efforts of their advocates, constituted an "evolutionist" intellectual environment,
as opposed to a purely "Darwinist" one. "Evolutionism" was a social, political and philosophical
movement that can be distinguished in important ways from Darwin's own theory of natural
selection (Bowler 1989). The two most important aspects of Darwin's evolutionary theory, as stated
in the Origin of Species, included the notions that variations in a population are random and that
local environments determine which variations survive to reproduce in future generations. Darwin's
proposed theory was, in fact, too radical for many of his contemporaries, as it denied an overall
guiding force behind organic development. It left human destiny open to the randomness of
mutation and other arbitrary environmental forces. Specifically, human characteristics were the
result of environmental responses, rather than divine traits. Relatively few Victorian scientists, or
social and political commentators, were actually "Darwinist" as a result (Bowler 1984). While it is the
130
Clifford also drew from nascent developments in logic, as propounded by Stanley Jevons, as he worked to develop his
largely speculative and incomplete theory of "mind stuff" in the late 1870s.
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case that many scientists in the 1860s adopted some notion of "evolution," they often did so from
within the perspective of "design" or with hopes in mind for a liberal transformation of society
towards a more progressive whole. "Progressionism" became a Victorian religion of sorts, imbuing
social and political discourse with the idea of positive transformation through the improvement of
individuals. From the progressionist standpoint, moral, ethical, and political changes were taking
place constantly, and they were all headed towards an improved social order.
Clifford's navigation through this "terrain" of progressionist discourse was a mediated and unique
one. He adopted the idea that random variations play a role in developing new capacities and new
human traits. He also came to believe that changes in the structure of the mind take place over time
and can lead to the capacity for new thought. In his lectures in 1874, collectively entitled "Body and
Mind," and delivered to the Sunday Lecture Society, Clifford explicitly states that such variations in
the structure of the human brain have allowed for the improvement of scientific theories and the
conceptualizations of new geometries. The body, including the brain, is in a constant state of flux
and this change has evolutionary consequences with regards to the sophistication with which we
engage in mathematical and scientific speculations. In extending his 1868 notions of "integration"
and "differentiation," Clifford claims humans can advance the evolutionary process themselves by
encouraging processes of change within the grey matter of their individual brains; they do this by
exposing themselves to ever new stimuli, including new scientific and mathematical accounts
(Clifford 1886, 244-273).
By the mid-1870s, Clifford's empiricist-evolutionist beliefs constituted a distinct motif that ran
throughout his general and specialist discourses. He sculpted a nascent philosophy of empirical and
evolutionary mathematics as he navigated through mid-Victorian accounts of Hume, while at the
same time absorbing the increasingly bold lessons of spontaneous evolution. In response to
criticisms of the incompleteness and imperfection of empirical-evolutionist views, for instance,
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Clifford contended the critics had effectively highlighted the very nature of knowledge itself. It is
fundamentally incomplete and fundamentally human. As Clifford wrote to Pollock in 1874,
I hope you have seen Sidgwick's remarks (I think in the Academy); he points out that to
prove Hume insufficient is not to do much in the present day. It should, I think, be
brought out clearly that if we pay attention only to the scientific or empirical school, the
theory of consciousness and its relation to the nervous system has progressed in exactly
the same way as any other scientific theory; that no position once gained has ever been
lost, and that each investigator has been able to say 'I don't know' of the questions
which lay beyond him without at all imperiling his own conclusions. Green, for instance,
points out that Hume has no complete theory of the object, which is of course a very
complex thing from the subjective point of view, because of the mixture of association
and symbolic substitution in it; and in fact I suppose this piece of work has not yet been
satisfactorily done. But it seems merely perverse to say that the scientific method is a
wrong one, because there is yet something for it to do; and to find fault with Hume for
the omission is like blaming Newton for not including Maxwell's Electricity in the
Principia (Clifford 1901, 58).
In his 1874 lecture to the Sunday Lecture Society, entitled "First and Last Catastrophe," Clifford
elaborates upon Maxwell's molecular theory of matter and then proceeds to deconstruct Maxwell's
concomitant claim that the molecular theory proves creationism and destroys evolutionism. The
crux of the molecular theory is that all matter is made up of identical particles that possess energy,
Clifford states. Clifford agrees with Maxwell, and the northern cohort of energy scientists, who had
argued that all oxygen particles are constituted identically, regardless of when or where in the
universe they exist. Maxwell had argued that they cannot be the product of "natural" formation or
evolution. Their sameness bears the stamp of a Creator who had created atomic entities in exact
likeness with one another.
Clifford's response maintains this molecular theory while at the same time invoking a boldly
evolutionist outlook to deconstruct Maxwell's metaphysical spin. Clifford laments the fact that
someone so eminent as Maxwell had given his support over to such anti-evolutionist claims, as
Maxwell's authority in science would lead many people to agree with the Creationist viewpoint.
Clifford tells his audience:
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[Maxwell] said that because these molecules are exactly alike, and because they have
not been in the least altered since the beginning of time, therefore they cannot have
been produced by any process of evolution ... I was to consider whether the evidence we
have to prove that these molecules are exactly alike is sufficient to make it impossible
that they can have been produced by any process of evolution (Clifford 1901, 238).
By referring to various molecular experiments from the past, including those carried out by "Dr.
Graham, late Master of the Mint," which had measured the rate at which different gases mixed
together, Clifford states the rates are found to nearly coincide each time, experimentally justifying
the molecular theory. However, such experiments only prove that all molecules of particular gases
are "nearly" the same given that "if there is any difference it is too small to be perceived by our
present means of observation." In other words,
Evidence of that sort can never prove that they are exactly of the same weight. The
means of measurement we have may be exceedingly correct, but a certain limit must
always be allowed for deviation; and if the deviation of molecules of oxygen from a
certain standard of weight were very small and restricted within small limits, it would be
quite possible for our experiments to give us the results which they do now (Clifford
1901, 242).
Clifford goes on to cite a series of spectroscopy experiments carried out by Lord Rayleigh, among
others, which had implied that perhaps molecules of a particular sort are not in fact all of the same
size. The upshot of those experiments is to highlight the fact that Maxwell's molecular theory in no
way discounts evolutionary theory of organic or inorganic objects. Clifford contends:
I do not understand myself how, even supposing we knew that they were exactly alike,
we could infer for certain that they had not been evolved; because there is only one
case of evolution that we know anything at all about—and that we know very little
about yet—namely, the evolution of organized beings. The processes by which that
evolution takes place are long, cumbrous, and wasteful processes of natural selection
and hereditary descent. They are processes which act slowly, which take a great lapse of
ages to produce their natural effects. But it seems to me quite possible to conceive, in
our entire ignorance of the subject, that there may be other processes of evolution
which result in a definite number of forms—those of the chemical elements—just as
these processes of the evolution of organized beings have resulted in a greater number
of forms. All that we know of the ether shows that its actions are of a rapidity very much
exceeding anything we know of the motions of visible matter. It is a possible thing, for
example, that mechanical conditions should exist according to which all bodies must be
made of regular solids, that molecules should all have flat sides, and that these sides
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should all be of the same shape. I suppose that it is just conceivable that it might be
impossible for a molecule to exist with two of its faces different (Clifford 1901, 250).
Clifford concludes, however, that
we have nothing definite to go upon [to determine] what the shape of a molecule is, or
what is the nature of the vibration it undergoes, or what its condition is compared with
the ether; and in our absolute ignorance it would be impossible to make any conception
of the mode in which it grew up ... In our present ignorance all we have to do is to show
that such experiments as we can make do not give us evidence that it is absolutely
impossible for molecules of matter to have been evolved out of ether by natural
processes (Clifford 1901, 251).
Similar to Maxwell's appropriation of legitimate science in the name of speculative religious
philosophizing, "physicalists" such as Thomson, Tait, Stewart, and Murphy had used the principles of
the "conservation" and "continuity" of "energy" to defend their view that some catastrophic
beginning to the universe had occurred in the past. Clifford argues that such theorizing is absurd as,
It is not according to the known laws of nature, it is according to the known laws of
conduction of heat, that Sir William Thomson is speaking; and from this we may see the
fallacy of concluding that if we consider the case of the whole universe we should be
able, supposing we had paper and ink enough, to write down an equation which would
enable us to make out the history of the world forward as far forward as we liked to go;
but if we attempted to calculate the history of the world backward, we should come to a
point where the equation would begin to talk nonsense we should come to a state of
things which could not have been produced from any previous state of things by any
known natural laws. You will see at once that that is an entirely different statement
(Clifford 1901, 256).
Clifford contends the conservation of heat is not the only process that goes on in the universe. To
assume that the dissipation of "energy" has a finite past when mapped out backwards, and then to
conclude that its finite origins constitute the catastrophic moment of Creation, is to assume that the
conservation (and dissipation) of energy constitute the only processes in the universe that
determine the development of organic and inorganic matter.
Clifford rejects such accounts outright, just as he rejects the concomitant religiosity associated with
those thermo-dynamical claims. He says that such a view,
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Depends upon the same assumption that the laws of geometry and mechanics are
exactly and absolutely true; and that they will continue exactly and absolutely true for
ever and ever. Such an assumption we have no right whatever to make (Clifford 1901,
264).
Clifford's public attack on the religious musings of the northern scientists of "energy" would have
found a happy home in mid-Victorian Britain. Indeed, despite its underlying design tones, one of the
offshoots of the rise of "progressionism" in Britain was the increasingly public nature of scientific
discourse imbued with religious (or anti-religious) themes. Actors such as Huxley, Bishop
Wilberforce, Tyndall, Francis Galton, Gladstone and Clifford all thought there was a direct conflict
between science and religion (Turner 1993). Sermons that criticized the egotism of scientists rang
out in British churches, while journals and newspapers issued attacks on the ignorance and
authoritarianism of the clergy. The rise of mid-century "empiricism" in Britain can be linked to those
popular advocates of secularism and science such as Huxley, Tyndall, Dalton and Henry Maudsley,
who argued religious stipulations and metaphysical constraints were hindering the full development
of science in the country. In defense of Darwin's Origins of Species, for instance, Huxley famously
declared "Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled snakes
beside that of Hercules" (Turner 1993, 173). It is not surprising, then, to find the avowedly agnostic
Clifford devoting pages upon pages in his lecture series "Body and Mind" to claims made by Huxley
and other agnostic criticisms of inexplicable "causes"—i.e. claims that god-like notions lurk behind
theologically-inspired science.
Huxley's neologistic use of the word "agnosticism" to identify like-minded secularists, as well as
Tyndall's blatant attack on Tait and Thomson's religious views in previous years, constituted two
anti-religious precedents that Clifford followed upon. Clifford actively sought to engage the public in
matters of religious criticism throughout the 1870s. He did so by identifying the empirically an
conventionally malleable nature of scientific and mathematical knowledge. By the mid-1870s,
Clifford's engagement in such matters had become increasingly adversarial. Questions about the
nature and status of geometry were not distinct from questions about the nature and status of God.
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The publication of Stewart and Tait's The Unseen Universe (1875) spurred him to issue a frenzied
diatribe against the proper place of God in science, which, in Clifford's view, was nowhere.
On the other hand, religious scientists, such as Maxwell, viewed the lamentable rise in agnosticism
as being linked to the transfer of authority from church to universities had degraded the overall
quality of intellectualism in the country. As Maxwell stated in 1873,
It is simply this, that while the numbers of our professors and their emoluments are
increasing, while the number of students is increasing, while practical instruction is
being introduced and text-books multiplied, while the number and calibre of popular
lectures and popular writers in Science is increasing, original research, the fountain-head
of a nation's wealth, is decreasing (Turner 1973, 175).
The expansion of professional scientists and professional bodies in newly emerging disciplines
paralleled the wider dispersion of science through the emergence of an increasing number of small
laboratories across the country and the rise of popular science discourse. Science was being
produced for mass consumption. The rise of mid-Victorian Whig organizations, such as the Society
for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, added to the dilution of specialist knowledge among
laypeople. Reverence that had once been given "to priests and to their stories of an unseen
universe," was now being transferred "to the astronomer, the geologist, the physician, and the
engineer" (Turner 1973, 175). For devout believers, such as Maxwell, Tait and Stewart, this diffusion
of access to scientific knowledge could have a negative impact on legitimate sources of authoritative
knowledge. Though not necessarily seeking to grant absolute authority back to the church, scientists
such as Maxwell, Tait and Stewart did aim to shift it away from the unfettered sciences of secularity,
i.e. Darwinism, to venerable, God-fearing sciences such as thermodynamics.
One of the vehicles by means of which both supporters and antagonists of the new secularist-
evolutionist discourse advocated their respective causes was the journal Mind, edited by the
Scottish philosopher George Croom Robertson (1842-1892) and financed by Alexander Bain. In its
first issue, appearing in January 1876, the editor notes that the historical lack of an English journal of
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philosophy or psychology is "not surprising" given that the professions of philosopher and
psychology were only then beginning to gain wider recognition. Robertson writes,
The signs ... that mental science and philosophy have for some time past been cultivated
with a more single-minded endeavour, and that the class of those who are specially
interested is growing steadily larger, are neither few nor uncertain (Robertson 1876, 2).
It is revealing of the state of popularized discourse regarding mathematics that one of the first
debates to unfold in the pages of this Scottish journal was that between Helmholtz and J. P. Land on
the issue of non-Euclidean geometry. In his paper, "The Origin and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms,"
published in Mind (July 1876), Helmholtz opened with the bold claim that he would discuss "the
philosophical bearing of recent inquiries concerning geometrical axioms and the possibility of
working out analytically other systems of geometry with other axioms than Euclid's" (Helmholtz
1876, 21). Helmholtz describes the traditional basis of mathematics as that of axiomatic rules-
statements of truth about mathematical systems. But, he asks, where do those axioms come from?
He wonders,
What is the origin of such propositions, unquestionably true yet incapable of proof in a
science where everything else is reasoned conclusion? Are they inherited from the
divine source of our reason as the idealistic philosophers think, or is it only that the
ingenuity of mathematicians has hitherto not been penetrating enough to find the
proof? (Helmholtz 1876, 302).
The problem with the axioms of geometry, Helmholtz explains, is that "everyday experiences
become mixed up as apparent necessities of thought" (Helmholtz 1876, 302). Recent geometrical
investigations had come to new and profound conclusions "by means of the purely abstract methods
of analytical geometry," he argues. Yet, the results of those methods are based upon the analysis of
experience.
Here Helmholtz offers an account of two-dimensional worms. He tells his readers to suppose that
there are two-dimensional beings that live and move on the surface of a solid body. He continues,
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We will assume that they have not the power of perceiving anything outside their
surface, but that upon it they have perceptions similar to ours. If such beings worked out
a geometry, they would of course assign only two dimensions to their space. They would
ascertain that a point moving describes a line, and that a line in moving describes a
surface. But they could as little represent to themselves what further spatial
construction would be generated by a surface moving out of itself, as we can represent
what would be generated by a solid moving out of the space we know ... Now as no
sensible impression is known relating to such an unheard-of event as the movement to a
fourth dimension would be to us, or as a movement to our third dimension would be to
the inhabitants of a surface, such a "representation" is as impossible as the
"representation" of colours would be to one born blind, though a description of them in
general terms might be given to him (Helmholtz 1876, 304).
Those surface-beings would be able to draw out lines—not necessarily straight lines, but the
"straightest" lines possible (also known as "geodetic" lines, he explains)—which would bring out
their analogy with the straight line in a plane. If all beings lived in this way, their geometry would be
the same as our "planimetry" (plane geometry), Helmholtz concludes. They would hold that only one
straight line is possible between two points and that through a third point not lying on that line only
one line could be drawn parallel.
However, what if our intelligent beings were to inhabit the surface of a sphere?, Helmholtz asks. In
that instance, their perceptions would differ in that between any two points at polar opposites on
the sphere, there would be an infinite number of geodesic lines connecting them. Thus, these
sphere-surface dwellers would find their geometrical axioms differ from those of the plane-dwellers.
For instance, the sum of the triangles on the surface of the sphere would always be greater than two
right angles. Consider now the instance of egg-surface dwellers. Helmholtz explains that in such
instances, the rules governing geometry would be radically different from those of the plane-
dwellers and those of the sphere-dwellers. Whereas in the latter two cases, constant curvature (or
zero curvature) of the surface means shapes remain congruous to themselves as they move through
space, the egg-dwellers would experience changes in shape and size as they move about the surface
of the egg, from the ends where the curvature is greater to the sides of the egg-surface, where the
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curvature is less.131 The upshot of these examples is to argue that geometrical axioms are founded
upon empirical perceptions.
Helmholtz concludes it is perceptually impossible for us to know whether we are living as beings on a
constantly-curved surface or as beings on a flat surface, without experimenting in either case to
determine whether the rules of geometry, as we suppose them to hold, do in fact hold throughout
space in all directions. By the 1860s, Helmholtz had become deeply involved in the developing
science of thermodynamics in Scotland. He was a personal friend of Thomson and Tait's (he often
visited Thomson and even travelled aboard his yacht on vacation). He was also a scientific colleague.
Helmholtz's views in Mind are revealing of the "terrains of knowledge" he himself was treading upon
in his engagements with non-Euclidean geometries. A study of Helmholtz's cultural context lies
beyond the remit of this chapter, but it is interesting to note his overall view at the time is that
geometrical knowledge requires an intimate acquaintance with developments in physics. He writes,
I would again urge that the axioms of geometry are not propositions pertaining only to
the pure doctrine of space. As I said before, they are concerned with quantity. We can
speak of quantities only when we know of some way by which we can compare, divide
and measure them. All space-measurements and therefore in general all ideas of
quantities applied to space assume the possibility of figures moving without change of
form or size. It is true we are accustomed in geometry to call such figures purely
geometrical solids, surfaces, angles and lines, because we abstract from all the other
distinctions physical and chemical of natural bodies; but yet one physical quality, rigidity
is retained. Now we have no other mark of rigidity of bodies or figures but congruence,
whenever they are applied to one another at any time or place, and after any revolution.
We cannot however decide by pure geometry and without mechanical considerations
whether the coinciding bodies may not both have varied in the same sense (Helmholtz
1876, 319).
The debate that follows with Land over the course of the following two years centres on these
empiricist claims. Land argues that the "rigidity" ascribed to geometrical figures has nothing to do
with "physical quality." Being a "rigid body" is a part of the geometrical definition of the object, Land
writes. Thus, it is impossible for a geometrical body to lose its rigidity in the same way that an India-
131
Helmholtz defines "the measure of curvature" as being the "reciprocal of the product of the greatest and least radii of
curvature." According to Gauss, for a figure to move about a surface without changing shape, this measure must be
constant for all measures of the radii (Helmholtz 1876, 305).
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rubber ball could be flattened (Land 1877, 44). Helmholtz's response is to argue that, in defining an
object as "rigid", one already assumes Euclidean space. Thus, all geometrical notions that assume
rigidity are assuming Euclidean space a priori (Helmholtz 1878).
The debate between Helmholtz and Land raged on in other venues. Clifford, for instance, engaged in
similar debates as he offered popular lectures on the physiological reasonability of unconventional
mathematical knowledge. He foreshadowed the end of a priori appeals to truth. No longer would
mathematics—and certainly not Euclidean axioms, or Kantian assumptions about space and time-
serve as models of God's incontrovertible universe. As part of his anti-religious, pro-empirical view
of mathematical epistemology, Clifford chose to attack Stewart and Tait's Unseen Universe. Recall
that Stewart and Tait had sought to save God by arguing that the conservation of "energy" and the
principle of "continuity" together reveal there is some realm of existence for our body's energy (i.e.
our soul) after death. In his review of their book, published in the Fortnightly Review (June 1875),
Clifford writes,
Our authors assume, as absolutely self-evident, the existence of a Deity who is the
Creator of all things. They must both have had enough to do with examinations to be
aware that "it is evident" means "I do not know how to prove" (Clifford 1886,176).
The hope for deathlessness, or life after death, is a mere "shrinking from death," Clifford writes. It is
the hope embodied in all non-active lives of those people who fear that no good can be done in the
here and now and that no improvement or progress can be had, such that the deathbed always
appears a better option than living, toiling, or working for change. Clifford states,
However vividly I recall the feelings of pain and weakness, it is the life and energy of my
present self that pictures them; and this life and energy cannot help raising at the same
time combative instincts of resistance to pain and weakness, whose very nature it is to
demand that the sun shall not go down upon Gibeon until they have slain the
Amalekites (Clifford 1901, 271).
It is perhaps this feeling of youth, the love of youthful life, or the fear of losing it that leads certain
practitioners—such as Stewart and Tait—to long for an ever-after, he concludes.
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In their book, Stewart and Tait attempt to account for the dissipation of energy by suggesting that
entropy allows for the passage of lost potential energy into some other "unseen" domain of the
universe. Clifford rejects the notion that the conservation and dissipation of energy leads to anything
like the need for an alternative, "unseen" universe, where dissipated energy serves some ultimate
purpose. In deeply empiricist tones, Clifford argues,
The laws of motion and the conservation of energy are very general propositions which
are as nearly true as we can make out for gross bodies, and which, being tentatively
applied to certain motions of molecules and the ether, are found to fit. There is nothing
to tell us that they are absolutely exact in any particular case, or that they are
everywhere and always true. If it were shown conclusively that energy was lost from the
ether, it would not at all follow that it was handed on to anything else. The right
statement might be that the conservation of energy was only a very near approximation
to the facts (Clifford 1901, 291).
Not only are thermodynamical principles approximations, but those principles change and evolve
over time, Clifford contends. There is nothing to prevent the ongoing, spontaneous evolution of the
physical universe in the same way that Darwinism had revealed the ongoing, spontaneous evolution
of the organic universe.
In a paper published in the popular journal Nineteenth Century (October, 1877), Clifford further
argues that evolutionary theories constitute the only legitimate approach to understanding
mathematical, or scientific knowledge-generation. He writes,
It is true that we can no longer think of conscience and reason as testifying to us of
things eternal and immutable. Human nature is no longer there, a definite thing from
age to age, persisting unaltered through the vicissitudes of cities and peoples. Very
nearly constant it is, practically constant for so many centuries; but not constant
through that range of time which it practically concerns us to know about and to
ponder. But, on the other side, what a flood of light is let in by this very fact, not only on
human nature, but on the whole world. It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of the
doctrine of evolution on our conception of man and of nature. Suppose all moving
things to be suddenly stopped at some instant, and that we could be brought fresh,
without any previous knowledge, to look at this petrified scene. The spectacle would be
intensely absurd. Crowds of people would be senselessly standing on one leg in the
street, looking at one another's backs; others would be wasting their time by sitting in a
train in a place difficult to get at, nearly all with their mouths open and their bodies in
some contorted, unrestful posture. Clocks would stand with their pendulum on one side.
Everything would be disorderly conflicting in its wrong place. But once remember that
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the world is in motion, is going somewhere and everything will be accounted for and
found just as it should be. Just so great a change of view, just so complete an
explanation, is given to us when we recognise that the nature of man and beast and of
all the world is changing ... The silly maladaptations in organic nature are seen to be
steps towards the improvement or discarding of imperfect organs (Clifford 1901, 282-
283).
A year after issuing these claims, Clifford followed up with his account of Rudolph Virchow's (1821-
1902) talk on the theoretical uncertainty of certain aspects of evolutionary theory, such as the
descent of man. In a lecture later published in the Nineteenth Century (1878), Clifford recounts the
jubilee meeting of German naturalists and physicians at Munich in 1877, where Virchow had argued
evolutionary theory should not be taught dogmatically, as many elements of various evolutionary
notions had yet to find justification in paleontological or geological evidence. Yet, despite the many
gaping holes in the evidential picture, Clifford nonetheless enjoins his readers to,
not allow any dishonest person to persuade you to not believe strongly in the doctrine
of evolution, because Virchow has admitted that certain parts of it are not yet absolutely
proved. It is one thing to believe that a doctrine is false, and quite another thing to
admit a theoretical doubt about it, I say a theoretical doubt, because it is a doubt
founded on the necessary imperfection of all human knowledge, and not on any
practical defect of the evidence (Clifford 1901, 319-320).
In issuing his evolutionary-themed views of development, change and knowledge-generation,
Clifford relied upon the institutional conduits of community halls, popular reviews, and professional
journals. He also utilized the lecturing space of his classrooms as channels through which he
delivered his empiricist-evolutionist view of scientific and mathematical knowledge.
One particular set of lecture notes existent from Clifford's UCL days indicates the degree to which
these empiricist-evolutionist views shaped his mathematical discourses, especially with regards to
quaternions.132 In his notes, Clifford outlines the fact symbols such as + and — have geometrical
content. They indicate the augmentation or diminishment of a magnitude, if we assume we are
operating in one-dimension only. Clifford then seeks to offer a geometrical or spatial rendering of
132
This series of lectures formed the basis for Clifford's unfinished manuscript for the Common Sense of the Exact Sciences
(1885), edited by Karl Pearson, the bulk of which was reworked and even written by Pearson himself. The first two
chapters of that book were Clifford's own, and they map on to the lecture notes discussed here.
361
every symbol he uses to teach his students. The upshot of his lesson is that much symbolical algebra
is merely short-hand for data gathered by geometrical induction. Symbols such as +2 and —3 are
conventional tools that indicate steps along a number line, forward or backwards. In arithmetic, we
can consider +2 to be a positive number and —3 to be a negative number. However, arithmetic
deals only in discrete quantities. In geometry, +2 indicates the continuous length of 2 units
combined with a + direction along an axis in a particular direction. These symbols indicate nothing
other than "steps in space." In the terms of vector geometry, the symbol + in a plane indicates a
step in a plane. The equation OP — OM + MP refers to the "step" from 0 to M followed by a
"step" from M to P, the resulting series of which is equally represented by the "single step" OP.
Hamiltonian vector addition, subtraction, multiplication and division demonstrate the nature of
quaternions as operators that initiate a series of "steps in space," Clifford writes, adding that
Grassmann's "outer product" is a "step" too, as an area is considered to be the product of two
vectors (two directed steps) of the same kind, and a volume is considered to be a product of three
vectors of the same kind. Thus, there is an empirically meaningful way (i.e. a geometrical way) to
speak about negative areas and negative volumes.
In his lectures to students, this distinction between the Hamiltonian approach and the Grassmannian
approach is not posited as problematical, but rather as terminological. Directed areas and volumes
can be represented symbolically, Clifford explains, but their legitimacy derives from the geometrical
content of those symbols. Hamiltonian "versors", enable "us to represent any one in terms of three




vector xi + yj + zk. In this sense, both Grassmannian and Hamiltonian algebras are simple matters
of combined "steps in space," some of which involve translations, some of which involve rotations,
and none of which are nullified or delegitimized by their non-commutative nature.133 In sum, Clifford
presents his students with the view that mathematical knowledge is empirically-founded—it is based
upon the experience of "steps in space," which are themselves observational concepts that depend
upon the evolutionary status of the observer.
Clifford's view of the fundamentally conventional and empirical nature of mathematical
knowledge—and especially quaternions—motivated him, in part, to teach the topic to his
undergraduates at UCL. Clifford was convinced the complex symbolical representations of
quaternions could be rendered easily comprehensible by appeals to "steps in space"—i.e. the
empirical content of quaternions. Those lessons formed the basis for Clifford's 1878 Elements of
Dynamic, An Introduction to the Study of Motion and Rest in Solid and Fluid bodies, Part I:
Kinematic—a text written and published before Clifford's death. This latter text constitutes Clifford's
first textbook. The Dynamics reflects Clifford's appeal to students, as well as his need to financially
sustain himself by producing textbooks that his students would buy for use at UCL. It is to this last
"terrain of knowledge" that we turn now to see how Clifford's quaternion presentations were
contoured by the institutional framework within which he operated.
University College, London—a secularist tradition in urban education
Alongside the country's emerging mechanics institutes, and groups such as the Society for the
Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, the University College, London (UCL) emerged as an early-century
attempt to diffuse higher knowledge to a greater proportion of Britain's middle classes. This process
was promulgated, in part, by a reaction against traditional church-university relations, which had
governed accessibility to the country's grandest universities for centuries. UCL was established with
133
For Clifford's account of "strain" see Clifford (1882, 510-513); for Clifford's account of the vector function used so
extensively by Tait, see Clifford (1882, 514).
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the explicit objective of sidestepping religious tests and faith-based oaths required at other
institutions, both in practice (as at Cambridge) and by statute (as at Edinburgh). The University
College was, therefore, a child of the Industrial Revolution (Taylor 1967). As the middle-class came to
represent a greater cross-section of local communities, industrial merchant-men, businessmen, and
technicians were gaining increased social recognition. Non-conformism was on the rise, and
although neither Oxford nor Cambridge had dropped their respective requirements to have students
(and graduates) subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion that defined the Anglican Church,
UCL's Deed of Settlement, as signed on February 11th, 1826, declared:
The object of the said Institution is the advancement of literature and science by
affording to young men residing or resorting to the Cities of London and Westminster,
the Borough of Southwark, and Counties adjoining to either of the said Cities, or to the
said Borough, adequate opportunities for acquiring literary and scientific education at a
moderate expense (Taylor 1967).
A new and distinct textbook industry consequently cropped up in London, where the need for
university-level books to be used by students who had arrived to school less well-prepared than
their peers at Cambridge, meant that Clifford, as professor of mathematics, faced a needy market.
Given Clifford's own impoverished circumstances (he eventually died with only £400 to his name),
the motivation to generate textbooks for entry-level university students was a powerful driving
force. Furthermore, the nature of UCL's curriculum, based as it was upon the Scottish liberal arts
tradition, meant that texts in "pure" mathematics—i.e. Tripos-style mathematical training—would
have failed to meet student needs appropriately. It is for this reason Clifford crafted the Dynamics as
an omnibus textbook that could have provided students with textual material for a series of courses
in mathematics, mechanics and natural sciences. Parts I, II, and III of the Dynamics were completed
in full and published before Clifford died; part IV was left unfinished at Clifford's death, and was
published posthumously with relatively few edits.
In the Dynamics, Clifford presents his joint Hamiltonian-Grassmannian approach to directed
magnitudes as set out within a conventionalist-empiricist (and, thus, evolutionist) approach to the
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generation of mathematical knowledge. The first chapter begins with a recapitulation of the lecture
on "steps." Clifford writes,
Just as geometry teaches us about the sizes and shapes and distances of bodies, and
about the relations which hold good between them, so Dynamic teaches us about the
changes which take place in those distances, sizes, and shapes (which changes are called
motions), the relations which hold good between different motions, and the
circumstances under which motions take place (Clifford 1878,1).
"Motions" are complicated things, Clifford writes; if one tries to describe the motion of one person
on a moving train, one must describe first the motion of the train, second the motion of the person's
body, third the change in muscle shape as the person's body contracts as he walks through the train,
and so forth. To avoid such complications, Clifford writes, "We deal with the simplest motions first,
and gradually go on to consider the more complex ones."
Pedagogically-minded, Clifford first defines his terms. A body that is so small that it has no differing
parts is called a "particle." The only motion it is capable of is a translation. A "rigid body" is a body
that does not change its shape when moved about. It can be moved in two ways—via translation (a
change in its place), or via rotation (a change in its orientation). In pure translations, every straight
line in the body remains parallel to its original position. When that is not the case, it indicates that a
rotation has taken place. A motion in which there is both a translation and a rotation at the same
time is "like that of a corkscrew entering into a cork" and it is called a "twist." Lastly, an "elastic"
body is that which can change in size or shape. It can experience motions called "strains." The
science that describes these various motions is termed "kinematics," and it can be subdivided as
follows (Clifford 1878, 2):
Kinematic of Points or particles Translations
Rigid Bodies Rotations and Twists
Elastic Bodies Strains
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When a body changes in motion, the cause of that change is generally talked about as though it is a
"force." The science that describes the changes in motion due to forces is called "dynamics,"
although the present textbook considers various changes in motion without reference to the
"forces" at play. Thus, the Dynamics seeks to speak about motion as "compositions of steps," by
appealing to geometrical constructions and algebraic manipulations alone.
In a section entitled "Product of Two Vectors," Clifford presents both the Hamiltonian account of
vector multiplication and the Grassmannian account. He explains that two vectors multiplied
together can result in either a scalar product or a directed area. That is:
The area of the parallelogram abed may be supposed to be generated by the motion of
ab over the step ac, or by the motion of ac over the step of ab. Hence it seems natural
to speak of it as the product of the two steps ab,ac. We have been accustomed to
identify a rectangle with the product of its two sides, when their lengths are only taken
into account; we shall now make just such an extension of the meaning of a product as
we formerly made of the meaning of a sum, and still regard the parallelogram contained
by two steps as their product, when their directions are taken into account. The
magnitude of this product is ab. ac sin bac; like any other area, it is to be regarded as a
directed quantity.
Furthermore,
Suppose ... that one of the two steps, say ac, represents an area perpendicular to it;
then to multiply this by ab, we must naturally make that area take the step of
translation ab. In so doing it will generate a volume, which may be regarded as the
product of ac and ab. But the magnitude of this volume is ab multiplied by the area into
the sine of the angle it makes with ab. This kind of product therefore has the magnitude
ab.ac cos bac-, being a volume, it can only be greater or less; that is, it is a scalar
quantity.
The important difference between these two products is that the direction, or sign, of the area in the
first instance depends upon "the way it is gone round; an area gone round counter-clockwise is
positive, gone round clockwise is negative." If V. ab.ac = area abed, then V. ac. ab = areaacdb;
therefore, V.ac.ab = —V. ab.ac, while the scalar products can be represented in Hamiltonian
terms as Sap = Spa.
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Having accounted for the two possible products of multiplication of vectors, Clifford discusses
"rotations," which he says can be considered to be the "steps of a rigid body" through space. He
clarifies a significant equivalence established in his 1873 paper on biquaternions. He repeats there
are two "kinds" of motion of a rigid body. "The first," he says, "is the motion of a body sliding about
on a plane (e.g. a book on a table), which may be completely described by specifying the motion of a
moving plane on a fixed plane." The second "is the motion of a body, one point of which is fixed;
which in practice is secured by a ball-and-socket joint, and which is most conveniently studied under
the form of the sliding of a spherical surface on an equal spherical surface." This second "kind" of
motion is important to the study of dynamics, because of the dual nature in which it can be
interpreted empirically. Clifford explains,
When the centre of a sphere is very far away from the surface, the surface approximates
to that of a plane. Thus, the frozen surface of still water is approximately spherical, with
its centre at the centre of the earth. In this way we may see that the first of our two
motions is only a limiting case of the second, in which the fixed point is an infinite
distance off (Clifford 1878, 118).
In other words, "every change of position in a plane sliding on a plane may be produced either by




v (Clifford 1878, 119)
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Lastly, Clifford discusses velocity-systems, strain-steps and strain-velocities. Most of his discussion is
presented in vector and quaternion form, although always with the caveat that as complicated as
the "motion" might seem, it is only ever a composition of simple "steps" including translations,
rotations and strain-steps. In all of these instances, Clifford emphasizes the possibility of "dual
interpretations". Where one observes simple translations in space of three-dimensions, one may
also be observing the rotation of a rigid body about a distant central axis. At an astronomical level,
perceivers are incapable of recognizing any difference between these two ontological constructs.
Mathematically there is a difference in terms of the geometrical model being analyzed. Yet, there is
no distinguishing phenomenal factor that an observer located upon the surface in which the motion
is taking place could use to distinguish between the two geometrical possibilities.
Apart from the small discussion on directed products, Grassmannian analysis does not actually
appear prominently in the Dynamics, and the biquaternions do not appear at all. This is not an
indication that Clifford had abandoned the more formal aspects of Grassmannian analysis, or that
his bi-quaternion system—as presented in generalized form in his 1873 and 1876 papers—had been
left to the wayside. Rather, it is a clear indication that the Dynamics is an introductory textbook
written for students at UCL, rather than a treatise written for an advanced mathematical community
of practitioners. It is meant to generate income for Clifford and his family, while at the same time
satisfying the need for a textbook that students in Clifford's UCL classes could use meaningfully.
Given that Clifford died only a year later, and in a state of penury so severe that his colleagues had
to generate a survival fund for his wife, Lucy, and their children, the motivation to produce such a
beginner's texts would have been a compelling one. The fact the book was aimed at a newly
emerging market of urban university students also helps to explain why Tait's lightly veiled
accusation of plagiarism emerged a few years later. Tait was concerned about a potential loss in
income as the author of the primary introductory text in quaternion and vector mathematics.
Clifford's text was more readable and more elementary than both of Tait's quaternion books, and it
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reflected the increasingly popular view of "empirical" and "evolutionary" mathematics. If popular, it
could possibly lead to Clifford's posthumous name being credited with the development and
advancement of vector mathematics, especially if his textbook were to be adopted and used by
Tripos coaches—a phenomenon that Tait and Kelland had failed to initiate in with their own works in
past years.
Conclusion
Thus, we have seen that Clifford trod upon multiple "terrains" throughout his engagements with
quaternion mathematics. Like Tait, Clifford had adopted a foundational philosophy in symbolical
algebra by virtue of his Cambridge education. In Clifford's case, however, that symbolical algebraic
education was imbued with lessons on projective geometry, as put forth by Cayley, and, most
importantly, exposure to the formalism of Grassmann. That symbolical algebraic training taught
Clifford that mathematical analysis can drive research in new directions, including new geometrical
directions. However, Clifford's symbolical algebraic "terrain" developed as another "terrain"—
namely, Victorian Darwinism—was developing underneath it. Clifford's early exposure to Darwinist
discourse led him to view mathematical "truths"—symbolical or otherwise—as the product of the
evolutionary status of the human mind. Through the processes of "integration" and
"differentiation," the grey matter of human brains had come to deem certain mathematical claims
as "true." In Clifford's view, such truth was only ever temporal—fundamentally dependent upon the
physiologically incomplete status of the "eye" and "mind."
With those Darwinist notions contouring Clifford's navigations, his approach to quaternions was
unique indeed. Clifford engaged with quaternions both as symbolical algebraic tools in the newly
forming field of symbolical geometry, as well as instantiations of "empiricism" in mathematics.
Clifford viewed himself as revivifying a venerable tradition in hunting for the empirical content—i.e.
the "steps in space"—which gave meaning to operational tools such as quaternions and his own bi-
quaternions. Clifford's publications on the matter were later defined by his need to generate wealth
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via textbooks, as well as his belief that, as empirically-founded artifacts, quaternions could be
explained as basic "steps in space" to even the mathematically untrained, middle-class boys
populating his classroom at UCL. In sum, in explaining why Clifford used quaternions as he did, the
historian must appeal to those terrains that he trod upon in order to understand the specific
conceptual resources that equipped him to make his movements, and which imbued his choices and
actions with meaning, given that they provided a space within which Clifford could view his own uses
of quaternions as reasonable and, even, natural.
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Conclusion
Tait and Clifford were contemporaries. They were colleagues. They were competitors. Though the
Tait-Clifford relationship is nowhere near as antagonistic in the history of science as some other
duos have been in the past (consider Hobbes and Boyle, Newton and Leibniz, or even Whewell and
Peacock), their mathematical engagements diverged in important respects. Both actors were
educated into the Cambridge school of mid-century symbolical analysis, but each mathematician
trod upon a variety of contoured conceptual terrains, which provided him with the resources needed
to engage with the particular artifact known as "quaternions" in unique and distinct ways. Those
"terrains" allowed both Tait and Clifford to view their respective engagements as meaningful
attempts to generate new knowledge claims. The relative terrains navigated by Tait and Clifford
should suggest to the reader that unique knowledge claims are based on the contingent factors that
shape the conceptual topology within which practitioners find meaningful reasons to behave in
particular ways. An actor's engagement with an artifact, such as quaternions, is not predetermined
by previous uses, although previous uses can form part of a "terrain" navigated by the actor,
constituting part of the "meaning" infused in the terrain itself. But, like a trekker moving through a
diverse landscape, an actor's engagements with an artifact can occur from an infinite number of
possible directions and result in an infinite number of possible outcomes.
In Chapter One, I explored the foundational ground set out by the tradition of symbolical algebra in
Britain or, better put, the philosophy of symbolical algebra, which embodied a methodological
approach towards mathematical practice (i.e. succinct, symbolical, and devoid of empirical content)
as well as a metaphysical view about the nature of mathematical identities and manipulations (i.e.
that symbolical equivalences are universally true, though conventional in construction). Expressed
poignantly in Peacock's "principle of the permanence of equivalent forms," the symbolical algebraic
"philosophy" and its various interpretations and justifications created the basis for more specific
terrains that would manifest themselves in Tait and Clifford's later mathematical outputs. Both
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actors were trained into the belief that mathematical research can be driven by symbolical
manipulation alone, although, due to the contouring influence of other "terrains", neither actor
remained satisfied with that approach. "Symbolical algebra" was, therefore, both a tool for
mathematicians to use, i.e. the "how", and the "why" for much of their mathematical practices. For
actors such as Tait and Clifford, symbolical algebra constituted an entirely justifiable, reasonable and
meaningful way to approach new problems in the first instance.
In Chapter Two, I explored a brief period in Hamilton's life in order to demonstrate why the Irishman
chose to recast his research in quaternions in the light of the symbolical algebraic discourse then
institutionalized at Cambridge. Hamilton had always used the tools of symbolical analysis in his
research, but he had often sought to identify his "couples" as the "Science of Pure Time" and to
grant them a priori, ontological content rather than view them as mere symbolical equivalences.
Hamilton's choice to adopt the conventionalist-speak of the British symbolical algebraists of the
1850s signaled a discontinuity in his approach to knowledge. In his 1853 "Preface," Hamilton painted
himself the colour of Peacockian algebra. This was, in part, motivated by his desire to gain renown
within the Peacockian-inspired community of practitioners in Cambridge, and thus satisfy the
institutional requirements of Trinity College, Dublin, and it was motivated, in part, by Hamilton's
personal hopes at revivifying his own reputation as the producer of great Irish science—a reputation
that he felt required the kudos and support of English, Protestant practitioners.
In Chapter Three, I explored Tait's engagements with quaternions, from the early-1850s to the early-
1880s in order to account for why it is that Tait sought to present them as symbolical tools, why he
recast them as thermodynamical tools in the 1860s, and why he lauded their simplicity and "paucity
of symbols" (i.e. their efficiency). Tait had started out as a Scottish Presbyterian student at
Cambridge, where he absorbed the philosophy of Peacock's symbolical algebra as it had been
institutionalized in the university's newly reformed curriculum in the early-1850s. After he
graduated Senior Wrangler, Tait's initial research outputs reproduced meaningful accounts of
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symbolical analysis that he had absorbed during his navigations through his educational "terrain of
knowledge". Tait's later navigations through Belfast mathematics, where he received support from
Andrews, and his navigations through the world of natural philosophy at the University of Edinburgh,
overlaid his symbolical algebraic outlook with resources stemming from thermodynamic and
Presbyterian conceptions of "dissipation" in the universe and avoidance of "waste" in moral life. His
movements through the institution of a Scottish university also generated poignant interests in
wealth-generation, where textbooks could be used to attract potential students to fee-based
lectures. When overlaid, these terrains constituted a complex topology upon which Tait chose to
engage with quaternions. The historian is well-placed, therefore, to explain that Tait engaged with
quaternions in the ways he did because those varied terrains equipped him with the tools (i.e.
symbolical algebraic techniques and specific vocabularies) to do so and because they rendered his
choice of engagement meaningful, both as an approach and as an output.
In Chapter Four, I explored Clifford's engagements with quaternions, from the mid-1860s to the end
of the 1870s, in order to account for why it is that Clifford sought to present them as symbolical
geometrical tools that were fundamentally "empirical" in their foundations and "conventional" in
their universality. For Clifford, all knowledge is shaped by the human state of evolution. Thus,
knowledge claims are the representation of our imperfect evolutionary status with regards to
intellect and perception. Mathematical knowledge is no different. As Clifford moved through the
terrain of symbolical algebra at Cambridge in the mid-1860s, he learned to apply symbolical
techniques to the analysis of geometrical properties; his encounters with Riemannian and
Lobachevskian geometries came to influence him so deeply that they also formed another terrain,
upon which he began to judge other scientific, mathematical and even physiological claims. Clifford
approached Hamiltonian quaternions from the perspective of non-Euclidean geometries, which led
him to attempt to generalize quaternions into biquaternions—generating, thereby, new symbolical
geometrical tools that he felt could be used meaningfully within spaces of multiple dimensions.
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Many of Clifford's research outputs along the way were rendered meaningful by virtue of the
institutional environments within which he was operating. His initial papers were highly technical —
they were published in mathematical journals based at Cambridge. But once at UCL, Clifford's
quaternion outputs took the form of popular lectures, entry-level lectures to students (both female
and male), and beginner textbooks that placed complex symbolical analysis, such as quaternions,
within the domain of empirically-simple "steps in space."
Following the advice of Shapin and Schaffer (1985), this author has indeed tried to "get on with it" in
order to present this historical account of Tait and Clifford's respective encounters with, and uses of,
quaternions mathematics. Clearly, each actor approached the matter of "quaternions" from differing
directions and with differing sets of conceptual resources in hand. As a result, their mathematical
outputs reflected alternative understandings of symbolical algebraic knowledge, as well as
alternative views on the place of humanity in the universe, the moral duties of humans, the
evolutionary status of human perception, and professionalization.
The comparative study provided here has outlined four terrains of knowledge that describe Tait and
Clifford's respective engagements with quaternions. The aim has been to explain not only "how"
they engaged with quaternions—i.e. the symbolical techniques used—but, more importantly, "why"
they engaged with quaternions. Mathematical knowledge generation does not happen on its own. It
is not driven by an internal force unique to its domain. Mathematical claims are generated by actors
navigating through particular terrains infused with conceptual resources. The history of mathematics
is, therefore, the history of people doing things with the contingent resources available to them. In
sum, mathematical knowledge cannot be separated from the terrains upon which it is rendered
meaningful, engaged with, and made into artifacts for use by other actors. Simply put, mathematics





A briefnote on quaternions—a summary overview
A summary overview of Hamilton's quaternion mathematics is useful here to orient the reader to
the 700-page account that Hamilton provides in his Lectures (1853). Working within a tradition that
sought to ascribe meaning to imaginary numbers, Hamilton relied upon Jean- Argand's (1768- 1822)
method of representing imaginary numbers as directed lines in space. In his paper, "On Conjugate
Functions and on Algebra as the Science of Pure Time," Hamilton developed an extension of
Argand's method. He argued that although a + bi could be used to represent a complex number in
space (where a and b are real number components of the complex number), the expression a +
bi is not a "sum" in the same sense that a + b is a sum of two quantities. The problem, Hamilton
states, is that complex sums assume that a quantity (a) can be added to a directed line (bi), which it
cannot. The things are two of a different kind, Hamilton argues. The expression a + bi does not
represent an arithmetic addition; it represents an ordered geometric couple in space, where (a, b)
constitutes the end point of a directed line emanating from a given origin. According to Hamilton, if
a + bi and c + di are two complex numbers, then the following identities hold (I use Kline's
notation here) (Kline 1972, 776):
(a, b) ± (c, d) = (a + c, b ± cf),
(a, b) • (c, d) = (ac — bd, ad + be); and
(a,b) fac+bd bc—ad\
(c,d) \c2+d2 ' c2+d2 )'
The sum, difference, product and quotient of two couples result in another couple.
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Although the concept of "directed lines" had long been established in the works of mathematicians
seeking to represent the addition of forces in space, and although mathematicians such as Wessel,
Argand and Gauss had already used the complex representation of directed lines (a + bi) to "add
forces" (so that if two forces are represented by the directed lines (1 + 21) and (2 + 3t), the
combined force is represented by the single line (3 + 5i)), there was no obvious way to extend that
addition of forces to more than two dimensions. Such an extension would have been a useful artifice
for any natural philosopher who sought to find the resultant force on a body acted upon by forces
emanating from different directions. Hamilton had set as his task the resolution of this problem —
namely, to determine a three-dimensional complex algebra that could be used to geometrically
describe the motion of bodies in space when acted upon by varying forces.
Hamilton believed that to represent the sum, difference, product and quotient of directed lines in
three-dimensional space, i.e. "triplets," a four-termed number would be required. His solution was
to develop a number of the form a + bi + cj + dk, where "a" is the scalar part of the number and
bi + cj + dk is the vector part of the number. Together, the scalar and vector parts form a
"quaternion"—a four-termed number that, when applied to another directed line in space, causes a
change in the vector's size (i.e. its magnitude, or scalar part) as well as a change in its direction (i.e.
its vector part). The three real-number parts of the vector component are the three Cartesian
coordinates of the point P, while the i,j,k components represent a directed unit along three axes.
Quaternions can be subjected to the following algebraic operations: addition, subtraction,
multiplication and division, as long as the i,j, k components follow the rules stated earlier for
multiplication. For instance, Hamilton says, a quaternion q is represented by q = w + xi + yj + zk,
where w, x, y, andz are real numbers. He uses the notation q,q , and q" to represent different
quaternions so that, if q and q' are two quaternions of the form q = w + xi + yj + zk and
q = w +xi+yj + zk, then we can define the following basic algebraic operations:
q + q = (w + w ) + (x 4- x )i + (y + y')j + (z + z')k,
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q — q = (w — w ) + (x — x )i + (y — y )j + (z - z )k, and,
qq = (ww — xx — yy — zz') + (wx + xw — yz — zy')i + (wy — yw — zx — xz )j+
(wz — zw—xy — yx)k.
The rules of multiplication for the imaginary parts of the quaternion further indicate that, if one has
two quaternions p and q, and p = 3 + 2i + 6j + 7k and q = 4 + 6i + 8j + 9k, then pq = —111 +
24i + 72j + 35k, whereas, qp = —11 + 28i + 24j + 75k. In other words, the multiplication of
quaternions is not commutative (ab =£ ba) (Kline 1972). That multiplication is, however,
"associative" (i.e. (qq^q" = q(q'q")) (Wilkins 2005, 240).
Hamilton also defined a "conjugate" quaternion, using the symbol Kq to represent the conjugate
(defined in Cartesian terms as Kq = w — xi — yj — zk). And he used the symbol Tq to represent the
"modulus," or what he later termed the "tensor" (after 1846). The "modulus" of the quaternion (i.e.
the length of the quaternion) is defined as Tq = yjw2 + x2 + y2 + z2. Various relationships can
then be determined to hold true between the conjugate of the quaternion, q, and its tensor, Tq. For
example, Hamilton finds that q(Kq) = (Kq)q — (Tq)2. This algebraic relationship means that a
quaternion multiplied by the conjugate of itself is equal to the conjugate of the quaternion
multiplied by the quaternion (i.e. the multiplication of these two entities commutes). The product of
this operation is equal to the tensor of the quaternion squared. On Hamilton's account, all of these
operations can be interpreted "synthetically"—i.e. geometrically—as systems of forces acting upon
points and directed lines in space.
In his Lectures, Hamilton also introduces a differential operator, known as "nabla", symbolized by V.
Hamilton introduces the "nabla" differential operator on page 610 of his Lectures, in which he offers
a semi-Cartesian trinomial version of the analytical tool. The defined as: V= i— + j — + k— .134
ox oy oz
When a scalar point function u(x,y,z) is operated upon by "nabla," the result is a vector that varies
134
A name first suggested by William Robertson Smith (1846-1894), because of its resemblance to an Assyrian harp.
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from point to point—that is, it represents the rate of increase of u in space. When "nabla" is applied
to a vector point function, it produces a quaternion.
Tait later raised concerns about the "nabla" operator in his correspondence with Hamilton; Hamilton
failed to elaborate upon V any further in his Elements (1866) or in his correspondences with Tait
throughout the same decade. As a result, the operator is barely mentioned in Tait's first quaternion
textbook, An Elementary Treatise on Quaternions (1867). By the 1870s, however, "nabla" does come
to dominate Tait's discussions with other mathematicians, such as James Clerk Maxwell (1831-1879),
and it comes to constitute an important topic in the former's Introduction to Quaternions (1873).
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Appendix Two
Tait's navigations away from Hamilton
Tait did not adopt all of Hamilton's notational specifics, or his specific definitions and
interpretations, with regards to quaternions. For instance, in his work on differentials of
quaternions, and in his correspondence with Tait, Hamilton interpreted differentials (such as dx and
dy) not as infinitely small quantities (which was a common interpretation among post-Cauchian
British mathematicians at the time), but rather as ordinary finite quantities (Wilkins 2005, 245). This
caused no little amount of puzzlement for Tait, who had been trained in the Cambridge-influenced
symbolical analytical curriculum of the 1850s. Such divergences between Hamilton and Tait became
more prominent in the 1860s, just as Tait was becoming a more widely-recognized authority in his
own right in relation to the science of "energy". At the same time, Hamilton was nearing the end of
his productive life, and becoming less of a valuable colleague than he would have been to the young
and newly graduated Tait in the late-1850s. Thus, we find in Tait's quaternion publications,
throughout the 1860s, a clear willingness to make more bold and ideological statements with
regards to quaternion mathematics and its role in practical, efficient and productive mathematics,
even when those accounts were not necessarily in line with Hamilton's own views.
Upon arriving to Edinburgh, for instance, Tait wrote to Hamilton of the "powers" embedded in the
"tremendous engine" of quaternions, to which the "great secret... seems to be the utter absence of
artifice and the perfect simplicity and naturalness of the original conceptions" (Knott 1911, 139). The
terminology reflects the industrial motifs surrounding Tait in Scotland. "Power", "work" and
"engines" were metaphors that served as standards of good science for the Scotsman—they were
not, however, the metaphors favoured by Hamilton, an elite Protestant Irishman. From 1862
onwards, the correspondence between the two mathematicians thus began to wane and Tait turned
his attention towards courting his old Cambridge colleagues and fellow mathematicians. Recall that
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Tait's initial aim in the late-1850s had been to have his quaternion works "taken up" at Cambridge.
Yet, the pressures of developing and legitimizing thermodynamics in the 1860s meant that Tait's
textbook efforts in quaternions had given way to laboratory work. As Tait wrote to Maxwell, the
difficulties associated with pursuing both the science of "energy" and quaternion mathematics
simultaneously were, at times, insurmountable. Thus, Tait enjoins the mathematician-astronomer to
advance his own quaternion publications down South so as to keep the field alive. In a letter written
in 1864, for instance, Tait tells Maxwell,
I am much obliged by your very kind note just received...
Five years ago, Messrs Macmillan & Co. advertised for speedy publication an
"Elementary Treatise on Quaternions" by me; but, as my good friend Sir W.R. Hamilton
thought that it might possibly interfere with his forthcoming "Elements of Quaternions"
I withdrew it—and have published only the few articles I recently sent you—all of them
with his approval.
I had no idea that you had been engaged in preparing such a work; and I merely write to
say that I shall be most happy if you will persevere in your intention of publishing an
elementary volume on the subject. In fact the papers I have sent you contain nearly the
whole of my researches in the elementary part of the theory. I have an immense store of
work in MSS relating to its higher applications—but unfit for an elementary treatise.
Since I projected the treatise I have ceased to be a Professor of Mathematics; and with
private experiments and the ordinary preparation for the work of my class, I feel that I
have barely time enough to contribute my fair share to the "Treatise on Natural
Philosophy" which Thomson and I have undertaken. And, as this Treatise is certain to
extend to three volumes at least, of which (after two years work) not even one is yet
published, I feel that it may be years before I shall be in a position to write on
Quaternions in a carefully considered popular style. I am sure that my old friend
Macmillan would be delighted to have the chance of substituting your name for mine in
the advertisement, which he has been hopelessly repeating for some years.
But the consent of Sir W.R. Hamilton is absolutely necessary to anyone undertaking the
work (Knott 1911, 141-142).
Tait had, in other words, become heavily involved in other fruitful ventures—namely, the
development of the science of "energy" and its legitimization within the wider British network of
natural philosophy. Within that matrix, quaternions had slipped to become a peripheral issue in
large part due to the publishing strictures imposed on Tait's research by Hamilton. For the still young
Cambridge-graduate, the need to publish and to establish primacy in a particular field was of
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paramount importance. Tait's inability to do so with quaternions meant that, in an intellectual
balancing act of costs and benefits, Tait favored thermodynamics—a more profitable and publicized
endeavor in many respects.
In the meantime, a key point of contrast had emerged between Hamilton and Tait over the question
of the relative use and importance of quaternions. For Hamilton, the usefulness of quaternions
stemmed from their ability to expand upon the foundations of symbolical algebra by including non-
commutative symbolical equivalences. For Tait, the relative relevance and usefulness of quaternions
stemmed from their potential applications to dynamics (thermodynamics in particular) and to
natural philosophy more generally. By the mid-1860s, quaternions had become another natural
philosophical tool for Tait; they had become a hand-maiden to science. This outlook was reflected in
Tait's use of the linear vector function, which he viewed as a means of expanding upon his theory of
"strains"—a theme outlined in Tait and Kelland's Introduction to Quaternions (1873).
Following a long discussion with Maxwell on the Hamiltonian operator "nabla", V, Tait also included
a thorough account of the Hamiltonian operator in the second edition of his Elementary Treatise on
Quaternions (1875). In a letter dated November 7th, 1870, Maxwell highlighted the theme by
querying Tait about the results of V acting on scalar and vector functions. Maxwell wrote
humorously, though with a note of seriousness, of the possibility of describing "twists" and "twirls"




What do you call this? Atled?
I want to get a name or names for the result of it on scalar or vector functions of the
vector of a point.
Here are some rough hewn names. Will you like a good Divinity shape their ends
properly so as to make stick?
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(1) The result of V applied to a scalar function might be called the slope of the
function. Lame would call it the differential parameter, but the thing itself is a vector,
now slope is a vector word, whereas parameter has, to say the least, a scalar sound.
(2) If the original function is a vector then V applied to it may give two parts. The
scalar part I would call the Convergence of the vector function, and the vector part I
would call the Twist of the vector function. Here the word twist has nothing to do with a
screw or helix. If the word turn or version would do they would be better than twist, for
twist suggests a screw. Twirl is free from the screw notion and is sufficiently racy.
Perhaps it is too dynamical for pure mathematicians, so for Cayley's sake I might say Curl
(after the fashion of Scroll). Hence the effect of V on a scalar function is to give the slope
of that scalar, and its effect on a vector function is to give the convergence and the twirl
of that function. The result of V2 applied to any function may be called the
concentration of that function because it indicates the mode in which the value of the
function at a point exceeds (in the Hamiltonian sense) the average value of the function
in a little spherical surface drawn round it.
Now if a be a vector function of p, and F a scalar function of p, VF is the slope of F
VV. VF is the twirl of the slope which is necessarily zero
SV. VF = V2F is the twirl of the slope which is necessarily zero
SVa is the twirl of a.
Now, the convergence being a scalar if we operate on it with V, we find that it has a
slope but no twirl.
The twirl of o is a vector function which has no convergence but only a twirl...
What I want is to ascertain from you if there are any better names for these things, or if
these names are inconsistent with anything in Quaternions, for I am unlearned in
quaternion idioms and may make solecisms. I want phrases of this kind to make
statements in electromagnetism and I do not wish to expose either myself to the
contempt of the initiated, or Quaternions to the scorn of the profane (Knott 1911, 143-
144).
In 1871, Maxwell wrote to Tait again to encourage him to push further with his quaternion
demonstrations. Maxwell himself viewed quaternions as much more than just short-hand for longer
Cartesian accounts of particular problems. Maxwell wrote:
The unbelievers are rampant. They say "show me something done by 4nions which has
not been done by old plans. At the best it must rank with abbreviated notations."
You should reply to this, and no doubt you will.
But the virtue of the 4nions lies not so much as yet in solving hard questions, as in
enabling us to see the meaning of the question and of its solution, instead of setting up
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the question xy z, sending it to the analytical engine, and when the solution is sent
home translating it back from xy z so that it may appear as A, B, C, to the vulgar.





In the same decade that Tait began to correspond with Maxwell on quaternions, he also began to
correspond with Arthur Cayley (1821-1895) on the "nabla" operator. In Tait's "Note on Linear
Differential Equations in Quaternions," published in the Proceedings for the Royal Society of
Edinburgh, Scientific Papers, the Scotsman stated a solution to the problem of extracting the square
root of a strain (i.e. a linear function). In a letter to Cayley dated February 28th, 1872, Tait noted that,
as a result of that article, he wished
to introduce [the quaternion account of strains] into the new edition of our first volume
on Natural Philosophy—but [Thomson] objects utterly to Quaternions, and neither of us
can profess to more than a very slight acquaintance with modern algebra—so that we
are afraid of publishing something which you and Sylvester would smile at as utterly
antiquated if we gave our laborious solutions of these nine quadratic equations (Knott
1911, 152).
Cayley responds by stating that the "question may be solved very simply by means of the theorem in
my memoir on Matrices," which had been published a decade before (Knott 1911, 153). Tait
responds a month later saying that, although he recognized "many of Hamilton's properties of the
linear and vector function" could be converted into matrices, he was not entirely convinced of the
method. Tait also acknowledges his lack of eminence in employing newly developed symbolical
techniques. He notes, for instance, that he might not be the best prepared to fulfill Cayley's request
for an article on quaternions for the BAAS, as a result of his lack of contemporary algebraic
knowledge. Thus, he asks to be relieved of the task by having Clifford take up that duty instead.
135
While Thomson was often referred to by the northern British scientists and their network of colleagues as T, and Tait as
T', Maxwell represented himself as It is one expression, Knott says, for the Second Law of Thermodynamics:
^ = JCM, where J is Joule's equivalent, C is Carnot's function, and M the rate at which heat must be supplied per unit
increase of volume, the temperature being constant (and where JCM also happens to be the initials for James Clerk
Maxwell).
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Yet, although it seems here that Tait is subordinating his skills to those of Cayley, his correspondence
with the mathematician continues throughout the 1870s and into later decades, during which time
Tait reverts to reasserting his mastery and skill in quaternion mathematics. He rejects, for instance,
Cayley's matrix approach. In 1874, following Tait's publication of a paper entitled "Orthogonal
Isothermal Surfaces," Tait and Cayley discuss the ultimate meaning of one solution provided therein.
In their correspondence, Cayley notes that for "r = const." to represent a family of orthogonal
surfaces, r (as a function of x,y,z) has to satisfy a particular partial differential equation of the third
order. The equation Tait had presented in his published paper (i.e. do = uqdpq_1) had to be the
equivalent of that partial differential equation, Cayley argued. Tait disagreed. Whereas Cayley
viewed quaternions as a "pocket map"—the formulae being concise, though they described nothing
other than the same underlying concepts that mathematicians were familiar with already—Tait felt
quaternions pointed to new physical structures, rather than just new forms of symbolical
equivalences. Thus, a matrix approach reduced the "power" of quaternions to mere symbolical
manipulation.
In 1884, Sylvester was also brought into the correspondence. Sylvester commented on the solution
to the quaternion equation aq = qb. At the time, Sylvester had already published his general
solution for a linear matrix equation. In generalizing the quaternion, he had developed a solution
that differed from Tait's. The correspondence between Tait, Cayley and Sylvester led Tait to return to
his original solution, as presented in 1867 textbook on quaternions, and to revise it significantly,
invoking, this time, Cayley's help. He took Sylvester's lead to present a thoroughly analytic approach
to the study of quaternions in general. In the mid-1880s, therefore, quaternions were re-interpreted
within a Cayley- and Sylvester-inspired tradition in late-Victorian symbolical algebra and analytics,
which engendered a renewed emphasis on moving away from geometrical and natural philosophical
concerns.
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However, after having consulted with Cayley and Sylvester on a number of points related to the third
edition of his Quaternions (as published in 1890), Tait wrote to the mathematicians to renew his
reservations about the analytical treatment of quaternions. In a letter written on August 28th, 1888,
he told the mathematicians:
Since I returned to Edinburgh, I have been considering more closely the question of the
new edition of my Quaternions and looking up specially Sylvester's papers in the
Comptes Rendus and the Phil. Mag. It seems to me from my point of view (which I think
is that of Hamilton) that all these things, excellent and valuable as they are, are not
Quaternions but developments of Matrices. As I understand Hamilton's quest, it was for
a method which should supersede Cartesian methods, wherever it is possible to do so.
Hence i,j,k, and their properties, though they were the stepping stones by which
Hamilton got his method, are to be discarded in favour of a, q, cp etc.: and no problem or
subject is a fit one for the introduction of Quaternions if it necessitates the introduction
of Cartesian Machinery...
The conclusion from this seems to be that I ought, instead of inserting your
contributions in the text of my book as it stands, make a new chapter "On the Analytical
view of Quaternions" (or some such title) in which they will form the spinal column.
Therein will naturally assemble all the disaffected or lob-sided members, which are not
capable of pure quaternionic treatment but which are nevertheless valuable, like the
occipital ribs and the anecephalous heads in an anatomical museum (Knott 1911, 158-
159).
Cayley replied a week later, indicating his continued disagreement with Tait on the matter. The
mathematician wrote:
I ... have not yet written out two further notes which I should like to send you for the
new Chapter—which (I take it kindly) you do not compare with the Chamber of Horrors
are Madame Tussaud's ... I need not say anything as to the difference between our
points of view; we are irreconcilable and shall remain so: but is it necessary to express
(in the book) all your feelings in regard to coordinates? One remark: I think you do not
give your symbol <p a sufficiently formal introduction: it comes in incidentally through a
particular case, without the full meaning of it being shown (Knott 1911, 159).
Tait's response followed a month later:
I don't know that my view of coordinates is very different from yours, though my sight is
vastly inferior. But I can see pretty clearly in the real world, with its simple Euclidean
space, by means of the quaternion telescope. Witness a paper of Thomson's which I
have just seen in type for the next Phil. Mag.; where three pages of formulae can easily,
and with immense increase of comprehensibility, be put into as many lines of
quaternions (Knott 1911, 159).
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In his response, Cayley continued to wonder whether "geometrical proofs" were "independent of
anything that is distinctly Quaternions, and depend only on the notion of ix + jy + kz, with i,j, k as
incommensurable imaginaries not further defined?" These concerns would go on to occupy Tait well
into the next decade.
An account of those occupations is beyond the remit of this study, though an historical study of Tait
and Cayley's discourse on the matter constitutes fertile grounds for further research. The aim here
has been to highlight that, well into the 1880s, Tait was navigating through what was an offshoot of
the symbolical algebraic tradition at Cambridge, now manifest in the universalizing claims of Cayley
and Sylvester. Ultimately, for Tait, the quaternion obeyed certain laws, and through various
transformations it could come to represent a plethora of physical phenomena. For Cayley and
Sylvester, the quaternion was merely a symbolical tool that could be played with. Both Cayley and
Sylvester saw quaternions in relation to matrices—a topic that remained of little interest to Tait until
his death in 1901.
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Appendix Three
The "science ofenergy" and a shifting in worldview
In a letter (dated November 1, 1877) written to his former Belfast colleague, Thomas Andrews, Tait
declares:
We all heartily join in wishing you and yours many happy new years. We are all well, but
very busy—I at Physics, the rest at skatingl ... I am delighted to hear that you are getting
on so well with your high pressures. I often wish I were back again in Belfast. True I had
more lecturing to do, and less pay, but I had a great deal more leisure for private work.
In fact I have barely time for any private work during the winter session now-a-days.
However, I have got some students who are able and willing to work and I have handed
over my apparatus to them to make the best of it. At present I am entirely engaged with
"I'effet Thomson" if you know what that is—the so-called specific heat in electricity in
different conductors, which I think I have proved both experimentally and theoretically
to be proportional to the absolute temperature. This has led me to construct a
thermometer depending on two separate thermoelectric circuits working against one
another, so as to give galvonometric deflections rigorously proportional to differences of
absolute temperature through all ranges till the wires melt. I hope to get the specific
heats and melting points of various igneous rocks, &c., &c., true to a very few degrees
(Knott 1911, 76-77).
From 1870 to the 1880s, thermoelectric investigations dominated work in Tait's Physical Laboratory.
He instructed his students, Cargill Gilston Knott (1856-1922) and C.E. Greig, to spend a winter in the
laboratory investigating the thermoelectric properties of 20 different metals pairs. Those
experiments formed the basis of the "First Approximation to the Thermoelectric Diagram," an
experiment that involved heating oil to a temperature of nearly 300°C. Tait was also involved in
working with higher temperatures to demonstrate the fact that differing temperatures produce
differing thermoelectric properties in iron and nickel (Knott 1911, 77). Tait had determined that,
with nearly all of the pairs of metals he had tested up to their melting points, the
"thermoelectromotive force" of the metal in question could be represented by a "parabolic function
of the difference of the temperatures of the junctions." Yet, when iron or nickel is introduced into
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the metallic pair, that rule breaks down. Tait concluded that "between particular limits of
temperature the parabolic law is satisfied, so that the relation between electromotive force and
temperature can be fairly well represented by a succession of three parabolas with quite different
parameters" (Knott 1911, 77-78). From 1860 to 1880, in other words, distinctive features of the
"energy of science," especially with regards to electromotive force, manifested themselves in Tait's
daily research and his personal correspondences.
Tait's preoccupations with thermo-dynamic and electro-motive practices hearkened a significant
shift in world view more broadly—from Enlightenment-inspired metaphors of "balance" and
"equilibrium" to unidirectional views of dissipation and degradation in the universe. Newton's
"System of the world," as it had been termed, formed the basis for the Enlightenment view of
equilibrium and celestial balance. Centripetal force (gravity) and centrifugal force (inertia) reached a
state of equivalence such that the orbits of the planets maintain their respective paths infinitely and
continuously. The natural philosophy of Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier (1743-1794) had also made the
balance of chemical equations a conceptual foundation for natural philosophy. Post-enlightenment
mathematicians, such Lagrange and Laplace, placed "balance" and "equilibrium" at the centre of
their algebraic developments throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries. In Lagrange's Mecanique
Analytique (1788), for instance, the universe is governed by action-reaction balances such that
dynamics became subordinate to an overall natural philosophy of statics. Early British advocates of
Lagrange and Laplace, including Herschel and Babbage, adopted this Enlightenment picture of the
universe. Progress in the material, temporal world derived from rational control over matter via
knowledge of the universe's fixed and static laws. In addition, the progression of time did not affect
the composition of material existence. Consider, for instance, Herschel's thesis in his Preliminary
Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy (1830). Herschel argued that, although society can
progress through experimentation, nature itself remains fundamentally static and atemporal.
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Whereas early symbolical algebraists embraced Enlightenment notions of "balance" and
"equilibrium" in their conceptualizations of mathematical and natural philosophical processes,
Victorian energy scientists—in particular Thomson and Tait—transformed those religiously- and
socially-inspired notions of "progress" into natural philosophical claims about "dissipation" in
thermodynamics. Thomson and Tait's Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867), for instance, elaborated
upon three thermo-dynamical laws, which collectively embraced all aspects of "energy" science.
Those laws dictated that usable energy (i.e. "potential energy", which can be converted into work by
humans) is always dissipating. The culturally-rooted notions of "work," "waste," and "efficiency"
were thus translated into thermo-dynamical principles of conservation and dissipation. Northern
energy scientists catalyzed a transformation away from the Enlightenment worldview of balance by
focusing on the linear "progress" and inevitable "dissipation of energy". The moral upshot of this
new natural philosophy was that constant human ingenuity is required to harness energy before it
ultimately dissipates and is rendered utterly unusable and irretrievable. From the point of view of
actors such as Thomson and Tait, the harnessing of this dissipating potential energy constituted
nothing less than the moral obligation of man to fulfill his place in the kingdom of God (Wise and
Smith 1989a; 1989b; 1990).
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Appendix Four
Treatise on the Dynamics ofa Particle (1858; 1865)
Tait and Steele's Dynamics of a Particle (1858) represents a characteristically "Cambridge"
production in the sense that the book is written as a textbook for examination-minded students,
with problems and solutions included at the end of the chapters. The bulk of the questions, and their
attached "hint" solutions, derive from the Senate House (Tripos) examination and the College
examinations at Cambridge then in place. In the second edition of the book, published in 1865 (years
after Steele's death), Tait shifts his attention and philosophical outlook away from Cambridge and
towards his and Thomson's developing "Natural Philosophy"—something that had been entirely
unknown to Steele in the previous decade. In the new edition, Tait recollects that when he had
written the book with Steele in 1858, he had not read Newton's "admirable introduction to the
Principia" in its original Latin. He had relied upon English and French treatises on mechanics. As a
result, certain pages were "erroneous" and had "cost [him] almost as much labour and thought as
the utterly disproportionate remainder of my contributions to the volume." He writes:
I cannot but ascribe this result, in part at least, to the vicious system of the present day,
which ignores Newton's Third Law of Motion, though constantly assuming it (tacitly) as
an axiom; and erects Statics upon a separate basis from Kinetics, thereby necessitating
several additional Physical Axioms, the splitting of Newton's Law into two, and the
introduction of a so-called Statical measure of Force (Tait 1865, viii).
Tait starts by acknowledging that his previous work seemed to be passe and "not the form in which
such a treatise ought to be written." The 1858 text was meant to provide "advantages to the student
whose sole object in reading is to pass an examination" (Tait 1865, ix).
In consulting with Cambridge coaches, such as Isaac Todhunter (1820-1884), Tait notes he had
refrained from revising the new edition as thoroughly as he had wished to do, because Todhunter
had told him the 1858 text was still well-suited for the Tripos. Yet, Tait's collaboration with Thomson
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on thermodynamics was a dominant theme in the natural philosopher's life. Not surprisingly, it crept
into Tait's edited passages on "dynamics," where he indicates that properly speaking dynamics is
"thermo-dynamics".
Recall that the Scottish energy scientists had been engaged in a long-winded struggle for legitimacy
and primacy in their thermo-dynamical theories. As part of that project, they hunted for a British
progenitor of "energy" concepts. They found him in the form of Newton. "The Conservation of
Energy must be in Newton somewhere if we can only find it," Tait had told Thomson (Knott 1911,
191). The two authors thus reread the Principia in its original Latin, eventually falling upon a part of
that treatise that served their needs. Tait and Thomson reissued Newton's Laws of Motion as the
foundation for their own laws of dynamics. They also adopted Newton's definition of "force" as
measured by changes in a body's motion to show that the composition and resolution of concurrent
forces follows naturally from the second law of motion. As a result, Tait exclaimed he had
"rediscovered Newton for the world" (Knott 1911, 190). In the second edition of the Dynamics, Tait
invokes the concept of "energy" and argues he has revised the text so it serves as a precursor for his
and Thomson's treatise on thermodynamics (unpublished at the time). The link between
"thermodynamics" and Newton's "Laws of Motion" are evident, the authors claim, as both consider
mass, density, particle, force, momentum, vis viva, kinetic energy and the measurement of force.
The shift towards neo-Newtonianism in Scotland was already apparent by the time Tait had moved
to Edinburgh in 1860. In his inaugural lecture at the university that year, Tait tells his audience,
That godlike mortal, as Halley does not scruple to call him, who, finding the very laws of
motion imperfectly understood, in a few years not only gave them fully and accurately,
and devised a mathematical method of almost unlimited power for their application, but
explained most of the phenomena of the Solar System including Tides, Precession and
Perturbations (though this is but one part of his contributions to Natural Philosophy) —
and who was only, after repeated solicitations, persuaded that he had anything worthy
to offer the world, will remain to all time the beau-ideal of magnificent genius and
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devoted application, alike unstained by vanity and unwarped by prejudice (Knott 1911,
206).136
Thus, in his Dynamics, Tait talks of "the definition of work done by a force" and Newton's laws of
motion as a "Parallelogram of Forces" in conjunction with "energy" and the laws of
thermodynamics.
Remarkably, nowhere in his revised text does Tait mention vectors or quaternions, nor does he
mention Hamilton. There are two reasons for these omissions. Even in 1865, Tait would have been
reluctant to publish any introductory account of quaternions, especially as related to the addition of
forces in the form of couples. Recall that Hamilton had stipulated he wanted to publish his own
version of an introductory account of quaternions before Tait. Hamilton had already berated Tait in
their private correspondences for having promised such an account in his inaugural lecture in 1860.
Tait's reservation in issuing even a preliminary account of vector addition in his revised Dynamics
was, therefore, the result of his hyper-awareness to issues surrounding priority claims in mid-
Victorian science and Hamilton's potential admonishment were he to breach the Irishman's trust.
Given Tait's sensitivity to these issues, he would have been reluctant to irk so vocal a supporter as
Hamilton had been, by usurping the latter's position as being the first to publish an introductory
account of quaternions. Secondly, despite its revisions, the Dynamics was still aimed at students
studying for the Tripos examination. By the mid-1860s, the Tripos did not include anything related to
quaternion mathematics. Thus, Tait chose to prudently ignore quaternions in his exam-minded text,
given that it would not have been taught by coaches anyhow. And for coaches such as Todhunter,
the worth of any given text lay solely in its applicability to current Tripos exams, not in its
propagation of new techniques or philosophies.
136
In the same address, Tait defines the nascent concept of "energy" in linking it to Newton's old notion of "force". He
explains, "When we talk of the Conservation of Force as a principle in Nature, it is to be carefully noted that we do not
mean force in the ordinary acceptation of the word—and, indeed, the principle is now better known as the Conservation
of Energy. As this is a matter of very considerable moment I shall treat of it with a little detail. Energy may be Actual or
Potential. Actual Energy belongs to moving bodies ... Potential Energy .... belongs to a mass or a particle in virtue of its
position ... Supposing that you have now an idea as to the meaning of these two terms, I give the principle of the
Conservation of Energy as it has been put by Professor Rankine to whom these terms are due ... In any system of bodies,
the sum of the potential and actual energies of the bodies is never altered by their mutual action" (Knott 1911, 206).
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That is not to say, however, that the Dynamics was philosophically inert. On the contrary, it did
contain some ideologically-driven statements, including claims about what constitutes correct and
proper theorizing in natural philosophy, at least according to Tait. For instance, Tait argues he had
been dissuaded from introducing a Newtonian fluxional notation in his treatment of particle
dynamics due to the fact Newton's fluxional notation was no longer a central or significant part of
the Tripos examination. Yet, for Tait, this was a regrettable dissuasion. He claimed,
When the general equations of motion of a system have to be treated, in the beautiful
manner by Lagrange, a partial use of [Newton's fluxions] is absolutely necessary.
Newton's idea of Fluxions was purely Kinematical; and, in fact, the fundamental ideas of
the Differential Calculus are essentially involved in the most elementary considerations
regarding velocity. It is also to be observed, that, whenever we write /'(x) for the
differential coefficient of /(x), we are really employing the principal feature of
Newton's notation, though in a form somewhat more expressive than his (Tait 1865, x).
In Chapter II, on Newton's Laws of Motion, Tait introduces the "parallelogram of forces" as a means
of describing Newton's second law. He further states,
When any forces whatever act on a body, then, whether the body be originally at rest or
moving with any velocity and in any direction, each force produces in the body the exact
change of motion which it would have produced if it had acted singly on the body
originally at rest (Tait 1865, 41).
The consequence of this law is that two forces acting upon a given body can produce a resultant
motion, that can be described using the geometric resultant of a parallelogram representing the two
initial forces. Tait uses this opportunity to laud Newton as the precursor to "energy" science. And he
writes of Newton's third law (i.e. that every action has an equal and opposite reaction) that the great
British figure had laid "the foundations of the abstract theory of Energy, which recent experimental
discovery has raised to the position of the grandest of known physical laws." Newton discerned the
application of such a theory to mechanics, which "in modern English phraseology, [is] the rate at
which the agent works." Though James Watt (1736-1819) had introduced the practical "work" unit
of horse-power, or "the rate at which an agent works when overcoming 33,000 times the weight of a
pound through the space of a foot in a minute," a century, Newton's implied unit is still more useful,
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Tait argues. What Newton "implied," Tait says, is the rate of doing work "in which the unit of energy
is produced in the unit of time" (Tait 1865, 46). Of course, Newton "implied" no such thing, given the
concept of "energy" is a quintessential^ 19th-century production. However, Tait's reconstruction of
Newtonian mechanics characterizes the degree to which he saw thermodynamics forming the next
big British moment in science.
Within that formation, Tait no doubt saw himself playing an important role, both as a scientist
engaged in the development of the theory, and as a key propagator of the "discoveries" of the
northern group. Tait's self-positing alongside Newton is developed further in Tait and Thomson's
Treatise on Natural Philosophy (1867). In their personal correspondences it is evident that Tait was
the driving force behind the Treatise's production. His aim was not only to produce a university
textbook that would be used in his natural philosophy classes in Scotland, which might serve to
introduce thermo-dynamical questions into the Tripos exam, and which might serve as a manifesto
declaring the pre-eminence and scientific superiority of the science of "energy" in Britain. The
Treatise opens with a declaration of Newton's wisdom in having defined "natural philosophy" as the
investigation of laws in the material world—investigation, often mathematical in nature, that is
preceded by "observation, classification and description" (Tait and Thomson 1867, v). Modern
natural philosophy relies upon "principles derived directly from experiment," though they are
principles that "lead by mathematical processes to interesting and useful results, for the testing of
which our most delicate experimental methods are as yet totally insufficient." Newton had foreseen
the contemporary development of mathematical-physics. The authors write,
One object which we have constantly kept in view is the grand principle of the
Conservation of Energy. According to modern experimental results, especially those of
Joule, Energy is as real and as indestructible as Matter. It is satisfactory to find that
Newton anticipated, so far as the state of experimental science in his time permitted
him, this magnificent generalization.
We desire it to be remarked that in much of our work, where we may appear to have
rashly and needlessly interfered with methods and systems of proof in the present day
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generally accepted, we take the position of Restorers [of Newton], and not Innovators
(Tait and Thomson 1867, vi).
The "Restorers" claim they are revivifying a tradition in mixed and applied mathematics that had
been lost through the decades of symbolization and rigorization of mathematics prominent at
Cambridge. To restore the greatness of Newton was also to associate the grand concepts of the
science of "energy" with the venerable Newtonian tradition.
Revealingly, the symbolical approach employed by Thomson and Tait, not only in this text but
throughout their natural philosophical texts, belies the mythical nature of their historical
reconstruction. Both Thomson and Tait used symbolical analysis in the mathematization of their
"energy" science. They were not geometers of the Newtonian sort. Tait and Thomson both engaged
in symbolical algebraic analysis according to the accepted rules of the day. The fact the authors
introduced Lagrange's "generalized Coordinates" in their second chapter on Newton's Laws of
Motion in order "to complete the chapter" indicates the degree to which this was the case. Thus, it
was neither Newton's mathematics, nor the Newtonian "tradition" they were restoring. Rather, they
were displaying a bravura account of the developing field of energy science, which was heavily
dependent upon 19th-century symbolical algebra, but which could be glossed over by mid-Victorian




The "Disruption" of 1843, led by Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847), a Scottish preacher and theologian,
resulted in a split in religious culture across the north of Britain. Unlike Anglicanism, in which highly
structured and aristocratic social divisions governed daily life, affordable university education in
Scotland meant that much of the Scottish Kirk's staff stemmed from families of small farmers and
small-scale entrepreneurs who could wield much less financial clout than the industrial middle-class
families that sent their sons to Cambridge. The governing structure of the Presbyterian Church also
differed from its Anglican analogue in that Scottish Kirk congregations were represented in the Kirk's
General Assembly, and it was—ostensibly—the congregations that controlled the election of the
Kirk's yearly Moderator and the appointment of ministers. The Moderator was elected by the
Assembly to serve a 12-month term.
Contrary to the Kirk's statutes and mandate, however, patronage and politics went hand-in-hand in
Scotland (Fry 1987). By the 1820s, "moderate" Presbyterians had largely allied themselves with the
academic elite of Scotland's university cultures. That alliance displayed the untruth of the
democratic ethos engendered in the Presbyterian governing system, as aristocrat Scottish patrons
effectively dominated the election of moderators and ministers, despite the fact that control ought
to have laid solely in the hands of the General Assembly and its constituent congregations.
Throughout the 1830s, various parishes protested the cronyism embedded in the Kirk's election
processes; the rising level of aristocratic patronage in church politics led to a "crisis" in allegiance
spearheaded by Chalmers in 1843.
Chalmers led the vanguard of protesting congregations that had ceded from the established church
to univocally found the Free Kirk of Scotland. At the time of the Disruption, Chalmers was the chair
of Divinity at the University of Edinburgh. Fie had published his most ardent defense of natural
history and natural philosophy in the 1830s. Chalmers' sermons were severe in their account of the
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world of man. Life, for Chalmers, was inherently immoral and degraded. The world was an "arena of
moral trial," an "imperfect state" not able to accommodate much welfare or well-being (Hilton 1991,
80). Furthermore, Chalmers defined "natural history" as the description of static categories, such as
kingdoms and classes. In so doing, he highlighted the designed nature of the contemporary universe
and he focused on suffering as a natural part of a fallen human existence.
According to Chalmers, natural philosophy could explain progress in time. It could reveal the law-like
transformations of the universe that scientists observe. In Chalmers's view, natural philosophy can
explain both observable phenomena and insensible phenomena. Problematically, however, natural
philosophy cannot describe the original arrangement of organic and inorganic life; nor can it account
for how those arrangements would re-emerge if ever the known laws of natural philosophy were
destroyed entirely (say, by an act of God). Thus, natural philosophy always provides an incomplete
view of the universe. Chalmers claimed, "The laws of nature may keep up the working of the
machinery—but they did not and could not set up the machine." Furthermore:
For the continuance of the system and of all its operations, we might imagine a
sufficiency in the laws of nature; but it is the first construction of the system which so
palpably calls for the intervention of an artificer, or demonstrates so powerfully the fiat
and finger of a God (Chalmers 1836-1842, 1: 222-225).
In other words, natural philosophy cannot serve as the basis for natural theology. For Chalmers,
human toil is a necessary part of life. Suffering is a virtue and a gateway to heaven. Charity was to be
avoided as inappropriate tampering with the divine design of the universe. On this view, patronage
is an indication of moral laziness and profligacy—the sort that lead to eternal condemnation rather
than a virtuous ever-after.
Chalmers's querulous protests, along with other criticisms of patronage and aristocratic creep within
the Scottish Kirk, ultimately resulted in a serious rift between congregations. The Scottish church
divided into the Established Kirk and the Free Kirk. The Kirk's schism split sympathies across the
spectrum of Scottish social, political, economic and academic life. The five Scottish universities were
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largely staffed by moderates, who saw themselves as representatives of the ideals of the Scottish
Enlightenment. They played a formative role in shaping the nature of Scottish religion by producing
the bulk of the clergy. Strong ties between the Moderate voices of the Scottish Kirk (and their allied
resources in aristocratic patronage), and the universities of the nation, led to direct attacks from
Chalmers and the Free Kirk followers.
For their part, the Free churchmen proposed an evangelical interpretation of life as an ongoing
manifestation of humanity's decline. The lackluster performance of Scottish universities in the first
half of the 19th-century was used as proof of this fact. The Free Kirk followers pointed to the
irrelevance of Scottish moral philosophy, natural philosophy and educational curricula in Britain
more generally as further indication of the nation's degradation. The country was no longer
producing great names, such as Adam Smith (1723-1790) or Joseph Black (1728-199), nor was it
providing solutions to the ongoing social problems of urban decay and deprivation witnessed daily
on the streets of Edinburgh and Glasgow. An indication of the radicalized nature of religious life
across Scotland is evident in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland's 1835 national "day of
humiliation." The Evangelical Party decried the "demerits of this our day" in religious instruction,
family worship and church attendance. Following the Disruption, the Pastoral Letter of the Free
Church in 1846 lamented "the prevailing ignorance and practical heathenism of large masses of the
people." Those authors concluded "God seems a stranger in the land." And in 1851, concerns over
rising secularism, or at least rising church absenteeism, reached a peak when 17 presbyteries
petitioned the General Assembly of the Free Church to counteract the "Spirit Destitution of the
Land." The Synod of Glasgow and Ayr issued the following statement in response:
Whereas irreligion, neglect of the means of grace, atheistic contempt of God, and
antichristian error are alarmingly prevalent over all the land, but more especially
wheresoever large masses of the population are drawn together: Whereas this
lamentable state of things is so rapidly increasing as to be almost already beyond the
ordinary means of cure, and threatens soon to obliterate the very appearance of
Christianity amongst us and thus to bring down the judgments of God on a people so
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privileged as we have been ... We overture the General Assembly of the Free Church of
Scotland to take the subject into its consideration (Enright 1978, 401).
Indeed, as late as 1863, the The North British Review argued that, while the religious "condition" in
Scotland was better than that found in England, the "sunken classes are the irreligious classes" and
they still marked the landscape (Enright 1978, 401).
The evangelical fervour of the Free Kirk fuelled debates over moral obligation and religious action
throughout the 1840s and 1850s. A new-found biblical literalism swept across the country's
university campuses in those decades. Biblical literalism of the Free Church increased to
accommodate the negative reaction of its members to the "materialism" of the anonymous Vestiges
of the Natural History of Creation (1844) (Hilton 1991, 24-26). Following Chalmers's death in 1847, a
severely literalist reading of the Bible became popular among young university students, colouring
the manner in which natural philosophy and mathematics were viewed by Free Kirk members more
generally.
The Disruption would come to have profound effects on Tait's later professional career. One way in
which it did so was through the choices made by James Thomson. When the senior Thomson had
arrived to Glasgow in the 1830s, with his young sons James and William in tow, the Scottish colleges
had largely alienated themselves from the poverty-stricken, urban populations of the overcrowded
town centres. Tory-supporting moderates, who enjoyed academic and social privileges from their
positions at the university, were reluctant to reform the university to allow for more democratic
access to paid positions or even to alter curricula so as to better suit and serve the circumstances of
the cities. For instance, in the year of the Disruption, the Principal of the University of Glasgow,
Duncan Macfarlane (1771-1857), was also Moderator of the Scottish Kirk. Macfarlane led his fellow
moderate colleagues in Glasgow in a protest against any changes to their privileged status. Through
Macfarlane's efforts, college moderates were able to hold on to their administrative control at the
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university as well as their hefty incomes, derived from annual land rents. Indeed, for years after the
Disruption, the status quo remained untouched.
Yet, the changing nature of the student body, which was becoming increasingly evangelical and Free
Kirk-friendly, exerted indirect pressure on the moderate class of professors and academic staff at the
universities. Decreasing student numbers (which led to a drop in salaries among university staff),
was particularly problematic. Young students were being drawn away to newly established Free Kirk
educational institutions (such as the Edinburgh Free Church College). The need to attract students in
the new era of religious schism drove a series of reform efforts, led in large part by the latitudinarian
Glaswegian professor of mathematics, James Thomson, and his reformist colleague astronomer,
John Nichol. With Thomson and Nichol leading calls for change, Macfarlane's efforts were short¬
lived. A significant change in teaching staff took place over the course of the latter half of the 1840s,
evidenced by the fact that, by the end of that decade, nearly half the votes in the College belonged
to self-identified reformers and non-Moderates. As a result, the university was under severe internal
pressure to abolish its religious tests, which had long ensured that new professors had signed the
Westminster Confession of Faith professing faith and commitment to the established Kirk in Scottish
Presbyterianism (Smith 1989, 23).
To spearhead his efforts, Thomson allied himself with Norman Macleod (1812-1872), a former Arts
student at Glasgow and divinity student at Edinburgh who had returned to Glasgow as leader of
Glasgow's Peel Party in the late-1830s. In so doing, Macleod situated himself within a community of
reformers who opposed traditional Tory moderates. But unlike the evangelical Chalmers, Macleod
was not a Free Churchman. Fie believed that humans had a role to play in improving the lot of
humanity (Macleod 1876). In 1851, Macleod became the Church of Scotland minister for Glasgow's
Barony parish. In that position, he vocally attacked the elitism and authoritarian control that
traditional moderates still brandished in the Scottish universities. In 1856, Macleod addressed the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, arguing that the old guard required reform. Macleod's
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speeches created a standard for reformist rhetoric; as a result of his diatribes, increasing numbers of
non-sectarian liberals were appointed to posts within the university. For instance, Rev. John Caird
(1820-1898) was appointed professor of theology in 1862; he later became principal of the
university in 1873. Caird's non-sectarian views had long been known. In his sermon, "The Christian's
Heritage," published in 1858, Caird argued:
The history of the Church but too often exhibits the strange anomaly of a religion of love
producing the keenest haters, and a gospel of peace engendering strifes and animosities
more bitter than the disputes and rivalries of the profane ... The Christians at Corinth
had quarreled with each other on the merits of their respective teachers—each party
boasting of the pre-eminent wisdom or eloquence of its own head, and contemning the
gifts of his supposed rivals...In the pursuit of wealth it may be natural, however culpable,
to begrudge another his gains, or to be elated at our own; for wealth is a limited
good...But with respect to spiritual good ...These belong to that class of blessings which
possess the qualities of universality and inexhaustibleness. The light of the sun is not the
less bright to me that it beams at the same moment on millions of my fellow-men (Caird
1858, 246-249).
With such views in hand, Caird became a clear contender for an appointment at the university given
that Thomson, Macleod and Nichol were, by that time, in control of the choice.
These religious events in Scotland coloured the workings of the later scientists of "energy" in
important ways. In 1848, for instance, the deeply religious, though latitudinarian, Thomson declared,
"as yet much is involved in mystery with reference to [the] fundamental questions of natural
philosophy" (Smith 1989, 101). Chalmers had been a close acquaintance of the Thomson family for
years, and he had spoken vehemently throughout the 1830s about the nature of the universe to
tend towards disruption and decay. Though neither the elder nor the younger Thomson shared
Chalmers's Calvinist gloominess, Thomson's 1851 statement that "everything in the material world is
progressive" evoked images of decay. Thomson had defined "progressive" as movement towards
dissipation. That phrase, uttered in the context of his first installment of the "Dynamical Theory of
Heat," as presented to the Royal Society of Edinburgh on March 17th, 1851, suggested a theoretical
approach to "energy" that had been informed by more than just the experimental results of the
Thomson brothers, the young Rankine, and Joule. Thomson noted, for instance, the convincing
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investigations of Clausius and Rankine, which had indicated a dynamical theory of heat at play, in
which heat and work could be converted into one another. He declared those investigations to be
among the best means of developing theories of motive force, as those investigations demonstrated
work could be produced from systems that went from high heat to low heat. They also indicated
that one could not recapture work done or energy lost. Thus, Thomson concluded, "Everything in the
material world is progressive." In other words, energy flows in one direction only and humans can
choose to capture it and use it efficiently, or let it go to waste and allow it to dissipate all the more
quickly. Thomson's moral claim was that humans are born with the duty to capture divine resources
in the form of "potential energy" and use it to do useful and meaningful work—i.e. the work of God.
Thus, the northern scientists—inspired largely by Thomson's latitudinarian attitude—forged a
middle-ground between doomsday scenarios and the positive interventions possible on part of
humanity. Macleod, for his part, encouraged the northern scientists in their compromising efforts.
On Macleod's interpretation, natural laws govern phenomena, but the teleological end of the
universe is envisioned and encapsulated in the dissipation of energy. Although theirs was not as
severe an account of the death of the universe as Chalmers's moral condemnation of the entire
world had been, the northern British scientists did view energy dissipation as a form of natural
degradation. They belonged to a "post-evangelical culture," as Smith (1989) has labeled it, in which
human beings "in their moral and material actions, had an obligation to aspire to the perfections of
nature and of Christ" (Smith 1989, 318n). The developing "science of energy" thus attempted to
counter atheist materialism, as embodied in Darwinism in the South, and biblical literalism, which
was still prominent among practitioners in the North.
In later years, Tait diverged from this latitudinarian and compromising stance by issuing increasingly
bombastic and explicit religious claims. In part, he was motivated to be explicit in his metaphysical
views by the threat of Darwinism, as he perceived it. His religiousness also came to represent,
however, a subtle opposition to his colleague, Thomson, who had remained adamantly private in
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religious practice. By the 1870s, Tait found support in the like-minded opinions of his fellow energy
scientist, the Scotsman Balfour Stewart (1828-1887), a natural philosopher who, like Tait, had been
schooled at the University of Edinburgh in the radical days of the 1840s. Those two Presbyterians
chose to express their frustrations with evangelicalism and secularism through the issuance of two
highly charged publications. Much to the chagrin of Thomson, Tait and Stewart first publicized their
world view in The Unseen Universe (1875). Following a severe intellectual hammering from Clifford
and other secular critics, Tait and Stewart issued a second account of their religious-scientific picture
of the universe in A Paradoxical Universe: Sequel to the Unseen Universe (1878). Despite the criticism
from secular social theorists and mathematicians in the South, and a displeasure among northern
thermo-dynamics scientists, such as Thomson, both books proved to be wildly popular. By 1880, The
Unseen Universe, and its profoundly religious message about morality in scientific discourse, had
already gone through six editions.
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